Karnataka High Court
Mohammad Fayaz Ahmed Alias Dadu Fayaz ... vs The Commissioner For Workmen'S ... on 21 January, 2003
Equivalent citations: II(2003)ACC400, 2004ACJ2076, [2003(97)FLR599], 2003(2)KARLJ166, (2003)IILLJ383KANT
Author: S.B. Majage
Bench: S.B. Majage
JUDGMENT S.B. Majage, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the appellant-owner of M/s. Dadu Fayaz Silk Filature and Winding, Ramanagaram, questioning the order dated 9-10-2002, by which his writ petition, challenging the constitutional validity of third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and also to declare that he has right to file an appeal before this Court without depositing the compensation amount awarded to respondents 3 and 4 has been rejected.
2. It is vehemently argued for the appellant that on account of proviso in question, he is unable to avail his right to appeal due to financial problem and that a welfare legislation should not have made it mandatory to deposit compensation amount for filing an appeal by an aggrieved person against compensation awarded under Workmen's Compensation Act and as such, it violates Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution and consequently ultra vires. Perused the records carefully.
3. Before going into the merits, it is necessary to note the requirements of a petition to be filed when one approaches the Court alleging violation/transgression of constitutional principles. In the case of Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1533, [ 2002 ( 93 ) FLR 1134 ], JT 2002 ( 3 ) SC 219, 2002 LablC 1457, 2002 ( 3 ) SCALE 203, the Supreme Court has held as under.--
"..... Where the challenge is made to a statutory provision being discriminatory, allegations in writ petition must be specific, clear and unambiguous. There must be proper pleadings and averments in the substantive petition before the question of denial of equal protection of infringement of fundamental right can be decided. There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles".
4. However, in the present matter, there are no such specific pleadings and averments nor shown as to how or where transgression of constitutional principles or infringement of fundamental right has taken place. This was necessary for the appellant to show since it is a settled proposition that the Courts should try to sustain validity of an Act to the extent possible and it should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Ors. v. Bihar Distillery Limited, . Not only that, in the case of Ashutosh Gupta, supra, the Supreme Court has recently held as under.--
". . . . The presumption of constitutionality stems" from the wide power of classification which the Legislature must, of necessity possess in making laws operating differently as regards different groups of persons in order to give effect to policies. . .".
5. Further, it may be noted that a right to file an appeal against any order is not a vested right much less a fundamental or constitutional right, as it is alright conferred under a statute under which such orders are passed and as such, it is only a statutory right and not a constitutional right. In the case of N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Selam District and Ors., , the Supreme Court has observed as under.--
"The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. . . .".
In the same decision, it has further observed that;
"Where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of".
So also, while considering the vires of Sections 123(5) and 124(5) of the Representation of the People Act, in the case of Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Ors. v. Lachhi Ram and Ors., , the Supreme Court has held as under.--
". . . It was contended that Article 245(1) prohibits the making of laws which violate the Constitution and that the impugned sections interfere with a citizen's fundamental right to freedom of speech. There is nothing in this contention. These laws do not stop a man from speaking. They merely prescribe conditions which must be observed if he wants to enter Parliament. The right to stand as a candidate and contest an election is not a common law right. It is a, special right created by the statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute. The Fundamental Rights Chapter has no bearing on a right like this created by statute. The appellants have no fundamental right to be elected members of Parliament. If they want that they must observe the rules. If they prefer to exercise their right of free speech outside these rules, the impugned sections do not stop them. We hold that these sections are intra vires", (emphasis supplied)
6. The appellant has not shown any fundamental or constitutional right in him. Even he has not shown anything to suggest that any such differentia is made in the proviso between the persons, who intend to file appeal challenging the orders of compensation, nor it is shown that the Parliament has no power to enact such a law requiring to deposit while giving right to file appeal against an order of compensation under the Act, when the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by such condition of deposit are also kept in mind.
7. In the said context, it will be useful to refer the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashutosh Gupta, supra, wherein it is observed as under.--
". . . It must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are ' directed to problems made manifest by experience. The claim of equal protection under Article 14, therefore, is examined with the aforesaid presumption that the State Acts are reasonable and justified. .... A Legislature, which has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations must of necessity, have the power of making special laws, to attain particular objects; and for that purpose it must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and things upon which such laws are to operate. .... When a law is challenged as violative of Article 14, it is necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it".
It is also observed in the said decision that:
". . . . In order that a law may be struck down under this Article, the inequality must arise under the same piece of legislation or under the same set of laws which have to be treated together as one enactment Inequality resulting from two different enactments made by two different authorities in relation to the same subject will not be liable to attack under Article 14", (emphasis supplied)
8. So, no comparison can be made with other enactments. Further, it is the case of the appellant that not only he is incapable of depositing the amount of compensation to file appeal, it will be difficult for him to recover the same from the legal representatives of deceased if he deposits the amount of compensation awarded. However, this has no leg to stand because the condition prescribed is for deposit and not for payment of the amount to claimants. It appears that the condition of deposit has been incorporated in order to safeguard the interest of helpless dependants of deceased workman or an injured workman as the case may be, so that, if appeal is filed challenging an order awarding compensation is dismissed, compensation can be recovered without delay/without any loss of time otherwise, by filing an appeal and obtaining stay order, an unscrupulous employer may see that the appeal is dragged on unnecessarily and thereby frustrate the very purpose of providing compensation. With this avowed object in mind and the purpose, for which such a beneficial legislation has been enacted, if the Legislature, while giving right to the person aggrieved to challenge the order of compensation, has provided necessary safeguard to the right of claimants, whose benefit the Legislature intends, such a condition of deposit cannot be said to be bad in the eye of law much less under any provision of the Constitution. So, we do not see violation of any of the Articles 14, 19 and 39A of the Constitution.
9. In fact, similar provisions for deposit of amount as condition precedent to challenge orders are found in various enactments. However, no authority or decision is brought to our notice wherein such a provision is held ultra vires. On the other hand, in the case of Salem. Advocates Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union, of India, , recently, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity of Section 100A of the CPC by which putting restriction on availing remedy by way of appeal has been introduced.
10. Not only that, in the case of T. Narayanan Nair v. Union of India and Ors., 1990 ACJ 798 (Ker.), a learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court has held that Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act requiring deposit of the amount of compensation for filing appeal is not ultra vires so as to strike it down. So, for the reasons given and discussion made, we do not find violation of any fundamental or constitutional right in prescribing deposit of compensation amount as pre-condition to file appeal under Section 30 of the Act and as such, ex facie there is no substance whatsoever in the appeal.
In the above view of the matter, the appeal is rejected at the stage of admission itself without ordering notice to the respondents.