Chattisgarh High Court
Shri Ved Dev Verma vs Smt. Pushpadevi Awasthi on 27 March, 2026
1
Digitally
signed
by
SHAYNA 2026:CGHC:14590-DB
KADRI
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
FA No. 188 of 2025
1 - Shri Ved Dev Verma S/o Chova Ram Verma Aged About 42 Years
R/o Panchshil Clubpara, Ward No. 19, City Mahasamund, Tahsil And
District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Shri Bhekh Dev Verma S/o Chova Ram Verma Aged About 40 Years
R/o Panchshil Clubpara, Ward No. 19, City Mahasamund, Tahsil And
District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Shri Shamendra Dev Verma S/o Chova Ram Verma Aged About 38
Years R/o Panchshil Clubpara, Ward No. 19, City Mahasamund, Tahsil
And District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
4 - Shri Chovaram Verma S/o Shri Mangluram Aged About 64 Years R/o
Panchshil Clubpara, Ward No. 19, City Mahasamund, Tahsil And District
Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Smt. Pushpadevi Awasthi W/o Late Shri Prakashchandra Awasthi
Aged About 66 Years R/o Appu Chowk, Nayapara, Near Electricity
Board Office, Raipur City, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Shri Chhabi Ram Chandrakar Dead Through Lrs.
2.1 - (A). Shri Gautam Chandrakar S/o Late Chhabiram Chandrakar
Aged About 59 Years R/o Near The House Of Premchand Verma, Near
Canal, Clubpara, Panchshil Ward, City Mahasamund, Tahsil And District
Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
2.2 - (B) Shri Anuj Chandrakar S/o Late Chhabiram Chandrakar Aged
About 57 Years R/o Chandrakar Kirana Store, Millennium Chowk,
Sundar Nagar, City Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title is taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Siddharth Pandey, Advocate 2 (Division Bench) (Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Order On Board 27.03.2026 Per; Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2023 passed by the learned I st Additional District Judge, Mahasamund (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 15A/2016 in the matter of Smt. Pushpadevi Awasthi vs. Shri Ved Dev Verma and others, whereby the learned trial Court has allowed and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, the present appeal has been preferred seeking setting aside of the impugned judgment and decree in the interest of justice.
2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff/respondent No.1 instituted Civil Suit No. 15A/2016 before the Court of learned Ist Additional District Judge, Mahasamund, seeking declaration, permanent injunction and consequential reliefs. The plaintiff sought declaration that three registered sale deeds dated 09.12.2013, allegedly executed by defendant No.4/respondent No.2 in favour of defendants No.1, 2 and 3 (present appellants No.1, 2 and 3), are null and void, illegal and 3 not binding upon her rights. The plaintiff further claimed that the suit property bearing Khasra No. 2017/1/24 admeasuring 5000 sq. ft. (0.045 hectares), situated at Club Para, Tahsil and District Mahasamund, is owned and possessed by her, and prayed for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with her peaceful possession. The case of the plaintiff/respondent No.1 was that she is the absolute owner and in possession of the suit land, which she had received through a registered gift deed dated 16.04.1993 executed in her favour by one Bharat Lal Sahu, who had earlier acquired the property through a registered sale deed dated 06.02.1970 from defendant No.4/respondent No.2. It was pleaded that ever since the execution of the gift deed, the plaintiff has remained in peaceful possession of the land, having constructed a boundary wall and installed a gate over the same. It was further alleged that since the plaintiff was residing at Raipur, defendant No.4/respondent No.2 and defendant No.5/appellant No.4 started harassing her with an intention to grab the suit land by instituting false cases and creating obstructions. The plaintiff further pleaded that earlier litigation between the parties culminated in her favour, wherein her title and possession over the suit land were upheld by the Civil Court as well as the First Appellate Court. Despite such findings, the defendants, in collusion with revenue authorities, allegedly prepared forged maps and documents showing the suit land as part of Khasra No. 2017/5/1 and executed three sale deeds dated 4 09.12.2013 in favour of defendants No.1, 2 and 3 (appellants herein). It was specifically alleged that defendant No.4/respondent No.2, acting through defendant No.5/appellant No.4 and in connivance with a revenue officer, namely Govardhan Rao Ingole, fabricated documents and executed the impugned sale deeds in order to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. The plaintiff also initiated criminal proceedings and lodged complaints alleging offences of cheating, forgery and conspiracy, wherein cognizance was taken by the competent court. It was further pleaded that despite pendency of earlier litigation and stay orders granted by revenue authorities, the defendants continued to file mutation applications on the basis of the impugned sale deeds and attempted to get their names recorded in revenue records by suppressing material facts. Several such mutation proceedings were either stayed, dismissed or rejected by the competent authorities. The plaintiff asserted that the cause of action arose initially on 09.12.2013 with execution of the impugned sale deeds and continued thereafter with subsequent attempts of the defendants to interfere with her rights. The defendants/appellants contested the suit by filing written statement, denying the allegations made by the plaintiff. It was contended that defendant No.4/respondent No.2 had never executed any sale deed in favour of Bharat Lal Sahu in the year 1970, and therefore, the plaintiff's claim based on the alleged gift deed of 1993 was invalid. It was further contended that no revenue records or documents exist for the period between 1970 5 to 1993 supporting the plaintiff's claim, and the alleged documents are fabricated. The defendants also questioned the validity of the gift deed on the ground that it lacked proper acceptance and execution. On such grounds, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. During trial, the plaintiff examined several witnesses and produced documentary evidence to substantiate her claim, whereas the defendants also led evidence in support of their defence. Upon appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Court recorded a finding that the plaintiff had successfully established her title and possession over the suit land on the basis of the sale deed of 1970 and the gift deed of 1993. The trial Court disbelieved the defence raised by the defendants and held that the impugned sale deeds dated 09.12.2013 were illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiff, as defendant No.4/respondent No.2 had already divested his title in the year 1970. Accordingly, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff by declaring the sale deeds dated 09.12.2013 as null and void and granted permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants/defendants on the ground that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse, contrary to evidence on record and unsustainable in law.
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3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners submits that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court is wholly erroneous, contrary to law and facts on record, and is liable to be set aside. It is contended that the learned Trial Court has gravely erred in holding the plaintiff/respondent No.1 to be the exclusive owner and possessor of the suit land without properly appreciating the chain of title, mutation entries, and relevant documentary evidence available on record. The findings recorded by the Trial Court are stated to be perverse and based on incomplete and selective appreciation of evidence. It is further submitted that the Trial Court has failed to consider the settled legal position that a valid gift under law requires acceptance by the donee during the lifetime of the donor. In the present case, no cogent evidence has been brought on record by the plaintiff/respondent No.1 to establish acceptance of the alleged gift deed dated 16.04.1993. In absence of proof of such acceptance, the said gift deed cannot be said to have conferred any valid title upon the plaintiff, rendering her entire claim unsustainable. Learned counsel further contends that the registered sale deeds dated 09.12.2013 executed by defendant No.4/respondent No.2 in favour of defendants No.1, 2 and 3 (appellants herein) are valid documents executed in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act and carry a presumption of legality. It is argued that the learned Trial Court has failed to return any specific finding regarding the genuineness 7 and validity of these registered sale deeds and has set them aside without proper legal scrutiny. It is also submitted that the findings recorded by the Trial Court with regard to alleged fabrication of maps and documents are wholly perverse and unsupported by evidence. No expert evidence or cogent material was produced by the plaintiff to substantiate the serious allegations of forgery and fabrication. Despite this, the Trial Court erroneously accepted such unproven allegations, which vitiates the impugned judgment. Learned counsel further submits that the Trial Court has wrongly shifted the burden of proof upon the defendants/appellants, whereas in a suit for declaration and injunction, the burden squarely lies upon the plaintiff to establish her title and possession by clear, cogent and reliable evidence. The plaintiff/respondent No.1 having failed to discharge this burden, the suit ought to have been dismissed. It is further contended that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate that Khasra No. 2017/5/1 belonged to defendant No.4/respondent No.2 (since deceased), and the sale deeds executed out of the said khasra in favour of the appellants are lawful and valid. The alleged land of the plaintiff, if any, is distinct and separate, and the Trial Court has erred in conflating the two without proper demarcation or determination. Learned counsel also submits that the Trial Court has failed to decide the core issue regarding the identity of the suit land and whether the alleged sale deed dated 06.02.1970 was ever acted upon. In absence of any clear finding on these crucial aspects, the 8 decree passed by the Trial Court is legally unsustainable. It is thus submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material facts, and incorrect application of legal principles, thereby causing serious miscarriage of justice. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed that this Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2023 passed by the learned I st Additional District Judge, Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh in Civil Suit No. 15A/2016, and further be pleased to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent No.1, in the interest of justice.
4. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the record with due consideration.
5. At the outset, before adverting to the merits of the case, this Court deems it appropriate to examine the question of limitation, as the same goes to the root of the maintainability of the present appeal.
6. From the record, it is apparent that the impugned judgment and decree was passed on 30.10.2023, whereas the present appeal has been filed after a delay of about 586 days. Though an application for condonation of delay has been filed, the explanation offered therein does not constitute "sufficient cause"
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. This Court has carefully considered the explanation furnished by the appellants for such inordinate delay; however, no reasonable, plausible or satisfactory cause has been made out. The 9 appellants have failed to explain each day's delay, and the grounds taken are vague, general and lacking in bona fides. It is settled law that though a liberal approach is to be adopted while considering applications for condonation of delay, such liberal approach cannot be extended to cases where the delay is inordinate and remains unexplained.
7. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj & Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, wherein it has been held:
9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man.
In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the 10 reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause"
and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause"
should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has 11 been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .) xxx xxx xxx
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."12
8. Similarly, in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the principles governing condonation of delay and held that:
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause"
should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are 13 required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is 14 founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
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9. Further, in P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically observed:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs."
10. Very recently, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Odisha and Others Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191 has held as under :
"21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a "State", we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up."16
11. Similarly, High Court of Delhi in the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Navraj Dahiya, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine Del 615, taking note of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court, has held as under :
"9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA), (2024) 12 SCC 336 : (2025) 3 SCC (Civ) 697, has reiterated that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be construed liberally, such liberality cannot be extended to defeat the substantive law of limitation. It has been categorically held that the power to condone delay is discretionary and may not be exercised even where sufficient cause is claimed, particularly in cases involving inordinate delay, negligence or lack of due diligence. The Supreme Court further clarified that the merits of the matter are wholly irrelevant at the stage of considering an application for condonation of delay. The following principles in respect of condonation of delay were enumerated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:
"28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
28.1. Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;17
28.2. A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
28.3. The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; 28.4. In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
28.5. Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
28.6. Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
28.7. Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and 18 28.8. Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
10. Similarly, in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised that the length of delay is a relevant factor and that once a party loses its right due to prolonged inaction, it cannot invoke the principle of substantial justice as a matter of course. The Court is first required to test the bona fides of the explanation offered, and only if the explanation inspires confidence can discretion be exercised. The relevant observations are set out below:
"16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such 19 circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time."
11. Most recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 INSC 148 (order dated 09.02.2026), has taken a firm view while dealing with delays attributable to governmental functioning. The Supreme Court has observed that condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right, even by the State, and that there is a point beyond which courts cannot come to the aid of a 20 litigant-State merely because the delay is sought to be justified on the ground of bureaucratic procedures. The Court drew a clear distinction between an "explanation" and a "mere excuse" and refused to condone the delay of 123 days in filing the Special Leave Petition and a further delay of 96 days in re-
filing the same by the State of Odisha.
It has been held as under:
"16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly strict approach while dealing with applications for condonation of delay during the last decade and a half became discernible starting with the decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition was not condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India is another decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was not condoned. While upholding the decision of the relevant high court under challenge refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the object is that a 21 legal remedy is put to an end so that no litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was also held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits of the case cannot be considered at the stage of considering the application for condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India14 authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an 'explanation' and an 'excuse' that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted while this Court is considering an application for condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.22
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing officers of the "revenue" in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:
* * *
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible support for such optimism and the Court's patience having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government.23
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-
barred by the High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a "State", we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse.
No case for exercise of discretion has been set up.
22. The applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-barred."
12. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the explanation tendered by the State does not meet the threshold of "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. As noted above, the application lacks material particulars, 24 does not explain the delay day-wise or even broadly stage-wise, and fails to demonstrate any diligence on the part of the authorities concerned. What has been placed before the Court is, at best, a general administrative narrative of how the case file passed from one person to another, and at worst, an attempt to seek condonation as a matter of routine.
13. In the absence of any specific, credible and satisfactory explanation accounting for the delay of 413 days, this Court finds no justification to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the applicant-State."
12. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the delay of about 586 days in filing the appeal has not been satisfactorily explained. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any sufficient cause which prevented them from approaching this Court within the prescribed period of limitation. The explanation offered is neither convincing nor supported by any cogent material.
13. This Court has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter in its entirety. After considering the same, and further taking into account that no reasonable explanation has been furnished for the inordinate delay in filing the present appeal, this Court is of the considered opinion that such delay is not required to be condoned.
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14. Accordingly, the appeal is held to be barred by limitation and is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone, without entering into the merits of the case.
No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge Judge
Shayna