State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Reliance General Insurance Co.Ltd. vs M/S. Shri Pariyojna Nirman Pvt.Ltd. on 11 August, 2015
CHHATTISGARH STATE
CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
PANDRI, RAIPUR (C.G).
Appeal No.FA/15/366
Instituted on : 17.07.2015
Reliance General Insurance Company Limited,
5th Floor, National Corporate Park, G.E. Road,
Raipur (C.G.) .... Appellant
Vs.
M/s Shri Pariyojna Niram Private Limited,
Urdana Chowk, Raigarh (C.G.),
Through : Director - Vikram Rateriya,
S/o Natwar Rateriya, Aged 29 years,
Raigarh (C.G.) ..... Respondent
PRESENT :
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE R.S. SHARMA, PRESIDENT
HON'BLE MISS HEENA THAKKAR, MEMBER
HON'BLE SHRI D.K. PODDAR, MEMBER HON'BLE SHRI NARENDRA GUPTA, MEMBER COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES :
Shri Manoj Prasad, for the appellant.
ORAL ORDER DATED : 11/08/2015 PER :- HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE R.S. SHARMA, PRESIDENT.
This appeal is directed against the order dated 29.11.2014, passed by District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Raigarh (C.G.) (henceforth "District Forum") in Complaint Case No.64/2014, whereby the complaint of the respondent (complainant), has been allowed and the appellant (O.P.) has been directed to pay compensation to the respondent (complainant), as mentioned in para 12 of the impugned order.
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2. The appellant (O.P.) has preferred this appeal against the impugned order dated 29.11.2014, passed by the District Forum and has filed an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal. The appeal is belated by 6 months and 19 days.
3. We have heard arguments of Manoj Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant (O.P.) on the application filed for condonation of delay in filing appeal.
4. In Revision Petition No.1616 of 2011 - National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Shri P. Rangaswamy & anr., decided on 11.11.2013, Hon'ble National Commission held thus :
"8. In Ram Lal & others Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed :-
It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.".
9. In R.B. Ramlingam vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed thus ;
// 3 // We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal / petition.
10. Hon'ble Supreme Court after exhaustively considering the case law on the aspect of condonation of delay in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 as under ;
We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.
5. In Basavraj & Anr. V. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient"
embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona // 4 // fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee &Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A.Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v. Veena alias Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150 : (2011 AIR SEW 1233); and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629 : (2012 AIR SCW 2412.)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a // 5 // justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
6. In Ludhiana Improvement Trust vs. Ms. Harpreet Kaur, 2013 (4) CPR 848 (NC), Hon'ble National Commission observed thus :-
"11. Hon'ble Apex Court in Post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563, has not condoned delay in filing appeal even by Government department and further observed that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government departments.
Thus, it becomes clear that there is no reasonable explanation at all for condonation of inordinate delay of 62 days. In such circumstances, application for condonation of delay has been dismissed. As application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, revision petition being barred by limitation is also liable to be dismissed."
7. In N. Manohar Reddy v. Happy Farm and Resorts, I (2014) CPJ 149 (NC), Hon'ble National Commission observed thus :-
"16. This Section does not help a person who is guilty of negligence, laches or inaction. The test of good faith is real and bona fide belief of the plaintiff that he could institute the proceedings in the Court where he first instituted it.
25. It is well settled that "sufficient cause" for non-appearance in each case, is a question of fact. Delhi High Court in New Bank of India v. M/s Marvels (India), 93 (2001) DLT 558, has held :
// 6 // No doubt the words 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. However, when it is found that the applicants were most negligent in defending the case and their non-action and want of bona fide are clearly imputable, the Court would not help such a party. After all 'sufficient cause' is an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guidelines can be given and Court has to decide on the facts of each case as to whether the defendant who has suffered ex parte decree has been able to satisfactorily show sufficient cause for non-appearance and in examining this aspect cumulative effect of all the relevant factors is to be seen.
26. In Ram Lal and Ors. v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed :
It is however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.
30. Decision of Anshul Aggarwal (supra), has been reiterated in Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC) wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :
4. This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the special Courts / Tribunals have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the Court // 7 // must keep in mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute(s).
5. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the Legislature for filing the special petition.
Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay.
6. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay." [See also Amarjyothi House Building Co-operative Society Limited v. V.S. Pradeep, I (2014) CPJ 438 (NC)."
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), has laid down that :
"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras."
9. Shri Manoj Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the appellant (O.P)., has argued that the impugned order was passed by the District Forum on 29.11.2014 and its copy was provided on 04.12.2014. The copy of the impugned order was sent by the counsel and the same was sent to its higher authority, Mumbai. It was suggested by the higher Authority, Mumbai to seek legal opinion with regard to filing of the // 8 // appeal from the counsel and to send the entire documents to the concerned counsel. Thereafter the counsel has sent his opinion to the higher authority, Mumbai for final decision with regard to filing of the appeal. Thereafter decision to file an appeal against the order of learned District Forum was taken by the appellant (O.P.) and the entire file was sent to its counsel for drafting of memo appeal and the same was prepared by the counsel and the counsel sent a draft of memo of appeal to higher authority of the appellant (O.P.) and sent a request to concerned department of the appellant (O.P.) for permitting preparation of cheque of Rs.25,000/- in compliance of Proviso of Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and sent entire file to the concerned department. The delay occurred in filing appeal is not deliberate and the same is deserves to be condoned.
10. In Cordcon Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Valerian Anthony Diago & Anr. 2015 (2) CPR 517 (NC), Hon'ble National Commission has observed thus :-
"10. .......Thus, it becomes clear that almost after about 9 months he applied for certified copy of the impugned order inspite of having knowledge of the impugned order. Section 12 (2) of Limitation Act runs as under:
"(2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order // 9 // appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.
Thus, limitation runs from the date of pronouncement/knowledge and is such circumstances limitation for filing appeal started from 10.04.2012 and period taken in obtaining certified copy is to be excluded for the purpose of calculation of condonation of delay.
Apparently , appellant applied for certified copy on 4.01.2013 and he received copy on the same day; hence, only one day for getting certified copy of the impugned order is to be excluded for computation of limitation for filing appeal.
11. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that period of limitation is to be calculated from the date of receiving free copy as provided under Regulation 21 of the C.P. Regulations, 2005. This argument is devoid of force because this provision only directs to the Consumer Fora to give parties free of cost copy of the order, but it nowhere specifies that limitation will run from the date of receipt of free copy. If a party does not receive free copy at all, it cannot be held that limitation will not run against him till he receives certified copy. Limitation will run from the date he obtains knowledge of the order passed by Consumer Fora and only period taken in obtaining certified copy will be excluded. Appellant should have applied for certified copy of order on 10.04.2012, when judgment was pronounced in his presence and as he did not apply for certified copy uptill 4.1.2013, period from 11.4.2012 to 3.1.2013 cannot be excluded from period of limitation provided for filing appeal."
11. The appellant (O.P.) has filed an application for condonation of delay, in which it is mentioned that that the impugned order was // 10 // passed by the District Forum on 29.11.2014 and its copy was provided on 04.12.2014. The copy of the impugned order was sent by the counsel and the same was sent to its higher authority, Mumbai. It was suggested by the higher Authority, Mumbai to seek legal opinion with regard to filing of the appeal from the counsel and to send the entire documents to the concerned counsel. Thereafter the counsel has sent his opinion to the higher authority, Mumbai for final decision with regard to filing of the appeal. Thereafter decision to file an appeal against the order of learned District Forum was taken by the appellant (O.P.) and the entire file was sent to its counsel for drafting of memo appeal and the same was prepared by the counsel and the counsel sent a draft of memo of appeal to higher authority of the appellant (O.P.) and sent a request to concerned department of the appellant (O.P.) for permitting preparation of cheque of Rs.25,000/- in compliance of Proviso of Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and sent entire file to the concerned department. The delay occurred in filing appeal is not deliberate and the same is deserves to be condoned.
12. It is now well settled that departmental and official procedural delays do not constitutes "sufficient ground". It must be borne in mind that Consumer Protection Act, 1986 lays down its own period of limitation. In the instant case, looking to the application filed by the appellant (O.P.) for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and affidavit of Shri Edvin Gardia, Legal Officer, Reliance General // 11 // Insurance Company Ltd., Raipur, filed in support of the said application, it appears that the reasons assigned by the appellant (O.P.) in the said application regarding delay in filing the appeal, are not satisfactory and delay has not been explained properly.
13. The appeal is barred by limitation by 6 months and 19 days, and no proper explanation has been given. Thus, on the facts of the case, the appeal filed by the appellant (O.P.), is barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanation has been given by the appellant (O.P.) in the application for condonation of delay in filing appeal. In the said application, no sufficient ground has been mentioned for condoning the delay in filing the appeal beyond the limitation, therefore, the appeal is barred by time.
14. Thus, the application filed by the appellant (O.P.) for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, is hereby rejected.
Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed.
(Justice R.S. Sharma) (Ms. Heena Thakkar) (D.K. Poddar) (NarendraGupta) President Member Member Member /08/2015 /08/2015 /08/2015 /08/2015