Allahabad High Court
Principal M.R. Jaipuria School Gomti ... vs Deputy Transport Commissioner ... on 31 May, 2023
Author: Vivek Chaudhary
Bench: Vivek Chaudhary
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:39310 AFR Reserved Case :- WRIT - C No. - 1002443 of 2012 Petitioner :- Principal M.R. Jaipuria School Gomti Nagar Lucknow Respondent :- Deputy Transport Commissioner Passenger Tax Lko.And Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Ghaus Beg Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary,J.
1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State.
2. By the present writ petition, petitioner is challenging order dated 06.02.2010 whereby a school bus registered in the name of petitioner is seized, order dated 15.01.2011 whereby tax liability has been fixed on the petitioner and order dated 09.02.2012 whereby appeal against the same is also rejected.
3. Brief facts of the case are that a school bus bearing registration number UP42A8602, registered in the name of Principal M. R. Jaipuria School was seized by Assistant Regional Transport Officer, Raebareli on 06.02.2010 near Bacchrawan, Raebareli. One of the charges levelled included carrying wedding guests without any permit for the same. Petitioner's bus had a permit for carrying "school children only". This alleged act was in violation of section 4(3) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997 (for short 'the Taxation Act of 1997') and as such by order dated 15.01.2011, petitioner was held liable to pay taxes for using the school bus as transport vehicle without any permit. Petitioner preferred an appeal against the same which was also dismissed by order dated 09.02.2012.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner challenges the validity of impugned orders on following grounds:
(i) petitioner was not given any opportunity of hearing before passing the final assessment order dated 15.1.2011;
(ii) there are two proceedings; one under the U.P. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act of 1988') and another under the Taxation Act of 1997 initiated against the petitioner and two proceedings for the same offence cannot be initiated; and
(iii) that the respondent-authorities have wrongly taken the definition of the word 'transport vehicle' from the Taxation Act of 1997 and the same ought to have been as provided under the Act of 1988.
5. So far as the first submission of learned counsel for petitioner with regard to opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order dated 15.1.2011 is concerned, the appellate authority has considered the same and given a finding that petitioner/appellant had moved an application of acceptance of his mistake and tax is assessed on the basis of the said acceptance of petitioner. Hence, there was no requirement of providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
6. Learned counsel for petitioner could not dispute the said finding as he could not show that the tax is assessed on the basis of his application accepting his guilt. Therefore, the said submission of learned counsel for petitioner has no force and is rejected.
7. So far as second submission of learned counsel for petitioner that two proceedings are initiated against the petitioner for the same act is concerned, there are two separate Acts i.e. U.P. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997, which are violated by the act of petitioner, therefore, proceedings under both the Acts are bound to be held.
8. Learned counsel for petitioner could not show any provision of law or rulings in support of his submission whereby when an act of a person violates two separate Acts, a general law and a tax law, two separate proceedings cannot be initiated. Hence, the second submission of learned counsel for petitioner also has no force and is rejected.
9. Now, coming to the third submission of learned counsel for petitioner that authorities were required to take definition of 'transport vehicle' as provided under Section 2(47) of the Act of 1988 and not under Section 2(n) of the Taxation Act of 1997 is concerned, it is necessary to peruse the relevant provisions also.
10. Section 2(47) of the Act of 1988 provides:
"2(47) "transport vehicle" means a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a private services vehicle."
The said definition takes within the scope public service vehicle, goods carriage as well as educational institution bus or private service vehicle. The said definition is entirely different from the definition of word 'transport vehicle' provided under Section 2(n) of the Taxation Act of 1997, which reads:
"2(n) "transport vehicle" means a good carriage or a public service vehicle."
11. Under the Taxation Act of 1997, a transport vehicle is merely a good carriage and a public service vehicle. The word 'public service vehicle' is further defined by Section 2(35) of the Act of 1988, which reads:
"2(35) "public service vehicle" means any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a maxicab, a motorcab, contract carriage, and stage carriage."
Therefore, the word 'public vehicle' only includes vehicles in which passengers are carrying on rent. School bus is not covered within the definition of 'public service vehicle' under the Taxation Act of 1997 and, therefore, is not covered within the definition of 'transport vehicle'. Thus, school bus is not a transport vehicle so far as the Taxation Act of 1997 is concerned while the same is a transport vehicle under the Act of 1988.
12. Section 2(o) of the Taxation Act of 1997 provides:
"2(o) words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 shall have the respective meaning assigned to them in that Act."
As per aforesaid Section 2(o), only those definitions are required to be borrowed from the Act of 1988 which are not provided under the Taxation Act of 1997.
13. Since definition of 'transport vehicle' is vehicle provided by the Taxation Act of 1997, the same cannot be borrowed from the Act of 1988. Even otherwise, both the Acts are operating in entirely separate fields while the Act of 1988 is a Central Act enacted to consolidate laws relating to the Act of 1988, which is applicable throughout the country and the Taxation Act of 1997 is a State Act, which provides for taxation on transport and commercial vehicles.
14. Therefore, since the scope and subject matter of both the aforesaid laws deal with entirely separate subjects, it would not be proper to borrow definition while the same is already provided under the Act. In case Legislature so desired, it would not have provided a separate definition of the word 'transport vehicle' under the Taxation Act of 1997. Therefore, the said submission of learned counsel for petitioner also does not have any force.
15. In view of aforesaid, there is no force in present writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed.
[Vivek Chaudhary,J.] Dated: May 31, 2023 Sachin