Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sachdeva Rice Mills And Ors. vs Smt. Raj Anand And Ors. on 5 August, 2002
Equivalent citations: I(2003)ACC53, 2003ACJ1482, (2003)133PLR23
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J.
1. By this order, we are disposing of Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 33 to 36 of 1987, Letters Patent Appeal Nos.837 and 838 of 1986 alongwith Cross Objection No. 3 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 837 of 1986, Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 10 to 13 of 1987 with Cross Objection No. 9 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 10 of 1987 which are directed against judgment dated 25.8.1986 of the learned Single Judge vide which he enhanced the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gurdaspur (for brevity, 'the Tribunal'). The Tribunal had awarded total compensation amounting to Rs. 1,93,000/- alongwith interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The Learned Single Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs. 3,00,000/- but maintained the rate of interest specified in the award of the Tribunal. For the sake of convenience, the appeals and cross-objections can be divided into the following three groups;
(a) LPAs No. 837 and 838 of 1986 have been filed by M/s Sachdeva Rice Mills and its partners who are owners of the truck which was involved in the accident. In LPA No. 837 cross pbjection No. 3 of 1988 has also been preferred by Jatinder Gupta son of deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta and Smt. Vidya Wati Gupta mother of deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta.
(b) LPAs No.10 of 1987 have been filed by the claimants, namely, Smt. Raj Anand widow of Mohinder Partap Gupta and Kr. Mamta Rani daughter of Mohinder Partap Gupta. In LPA No.10 cross-objection No. 9 of 1988 has been preferred by Smt. Jatinder Gupta son of the deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta and Smt. Vidya Wati Gupta mother of the deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta.
(c) LPAs No. 33 to 36 of 1987 have been filed by the United India Insurance Company Ltd., challenging the enhancement of compensation and directing it to pay compensation jointly and severally."
2. We may now notice the facts relevant to the decision of the appeals.
In an accident which occurred on 15.8.1981 involving bus No. PUG-3720 belonging to Punjab Roadways and truck No.PBN-778 at the crossing of Amritsar-Gurdaspur road near the outskirts of Batata, Mohinder Partap Singh, who was a passenger in the bus, was killed on the spot. His widow Smt. Raj Anand, daughter Kumar Mamta Rani and son Jatinder Gupta filed petition for award of compensation. Smt. Vidyawati Gupta filed separate petition in her personal capacity as also guardian of Jatinder Gupta. The claimants averred that the deceased had been killed due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicles involved in the accident. They gave out the age of late Mohinder Partap Singh as 45 years and averred that while working as Sub Divisional Engineer in Public Works Department, he was drawing salary at the rate of Rs. 2100/- per month.
3. The appellants and others contested the claim petitions and pleaded that they were not liable to pay compensation.
4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the Tribunal framed the following issues:
"1. Whether claimants Raj Anand, Mamta Rani, Jatinder Gupta and Vidya Wati are the legal representatives of deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta? OPA
2. Whether Mohinder Partap Gupta died in an accident due to rash and negligent driving of Santokh Singh respondent No. 1, driver of truck No. PBN-778, or Sajjan Singh respondent no. 10, driver of Punjab Roadways, Depot, Pathankot and bus No. 3720 or the deceased died due to rash and negligent driving of both the respondents No. 1 and 10 drivers of the respective offending vehiples? OPR
3. To what amount of compensation if any the claimants are entitled and from whom? OPA
4. Whether respondents No. l and 10 drivers of vehicles did not possess a valid licence? OPR-12
5. Relief."
5. After considering the evidence of the parties, the Tribunal held that the accident had been caused due to rash and negligent driving of both the vehicles. It, however, rejected the plea of the Insurance Company that the driver of the truck was not having valid driving licence. On the question of sharing the liability, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that both the drivers were joint tort-feasors and held that both of them were jointly and severally liable. It was further held that Sajjan Singh the driver of the bus was an employee of the State of Punjab and at the time of accident he was discharging his official duty and, therefore, his employer i.e., State of Punjab was vicariously liable to pay the compensation to the claimants. The Tribunal also held the appellant and its partners liable on the ground that Santokh Singh, driver of the truck was its employee. Still further, the Tribunal held that as the truck was covered by a comprehensive insurance policy with a limited liability of Rs. 50,000/-, the Insurance Company was held liable to pay the compensation upto the limits pf Rs. 50,000/-.
6. The award of the Tribunal was challenged by the Insurance Company, the owner of the truck and the claimants. Learned Single Judge enhanced compensation and also accepted the claim of the widow and daughter. Learned Single Judge affirmed the award of the Tribunal with regard to the negligence of both the drivers by referring to regulation 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for brevity '1939 ' Act') and apportioned the liability of the bus and the truck to the extent of two-third and one-third. The reason recorded by the learned Single Judge for recording the afore-mentioned conclusions read as under-
"The accident itself took place in the middle of the crossing. The photographs taken soon after the occurrence clearly bring out the fact that it was the front side of the bus that hit into the left hand side of the truck and, what is more, the truck can be seen lying off the road in a ditch. This situation is indicative of the fact that the truck must have pome to the crossing before the bus reached there and also that the bus must have been traveling at a fairly fast speed. According to AW8 Kartar Singh, the only eye witness to be examined other than the two drivers, the bus was coming at a very fast speed when it rammed into the body of the truck. The breach of the provisions of regulation 6 of the Tenth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act is thus writ large on the part of regulation 7 too. A similar situation arose in Piara Singh and Ors. v. Gian Kaur. There it was observed that where the accident occurs at a road inter-section with one of the vehicles involved therein coming on to it from the right side of the other, both regulation 6 as also regulation 7 of the Tenth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act stand attracted thereto. A duty is cast on the driver of the motor vehicle by the provisions of regulation 6 to slow down while approaching a road inter-section and to enter it only in the knowledge that he can do so without endangering the safety of the persons thereon. Such persons be travelling in the vehicle. Regulation 7 casts a further duty on such driver on entering the inter-section to give way to the traffic proceedings on the road, if any, designated as the main road and, in other cases, to that approaching the inter-section from his right hand side. It was accordingly held that where an accident occurs at a crossing the negligence of the driver who contravenes both regulations 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act would be two-thirds as compared to one-third that of the driver who disregards the requirements of regulation 6 only. Following this precedent, the finding on the issue of negligence as recorded by the Tribunal is accordingly modified to the extent that the negligence of the bus driver shall be apportioned at two-thirds and that of the truck driver at one-third.
7. On the basis of a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Lachhman Singh v. Gurmit Kaur, (1978)80 P.L.R. 1, the Learned Single Judge also reached the conclusion that a multiplier of 16 in the facts and circumstances was appropriate multiplier. It also found that the emoluments of deceased at the time of his death were a little over Rs. 2,100/- per month. In this regard, it observed as under:
"Mohinder Partap Gupta was a Sub Divisional Engineer with the Punjab PWD but at the time of this accident he was on deputation with the Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board, Chandigarh. The total emoluments of the deceased at the time of his death were a little over Rs. 2,100/- per month, as is borne out by his last pay certificate, Exhibit AW9/1.
As regards the dependency of the claimants, after making due allowance for the amount that the deceased would have spent upon himself had he lived and the various other imponderables as set forth in Lachhman Singh's case (supra), it would be fair and just to assess it at around Rs. l,500/- per month or Rs. 18,000/- per annum. Computed at this rate, the compensation payable to the claimants would work out to Rs. 2,88,000/- which may be rounded off to Rs. 3,00,000 (three lakh rupees)."
8. On the question of awarding compensation to the widow, daughter, namely, Raj Anand and Kr. Mamta Gupta learned Single Judge found that the deceased was under obligation to maintain both of them by virtue of provisions of Section 22 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The observations of the learned Single Judge read as under:
"It is no doubt true that no amount was being paid by Mohinder Partap Gupta to his wife or daughter for their maintenance or otherwise. It has to be borne in mind, however, that both the wife and the daughter had a right to claim maintenance from the deceased both under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, as also under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, it is well settled that the father is under a legal obligation to maintain his child and the husband to maintain his wife and that the onus lies on him to allege and prove that his wife and the child are not entitled to the maintenance claimed. Not only this, Section 22 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, specifically provides that the liability for maintenance can be enforced against the estate of the deceased in the hands of his heirs. This being so, it must be held that there was a subsisting right in Raj Anand and her daughter to claim maintenance from the deceased during his life-time and further by virtue of being his heirs they were also entitled to succeed to his estate in their own right, it cannot, therefore, be said that they are not entitled to any compensation. It may be mentioned here that the opposing counsel could point to no material on record to suggest that Raj Anand or her daughter had in any manner disentitled themselves to maintenance or to succeed to the property left behind by Mohinder Partap Gupta."
9. The learned Single Judge further determined the compensation payable to various claimants and in this regard observations of the learned Single Judge read as under:
"As for the computation of compensation payable to Raj Anand and her daughter Mamta Anand, the appropriate yardstick to be applied here would be amount that they could have received as maintenance from Mohinder Partap Gupta during his life-time, In this behalf it is pertinent to note that Raj Anand is employed as a teacher at a salary of Rs. 800 per month while the salary of the deceased was over Rs. 2,100 per month, meaning thereby that the combined income of the husband and the wife was around Rs. 3,000 per month. It would be fair to put the father and the son on one side and the mother and the daughter on the other, somewhat at par financially, meaning thereby that if maintenance had been claimed from the deceased during his life-time he could have been called upon to pay his wife and daughter about Rs. 500 per month. It is on this basis, therefore, that the compensation payable to Raj Anand and her daughter deserves to be apportioned. This would have left a balance of over Rs. 1,600/- per month for father and son. Splitting up the compensation payable to the claimants on this basis, Raj Anand and her daughter Mamta Anand would thus be held entitled to one lakh rupees, the balance of two lakh rupees being payable to the mother and the son of the deceased. The sum of one lakh rupees payable to Raj Anand and Mamta Anand shall be shared by them equally while, in the other case, the son shall receive one lakh and seventy five thousand rupees and the balance of twenty five thousand rupees shall be payable to the mother of the deceased. The claimants shall in addition be entitled to interest on the amount awarded at the rate of twelve per cent per annum from the date of application to the date of payment of the amount. The amounts payable to the minor claimants shall be paid to them in such manner as the Tribunal may deem to be in their best interests."
10. Shri L.M. Suri, learned senior counsel argued that no portion of liability could be fastened on the owner of the truck as the truck was being driven in accordance with rules. According to the learned counsel, the whole liability has to be shouldered by the bus driver or its owner because the conditions of the vehicle reveal a tell-tale story as the bus has struck the left hand side of the truck. He referred to the observations of the learned Single Judge in this regard which are to the effect that the photographs taken soon after the occurrence clearly bring out the fact that it was the front side of the bus that hit into the left side of the truck. Learned counsel pointed out that the person on the right side has the right of way and, therefore, it must be concluded that the bus was-being drive in violation bf rule as it had no right of way from the left side of truck. Learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Lajwanti and Anr. v. Keshav Prasad Soni and Ors, 1984 A.C.J. 664 and also on a judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Usha Mehra and Ors. v. Naresh Chand and Ors, 1985 A.C.J. 752. Referring to the Lajwanti's case, the learned counsel submitted that the factual situation in that case was almost similar because in that case also the vehicle which had first entered the inter-section of the road was not fastened with any liability as it was considered the duty of the vehicle which had entered the inter-section later to slow down. Learned counsel also submitted that in the present case it would be even more appropriate to follow that principle because the truck was absolutely visible to the bus driver and with little vigilance the bus driver could have visualised that his negligence is likely to result into disastrous consequences and the bus driver neither followed the principle of driving to the right of the truck nor he slowed down the bus. Learned counsel further submitted that the bus driver was required to exercise due care and a duty was enjoined upon him not to enter the inter-section till he had taken stock of the situation, slow down the bus and should have driven the same on the right side of the truck. Learned counsel also placed reliance on regulation 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule of 1939 Act. In support of his contention, the learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Oriental Fire & Gent Ins. Co. Ltd and Anr. v. Kewal Kumar, 1983 A.C.J. 497.
11. Shri Vibhav Jain, learned counsel for the widow and daughter argued that in the matters of accident not only the daughter and the widow would be entitled to the grant of compensation but even the brother has been held entitled to maintain the claim petition. In support of his argument, he placed reliance on judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corpn., Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prab-hatbhai and another, 1987 A.C.J. 561. Learned counsel submitted that the amount of compensation payable to the widow and the daughter should have been increased instead of putting the widow and the daughter on one side and mother and son on the other side and awarding them equal shares. According to the learned counsel, once the relationship of husband-wife exists and the petition of the husband filed under Section 10 of 1955 act for judicial separation has been dismissed, then full compensation should have been given by treating the status of the claimants widow and the daughter. He further argued that the income of the wife could not be clubbed with the income of the deceased in order to apportion the same between the widow and the daughter on the one side and mother and the son on the other side. Learned counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge committed grave error in law by adopting that formula and, therefore, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside.
12. Shri Rajesh Garg, learned counsel for the son and the mother of deceased-Mo-hinder Partap Gupta argued that the widow and the daughter are not, at all, entitled to any part of the compensation because the widow has been living separately and was not being paid any maintenance by deceased-Mohinder Partap Gupta. According to the learned counsel, the view taken by the Tribunal is liable to be restored, inasmuch as, it held that affluence of the widow and maintenance of the daughter by her were sufficient factors to conclude that they were not dependents on the deceased. Learned counsel argued that the whole amount of compensation should have been given to the son as well as the mother of the deceased.
13. Shri Munishwar Puri appearing for the United India Insurance Company argued that rate of interest at the rate of 12% per annum awarded by the learned Single Judge is unsustainable in law. According to the leaned counsel, the rate of interest has been slashed by the Reserve Bank of India to 9% per annum. In this regard, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kaushnuma Begum (Smt.) and Ors. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (2001-2)128 P.L.R. 334 (S.C.).
14. We have thoughtfully considered the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties, perused the award and the judgment of the learned Single Judge. A reference to the Regulations 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule of 1939 Act would be essential to determine as to whether any liability could be fastened on the owner or on the . driver of the truck. These Regulations have been framed under Section 77 and 78 of 1939 Act which deal with the subject of the main roads and the duty of the drivers to obey traffic sings. Both the regulations read as under:
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6. The driver of a motor vehicle shall slow down when approaching a road intersection, a road junction or a road corner, and shall not enter any such intersection or junction until he has become aware that he may do so without endangering the safety of persons thereon.
7. The driver of a motor vehicle shall on entering a road intersection, if the road entered is a main road designated as such, give way to the vehicles proceeding along that road, and in any other case given way to al! traffic approaching the intersection on his right hand.
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15. A reading of the Regulations quoted above shows that it is incumbent upon the driver of the motor vehicle to slow down his vehicle when approaching a road inter-section, a road junction and also to give way to the vehicle approaching the inter-section on his right side.
16. The argument that the driver of the bus failed in both of his obligations, namely, to drive the bus on the right side of the truck and also to slow down before entering on the crossing has been substantiated because the truck has been damaged on its middle left side which would indicate that the bus driver was not driving on the right side of the truck. It is further clear that the speed of the bus was so high that it took 'U' turn facing the road from which it had come. It also threw away the truck into the ditches of the side road. In this regard, reliance on the Division Bench Judgment in Lajwanti's case (supra) would be relevant which is almost in similar facts and circumstances and the observations read as under:-
".....It is also proved that on account of the impact, the tempo took a complete turn so as to face the same direction of the road from which it had entered the intersection. In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, one cannot escape concluding that while the tempo had already entered and reached in the middle of the intersection, the truck must have entered the intersection later and dashed the front portion of the tempo so violently that the deceased was thrown on the ground and the tempo took a complete turn. The defence version does not fit in the probabilities of the case. It is, therefore, obvious that the driver of the truck even though had seen that the tempo already entered the intersection, continued to drive the truck in great speed. It was the duty of the truck driver to have slowed down his truck and avert the dash. Since the truck driver was not produced, an inference of negligence against the driver of the truck has ben drawn. See Liyakat Hussain v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, 1976 A.C.J. 25 (M.P.) Suman v. General Manager, M.P. State Road Transport 1970 A.C.J. 280 (M.P.) and Jamnibai v. Chhotekhan, 1981 A.C.J. 90 (M.P.) The driver of the truck was required to exercise due care and was enjoined upon not to enter into the inter-section until he had been able to take stock of the situation. See Maya Mukherjee v. Orissa Co-op. Ins Society, 1978 A.C.I. 292 (Orissa) and M.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Yasin, 1974 A.C.J. 92 (Bom.)"
17. By applying the ratio of the afore-mentioned decision to the facts of these cases, we hold that the whole liability has to be shouldered by the bus driver or its owner and the judgment of the learned Single Judge to the extent is liable to be set aside.
18. The claim of the widow and the daughter requires to be examined in the light of the principles of matrimonial law and the status attached to a valid marriage. Under Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for brevity, '1872 Act') a judgment rendered by the matrimonial court is a judgment in rem and is binding on the whole world. The declaration given in such judgments conferring a statutes or taking it away is a conclusive proof of that legal character. Section 41 of 1872 Act reads as under:
"41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc. of jurisdiction.-A final judgment, order or decree of competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.
Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof-
That any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation:
that any legal character, to which it declare any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, [order or decree] declares it to have accrued to that person:
that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, [order or decree] declared that it had ceased or should cease.
and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, [order or decree] declares that it had been or should be his property."
19. Therefore it is obvious that the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge dated 22.4.1974 (Ex.A13) refusing to pass a decree for judicial separation under Section 10 of 1955 Act would demonstrate that the status of the claimant being the wife was not even remotely affected. The deceased was not even granted judicial separation and, therefore, Smt. Raj Anand continued to be the legally wedded wife.
20. It is further clear that no doubt could be raised with regard to the paternity of Kr. Mamta Gupta the daughter of deceased because Section 112 of 1872 Act provides that a birth of child during marriage would be a conclusive proof of her legitimacy.
21. It is settled law that the judgment of the matrimonial court is a judgment in rem and conclusive not against the party to the proceeding but against the whole world. This view is supported by the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 85 which are extracted below:
"....Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act provides, to the extent material, that a final judgment of a competent court in the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction conclusive proof that the legal character which it confers or takes away accrued or ceased at the time declared in the judgment for that purpose. But the judgment has to be of a "competent Court", that is, a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter."
22. Therefore, the status of the claimant widow would continue to be that of wife on the date of accident.
23. The status of the daughter would also continue to be intact because Section 112 of 1872 Act provides that birth of child during continuation of marriage is a conclusive proof of legitimacy. Once it is accepted that the child is born during the subsistence of the marriage a conclusive proof arises to the paternity of the child. This has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that the whole burden of providing is on the person who asserts illegitimacy. For this proposition, reliance can be placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Chilukuri Venkateswarlu v. Chilukuri Venkatanarayana, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 176-77, Perumal Nadar v. Ponnuswami, (1970)1 S.C.C. 605 and Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2295. The view taken in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corpn's Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr., (supra) is that in the In- dian situation even the brother who is killed in a motor vehicle accident can claim compensation. Referring to the scheme and objects of 1939 Act and the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, their Lordships of the Supreme Court concluded as under:-
"....Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of Torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian Family brothers, sisters and brothers children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicles accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, 1977 A.C.J. 253 (Gujarat) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the act if he is a legal representative of the deceased."
24. On the basis of principles enunciated in the statutes and the judgments referred in the paras above, it can be safely concluded that the widow as well as the daughter are entitled to the payment of compensation. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the argument of Shri Rajesh Garg learned counsel representing the mother and the son of the deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta.
25. The argument of Shri Munishwar Puri with regard to payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum would also not merit any serious consideration because the judgment in Kaushnuma Begum's case (supra) is based on the change in the rate of interest introduced by the Reserve Bank of India and the rate of interest has been lowered. However, in the present case, the accident had taken place on 15.8.1981 and the award of the Tribunal was announced on 5.11.1982. Learned Single Judge rendered his judgment on 25.8.1986. Therefore, we do not find any justification to invoke the ratio of the judgment in Kaushnuma Begum's case (supra). Moreover, Section 110-CC of 1939 Act confers discretion on the Court or Tribunal to issue direction that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest would also be paid. We are not inclined to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge. Still further the judgment of Supreme Court in Kaushnuma Begum's case (supra) does not lay down any principle of law of general application that interest in every case should be 9% per annum. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel on behalf of United India Insurance Company does not merit acceptance.
26. In the light of the above discussion, we dispose of the appeals and the cross-objections in the following manner:
1. The owner of the truck is absolved of any liability because the truck did not contribute by his negligence to the accident. It is held that the whole liability is that of the Punjab Roadways as the accident had been caused by the negligence of the driver of the bus who had driven the bus rashly and negligently and more particularly in violation of Regulations 6 and 7 of Tenth Schedule of 1939 Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned Single Judge holding the owner and driver of the truck liable to the extent of one-third is set aside.
2. The multiplier of 16 applied by the learned Single Judge is upheld in view of the fact that multiplier of 16 has been held applicable in most of the cases by the Supreme Court like the case of G.M. Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas, (1994-2)107 P.L.R, 1 (S.C.).
3. The computation of compensation worked out between Smt. Raj Anand and her daughter Kr. Mamta Anand and mother and son of the deceased is also upheld.
4. The rate of interest of 12% per annum from the ate of the application till the date of realisation of the amount is also upheld. The appeals are disposed of in the above mentioned terms.
Sd/- G.S. Singhvi, J.