Allahabad High Court
Lalsar vs Rohit Kumar Maurya, Tehsildar, ... on 31 January, 2020
Author: Abdul Moin
Bench: Abdul Moin
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH AFR Court No. - 22 Case :- CONTEMPT No. - 249 of 2020 Applicant :- Lalsar Opposite Party :- Rohit Kumar Maurya, Tehsildar, Balrampur Counsel for Applicant :- Alok Kumar Tripathi,Anurakt Singh,Deepak Kumar Pandey Hon'ble Abdul Moin,J.
1. Heard.
2. The present contempt petition has been filed alleging non compliance of the judgment and order dated 18.12.2018 passed by writ Court in Writ Petition No. 36399 (MS) of 2018 Inre; Lalsar and Anr Vs. Tehsildar (Judicial), District Balrampur and ors, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the petition. By the said order, the writ Court had directed the Court concerned for expediting the proceedings of impleadment application dated 14.11.2017 and also the proceeding of case under Section 34 of the U.P Land Revenue Act and to decide the same within a specified time in case there is no legal impediment. It is contended that the copy of the said order was served upon in the Court of officer concerned on 28.12.2018 and since then despite lapse of more than a year and despite lapse of the time framed by the writ Court neither the impleadment application has been decided nor the said case has been decided and, consequently the officer concerned runs in contempt of the order of writ Court dated 18.12.2018.
3. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant and having perused the records including the order sheet of the said case which has been filed as annexure 3 to the petition it comes out that invariably the lawyers have been abstaining from work. On a few occasion the officer has also been busy in administrative work apart from the fact that the officer concerned has also been transferred. Once this Court had directed for deciding of the case within a period of four months provided there is no legal impediment yet taking into consideration the aforesaid circumstances of no work having taken place invariably on account of lawyer's strike it cannot be said that there is any deliberate and willful disobedience and defiance of the order passed by the writ Court dated 18.12.2018.
4. Taking into consideration the repeated strikes of lawyers, learned counsel for the applicant was asked as to whether he would like to implead the Bar Association as a party inasmuch as it is the Advocates who are standing as an impediment in compliance of the judgment and order 18.12.2018 passed by this Court as the matter pending before the Tehsildar concerned could not proceed on account of repeated strikes. However, learned counsel for the applicant outrightly refused to implead the Bar Association as party.
4. In this view of the matter, the Court may peruse the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court per which there has to be deliberate and wilful disobedience by the contemnor in order to to make out a case for contempt.
5. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Debabrata Bandopadbyay and others versus State of West Bengal and another reported in AIR 1969 SC 189 has held as under :-
"9. A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as the judge of the accusation. It behoves the court to act with as great circumspection as possible making all allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemner must be punished. It must be realised that our system of courts often results in delay of one kind or another. The remedy for it is reform and punishment departmentally. Punishment under the law of contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one's duty and in defiance of authority. To take action in an unclear case is to make the law of contempt do duty for other measures and is not to be encouraged."
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.K. Kar versus The Hon'ble the Chief Justice and his companion Justices of the Orissa High Court and others reported in AIR 1961 SC 1367 has held as under :-
"7. Before a subordinate court can be found guilty of disobeying the order of the superior court and thus to have committed contempt of court, it is necessary to show that the disobedience was intentional. .................. There may perhaps be a case where an order disobeyed could be reasonably construed in two ways and the subordinate court construed it in one of those ways but in a way different from that intended by the superior court. Surely, it cannot be said that disobedience of the order by the subordinate court was contempt of the superior court."
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Niaz Mohammad and others versus State of Haryana and others reported in 1994 (6) SCC 332 has held as under :-
"9 . Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') defines "Civil Contempt" to mean "willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a court...". Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of the court made in favour of the party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction has been made can move the Court for initiating proceeding for contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under CPC. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order. The Court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied and carried out the direction of the Court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for non compliance of the direction of a court the Court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was willful and intentional. The Civil Court while executing a decree against the judgment debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was willful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may be consequences thereof. But wile examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the Court has to record a finding that such disobedience was willful and intentional."
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrityunjoy Das and another versus Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and others reported in 2002 (3) SCC 739 has held as under :-
"13. Before however, proceeding with the matter any further, be it noted that exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act shall have to be rather cautious and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true effect of the contemptuous conduct. The Court must otherwise come to a conclusion that the conduct complained of tentamounts to obstruction of justice which if allowed, would even permeate in our society (vide Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Anr.). This is a special jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts to punish an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law. It is in this context that the observations of the this Court in Murray's case (supra) in which one of us (Banerjee, J.) was party needs to be noticed.
"The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be led to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by Courts of Law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged by the people for what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence which even can remotely be termed to affect the majesty of law, the society is bound to lose confidence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit the trust and confidence of the people in general."
14. The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed at this juncture viz., the burden and standard of proof. The common English phrase "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the 'standard of proof', be it noted that a proceeding under the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act is quasi criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. The observations of Lord Denning in Re Bramblevale 1969 3 All ER 1062 lend support to the aforesaid. Lord Denning in Re Bramblevale stated:
"A contempt of court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it,. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the timehonoured phrase, it must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not proved by showing that, when the man was asked about it, he told lies. There must be some further evidence to incriminate him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies can be thrown into the scale against him. But there must be some other evidence.... Where there are two equally consistent possibilities open to the Court, it is not right to hold that the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt."
15. In this context, the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Archana Guha v. Ranjit Guha Neogi 1989 (II) CHN 252 in which one of us was a party (Banerjee, J.) seem to be rather apposite and we do lend credence to the same and thus record our concurrence therewith.
16. In The Aligarh Municipal Board and Others v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union and Others MANU/SC/0075/1970 : 1970CriL J1520 , this Court in no uncertain term stated that in order to bring home a charge of contempt of court for disobeying orders of Courts, those who assert that the alleged contemners had knowledge of the order must prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. This Court went on to observe that in case of doubt, the benefit ought to go to the person charged.
17. In a similar vein in V.G. Nigam and others v. Kedar Nath Gupta and another MANU/SC/0419/1992 : 1992CriL J3576 , this Court stated that it would be rather hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the authorities in exercise of contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities.
18. Having discussed the law on the subject, let us thus at this juncture analyse as to whether in fact, the contempt alleged to have been committed by the alleged contemners, can said to have been established firmly without there being any element of doubt involved in the matter and that the Court would not be acting on mere probabilities having however, due regard to the nature of jurisdiction being quasi criminal conferred on to the law courts. Admittedly, this Court directed maintenance of status quo with the following words - "the members of the petitioner-Sangha who were before the High Court in the writ petition out of which the present proceedings arise". And it is on this score the applicant contended categorically that the intent of the Court to include all the members presenting the Petition before this Court whereas for the Respondent Mr. Ray contended that the same is restricted to the members who filed the writ petition before the High Court which culminated in the initiation of proceeding before this Court. The Counter affidavit filed by the Respondents also record the same. The issue thus arises as to whether the order stands categorical to lend credence to the answers of the respondent or the same supports the contention as raised by the applicants herein - Incidentally, since the appeal is pending in this Court for adjudication, and since the matter under consideration have no bearing on such adjudication so far as the merits of the dispute are concerned, we are not expressing any opinion in the matter neither we are required to express opinion thereon, excepting however, recording that probabilities of the situation may also warrant a finding, in favour of the interpretation of the applicant. The doubt persists and as such in any event the respondents being the alleged contemners are entitled to have the benefit or advantage of such a doubt having regard to the nature of the proceeding as noticed herein before more fully."
9. What comes out from a perusal of the aforesaid judgements is that for an act of contempt to be made out against the contemnor, there has to be a deliberate and wilfull disobedience and defiance of the order passed by a Court of law, the directions which are alleged to have been violated should be unambiguous and passing of an order in purported compliance of the order passed by a Court of law would give rise to a fresh cause of action.
10. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussions and the law in this regard, it cannot be said that there is any deliberate or wilful disobedience of the judgement and order dated 18.12.2018 passed by the writ Court.
11. Accordingly, the contempt petition is dismissed.
Order Date :- 31.1.2020 Pachhere/-
(Abdul Moin, J.)