Delhi District Court
State vs Chuttan Lal on 2 September, 2023
IN THE COURT OF MS. APOORVA RANA, M.M-10,
DWARKA COURT (SOUTH WEST), NEW DELHI
CNR No. DLSW02-051343-2021
Cr. Case 13438/2021
STATE Vs. CHUTTAN LAL
FIR No. 117/2021
P.S Kapashera
02.09.2023
JUDGMENT
Case No. : 13438/2021 Date of commission of offence : 28.03.2021
Date of institution of the case : 25.10.2021
Name of the complainant : Sh. Vinod Kumar
Name of accused and address : Chuttan Lal
S/o Sh. Mahender
Singh Jha
R/o H-Block, Taxi
Stand, Vikaspuri,
New Delhi.
Offence complained of or proved : U/s 279/338 IPC Plea of the accused : Pleaded not guilty Final order : Acquittal
Date when reserved for judgment : 27.07.2023 Date of judgment : 02.09.2023 State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.1 / 19 BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS FOR DECISION:
1. The present case pertains to prosecution of accused Chuttan Lal (here-in-after referred to as the accused), pursuant to charge sheet filed qua him under Section 279/338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter IPC for sake of brevity) subsequent to the investigation carried out at P.S: Kapashera, in FIR no. 117/2021.
2. It is the case of the prosecution that on 28.03.2021, at about 01.15 p.m, near Bamnoli Cut, Najafgarh-Kapashera Road, Kapashera, New Delhi, within the jurisdiction of PS Kapashera, the accused was found driving one Swift Desire Car bearing registration no. DL3CAH1888, in a manner so rash or negligent so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others. Due to this act of the accused, his aforesaid vehicle hit against one motorcycle bearing no. HR76D6855 being driven by the complainant/victim Vinod Kumar, resulting in grievous injuries to him. Consequently, an FIR was registered in the present case and after investigation, the police filed the present charge sheet against the accused for commission of offence punishable u/s 279/338 IPC.
3. Complete set of charge sheet and other documents were supplied to the accused. Notice for offence punishable u/s 279/338 IPC was served upon the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Further, the accused, vide his statement u/s 294 Cr.P.C, had admitted the genuineness of copy State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.2 / 19 of FIR No. 117/2021 alongwith certficate u/s 65B of IEA Ex. A1(colly).
MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN BRIEF:
4. The prosecution, in support of the present case has examined five witnesses in total.
5. PW-1 was Sh. Vinod Kumar, who deposed that he resided at the aforementioned address along with his family and used to work as security person at IOC Bijwasan. That, on 28.03.2021, when he was going from his house to IOC Bijwasan for duty, at about 1.30 p.m., when he had reached on Najafgarh- Bijwasan road near the road going towards Village Bamdoli, a Swift Desire Car of white colour bearing registration No.1888 suddenly came at a fast pace, being driven by its driver in a negligent manner, who tried to turn his car at a point where the divider was broken, and hit his motorcycle bearing No.6855, resulting in injuries to him. He had seen the accused who was travelling with his family. The accused took him to a private doctor and information regarding the incident was given to his family. The said PW further deposed that after sometime, his wife Savita also came to the place of the said private doctor at Gurugram and at that time, the accused left from there. His wife then took him to Signature Hospital, Gurugram, Haryana. Through him, the photographs of the offending vehicle were exhibited as Ex. PW1/A(colly), his statement was exhibited as Ex. PW1/B, arrest memo was exhibited as Ex. PW1/C and State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.3 / 19 photographs of the motorcycle were exhibited as Ex. PW1/D (colly).
6. PW-2 was Dr. Soumya Shrikanta, who deposed that on 28.03.2021, he had medically examined the injured Mr. Vinod Kumar vide MLC No. 206 dated 28.03.2021. Thereafter, she further deposed that injuries sustained by the injured were found grievous in nature. Through her, relevant MLC was exhibited as Ex. PW2/A.
7. PW-3 was Ct. Ankur Yadav, who deposed that on 28.03.2020, he was on emergency duty. His duty timings were from 8.00 a.m. to 8.00 p.m. On that day upon receiving DD No.37 A, he along with HC Rambir Meena went to the spot but they did not find anyone present at the spot. No eye witness of any incident was found. Thereafter upon receiving DD No.72 A, the IO along with him went to the Signature Hospital, Dwarka Express Way Gurugram where they found injured Vinod Kumar, who was under treatment. Statement of the injured could not be recorded as he was in pain. The MLC was not prepared at that time, hence, the call was kept pending. Thereafter on 29.03.2021, he along with IO HC Rambir Meena went to Signature Hospital, Dwarka Express Way, Gurugram where the MLC No.206/2021 of the injured was received by the IO wherein the nature of injuries were mentioned as 'K/U/O' by the doctors. The doctors declared the patient fit for statement. Thereafter, the said PW deposed with respect to the investigation carried out by the IO in the present matter. Through him, seizure memo was exhibited as State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.4 / 19 Ex. PW3/A.
8. PW-4 was HC Ramvir Singh, who deposed that on 28.03.2021, he received DD no.37A regarding accident. Thereafter, he along with Ct. Ankur went to Najafgarh Kapashera Road near Bamdoli cut where neither any eye witness nor any vehicle was found. He came back at PS. Thereafter, in the night he received DD no.72A, after which, he along with Ct. Ankur went to Signature Hospital, Gurgaon. There they met the complainant Vinod Kumar. The MLC of Vinod Kumar was not ready at that time and he was suffering from pain and therefore could not give statement. Thereafter they came back to PS. On the next day he along with Ct. Ankur again went to Signature Hospital and obtained the MLC of Vinod Kumar and Vinod Kumar also gave his statement. Thereafter, the said PW deposed with respect to the investigation carried out in the present matter. Through him, rukka was exhibited as Ex. PW4/A, site plan was exhibited as Ex. PW4/B, notice served to owner of offending vehicle was exhibited as Ex. PW4/C, seizure memo of car was exhibited as Ex. PW4/D, seizure memo of documents was exhibited as Ex. PW4/E and seizure memo of DL slip was exhibited as Ex. PW4/F.
9. PW-5 was Sh. Jiten Sharma, who deposed that during investigation of this case, he had conducted the mechanical inspection of vehicle nos. DL3CAH1888 (Maruti Suzuki Swift Desire Car) and vehicle no. HR76D6855 (Bajaj Platina Black Colour motorcycle). Thereafter, he had prepared State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.5 / 19 his reports. Through him, mechanical inspected report of Maruti Suzuki Swife Desire Car was exhibited as Ex. PW5/A and mechanical inspected report of Bajaj Platina Black Colour Motorcycle was exhibited as Ex. PW5/B.
10. On account of admission of accused u/s 294 Cr.P.C, PW at serial no. 6 DO HC Subhash Chand, as per list of prosecution witnesses was dropped from the list of prosecution witnesses and the formal proof of the documents sought to be proved by him was dispensed with.
11. No other PW was left to be examined, hence, P.E was closed.
STATEMENT OF ACCUSED U/S 313 Cr.P.C.:
12. Statement of the accused u/s 281 Cr.P.C read with Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded separately in which all the incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence were put to him. The accused controverted and denied the allegations leveled against him and inter alia stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case. Accused further opted to not lead evidence in his defence, hence DE was closed.
FINAL ARGUMENTS:
13. Ld. APP for the State has argued that prosecution witnesses have supported the prosecution case and their State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.6 / 19 testimony has remained unrebutted. It has been further argued that on the combined reading of the testimony of all the prosecution witnesses, offence u/s 279/338 IPC has been proved beyond doubt.
14. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for accused argued that the accused has been falsely implicated in the present case and that there is no evidence against him showing his liability in the present case and thus, he is entitled to be acquitted in the present case. It has also been argued that there are material contradictions and lacunae/inconsistencies in the version of the prosecution due to which the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused.
APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE AND CONSEQUENT FINDINGS QUA OFFENCE U/S 279/338 IPC:
15. Arguments adduced by Ld. APP for State and accused have been heard. The evidence and documents on record have been carefully perused.
16. I have bestowed my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by both the parties. Accused Chuttan Lal has been indicted for the offence u/s 279/338 IPC. Section 279 IPC provides punishment for offence of driving a vehicle in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person; and section 338 IPC provides punishment for causing grievous hurt to any person State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.7 / 19 by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others. To drive home the guilt of the accused under section 279/338 IPC in road accident cases, following ingredients are required to be proved:- a). That the accused was the person who was driving the offending vehicle at the time when the accident occurred. b). That the accused drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. c). That grievous hurt to the victim was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by way of rash and negligent driving of the accused. It must be causa causians - the immediate cause, and not enough that it may be causa sine qua non - proximate cause. (Ref. Suleman Rahiman Mulam v. State of Maharasthra AIR 1968 SC 829; Ambalal D Bhatt v State of Gujarat AIR 1972 SC 1150).
17. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions indicates that the main ingredient upon which the said offence hinges upon is that the act of the accused should be done in a rash or negligent manner. These words "Rash" and "Negligent" have not been defined in the IPC. However, the meaning of the said terms have been exhaustively delineated by way of various judicial pronouncements. In Empress v. Idu Beg, (1881) ILR 3 All 776, Straight, J. made the following pertinent observations which have been quoted with approval by various Courts, including the Apex Court:
"Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused.State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.8 / 19
The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted".
Similarly, in Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam vs State Of Andhra Pradesh (2000 SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court has inter alia held the following:
"A rash act is primarily an over hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution."
Again, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Rathnashalvan vs State Of Karnataka (2007 SC) that:
"Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow but with the hope that it will not. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are determining factors. A question whether the accused's conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.9 / 19 circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider it to be sufficient considering all the circumstances of the case. Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause injury but done without any intention to cause injury or knowledge that it would probably be caused."
18. It is trite law that the burden always lies upon the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence and that the law does not permit the court to punish the accused on the basis of moral conviction or on account of suspicion alone. Also, it is well settled that accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt in the prosecution story and such doubt entitles him to acquittal.
19. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it may be noted at the every outset, that the entire case of prosecution pivots upon the testimony of PW1, i.e., the complainant himself, who deposed that on 28.03.2021, while going from his home to IOC Bijwasan for duty, when he reached near the road going towards Bamdoli on Najafgarh-Bijwasan road, a Swift Dzire car bearing registration no. 1888 suddenly came at a fast pace, being driven by its driver/accused in a negligent manner, who tried to turn the car at a point where the divider on the road was broken and hit the motorcycle of PW1, who fell down and sustained injuries. Now, from perusal of the testimony of the various prosecution witnesses as well as the overall defence taken by the accused in the present matter, including at the time of recording of statement of accused under section 281 read with section 313 State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.10 / 19 of Cr.P.C., it can be conclusively said that the accident in question had occurred; that the complainant/victim had sustained injuries owing to the said accident; and that the accused was the driver of the offending car at the relevant time. Even otherwise, during the entire course of evidence, the aforesaid facts have not even been once denied on behalf of the accused.
20. In such a scenario, where the fact, that the accident had occurred resulting in injuries to the complainant and his wife, as alleged, and that the accused was the driver of the offending vehicle at the relevant time, has been proved, the following issue remains to be determined:
(i) Whether the said accident was caused by the rash and negligent act of attributable to the accused by virtue of his being the driver of the offending vehicle at the relevant time.
21. To establish the aforesaid fact, the only witness whose testimony is relevant in this regard is that of PW1 himself, who was the complainant /victim and sole eye witness in the case. However, a careful reading of his testimony, alongwith testimony of the IO and other prosecution witnesses, brings to light certain glaring inconsistencies and lacunae in the prosecution case, as discussed hereinafter.
a. First and foremost, it is pertinent to note that there is a delay of about one and half days in the registration of FIR in State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.11 / 19 the present case as, the date of incident is reported to be 28.03.2021 at around 01:30 PM, while the FIR came to be registered only on 29.03.2021 at about 08:45 PM. Now, while the IO deposed that the victim could not give his statement on the very first day as he was in pain owing to his injuries, the same is not corroborated by record in as much as it is not the case of the prosecution that the doctor had declared the victim unfit for giving his statement on 28.03.2021 itself. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that the victim was not in a medically fit condition to give his statement on the very first day itself. This discrepancy has thus remained unexplained on behalf of the prosecution. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled as Dilawar Singh vs State Of Delhi (2007 SC):
"8. In criminal trial one of the cardinal principles for the Court is to look for plausible explanation for the delay in lodging the report. Delay sometimes affords opportunity to the complainant to make deliberation upon the complaint and to make embellishment or even make fabrications. Delay defeats the chance of the unsoiled and untarnished version of the case to be presented before the Court at the earliest instance. That is why if there is delay in either coming before the police or before the Court, the Courts always view the allegations with suspicion and look for satisfactory explanation. If no such satisfaction is formed, the delay is treated as fatal to the prosecution case."
b. Furthermore, the allegations regarding the rash and negligent act on part of the accused appear to have been State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.12 / 19 constituted from the fact that the offending vehicle, being driven by the accused, suddenly came at a high speed and while being negligently driven by its driver and struck against the motorcycle of the complainant/victim. However, how the complainant/PW1 arrived at this conclusion of offending vehicle being driven at a high speed is obscure. It is not the case of the prosecution that the IO had observed any skid marks/tyre marks on the accident spot or that he had examined any speed checker/radar installed in/around the spot to ascertain the approximate speed of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident and had thereby concluded that the offending vehicle was being driven at a speed higher than the prescribed limit. In fact, neither has it surfaced on record as to what was the required speed limit on the road in question, nor has the complainant / injured stated the speed at which the offending vehicle was being driven. In such circumstances, it would be improper to impute allegations to the effect that the offending vehicle was speeding past the limit on the route on which it was being driven. Other than this, PW1 has failed to delineate any other manner in which the accused was driving the offending vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the complainant that the driver of the offending vehicle was trying to turn his car at a point where the driver divider was broken, however, there is nothing on record to suggest that such a turn was not permissible at that place on the road. It is also not the case that the offending vehicle was being driven on the wrong side in doing so or had jumped the traffic signal there, or the anything of the like. Moreover, it is beyond comprehension as to how the victim gained knowledge of the fact that the offending State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.13 / 19 vehicle was trying to make a turn from the point where the divider was broken on the road, as the place marked at point 'B' on the site plan Ex. PW4/B in no manner, prima facie indicates such a scenario. Now, it is trite law that allegations regarding the offending vehicle being driven at high speed alone, in itself cannot tantamount to act of rashness or negligence. In this regard, it would be apposite to advert to the ruling of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Satish (1998) 8 SCC 493, wherein, the following was observed:-
"4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur"."
Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Abdul Subhan Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2006 Delhi HC, observed as follows:-
"The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court make it more than clear that a mere allegation of high-speed would not tantamount to rashness or negligence. In the present case also, I find that apart from the allegation that the truck was being driven State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.14 / 19 at a very high-speed there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner acted in a manner which could be regarded as rash or negligent. In any event there is no description or approximation of what was the speed at which the truck was being driven. The expression "high-speed" could range from 30 km per hour to over 100 km per hour. It is not even known as to what the speed limit on Mathura Road was and whether the petitioner was exceeding that speed limit. Therefore, in the absence of material facts it cannot be said, merely because there is an allegation that the petitioner was driving the truck at a high-speed, that the petitioner is guilty of a rash or negligent act. Clearly the petitioner cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of PW 3 which itself suffers from various ambiguities."
Therefore, in light of the aforesaid observations, it is amply clear that mere allegation of the offending vehicle being driven at a high speed alone, would not suffice to draw an inference of act of rashness or negligence by the accused. Specific and cogent evidence has to be led by the prosecution in order to drive home this point by establishing the manner in which the offending vehicle was being driven, which is missing in the present case. No other attending circumstances as well are either apparent from record or from testimonies of victims in the case, as would necessarily point to negligence of accused being a logical conclusion rather than it being proved by providing an outright demonstration thereof.
c. Furthermore, there is discrepancy in the manner in which the accident is stated to have occurred. During his cross- examination, PW1/complainant deposed that the offending vehicle had hit his motorcycle from its front and the front part of the motorcycle cycle had suffered damaged owing to the same.
State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.15 / 19He further deposed that the offending vehicle had hit his motorcycle from the front driver's side wheel of the car. If aforesaid manner of occurrence of the incident is to be assumed, it would be appropriate to infer in the normal course of events, that the front part of the offending vehicle would have struck against motorcycle and thus, the damage that would have been sustained by the two vehicles owing to this collision would have been on their aforesaid respective sides. However, quite surprisingly, and in contrast to the above version of the complainant, the mechanical inspection report of the offending vehicle, Ex. PW5/A, mentions damage on both the right hand side doors of the said vehicle. In fact, during his testimony, mechanical inspector/PW5 deposed that there was no damage on the front or the back side of the offending car. Thus, the description of the damage on the offending vehicle as per the said report is irreconcilable with the actual damage which should have been reported on the said vehicle, if the version of the complainant in this regard was to be taken into consideration. Even the photographs of the offending car placed on record, exhibit no visible damage on the front portion of the car, which ideally should have been found damaged had the accident in question occurred in the alleged manner.
d. Additionally, certain discrepancies have also crept in the case of the prosecution as discussed hereinafter. Firstly, the site plan seems to have been prepared by the IO in a very perfunctory manner, without disclosing the actual state of affairs as led to the collision between the vehicles in question. Nowhere State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.16 / 19 does the site plan Ex. PW 4/B show the direction from which the offending vehicle was coming, or the direction in which the vehicle of the complainant was moving. Further, the site plan has admittedly not been prepared by the IO at the instance of the victim which is a material dereliction on part of the IO and thus, the portrayal of facts thereupon cannot be relied upon as being the apt and proper depiction thereof. The genuineness and correctness of the preparation of site plan is thus clouded with suspicion. Much importance has been rendered to proper preparation of site plan of the spot in cases of accident by various Hon'ble High Courts and the Hon'ble Apex Court, with one such ruling relied upon, being, Abdul Sudhan Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2006 Delhi HC. The aforesaid lacunae create a fatal dent in the prosecution story, rendering the version of the complainant as well as the prosecution improbable.
22. To further add to the woes of the prosecution, the IO failed to join any public person as a witness in the present case. The accident in question evidently appears to have occurred at a public place and during day time, despite which no passerby or any other person has been interrogated / examined during the entire course of investigation, let alone, having been made as a witness in the case. It is the version of PW1/complainant that the accused was travelling with his family, however no such family member of the accused has also been examined by the IO during the course of investigation. This court is conscious of the legal position that non-joining of independent witnesses cannot be the sole ground to discard or doubt the prosecution case, as has been State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.17 / 19 held in Appabhai and another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC
696. However, evidence in every case is to be sifted through in light of the varied facts and circumstances of each individual case. As observed above, the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses in the present case is not worthy of credit. In such a situation, evidence of an independent witness would have rendered the much needed corroborative value, to the otherwise uncompelling case of the prosecution, as discussed above. The absence of independent witness of the accident in question further raises suspicion about the genuineness of the allegations and the actual manner of occurrence of the accident due to the rash and negligent act of the accused. Further, there aren't even any photographs of the spot on the record.
23. Apart from the above, the testimony of no other wit- ness touches upon the aspect of the incident in question having been actually witnessed by anyone or the accused being defi- nitely responsible for the accident in question. Though, it appears that the victim has suffered injuries as mentioned in in his MLC, the prosecution has not been able to prove with certitude that the same were a result of the accident which had occurred due to rash and negligent act of the accused. In view of the glaring em- bellishments in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, the possibility that the accused has been falsely implicated for the aforesaid offence, cannot be ruled out and prosecution cannot be said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.18 / 1924. There is no gainsaying that if two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede to the existence of a reasonable doubt. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to bring on record any cogent evidence in order to prove the commission of and guilt of the accused for offence u/s 279/338 IPC beyond reasonable doubt, thus, entitling the accused person to benefit of doubt and acquittal.
25. Accordingly, this Court hereby accords the benefit of doubt to the accused for the offence u/s 279/338 IPC and holds the accused not guilty of commission of the said offence. Accused Chuttan Lal is thus, acquitted of the offence u/s 279/338 IPC.
27. Copy of this judgment be given free of cost to the accused.
Announced in the open court APOORVA Digitally signed by APOORVA RANA on 02.09.2023, in presence of DN: c=IN, o=DELHI DISTRICT COURT, ou=DWARKA DISTRICT COURTS, 2.5.4.20=e44f370ed24181afbc2552a0a075c9cf689ff4e8 6802cbb6c9139ae70e7949dc, postalCode=110075, accused and Ld. Counsel for RANA st=Delhi, serialNumber=457f315065357ee9f2e1d748229faa4332 02ffd2fbde3dd6e840c4f724c62ed4, cn=APOORVA accused.
RANA Date: 2023.09.02 16:50:49 -08'00' (APOORVA RANA) M.M-10/Dwarka Courts/02.09.2023 It is certified that this judgment contains 19 pages, all signed by the undersigned. APOORVA Digitally signed by APOORVA RANA DN: c=IN, o=DELHI DISTRICT COURT, ou=DWARKA DISTRICT COURTS, 2.5.4.20=e44f370ed24181afbc2552a0a075c9cf689ff4e86802 RANA cbb6c9139ae70e7949dc, postalCode=110075, st=Delhi, serialNumber=457f315065357ee9f2e1d748229faa433202ffd 2fbde3dd6e840c4f724c62ed4, cn=APOORVA RANA Date: 2023.09.02 16:51:32 -08'00' (APOORVA RANA) M.M-10/Dwarka Courts/02.09.2023 State Vs. Chuttan Lal Page Nos.19 / 19