Kerala High Court
Saheer Muhammed vs State Of Kerala on 12 November, 2025
Author: C.S.Dias
Bench: C.S.Dias
CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 1
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS
WEDNESDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2025 / 21ST KARTHIKA, 1947
CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020
CRIME NO.1508/2016 OF CANTONMENT POLICE STATION,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
IN CC NO.188 OF 2018 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST
CLASS -III, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
PETITIONER/ACCUSED:
SAHEER MUHAMMED
AGED 38 YEARS
S/O.MUHAMMED, KARAKUNNU, NEAR SALAFI MASJID,
ERANAD TALUK, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.
BY ADV SRI.P.RAHUL
RESPONDENTS/STATE AND DEFACTO COMPLAINANT:
1 STATE OF KERALA
(SHO, CANTONMENT POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
DISTRICT), REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
2 P.K.SREEMATHI TEACHER,
AGED 71 YEARS
EDATHIL, ATHIYADAM, PAYANGADI, KANNUR-670303.
BY SMT.SEETHA S, SR.PP
THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
12.11.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 2
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ORDER
Dated this the 12th day of November, 2025 The petitioner is the accused in C.C.No.188/2018 pending before the Court of the Judicial First-Class Magistrate-III, Thiruvananthapuram ('Trial Court', in short). The case arises from Crime No.1508/2016 registered by the Cantonment Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, alleging the commission of the offence punishable under Section 469 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity, 'IPC').
2. The prosecution's case, in essence, is as follows:
On 27.03.2010, the Special Private Secretary of the de facto complainant (2nd respondent - former Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Government of Kerala) had submitted a complaint to the Director General of Police, Kerala, alleging that some miscreants had registered a domain under the name 'sreemathiteacher.com' and had published derogatory comments against the 2 nd CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 3 2025:KER:86054 respondent. The miscreants had provided video links for downloading the speeches of the 2 nd respondent from other websites. Using another person's name for registering the URL address and using the personal caricature of the 2nd respondent proves the mala fide intention. The complaint was forwarded to the Office of the Circle Inspector of Police, Cyber Crime Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, who registered Crime No.8/2010 under Section 469 of IPC and Section 66A(a) and (b) of the Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008 (for short, 'IT Act'). During the course of the investigation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by judgment dated 24.03.2015 in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India [2015 KHC 4230], struck down Section 66A of the IT Act and Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act as unconstitutional. Consequently, the Cyber Crime Police transferred the investigation to the present Investigating Officer as per the orders of the Inspector of Police. Accordingly, the present crime has been registered against the petitioner.CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 4
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3. I have heard Sri. P. Rahul, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Smt. Seetha S, the learned Public Prosecutor.
4. Sri. P. Rahul contends that, even if the allegations in Annexure A First Information Report and Annexure B Final Report are taken on their face value, the same will not attract the offence under Section 469 of IPC. According to him, in addition to proving that the petitioner made the electronic record, the prosecution has to also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner created the electronic record with a dishonest intention, knowing that it does not belong to him and without the authority of the person in whose name it was made. The learned counsel submits that a reading of Annexures A and B substantiates that there are no materials to prove that the petitioner had created the electronic record with a dishonest intention to impersonate the 2 nd respondent. Therefore, even if the petitioner undergoes the ordeal of the trial, there is no likelihood of the petitioner being CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 5 2025:KER:86054 convicted. The learned counsel places reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohammed Ibrahim and Others v. State of Bihar and Another [2009 KHC 1009] and the decisions of this Court in Damodara Panicker and Another v. State of Kerala and Another [2019 (3) KHC 514] and Manmohan Shenoy D and Others v. State of Kerala and Others [2019 (4) KHC 482], to bolster his contentions. He urges that Annexures A and B may be quashed.
5. The learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposes the Crl. M.C. She draws the attention of this Court to the specific allegations in the First Information Report, the First Information Statement, the Final Report and the Case Diary. She argues that the above materials, particularly the Mahazar, establish that the petitioner had created the website with a dishonest and malicious intention by uploading the video links of the 2 nd respondent and her personal details. The website explicitly proves that the petitioner had the mens rea to impersonate CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 6 2025:KER:86054 the 2nd respondent. The materials on record unambiguously establish the petitioner's culpability in the crime. The grounds that have been raised in the Crl. M.C are matters to be decided by the Trial Court. Considering the gravity of the offence and the prima facie materials that demonstrate the petitioner's involvement in the crime, this Court may not exercise its inherent powers to quash the proceedings. Hence, the Crl. M.C may be dismissed.
6. The specific case of the prosecution is that a person had created a website in the name of the 2 nd respondent, who was the then Minister for Health and Social Welfare of the Government of Kerala. On the website, the video links for downloading the 2 nd respondent's speeches from other websites, as well as all her personal details, were provided.
7. The trump card of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, even if the allegations in Annexures A and B are taken on their face value, the same will not attract the offence under Section 469 of IPC. CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 7
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8. In light of the above contention, it is necessary to refer to Sections 463, 464 and 469 of the IPC, which are extracted herein below for the sake of convenience, and they read thus:
"463. Forgery:-Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."
"464. Making a false document:- A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record--
First--Who dishonestly or fraudulently--
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document;
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;
(c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed;
or Secondly-- Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly-- Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration;" CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 8
2025:KER:86054 "469. Forgery for purpose of harming reputation;-Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic record forged shall harm the reputation of any party, or knowing that it is likely to be used for that purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
9. As per Sections 463 and 464, if a person makes or transmits a false electronic record, with the intent to cause damage or injury to any person or with the intent to commit fraud, commits the offence under Section 469.
10. Electronic record has been defined in Section 29A of the IPC, which reads as follows:
"29A. Electronic record:- The words "electronic record" shall have the meaning assigned to them in clause (t) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000."
11. In light of the above definition, we have to refer to the definition under Section 2(1)(t) of the IT Act, which reads thus:
"2(1)(t) "electronic record" means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche;"
12. There is no doubt that a website falls within the purview of the definition of electronic record because they are composed of digital files stored on servers. CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 9
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13. While interpreting Section 464 of the IPC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohammed Ibrahim's case (supra) has held as follows:
"10. An analysis of Section 464 of Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories:
A. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed.
B. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person.
C. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration.
11. In short, a person is said to have made a `false document', if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.
12........ ............ ............... When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities.
The first is that he bonafide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of `false documents', it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 10 2025:KER:86054 is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted."
14. The above view has been reiterated by this Court in Damodara Panicker and Manmohan Shenoy's cases (supra).
15. Coming back to the facts of the present case, the prosecution alleges explicitly that the petitioner has made the website in the name of the 2 nd respondent, who was then the Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Government of Kerala.
16. It is not in dispute that the website contains the speeches and personal details of the 2 nd respondent. If the petitioner had, without any dishonest intention created the website, there was no necessity to upload the videos and personal details of the 2nd respondent. If so, the petitioner would have only uploaded his personal information. As the website contains the links to the speeches of the 2nd respondent and her personal details, CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 11 2025:KER:86054 prima facie, it is apparent that the petitioner had the mens rea to commit the offence under Sections 463 and 464 of the IPC, which is punishable under Section 469 of the IPC.
17. It is well-established that this Court has broad plenary powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which corresponds to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to quash criminal proceedings. However, such inherent power, though expansive in nature, is not unbridled or unlimited. They are to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and within the parameters delineated by judicial precedents. One of the elementary principles to quash a criminal proceeding is that, even if allegations in the first information report or the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, the same will not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (Read the decisions in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], Central Bureau of Investigation v. CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 12
2025:KER:86054 Aryan Singh and Others [(2023) 18 SCC 399], Daxaben v. State of Gujarat and Others [(2022) 16 SCC 117] and Monica Kumar and Another v. State of U.P. and Others [(2008) 8 SCC 781]).
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also consistently cautioned that High Courts, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, should not embark upon a "minitrial" or weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within the domain of the Trial Court. The scope of enquiry is confined to whether, on a plain reading of the FIR/complaint and accompanying material, the ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed. (Read the decisions in Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madal Lal Kapoor [(2013) 3 SCC 330] and HMT Watches Ltd. v. Abida M.A. and another [(2015) 11 SCC 776]).
19. In Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) [2025 KHC 6914], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code is extraordinary, but must be exercised sparingly. It is the CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 13 2025:KER:86054 duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil nature and criminal colour has been artificially given to it. Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise requiring adjudication, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial.
20. On an analysis of the allegations and the materials on record, I am prima facie satisfied that the allegations in Annexures A and B, if taken on their face value, attract the offence under Section 469 of the IPC.
21. Furthermore, I find that, although Annexure A First Information Report was registered on 01.12.2016, and Annexure B Final Report was filed on 05.01.2017, the petitioner has filed this Crl. M.C. only on 03.07.2020, that is, after a lapse of more than three and a half years. Moreover, it is also reported that the petitioner has not got himself enlarged on bail. There is no cogent explanation in the Crl. M.C. for the inordinate delay in filing the Crl. M.C. CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 14 2025:KER:86054
22. It is also trite that though no statutory period of limitation is prescribed under Section 582 of BNSS/482 Cr.P.C., the litigant seeking to quash a proceeding must approach the Court within a reasonable time period; if not, he must convincingly address the reasons for the delay. At any rate, the litigant cannot approach this Court at his whim and caprice, merely because no period of limitation is prescribed in the statute. In such cases, the High Court can decline to exercise its inherent jurisdiction.
23. On an overall consideration of the facts and the materials on record, I am not convinced and satisfied that this is a fit case to exercise the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and quash Annexure A First Information Report and Annexure B Final Report and all further proceedings pursuant to it.
In the aforesaid circumstances, I dismiss the Crl. M.C., but by reserving the right of the petitioner to raise all his contentions before the Trial Court, including filing CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 15 2025:KER:86054 an application for discharge, if the charge is not framed. If such application is filed, the same shall be considered untrammelled by any observation made in this order.
Sd/-
C.S.DIAS JUDGE NAB/DKR CRL.MC NO. 3034 OF 2020 16 2025:KER:86054 APPENDIX OF CRL.MC 3034/2020 PETITIONER ANNEXURES ANNEXURE A CERTIFIED COPY OF FIR IN CRIME NO.1508/2016 OF CANTONMENT POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, ATTACHED WITH THE EARLIER FIR REGISTERED BY THE CYBER CRIME POLICE DATED 1.12.2016.
ANNEXURE B CERTIFIED COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT IN CRIME NO.1508/2016 OF CANTONMENT POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DATED 5.1.2017.