Delhi High Court
Shri Uttam Kumar Bose vs National Capital Territory Of Delhi And ... on 9 August, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(76)DRJ197
Author: R.C. Chopra
Bench: R.C. Chopra
JUDGMENT R.C. Chopra, J.
1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeks quashing of F.I.R. No. 117/2004 registered at Police Station Connaught Place, New Delhi, under Section 420 of the I.P.C. Crl. M. No. 2130/2004 was filed for stay of investigations.
2. Crl. M. Nos. 2615 and 2616/2004 have been filed by respondent No. 2 for dismissing the writ petition and vacating stay order.
3. The facts relevant for the disposal of this petition and applications, briefly stated, are that the petitioner is the Chief Controller of Sahara Airlines Limited. The respondent No. 2-complainant, who is a Commercial Pilot, was working with Indian Airlines from 1972 to 1994 and from 1994 to 1995 with Jet Airways. In September, 1995, he was selected for the post of Commander by Sahara Airlines Limited. On 30th September, 1995, he was issued an appointment letter, one of the terms of which was that on Completion of three years service in Sahara India Airlines, the Management would provide him residential accommodation costing around Rs.36 lacs. This appointment letter was under the signatures of the petitioner. On 18th November, 1995, an addendum was issued by petitioner clarifying to the respondent No. 2 that on completion of his three years of service, the Management would provide him, on ownership basis, a house/flat costing Rs.36 lacs. According to respondent No. 2, after completion of three years of service, he requested the petitioner to provide him residential accommodation on ownership basis as promised but the petitioner did not provide him the same. When he raised this issue in the meetings of the Sahara Airlines, Chaired by the petitioner, he assured him that the Company stands by its commitment and residential accommodation on ownership basis would be provided to him and they were taking action to make provision for it.
4. On 14th November, 2000, the respondent No.2 after completion of five years of service, resigned and demanded his outstanding dues including residential accommodation costing Rs.36 lacs. On 15th November, 2000, his resignation was accepted but no residential accommodation was provided to him as a result of which he filed a Civil Suit No. 398/2001 in the High Court of Delhi. In the said suit, M/s. Sahara Airlines Limited raised a plea that the petitioner herein was not authorised to issue the letter dated 18th November, 1995. In these premises, the respondent No. 2 alleged that the petitioner was in conspiracy with others in M/s. Sahara Airlines Limited and had cheated him by making representations that he would be provided a house costing Rs. 36 lacs ownership basis. It was alleged that the petitioner had dishonest and fraudulent intentions since inception and had made unlawful gain of Rs. 36 lacs by cheating and forgery which came to respondent's notice when in I.A. No. 10878/2003 in Suit No. 398/2001, M/s. Sahara Airlines Limited pleaded that the petitioner was not empowered or authorised to issue the letter dated 18th November, 1995.
5. The petitioner invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court and prays for issuance of appropriate writ/directions quashing the F.I.R. No.117/2004 registered on the basis of the aforesaid complaint of respondent No.2. He pleads that the F.I.R. does not disclose any offence; that it is a purely civil dispute regarding which a civil suit has already been filed and Clause (3) of appointment letter which stipulated the providing of residential accommodation had clarified that benefit would not ensure in the event of the respondent's disassociation with Company for any reason. According to the petitioner, this Clause clearly conveyed that such a big benefit could be made available to respondent No. 2 only if he had continued with the Company till the age of superannuation. According to him, a flat of Rs.36 lacs after three years of service would have meant an additional package of Rs.1 lac per month to respondent No. 2 which was never the intention of the parties. It is asserted that dispute between the parties being civil in nature, the registration of F.I.R. on the complaint of the respondent No. 2 is an abuse of the process of law with a view to pressurise and intimidate the petitioner.
6. The respondent No. 2 has filed a counter affidavit in which he asserts that the F.I.R. in question discloses a cognizable offence. According to him all the ingredients of the offence of cheating are made out and as such there are no grounds for quashing the F.I.R. as prayed. He asserts that the plea taken by M/s. Sahara Airlines in the civil suit filed by respondent No. 2 that the letter dated 18th November, 1995 issued by petitioner was not in pursuance of decision taken by the Management and was in has personal capacity shows mala fides of petitioner. According to respondent No. 2, this plea fully establishes the dishonest and fraudulent intentions of the petitioner to deceive respondent No. 2 from very beginning and as such the offence under Section 20 I.P.C. is clearly made out.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. I have gone through the records.
8. The law is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, F.I.R. or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, the law is equally settled that where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the F.I.R. or complaint may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In the leading case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.; reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, certain guidelines were issued for the exercise of these powers by the Courts. In guideline number 3 it was laid down that where the uncontroverter allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and do not make out a case against the accused, the Court may quash the F.I.R. as well as the investigations. A note of caution was added by observing that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases It was held that the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint.
9. In the case of U. Dhar and others v State of Jharkand and others; reported in (2003) 1 J.I.C. Page 268, the Apex Court while considering a prayer for quashing an order of Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence against the appellants held that the dispute between the parties was a purely civil dispute regarding payment of money and since basic ingredients of the offence were not satisfied, the order taking cognizance of the offence and issuance of summons to the accused was wholly uncalled for and liable to be quashed.
10. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others; , the Apex Court in para 21 of the judgment laid down in no uncertain terms that the police has no unfettered discretion to commence investigations under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot reasonably have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R. prima facie discloses the commission of such offence. It was held that if the F.I.R. does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigations on the basis of information as laid or received. In para 22 of the same judgment, it was further observed that unlimited discretion to the police in the sphere of investigations can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom. Therefore, the power to investigate must be exercised strictly on the condition on which its granted by the Code.
11. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, however, relying upon some judgments contends that it is not a fit case for exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the F.I.R. in question. In the case of Dharma Reddy v. State; reported in 1991 Cri.L.J. page 1476, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh declined to quash the investigations mainly on the ground that the plea of the absence of legal evidence could not be upheld inasmuch as the investigations were still going on. In K. Karunakaran v. State of Kerala; , the Apex Court upheld an order of the High Court and declined to quash criminal proceedings inasmuch as the plea of the appellant that the F.I.R. against him and others was mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations was not sustainable. That was a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act and their Lordships were of the view that the menace of corruption could not be permitted to be hidden under the garb of legal technicalities. The main question before their Lordships was in regard to the legality of a Government order which was the basis for the registration of F.I.R. And investigations in consequence thereof.
12. In the judgments of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill; reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi; and Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. and Ors; reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, the Apex Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. A note of caution was added that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. In the case of Rajesh Bajaj (supra), the issue before the Court was as to whether a case of cheating was made out or not and it was held that in many cases cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and money transactions also and the averments in the complaint prima facie made out a case for investigations by the authorities. In the case of Rupan Deol Bajaj (supra) also the Apex Court did not approve the quashing of the F.I.R. inasmuch as the allegations made therein prima facie made out offences under Sections 354 and 509 I.P.C. Thus, there is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie case is made out, the F.I.R. or the proceedings in consequence thereof cannot be quashed. The judgments in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri; , Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi; and Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada; , relied upon by learned counsel for respondent No. 2 are also on this principle.
13. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has heavily relied upon the judgments of Kamala Devi Aggarwal v. State of West Bengal; reported in 2001 Cri.L.J. 4733, Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar; reported in JT 2001 (1) SC 150 and T.S. Rajamoni v. Randip Barua; reported in 2001 Cri.L.J. 4144, to contend that the mere fact that the dispute is of civil nature cannot be made a ground for quashing an F.I.R. This proposition is also unquestionable for the reason that many times a wrong gives rise to a civil as well as criminal cause of action and in certain cases both the remedies can be simultaneously invoked by an aggrieved person. In every criminal action for cheating or breach of trust, the aggrieved person has a right to invoke civil remedy also but reverse is not true for the reason that on every civil action a criminal offence is not made out. As such the High Court would not have any justification to quash an F.I.R. or a complaint merely on the ground that the dispute gives rise to a civil action also. However, where the wrong appears to be purely civil and the F.I.R. or the complaint does not disclose the commission of any offence and it appears that the F.I.R. or criminal complaint has been filed only with a view to pressurise or intimidate the opposite party, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not quash such an F.I.R. or complaint and leave the parties to have recourse to a civil remedy alone.
14. In the light of the above referred judgments and principles enunciated therein, a scrutiny of the F.I.R. in question clearly shows that this F.I.R. has been lodged by respondent No. 2 only with a view to harass, pressurise and intimidate the petitioner knowing fully well that his dispute with Sahara Airlines Limited is purely civil in nature based on his plea of non-payment of dues. The respondent No.2 was given employment by Sahara Airlines Limited and not by petitioner in his personal capacity. The petitioner was also an Officer of the Company like respondent No. 2 and had no reasons to practice deception on respondent No. 2. Petitioner had nothing to gain or lose by the contract between respondent No. 2 and Sahara Airlines. In the appointment letter dated 30th September, 1995, respondent No. 2 was offered a pay package which included a promise of providing him a house of about Rs. 36 lacs on completion of three years service. In this clause itself it was added that the benefit would not be admissible in the event of respondent's disassociation with the Company for any reason. The plea being raised by the Company is that in view of the resignation of respondent No. 2 after about five years of service, he has dis-entitled himself to this benefit. It is being contended that a house worth Rs. 36 lacs or so could not be provided to respondent No.2 merely upon completion of three years of service and that too without any embargo upon respondent No. 2 not to disassociate from the Company for the reason that in case it was to happen the respondent No.2 could walk away with a house worth Rs. 36 lacs after rendering only three years service to the Company which tantamounts to an additional pay package of Rs.1 lac per month. This dispute, therefore, is a dispute of purely civil nature which is already before a civil Court in a suit filed by respondent No. 2 much before the filing of the complaint on the basis which the F.I.R. in question was registered.
15. The contention of learned counsel for respondent No.2 that the plea raised by the Company in the civil suit that the petitioner had no authority or power to issue modification dated 18th November, 1995, makes out a case of deception against petitioner is not at all sustainable for the reason that the offer of providing the house was made by the Company to respondent No.2 at the time of appointment itself and it was incorporated in the appointment letter dated 30th September, 1995 also. On 18th November 1995, the petitioner, as a senior Officer of Company, merely clarified that this house would be provided on ownership basis and as such he did not promise anything new or beyond the letter dated 30th September, 1995. In a way the petitioner made the potion of respondent No.2 a shade better by issuing the addendum dated 18th November, 1995. This action of the petitioner appears to have irritated the Company even and that is why it is trying to disown this letter in the civil suit filed by respondent No.2. The parties may take any plea before the civil Court to get rid of the liability but that would not make out the ingredients of the offence of cheating under Section 415 I.P.C. This plea does not make a case of forgery even against the petitioner as he signed the main appointment letter also on behalf of the Company. It is not at all explained as to what the petitioner was going to gain out of the modification issued vide letter dated 18th November, 1995 and why he should have practiced any fraud upon respondent No. 2, who was his colleague and a senior Officer of the Company. There is nothing in the F.I.R. to support the plea that since inception the petitioner had mala fide intentions. It could not be because the employment as well as offer to respondent No. 2 was given by the Company and petitioner had merely signed the appointment letter on behalf of Company.
16. A perusal of the F.I.R. leaves no room for doubt that the dispute between the parties is of purely civil nature. The respondent No. 2 claims that he was not given the perquisites as promised to him at the time of his appointment on 30th September, 1995 whereas the Company says that he is not entitled. There is neither any allegation nor any circumstance to support the plea that at the time of the appointment of respondent No.2 itself the petitioner or the Company did not intend to act upon the promise of providing him a house. A serious civil dispute awaits trial as to whether immediately after expiry of three years, the respondent No.2 had become entitled to the house worth Rs.36 lacs and that too on ownership basis which made the respondent's pay package heavier by about Rs.1 lac per month. It is also a question to be considered by the civil Court as to whether in view of his resignation after five years of service the respondent No.2 remained entitled or not to a house in terms of Clause (3) of Annexure-C of the appointment letter dated 30th September, 1995 which specifically stated that this benefit would not be admissible in the event of the disassociation of respondent No. 2 with the Company for any reason.
17. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in concluding that the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner, on the basis of which the F.I.R. in question has been registered, is an abuse of the process of law with a view to pressurise and intimidate the petitioner. The complaint, even if taken at its face value and accepted in its entirety, does not even prima facie constitute an offence under Section 420 I.P.C. or any other cognizable offence. This complaint was nothing but an attempt of the part of respondent No.2 to convert a purely civil dispute regarding emoluments into a criminal offence. The police which commenced investigations under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had no reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. The freedom of the petitioner cannot be permitted to be jeopardised and threatened in this manner. The F.I.R. was manifestly attended with mala fides and actuated by ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the petitioner.
18. Accordingly, in exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the F.I.R. No. 117/2004 registered at P.S. Connaught Place, New Delhi, under Section 420 I.P.C. as well as investigations initiated in pursuance thereof stand quashed.
19. The petition as well as applications stand disposed of.