Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Kolkata Metropolitan Dev. Authority vs Pradip Kumar Ghosh on 24 October, 2017
Author: Arun Mishra
Bench: Arun Mishra
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 461 OF 2009
KOLKATA METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY … APPELLANT
VERSUS
PRADIP KUMAR GHOSH & ORS. … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. Aggrieved by the quashing of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition)
Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) notice under section
4(1)(a) was published in the Gazette on 14.10.1996 and also notice
under section 5 of the Act. The property in question had been
Signature Not Verified
requisitioned under the provisions of the Act by the issuance of
Digitally signed by
SARITA PUROHIT
Date: 2017.10.28
16:52:30 IST
Reason:
notification under section 3(1) since requisition continued for long
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for 14 years. It was questioned by filing a writ petition i.e. CR 15177
(W) of 1979 disposed of on 10.9.1993. The High Court of Calcutta
did not quash the notification issued under section 3(1), passed an
order directing the concerned authorities to acquire the properties
in question if so desired within a period of 6 months from the date
of communication of order and if the authorities did not acquire the
property within the time specified the Land Acquisition Collector
was directed to release the property under requisition and restore
possession of the same to the writ petitioner.
2. Thereafter there was some delay in initiating the land
acquisition proceedings. The notification under section 4(1)(a) of the
Act had been issued on 14.10.1996 for the acquisition of premises
No.11, Sarat Bose Road, Kolkata. Questioning the same, fresh
petition – Writ Petition No.4361 (W) of 1997 was filed. Award was
passed determining the compensation in a sum of Rs.7,69,950/.
The writ petition was dismissed by the Single Bench vide order
dated 11.3.1998. It was held by the Single Bench that in case the
order dated 10.9.1993 was not complied, by the concerned
authorities they would be liable for contempt of court and may be
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dealt with in accordance with law in the contempt proceedings, but
the mere fact that possession of the property was not restored, in
view of the order passed on 10.9.1993 the same would not disentitle
the authority in taking steps for acquisition of the property.
3. As against dismissal of the writ petition, appeal MAT
No.1165/1998 had been preferred before the Division Bench. The
Division Bench has allowed the same vide impugned judgment and
order. The Government of West Bengal had conveyed the property
by registered deed of conveyance on 21.12.2004 to Kolkata
Metropolitan Development Authority for development. A Division
Bench of the High Court has allowed the appeal. It was held that
requisition under section 3(1) of the Act deemed to have been
lapsed, as such the acquisition was illegal. Aggrieved thereby the
appeal has been preferred by the Kolkata Metropolitan Development
Authority.
4. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the High Court
did not quash the notification relating to requisition issued under
section 3(1) of the Act, but only issued a direction that the
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requisition should not continue for an indefinite period. Thus either
the land was to be acquired or it should have been released from
the requisition. The requisition continued and a notification under
section 4(1)(a) of the Act had been issued. Award has been passed.
Thus the property has vested in the State Government. The order of
reacquisition did not lapse. The acquisition made was lawful. The
ratio of Collector of Kamrup & Ors.v. Kamakhya Ram Barooah etc.
AIR 1965 SC 1301 was not attracted. The only question for
consideration was the effect of the orderdated 10.9.1993. The
requisition came to an end on the issuance of notification under
section 4(1) of the Act. There was no embargo created by orders of
the court to exercise statutory power for the purpose of acquisition.
5. Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents urged that the property had continued for a period of
more than 14 years in requisition. Thus the High Court has passed
an order on 10.9.1993 that the requisition was illegal and
impermissible. A direction was issued to release the property in
case the property was not acquired within the time specified. As the
State Government had not acted under the Act, it was a gross
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dereliction of statutory duty not to release the property. The
requisition came to an end and under the provisions of the Act
property under requisition could have been acquired. It was a pre
condition that the property should be under requisition for the
purpose of acquisition. Power of the High Court to issue mandamus
is wide and untrammeled. As the State Government failed to act as
per the mandamus it was not open to acquiring the property later
on. The consequence of not acquiring the property within the time
specified was the release of the property and to restore the
possession. The LAO had no option but to restore the same within 6
months as stipulated in the order passed in 1993. The requisition
came to an end on the lapse of 6 months period on 10.3.1994 and a
further period of 6 months also expired on 10.9.1994 during which
period property was to be released. Under no circumstances,
requisition would continue after that period. In view of the decision
in Collector of Kamrup (supra) the property did not remain under
acquisition, as such notification for acquisition under section 4 (1)
(a) was clearly ultra vires of the powers. It was also contended that
the property was not used for the purpose it was required. As the
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appellant had offered the property for commercial sale in the
market by inviting public bids, the acquisition was wholly
unjustified and deserves to be quashed. The notification under
section 4 of the Act and notice under section 5 was issued in
violation of orders of the courtdated 10.9.1993. The notification for
acquisition was a nullity and void abinitio being contemptuous to
the order passed by the High Court. As observed in Ravi S. Naik v.
Union of India & Ors. (1994) Supp 2 SCC 641 and Manohar Lal
(dead) by LRs. v. Ugrasen (dead) by LRs. & Ors. (2010) 11 SCC 557
the acquisition was colourable and mala fide exercise of power.
Even an erroneous decision operates as res judicata between the
parties as court’s order of 1993 was binding. Even if an order is
void the parties cannot determine it. A party aggrieved by invalidity
has to approach the court for invalidation that the order against is
inoperative. Such a declaration permissible if the court lacks
inherent jurisdiction hence the order of 10.9.1993 was binding. The
power of judicial review has been rightly exercised by the Division
Bench to undo the injustice and overreach of the State power.
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6. The property had been requisitioned in the year 1979. The
requisition continued for long. As the Single Bench passed an order
on 10.9.1993, on the ground that the requisition should not
continue for long. The requisition was not in fact quashed but a
direction was issued either to acquire the property within 6 months
and in case it was not so acquired within the time specified, Land
Acquisition Collector was to initiate proceedings within next 6
months thereafter for release.
7. The requisition cannot last for long was laid down in H.D. Vora
v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1984) 2 SCC 337 thus:
“6. But it was contended on behalf of the appellant that even if the
order of requisition was invalid as having been made for a purpose
other than a public purpose, Respondent 3 was not entitled to
challenge the same after a lapse of over 30 years and the writ
petition should, therefore, have been dismissed by the High Court.
Now if the only ground on which the order of requisition was
challenged in the writ petition was that it was not made for a public
purpose and was therefore void, perhaps it might have been possible
to successfully repel this ground of challenge by raising an objection
that the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition
challenging the order of requisition after a lapse of over 30 years.
But we find that there is also another ground of challenge urged on
behalf of Respondent 3 and that is a very formidable ground to
which there is no answer. The argument urged under this ground of
challenge was that an order of requisition is by its very nature
temporary in character and it cannot endure for an indefinite period
of time and the order of requisition in the present case, therefore,
ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of a reasonable
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period of time and that it could not, under any circumstances,
continue for a period of about 30 years and hence it was liable to be
quashed and set aside or in any event the State Government was
bound to revoke the same and to derequisition the flat. This
contention has, in our opinion, great force and must be sustained.
There is a basic and fundamental distinction recognised by law
between requisition and acquisition. The Constitution itself in Entry
42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule makes a distinction between
acquisition and requisitioning of property. The original Article 31
clause (2) of the Constitution also recognised this distinction
between compulsory acquisition and requisitioning of property. The
two concepts, one of requisition and the other of acquisition are
totally distinct and independent. The acquisition means the acquiring
of the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature and
extent of that title may be. The entire bundle of rights which was
vested in the original holder passes on acquisition to the acquirer
leaving nothing to the former. Vide: Observations of Mukherjee, J.,
in Chiranjit Lal case AIR 1951 SC 41. The concept of acquisition
has an air of permanence and finality in that there is transference of
the title of the original holder to the acquiring authority. But the
concept of requisition involves merely taking of “domain or control
over property without acquiring rights of ownership” and must by its
very nature be of temporary duration. If requisitioning of property
could legitimately continue for an indefinite period of time, the
distinction between requisition and acquisition would tend to
become blurred, because in that event for all practical purposes the
right to possession and enjoyment of the property which constitutes
a major constituent element of the right of ownership would be
vested indefinitely without any limitation of time in the
requisitioning authority and it would be possible for the authority to
substantially take over the property without acquiring it and paying
full market value as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. We do not think that the Government can under the guise of
requisition continued for an indefinite period of time, in substance
acquire the property, because that would be a fraud on the power
conferred on the Government. If the Government wants to take over
the property for an indefinite period of time, the Government must
acquire the property but it cannot use the power of requisition for
achieving that object. The power of requisition is exercisable by the
Government only for a public purpose which is of a transitory
character. If the public purpose for which the premises are required
is of a perennial or permanent character from the very inception, no
order can be passed requisitioning the premises and in such a case
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the order of requisition, if passed, would be a fraud upon the statute,
for the Government would be requisitioning the premises when
really speaking they want the premises for acquisition, the object of
taking the premises being not transitory but permanent in character.
Where the purpose for which the premises are required is of such a
character that from the very inception it can never be served by
requisitioning the premises but can be achieved only by acquiring
the property which would be the case where the purpose is of a
permanent character or likely to subsist for an indefinite period of
time, the Government may acquire the premises but it certainly
cannot requisition the premises and continue the requisitioning
indefinitely. Here in the present case the order of requisition was
made as far back as April 9, 1951, and even if it was made for
housing a homeless person and the appellant at that time fell within
the category of homeless person, it cannot be allowed to continue for
such an inordinately long period as thirty years. We must therefore
hold that the order of requisition even if it was valid when made,
ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of a reasonable
period of time. It is not necessary for us to decide what period of
time may be regarded as reasonable for the continuance of an order
of requisition in a given case, because ultimately the answer to this
question must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case
but there can be no doubt that whatever be the public purpose for
which an order of requisition is made, the period of time for which
the order of requisition may be continued cannot be an unreasonably
long period such as thirty years. The High Court was, therefore, in
any view of the matter, right in holding that in the circumstances the
order of requisition could not survive any longer and the State
Government was bound to revoke the order of requisition and
derequisition the flat and to take steps to evict the appellant from the
flat and to hand over vacant possession of it to Respondent 3.”
8. It was also held in Jiwani Kumar Paraki v. First Land
Acquisition Collector, Calcutta & Ors. (1984) 4 SCC 612 that the
requisition cannot continue for long and property should be
acquired if necessary. This Court observed:
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9“22. In view of the decision in the case of H.D. Vora (supra) in the
light of the decision of this Court rendered by Bench of three Judges
in Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra AIR 1968 SC 244 and bearing
in mind the distinction between “requisition” and “acquisition” as
also the provisions of West Bengal amended Section 49(1) (quoted
above), the correct position in law would be that it will not be
correct to say that in no case can an order of requisition for
permanent purpose be made but in a situation where the purpose of
requisitioning the property is of a permanent character and where the
Government has also the power and the opportunity to acquire the
property or a part thereof especially upon the fulfilment of the
conditions of Section 49(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (as amended
by the West Bengal Act) to the extent applicable, if the Government
chooses not to exercise that power nor attempts to exercise that
power to achieve its purpose, then that will be bad not because the
Government would be acting without power of requisition but the
Government might be acting in a bad faith. In other words, if there is
power to acquire as also the power to requisition and the purpose is
of permanent nature by having the property or a part thereof for the
Government then in such case to keep the property under requisition
permanently might be an abuse of the power and a colourable
exercise of the power not because the Government lacks the power
of requisition but because the Government does not use the other
power of acquisition which will protect the rights and interests of the
parties better.
24. It is true that the purpose indisputably in the instant case is a
public purpose. It is also true that the only part of the building
namely one room has been requisitioned for the showroom but the
premises in question has remained under requisition for over 25
years and the purpose of having the premises in question is of a
permanent and perennial nature. But that by itself without anything
more would not enable the Court to draw the inference that the
exercise of the power was bad initially, nor would the continuance of
the requisition become mala fide or colourable by mere lapse of
time. In order to draw such an inference, some more material ought
to have been placed before the Court. In the circumstances after
having heard counsel on either side fully, we feel that the following
would be an appropriate order to be made in the instant case:
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(1) The impugned requisition order is upheld but the
continuance of the requisition of the premises in question is
permitted subject to the conditions mentioned hereinafter.
(2) The Government is directed to take steps to acquire premises in
question by complying with the conditions mentioned and by
following the procedure prescribed in Section 49(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 as substituted for the State of West Bengal by
the West Bengal Act 32 of 1955 and if possible issue an appropriate
order acquiring the same if Government wants the continued use of
the premises. Such steps should be completed within a period of
three years from today.
(3) If, however, there are insurmountable difficulties in acquiring the
premises under Section 49(1), the Government will be at liberty to
apply to this Court for appropriate directions.
(4) We also hope that the Government would take steps to acquire
any alternative property or premises under Land Acquisition Act,
1894 in view of the fact that the purpose of the Government is more
or less permanent and such steps should also be taken not beyond a
period of three years as aforesaid.
(5) If the aforesaid conditions or directions are not complied with,
the petitioner will also be at liberty to apply to this Court for
appropriate directions in accordance with law.
(6) In the meantime, the parties are at liberty to make any
appropriate application for the enhancement of rent or compensation
in accordance with law, if they are so entitled to, and this will also
not prejudice the parties from proceeding with any suit for damages
etc. that may be pending.”
9. In Grahak Sanstha Manch & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra
(1994) 4 SCC 192 a Constitution Bench of this Court has observed
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that the requisition cannot continue indefinitely. This Court
observed:
“16. We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken in the cases
of Collector of Akola AIR 1968 SC 244 and Jiwani Kumar Paraki
(1984) 4 SCC 612 that the purpose of a requisition order may be
permanent. But that is not to say that an order of requisitioning can
be continued indefinitely or for a period of time longer than that
which is, in the facts and circumstances of the particular case,
reasonable. We note and approve in this regard, as did this Court in
Jiwani Kumar Paraki case, the observations of the Nagpur High
Court in the case of Mangilal Karwa v. State of M.P. AIR 1955 Nag.
153 which have been reproduced above. That the concept of
requisitioning is temporary is also indicated by the Law Commission
in its Tenth Report and, as pointed out earlier, by the terms of the
said Act itself, as it originally stood and as amended from time to
time. There is no contradiction in concluding that while a requisition
order can be issued for a permanent public purpose, it cannot be
continued indefinitely. Requisitioning might have to be resorted to
for a permanent public purpose, to give an example, to tide over the
period of time required for making permanent premises available for
it. The concepts of acquisition and requisition are altogether different
as are the consequences that flow therefrom. A landlord cannot, in
effect and substance, be deprived of his rights and title to property
without being paid due compensation, and this is the effect of
prolonged requisitioning. Requisitioning may be continued only for
a reasonable period; what that period should be would depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case and it would ordinarily, be
for the Government to decide.”
10. On 10.9.1993 the High Court at Calcutta had passed the
following directions in the previous writ application pertaining to
requisition:
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“1. Since the order of requisition has been continuing the year 1979,
the concerned Land Acquisition Collector is directed to acquire the
property in question, if the authority so desires, within six months
from the date of communication of this Order.
2. If the concerned authority does not acquire the property in
question within the time specified hereinabove, the Land Acquisition
Collector is directed to release the property in question from
requisition and restore possession of the same to the writ petitioner
within ……… months thereafter.”
The direction was twofold; one to acquire property in 6
months and secondly on failure to acquire within 6 months to
release the property within next 6 months. There was no automatic
release contemplated in the order neither the notification under
section 3 of the Requisition of Property issued wayback in the year
1979 had been quashed.
11. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are relevant and they are extracted
hereunder:
“3. Power to requisition. —(1) If the State Government is of the
opinion that it is necessary so to do for maintaining supplies and
services essential to the life of the community or for increasing
employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial
estates and industrial estates in different areas or for providing
proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage,
or for the creation of better living conditions in rural or urban areas,
not being an industrial or other area excluded by the State
Government by a notification in this behalf, by the construction or
reconstruction of dwelling places in such areas or for purposes
connected therewith or incidental thereto, the State Government
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may, by order in writing, requisition any land and may make such
further orders as appear to it to be necessary or expedient in
connection with the requisitioning:
Provided that no land used for the purpose of religious worship or
used by an educational or charitable institution shall be requisitioned
under this section.
(1A) A Collector of a district, an Additional District Magistrate or
the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta when authorized by
the State Government in this behalf, may exercise within his
jurisdiction the powers conferred by sub-section (1).
(2) An order under sub-section (1) shall be served in the prescribed
manner on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land
in occupation of an occupier, not being the owner of the land, also
on such occupier.
(3) If any person fails to comply with an order made under sub-
section (1), the Collector or any person authorized by him in writing
in this behalf shall execute the order in such manner as he considers
expedient and may, --
(a) if he is a Magistrate, enforce the delivery of possession of
the land in respect of which the order has been made to
himself, or
(b) if he is not a Magistrate, apply to a Magistrate or, in
Calcutta as defined in clause (11) of section 5 of the
Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, to the Commissioner of
Police, and such Magistrate or Commissioner, as the case
may be, shall enforce the delivery of possession of such
land to him”.
4. Acquisition of land.—(1) Where any land has been requisitioned
under section 3, the State Government may use or deal with such
land for any of the purposes referred to in sub-section (1) of section
3 as may appear to it to be expedient.
(1a) The State Government may acquire any land requisitioned
under section 3 by publishing a notice in the Official Gazette that
such land is required for a public purpose referred to in sub-section
(1) of section 3.
(2) Where a notice as aforesaid is published in the Official Gazette,
the requisitioned land shall, on and from the beginning of the day on
which the notice is so published, vest absolutely in the State
Government free from all encumbrances and the period of
requisition of such land shall end.”
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It is apparent from the aforesaid provisions that the property
that is under requisition can only be acquired. Requisition is a sine
qua non for a property as on the date when notification under
section 4 is issued. Section 3 had been omitted w.e.f. 1.4.1994.
However the property was requisitioned before the provision was
omitted.
12. Section 6 deals with release from requisition. Section 6 is
extracted hereunder :
“6. Release from requisition.—(1) Where any land
requisitioned under section 3 is not acquired and is to be released
from requisition, the State Government may, after making such
inquiry, if any, as it considers necessary, specify by order in writing
the person who appears to it to be entitled to the possession of such
land.
(2) The delivery of possession of such land to the person specified in
the order made under sub-section (1) shall be a full discharge of any
liability of the State Government for any claim for compensation or
other claim in respect of such land for any period after the date of
delivery but shall not prejudice any right in respect of such land
which any other person may be entitled by due process of law to
enforce against the person to whom possession of the land is so
delivered.
(3) Where the person specified in the order made under sub-section
(1) cannot be found or is not readily traceable or has no agent or
other person empowered to accept delivery on his behalf, the State
Government shall publish in the Official Gazette a notice declaring
that such land is release from requisition and shall cause a copy
thereof to be affixed on some conspicuous part of such land.
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(4) Where a notice referred to in sub-section (3) is published in the
Official Gazette, the land specified in such notice shall cease to be
subject to requisition on and from the date of such publication and
shall be deemed to have been delivered to the person specified in the
order made under sub-section (1); and the State Government shall
not be liable for any compensation or other claims in respect of such
land for any period after the said date.”
It is apparent that section 6 requires an order to be passed by
the State Government for release of the property from requisition.
Government has to conduct an inquiry if any, considered necessary
then the release order has to be passed and possession of the
property has to be delivered under section 6. Section 6(2) also
provides that even if possession has been delivered pursuant to a
release order, the same shall not prejudice any right in respect of
such land, if any other person may be entitled by due process of law
to enforce against the person to whom possession of land was
delivered.
13. The High Court in the instant case has not directed delivery of
possession and possession had not been handed over. Thus by
virtue of the provisions contained in section 6, until and unless
release order is passed and delivery of possession pursuant thereto
takes place, the requisition would continue.
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14. In The Collector of Kamrup & Ors. v. Kamakhya Ram Barooah
& Ors. (supra), this Court has laid down that the power to acquire
the land under section 4 can be exercised only when land has been
requisitioned under section 3 and not otherwise. This court in the
said case has observed:
“(4). The power to acquire land under s. 4 may, it is plain from a
bare perusal of sub-s. (1), be exercised where the land has been
requisitioned under s. 3 and not otherwise. In the present case, an
order for acquisition of the land was made in the first instance and
presumably because it was realized that the order was defective and
irregular, it was sought to be rectified by passing an order on August
4, 1949, requisitioning the land with effect from February 7, 1949.
By this expedient, an illegal order of acquisition could not be
validated.”
15. The question involved in the present case is whether in view of
order passed by the court on 10.9.1993 property could be said to be
under requisition under section 3 of the Act as on the date
notification under section 4 had been issued.
16. In regard to efficacy of order dated 10.9.1993, the respondents
have relied upon power to issue mandamus and the effect thereof. A
reference has been made to the decision in Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi & Anr. v. K.S.
18
Jagannathan & Anr. (1986) 2 SCC 679 and Andi Mukta Sadguru
Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak
Trust & Ors. v. V.R. Rudani & Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 691. In Comptroller
and AuditorGeneral of India (supra) the court observed :
“20. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising
their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of
mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and
give necessary directions where the government or a public authority
has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion
conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the
government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on
irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations
and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of
conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which
such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other
fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in
the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel
the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion
conferred upon the government or a public authority, and in a proper
case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties,
the court may itself pass an order or give directions which the
government or the public authority should have passed or given had
it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion.”
In Andi Mukta Sadguru (supra), it was held:
“20. The term “authority” used in Article 226, in the context, must
receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is
relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights
under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to
issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-
fundamental rights. The words “any person or authority” used in
Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory
authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any
other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body
concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature
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of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the
light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the
affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a
positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.”
There is no dispute with the proposition laid down in
Comptroller and AuditorGeneral of India (supra) and Andi Mukta
Sadguru (supra) that mandamus can be issued for doing the
positive act or a legal duty cast upon an authority.
17. In Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (1997) 7
SCC 622 it has been observed that mandamus is a discretionary
remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution to compel for a public
duty which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in
nature. Statutory duty may be either directory or mandatory. ‘Shall’
and ‘must’ sometimes be interpreted as ‘may’. This Court has
observed:
“22. Mandamus which is a discretionary remedy under Article 226
of the Constitution is requested to be issued, inter alia, to compel
performance of public duties which may be administrative,
ministerial or statutory in nature. Statutory duty may be either
directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they are intended to be
mandatory in character, are indicated by the use of the words “shall”
or “must”. But this is not conclusive as “shall” and “must” have,
sometimes, been interpreted as “may”. What is determinative of the
nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the
scheme of the statute in which the “duty” has been set out. Even if
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the “duty” is not set out clearly and specifically in the statute, it may
be implied as correlative to a “right”.
23. In the performance of this duty, if the authority in whom the
discretion is vested under the statute, does not act independently and
passes an order under the instructions and orders of another
authority, the Court would intervene in the matter, quash the order
and issue a mandamus to that authority to exercise its own
discretion.
29. It may be pointed out that this principle was also applied by
Professor Wade to quasi-judicial bodies and their decisions. Relying
upon the decision in R. v. Justices of London (1895) 1 QB 214.
Professor Wade laid down the principle that where a public authority
was given power to determine a matter, mandamus would not lie to
compel it to reach some particular decision.”
18. The High Court directed interim payment to be made in
accordance with law laid down by it in which it held A.P. Act 3 of
1971 to be invalid. However on appeal, in State of A.P. & Ors. v.
Raja Shri V.S.K. Krishna Yachandra Bahadur Varuh Rajah of
Venkatagiri & Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 660 this Court upheld the
constitutionality of the said Act and further held that interim
payments could be made only from the date of determination by the
Director under section 39(1). Though the mandamus that was
issued by the High Court relying upon Venkatagiri case (supra)
attained finality, for its enforcement, another writ petition was filed.
The Supreme Court laid down in Director of Settlements, A.P. & Ors.
21
v. M.R. Apparao & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 638, that no further
mandamus could have been issued for release of payment in
implementation of its earlier order. Once the decision on which it
was based that is Venkatagiri case stood wiped off thus the
mandamus became unenforceable. The Court further held that if
the law which was declared invalid by the High Court is held
constitutionally valid, effective and binding by the Supreme Court,
then the mandamus forbearing the authorities from enforcing its
provisions would become ineffective and the authorities cannot be
compelled to perform a negative duty. The mandamus would not
survive in favour of those parties against whom appeals were not
filed. This Court examined the question whether while issuing a
mandamus, the earlier judgment notwithstanding having been held
to be rendered ineffective, can still be held to be operative. This
Court in Director of Settlements v. M.R. Apparao (supra) observed :
“In other words, the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Venkatagiri case holding the Amendment Act to be constitutionally
invalid, on being reversed by the Supreme Court on a conclusion that the
said amendment is constitutionally valid, the said dictum would be valid
throughout the country and for all persons, including the respondents, even
though the judgment in their favour had not been assailed. It would in fact
lead to an anomalous situation, if in the case of the respondents, the earlier
conclusion that the Amendment Act is constitutionally invalid is allowed to
22
operate notwithstanding the reversal of that conclusion in Venkatagiri case
and only in Venkatagiri case or where the parties have never approached
the Court to hold that the same is constitutionally valid. This being the
position, notwithstanding the enunciation of the principle of res judicata
and its applicability to the litigation between the parties at different stages,
it is difficult for us to sustain the argument of Mr Rao that an indefeasible
right has accrued to the respondents on the basis of the judgment in their
favour which had not been challenged and that right could be enforced by
issuance of a fresh mandamus. On the other hand, to have uniformity of
the law and to have universal application of the law laid down by this
Court in Venkatagiri case it would be reasonable to hold that the so-called
direction in favour of the respondents became futile inasmuch as the
direction was on the basis that the Amendment Act is constitutionally
invalid, the moment the Supreme Court holds the Act to be constitutionally
valid. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that no indefeasible
right on the respondents could be said to have accrued on account of the
earlier judgment in their favour notwithstanding the reversal of the
judgment of the High Court in Venkatagiri case.”
19. This Court has laid down that the High Court erred in issuing
mandamus in respect of a right which ceased to exist and was not
available on the date on which mandamus had been issued afresh.
In our opinion to enforce an order it should be effective on date
mandamus is sought to be enforced. It can be interdicted by
another order or by statutory intervention.
20. In First Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. v. Nirodhi Prakash
Gangoli & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 160 the premises in question had been
requisitioned under the provisions of West Bengal Requisition and
Control (Temporary Provision) Act, 1947 for accommodating
23
students of Calcutta National Medical College, Calcutta. The
premises subsequently sought to be acquired by issuing notification
under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in 1982 and
1989 respectively. The High Court quashed the notifications. The
premises stood derequisitioned in 1993. A fresh notification was
issued under sections 4(1) and 17(4) of the Act in November 1994.
Entire notification was questioned by filing a writ petition. In the
said case Division Bench had issued a direction to hand over
physical possession on 25.8.1994. This Court held that merely
because possession had not been delivered pursuant to the
direction of derequisition the acquisition would not become
malafide. In case there existed need for acquisition it has to be
judged independently. This Court has laid down:
“6. It is indeed difficult for us to uphold the conclusion of the
Division Bench that acquisition is mala fide on the mere fact that
physical possession had not been delivered pursuant to the earlier
directions of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court dated
25-8-1994. When the Court is called upon to examine the question as
to whether the acquisition is mala fide or not, what is necessary to be
inquired into and found out is, whether the purpose for which the
acquisition is going to be made, is a real purpose or a camouflage.
By no stretch of imagination, exercise of power for acquisition can
be held to be mala fide, so long as the purpose of acquisition
continues and as has already been stated, there existed emergency to
acquire the premises in question. The premises which were under
24
occupation of the students of National Medical College, Calcutta,
were obviously badly needed for the College and the appropriate
authority having failed in their attempt earlier twice, the orders
having been quashed by the High Court, had taken the third attempt
of issuing notification under Sections 4(1) and 17(4) of the Act, such
acquisition cannot be held to be mala fide and, therefore, the
conclusion of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment that the
acquisition is mala fide, must be set aside and we accordingly set
aside the same.
7. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondents is that as the
premises in question continued to be under possession of Calcutta
Medical College, invocation of special powers under Section 17 was
vitiated and a valuable right of the landowners to file objections
under Section 5-A could not have been taken away. According to the
counsel for the respondents, Section 5-A of the Act, merely gives an
opportunity to the landowner to object to the acquisition within 30
days from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4,
the power under Section 17 dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-
A can, therefore, be invoked where there exists urgency to take
immediate possession of the land, but where possession is with the
acquiring authority, there cannot exist any urgency, and, therefore
the exercise of that power is patently erroneous. In support of this
contention, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in
Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat (1976) 1 SCC 700. We
are unable to accept this contention since the same proceeds on a
basic misconception about the possession of the premises. The
premises in question had been requisitioned under the provisions of
the Requisition Act and stood released from requisition by operation
of Section 10-B of the said Act, since 1993. Even though the
premises stood occupied by the students of the medical college, but
such occupation was neither as owner nor was lawful in the eye of
the law. To effectuate lawful possession and the purpose being
undoubtedly a public purpose, the State Government had been
attempting ever since December 1982 and each of its attempts had
failed on account of the Court’s intervention. It is in this context, the
legality of exercise of power under Section 17 of the notification
dated 29-11-1994 is required to be adjudicated upon. In our
considered opinion, having regard to the facts and circumstances
narrated above, the exercise of power under Section 17 by the State
Government, cannot be held to be illegal or mala fide and
consequently, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court cannot be sustained. The learned Judges of the
25
High Court have been totally swayed away by the fact of non-
implementation of the directions of Batabyal, J., in his order dated
25-8-1994, but that by itself would not be a ground for annulling
lawful exercise of power under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of
the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and hold that the
acquisition in question is not vitiated on any ground. The acquisition
proceeding, therefore, is held to be in accordance with law. The
appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.”
21. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that the
acquisition proceedings contrary to court's order were a nullity. In
substance, the submission is that once the derequisition has been
ordered to be made in specified time, having failed to do so,
continuance of requisition was unlawful. Thus the acquisition of
such property could not have been made in view of the principles
laid down by this Court in Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India & Ors.
(1994) Supp 2 SCC 641 and Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen (2010) 11 SCC
557. The relevant portion of Ravi S. Naik (supra) is extracted
hereunder :
“40. We will first examine whether Bandekar and Chopdekar could
be excluded from the group on the basis of order dated December
13, 1990, holding that they stood disqualified as members of the Goa
Legislative Assembly. The said two members had filed Writ Petition
No. 321 of 1990 in the Bombay High Court wherein they challenged
the validity of the said order of disqualification and by order dated
December 14, 1990, passed in the said writ petition the High Court
had stayed the operation of the said order of disqualification dated
26
December 13, 1990, passed by the Speaker. The effect of the stay of
the operation of the order of disqualification dated December 13,
1990 was that with effect from December 14, 1990, the declaration
that Bandekar and Chopdekar were disqualified from being members
of Goa Legislative Assembly under order dated December 13, 1991,
was not operative and on December 24, 1990, the date of the alleged
split, it could not be said that they were not members of Goa
Legislative Assembly. One of the reasons given by the Speaker for
not giving effect to the stay order passed by the High Court on
December 14, 1990, was that the said order came after the order of
disqualification was issued by him. We are unable to appreciate this
reason. Since the said order was passed in a writ petition challenging
the validity of the order dated December 13, 1990, passed by the
Speaker it, obviously, had to come after the order of disqualification
was issued by the Speaker. The other reason given by the Speaker
was that Parliament had held that the Speaker's order cannot be a
subject matter of court proceedings and his decision is final as far as
Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is concerned. The said reason is
also unsustainable in law. As to whether the order of the Speaker
could be a subject matter of court proceedings and whether his
decision was final were questions involving the interpretation of the
provisions contained in Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. On the
date of the passing of the stay order dated December 14, 1990, the
said questions were pending consideration before this Court. In the
absence of an authoritative pronouncement by this Court, the stay
order passed by the High Court could not be ignored by the Speaker
on the view that his order could not be a subject matter of court
proceedings and his decision was final. It is settled law that an order,
even though interim in nature, is binding till it is set aside by a
competent court and it cannot be ignored on the ground that the
court which passed the order had no jurisdiction to pass the same.
Moreover, the stay order was passed by the High Court which is a
superior Court of Record and "in the case of a superior Court of
Record, it is for the court to consider whether any matter falls within
its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a court of limited jurisdiction, the
Superior Court is entitled to determine for itself questions about its
own jurisdiction."
This Court has observed that interim order is also binding till
it is set aside. In Manohar Lal (supra) this Court observed:
27
24. In Mulraj v. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj AIR 1967 SC 1386, this
Court considered the effect of action taken subsequent to passing of
an interim order in its disobedience and held that any action taken in
disobedience of the order passed by the Court would be illegal.
Subsequent action would be a nullity.
25. In Surjit Singh v. Harbans Singh AIR 1966 SC 135, this Court
while dealing with the similar issue held as under (SCC p. 52, para
4)
“4. … In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment
was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends
of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the court intends
a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis,
that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is
presumed to exist till the court orders otherwise. The court, in
these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the
alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its
purposes.”
26. In All Bengal Excise Licensees’ Assn. v. Raghabendra Singh AIR
2007 SC 1386 this Court held as under: (SCC p. 387, para 28)
“28. … a party to the litigation cannot be allowed to take an
unfair advantage by committing breach of an interim order and
escape the consequences thereof. … the wrong perpetrated by the
respondent contemnors in utter disregard of the order of the High
Court should not be permitted to hold good.”
27. In DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. AIR 1966 SC 2005
this Court after making reference to many of the earlier judgments
held: (SCC p. 636, para 18)
“18. … ‘… on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought
not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good,
and not tainted by the illegality that produced them.’”
28. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund
AIR 2008 SC 901 this Court while dealing with the similar issues
held that even a court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the event of
coming to the conclusion that a breach of an order of restraint had
28
taken place, may bring back the parties to the same position as if the
order of injunction has not been violated.
29. In view of the above, it is evident that any order passed by any
authority in spite of the knowledge of the interim order of the court
is of no consequence as it remains a nullity.
22. In the light of aforesaid principles, in the instant case, we have
to consider the nature of mandamus that has been issued on
10.9.1993. Firstly the court had not quashed the order of
requisition. Apart from that, the court has not ordered that on lapse
of 6 months period granted for acquisition and further period of 6
months property shall stand derequisitioned. The direction was
issued to the L.A.C. to release the property in question from
requisition. It was not an automatic consequence of the command
issued. Thus if the property had not been released under section 6
of the Act obviously the requisition continued and statutory power
of acquisition could have been exercised.
23. In General Manager, Department of Telecommunications,
Thiruvananthapuram v. Jacob s/o Kochuvarkey Kalliath (dead) by
LRs. & Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 662 this Court considered the question of
issuance of direction by the High Court to complete acquisition
29
proceedings and pass an award within a specified period with a
view to avoiding further delay. This Court held that it would not
disable the authorities to exercise power under section 11A where
under a longer period was available for passing an award. This
Court also held that direction or order couldn’t be read to stultify
any authority from exercising its powers under the statute or
deprives a statutory provision of its enforceability. This Court also
considered the question of limitations of mandamus and also issue
of liability under the Contempt of Courts Act, and held that there
was no violation of either in exercise of statutory powers despite
court order. This court observed:
“7. As for the plea raised on behalf of the respondents that since the
Court directed the passing of the award by 3-9-1992 which time was
subsequently extended up to 3-12-1992, irrespective of the
provisions contained in the Act or for that matter even if what was
said by the Court was right or wrong, the order passed by the Court
was very much binding inter partes and the appellant could not have
legitimately passed an award at any time beyond 3-12-1992. Strong
reliance has been placed upon the decision reported in N.
Narasimhaiah (1996) 3 SCC 88. This was a case wherein the
exercise of power under Section 17(4) dispensing with enquiry under
Section 5-A was quashed by the High Court and liberty was given to
the State to proceed further in accordance with law i.e. to conduct
the enquiry under Section 5-A and if the Government forms an
opinion that the land is required for a public purpose, issue a fresh
declaration under Section 6. The question, which loomed large for
consideration, was as to whether the limitation prescribed under
clause (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) would still remain
30
operative and be capable of being complied with. This Court
observed that running of the limitation should be counted from the
date of the order of the court received by the Land Acquisition
Officer and declaration is to be published within one year from that
date. This was for the reason that the Court having quashed the
earlier declaration under Section 6 when directed an enquiry under
Section 5-A to be conducted and to proceed afresh from that stage,
the limitation prescribed for issuing Section 6 declaration would
apply to the publication of declaration under Section 6(1) afresh and
to be complied with from the date of receipt of a copy of the order of
the Court. This decision is of no assistance whatsoever to the
respondents in the present case. Notwithstanding the statutory period
fixed, further time came to be granted due to intervention of court
proceedings in which a direction came to be issued to proceed in the
matter afresh, as directed by the Court, apparently applying the well-
settled legal maxim — actus curiae neminemgravabit: an act of the
court shall prejudice no man. In substance what was done therein
was to necessitate afresh calculation of the statutory period from the
date of receipt of the copy of the order of the court. Granting of
further time than the one stipulated in law in a given case as a sequel
to the decision to carry out the dictates of the court afresh is not the
same as curtailing the statutory period of time to stultify an action
otherwise permissible or allowed in law. Consequently, no
inspiration can be drawn by the respondents in this case on the
analogy of the said decision.
8. Reliance placed on the decision reported in M.M. Krishnamurthy
Chetty (1998) 9 SCC 138 is equally inappropriate and ill-conceived.
That was a case wherein a learned Judge of the High Court, while
setting aside the order passed by the statutory authorities under the
Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Act, 1961,
remanded the case for fresh consideration specifically in the light of
an earlier judgment of the High Court in the case of Naganatha
Ayyar v. Authorised Officer 84 MLW 69. While the remand
proceedings were pending before the authorised officer, this Court
reversed the aforesaid judgment in Authorised Officer v. S.
Naganatha Ayyar (1979) 3 SCC 466 and the authorised officer
decided the ceiling limit in the remit proceedings in terms of the
decision of this Court and not as per the directions of the High Court
to determine the same in the light of the earlier High Court
judgment. It was held in that case that the order of the High Court
directing the authorised officer to examine the dispute in the light of
the earlier High Court decision reported in Naganatha (supra)
31
having become final in the absence of any challenge thereto despite
the reversal of the earlier High Court judgment by this Court, this
Court observed that even orders which may not be strictly legal
become final and are binding on the parties if they are not
challenged before the superior courts. This Court, while rendering
the said decision, was concerned with a direction of the High Court
to do a particular thing in a particular manner and unless the binding
judgment between parties was set at naught to enable the authority to
do it in any other way, it had to be done in a particular manner so
directed by the Court or not at all. So far as the case on hand is
concerned, since the Court in the earlier proceedings had intervened
at the instance of the respondents the Court was directing the
authorities concerned to complete the process within a particular
time to avoid further delay and ensure expeditious conclusion of the
proceedings. There is nothing to indicate in the order of the High
Court stipulating or extending the time for passing the award, that
beyond the time so permitted, it cannot be done at all and the
authorities are disabled once and for all even to proceed in the matter
in accordance with law, if it is so permissible for the authorities
under the law governing the matter in issue. The Court cannot be
imputed with such an intention to stifle the authorities from
exercising powers vested with them under statute or to have
rendered an otherwise enforceable statutory provision, a mere dead
letter. Neither from the nature and purport of the earlier orders
passed nor from their contents, is there any scope for inferring the
imposition of a total embargo upon the competent authorities, to
exercise the statutory powers indisputably vested with and available
to such authorities under the statute, at the time of such exercise.
24. In the instant case as the High Court has not quashed the
notification under section 3 and till derequisition was actually
made, once statutory power had been exercised under section 4
which could be exercised when requisition continues and that as a
matter of fact, continued as the court had not culled out the
consequence, there was no automatic consequence of the de
32
requisition on lapse of specified time. Proceedings under section 6
were required to be undertaken. No order of release was passed.
Requisition continued until the date of acquisition notification and
there was no time limit for initiating acquisition under the Act. The
statutory provision would not be stultified by the command so
issued by the High Court in view of the decision of this Court in
Jacob (supra). Though, Single Judge has opined that considering
the order, it would be a case of violation of the order to be dealt with
under the Contempt of Courts Act. However, in our opinion, when
statutory provision had been invoked for acquisition, there is no
question of applicability of contempt of court also as laid down in
Jacob (supra).
25. Reliance has been placed on Patasi Devi v. State of Haryana
(2012) 9 SCC 503 that it was a colourable exercise of power. In the
said case this Court found that the acquisition was made in order
to oblige the colonizer that was not for a public purpose. The facts
are different in the instant case. The property had been acquired for
the purpose of systematic development of Calcutta and the same
has been handed over to Kolkata Metropolitan Development
33
Corporation for the said purpose. Thus it could not be said that
there was colourable exercise of power in the instant case.
26. It was also submitted on behalf of respondents that even if the
order is void, it is required to be so declared by the competent
forum. It is not permissible to ignore it. For the purpose, reliance
has been placed on Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Ors. v.
Bombay Environmental Action Group & Ors. (2011) 3 SCC 363:
“16. It is a settled legal proposition that even if an order is void, it
requires to be so declared by a competent forum and it is not
permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his
opinion the order is void. In State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan
Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth Naduvi AIR 1996 SC 906, Tayabbhai
M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. AIR 1997 SC
1240, M. Meenakshi v. Metadin Agarwal (2006) 7 SCC 470 and
Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup (2009) 6 SCC 194, this Court held that
whether an order is valid or void, cannot be determined by the
parties. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to
approach the appropriate forum.
17. In State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh AIR 1991 SC 2219, this
Court held that a party aggrieved by the invalidity of an order has to
approach the court for relief of declaration that the order against him
is inoperative and therefore, not binding upon him. While deciding
the said case, this Court placed reliance upon the judgment in Smith
v. East Elloe RDC 1956 AC 736, wherein Lord Radcliffe observed:
(AC pp. 769-70)
“… An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act
capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity
[on] its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at
law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or
34
otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible
purpose as the most impeccable of orders.”
18. In Sultan Sadik v. Sanjay Raj Subba AIR 2004 SC 1377, this
Court took a similar view observing that once an order is declared
non-est by the court only then the judgment of nullity would operate
ergaomnes i.e. for and against everyone concerned. Such a
declaration is permissible if the court comes to the conclusion that
the author of the order lacks inherent jurisdiction/competence and
therefore, it comes to the conclusion that the order suffers from
patent and latent invalidity.
19. Thus, from the above, it emerges that even if the
order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same
cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it.
It has to approach the court for seeking such declaration. The order
may be hypothetically a nullity and even if its invalidity is
challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the court may
refuse to quash the same on various grounds including the standing
of the petitioner or on the ground of delay or on the doctrine of
waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one
purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or
another person."
In the instant case ratio of the aforesaid dictum is not
applicable and it is not the case that the order was void but
statutory power has been exercised and considering the nature of
command that has been issued in the previous order dated
10.9.1993, the decision in Krishnadevi (supra) is not attracted to
the case.
35
27. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that an
erroneous decision operates as res judicata. For this purpose,
reliance has been placed on Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna
Mukherjee & Ors. AIR 1953 SC 65. This Court observed:
(23)“There is ample authority for the proposition that even an
erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata
between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial
decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates
as res judicata. A decision in the previous execution case between
the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the
executing Court even though erroneous is binding on the parties;
see Abhoy Kanta Gohain v. Gopinath Deb Goswami and Others AIR
(30) 1943 Cal 460.”
There is no question of applicability of res judicata in the
instant case. As statutory power has been exercised the statutory
action is not stifled by the order of the court. It was stated that the
land was proposed to be sold but the appellants had made it clear
that they are not going to sell the property. This Court had held in
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 501 where the land
has been acquired for public purpose may be used for another
public purpose; diversion to private purpose is only interdicted.
36
28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the Division
Bench of the High Court has erred in law in quashing the
acquisition. We set aside the order passed by the Division Bench of
the High Court and restore that of the Single Bench. The appeal is
allowed. Parties to bear their costs.
……..……………………..J.
(ARUN MISHRA)
……….……………………J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 24, 2017.
37
ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.10 SECTION XVI
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s).461/2009
KOLKATA METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Appellant(s)
VERSUS
PRADIP KUMAR GHOSH & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 24-10-2017 This appeal was called on for pronouncement
of judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Ms. Anindita Gupta,Adv.
Ms. Kumud L. Das,Adv.
Mr. Rajesh Srivastava,AOR
For Respondent(s)
State Mr. Soumitra G. Chaudhuri,Adv.
Mr. Chanchal Kumar Ganguli,AOR
Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair,AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra pronounced the Reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed Reportable judgment. Parties to bear their own costs.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sarita Purohit) (Tapan Kumar Chakraborty)
Court Master Branch Officer
(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)