Gauhati High Court
Nurul Miah And Ors. vs State Of Tripura on 20 February, 2004
Equivalent citations: (2005)1GLR546
Author: I.A. Ansari
Bench: I.A. Ansari, T. Vaiphei
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J.
1. Aggrieved by the judgment and order, dated 4.8.1998, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur, in Sessions Trial No. 18(ST/U) of 1998, convicting the accused-appellant No. 1, namely, Nurul Miah, under Section 396 IPC and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one year and also convicting the remaining accused-appellants under Section 396 IPC and sentencing them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 8 years each and pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each and, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one year, the present appellants have preferred this appeal.
2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial against the accused-appellants, may, in brief, be stated as follows :-
On 29.11.1995 at about 10.45 p.m., while the complainant, Khadeja Bibi, her husband, Abdul Miah Choudhury and their daughter, Tanu Begum, were asleep in their dwelling hut at village Dataram under RK Pur Police Station and an oil lamp (Kupi bati) was kept lit there. The accused-appellants, armed with country-made gun, entered into their dwelling hut by breaking open the door and the accused, being co-villagers, were recognised by the inmates of the said house. The accused persons demanded that Abdul Miah Choudhury should withdraw the case filed against the accused at RK Pur Police Station. As Abdul Miah Choudhury refused to withdraw the case, accused Nurul Miah, who was armed with a country-made gun, shot at Abdul Miah Choudhury and as a result thereof, Abdul Miah Choudhury sustained bullet injury. Leaving Abdul Miah Choudhury lying on the floor of his hut with bullet injury, the accused-appellants fled away, when they heard sound of a whistle being blown from outside the hut; but while so feeling away, they forcibly took away some cloths from the said hut. On hearing the sound of gun being fired and hue and cry being raised at the said hut, some villagers assembled at the spot, but they found Abdul Miah Choudhury lying dead and they, immediately, shifted the dead body to the said deceased to Dataram Police Camp. On receiving a wireless message at RK Pur Police Station from Dataram Police Camp that some miscreants had short dead Ex-Gaon Pradhan of Dataram, GD No. 1506, dated 30-11-1995, was made at the said police station by Sub Inspector, SS Choudhury, and acting upon the information, so received, the said police officer came to the said police camp and, on finding the dead body lying there, recorded the version of Khadeja Bibi and treating the same as the FIR (Ext. P/1), RK Pur Police Station Case No. 222/95 under Sections 395/396/397 IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act was registered against the accused-appellants and after usual course of investigation, police laid charge sheet against the accused-appellants.
3. To the charges framed against the accused-appellants under Sections 395,396 and 397 IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty thereto and claimed to be tried.
4. In support of their case, the prosecution examined as many as 20 witnesses. The accused-appellants were, then, examined under Section 313 CrPC and in their examinations aforementioned, the accused-appellants denied that they had committed the offences alleged to have been committed by them, the case of the defence being that of total denial and the accused-appellants having been implicated falsely on account of animousity.
5. We have perused the materials on record including the impugned judgment and order. We have heard Mr. H. Debnath, learned counsel for the accused-appellants, and Mr. D. Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor, Tripura, appearing for the State-respondent.
6. Upon perusal of the materials on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, what attracts our attention, most prominently, is that this is a case in which, according to the prosecution, there were two eye witnesses to the occurrence, namely, Khadeja Bibi (PW-1), widow of the deceased Abdul Miah Ghoudhury, and Tanu Begum (PW-3), daughter of the said deceased. So far as PW-2 (Abdul Rashid), PW-7 (Ershad Miah) who is son-in-law of the said deceased, and PW-15 (Bishuni Bibi), who is also daughter of the said deceased and married to PW-7, are concerned, they are, admittedly, neighbours of the deceased and on hearing hulla raised at the house of the deceased, at the relevant time, they all came to the house of the deceased and found the deceased lying dead and they claimed to have been reported by PWs- 1 and 3, i.e., the alleged said eye witnesses, that the accused appellants were the ones, who had entered into the house of the said deceased by breaking open the house and that Nurul Miah (i.e., the accused-appellants No. 1) was the one, who had shot dead Abdul Miah Choudhury by a country-made gun and, then, the accused-appellants left the place of occurrence taking away forcibly with them clothings, etc. It is also alleged that PWs- 1 and 3 had reported to the neighbours, who had so arrived at the place of occurrence, that the accused-appellants, on their entry to the house of the said deceased, had demanded that Abdul Miah Choudhury (i.e. the said deceased) should withdraw the complaint, which he had lodged against them at RK Pur Police Station, and as Abdul Miah Choudhury refused to yield to the demand, so made by the accused-appellants, he was shot dead. As far as PW-5 (Lokman Hussain), son of the deceased, PW-6 (Sona Mian), who is younger brother of the said deceased, PW-14 (Mrityajoy) and PW-16 (Latani Bibi) who is first wife of the deceased, are concerned, their evidence is to the effect that when they reached the police camp, on being informed about the occurrence, they too were reported by PWs-1 and 3 what had already been allegedly stated by PWs- 1 and 3 to the neighbours aforementioned, namely, PW-2, PW-7 and PW-15.
7. Keeping in view the above aspects of the matter, when we come to the evidence on record, we find that in the present case, the death of the deceased, Abdul Miah Choudhury, as a result of gun shot injury suffered by him is not really in dispute. The doctor, who performed post-mortem examination, has not been examined, but the postmortem report has been proved. This apart, all the witnesses, namely PWs-2, 5, 6, 7, 14 and 15 including the two alleged eye witnesses, PWs-1 and 3, have clearly deposed that on the night of occurrence, Abdul Miah Choudhury was found lying dead with bullet injury. Though, strictly speaking, the question whether Abdul Miah Choudhury had really died as a result of gun shot injury has not been medically proved nor is there any direct evidence to prove the same, what has surfaced undisputed from the evidence on record is that Abdul Miah Choudhury had died on the night of the occurrence. In view of the fact that though the post-mortem report has been proved, the doctor, who conducted the autopsy has not been examined and there is no direct evidence showing as to how Abdul Miah Choudhury had actually died, it clearly follows that there is really no substantive evidence on record to show the cause of death of the said deceased. In the absence of non-examination of the doctor, who had performed the autopsy on the said dead body and in view also of the fact, which we shall shortly show, that none has claimed to have seen Abdul Miah Choudhury having been shot dead by bullet injury, it is not possible, at this sage, to definitely conclude that the said deceased died as a result of gun shot injury; but the fact remains that his death on the night of the alleged occurrence is not in dispute. In a situation, such as this, we proceed on the premises that the said deceased met with his death on the night of the occurrence. Whether his death was homicidal or not in a question, which we will, now endeavour to determine.
8. For what have been indicated above, let us, first, deal with the evidence of PW-1, who is the widow of the deceased. According to her, on the day of the occurrence, at about 11/11.30 pm, she along with her husband, Abdul Miah Choudhury, and their daughter, Tanu Begum (PW-3) was in their dwelling hut. The evidence of PW-1 also shows that whereas their daughter was in the northern room, she (PW-1) along with her husband, Abdul Miah Choudhury, was in the southern room of their hut, the hut having two rooms, Abdul Miah Choudhury went out to answer nature's call and, suddenly, PW-1 heard the sound of shooting and, immediately, she along with her daughter went out of the room and found her husband in the courtyard lying with bullet injury and seeing the condition of her husband, she raised hue and cry and on hearing the same, their co-villagers, namely, Rashid Miah, Ershad Mia, Ali Hossain, Mushader Rahman and several others came. She has also deposed that her neighbours did not enquire from her how her husband was killed and she also did not disclose to her neighbours how the alleged incident had occurred, her co-villagers brought the dead body of her husband to Dataram Police camp and she also accompanied them and from there, the dead body was taken to TS Hospital, Udaipur. PW-1 has further deposed that on following day in the morning, police visited her house, but she did not make any statement to police at Dataram camp. She denied to have made any statement to the police, but she identified her signature on the body of the complaint (Ext. P/1). It was, admitted, by PW-1 in her evidence that prior to the occurrence, a criminal case had been lodged by her husband against Darpan Marak, Taher Miah, Karun Miah and Ors., but she could not reveal the gist of the complaint, so lodged against the accused persons, by her husband.
9. Close on the heeds of the evidence of her mother (PW-1), PW-3 (Tanu Begum) has deposed that on the day of occurrence at about 11/12 O'clock at night, she along with her mother and father was present in the house, her father went out to answer the nature's call and, suddenly, she heard sound of shooting and, on hearing the same, she along with her mother went out and found her father lying in the courtyard with bullet injury and, on seeing this, she fell unconscious. The prosecution declared her hostile and cross-examined her, but she denied to have made any statement to police.
10. From a close reading of the evidence of the two alleged eye witnesses, what transpires is that Abdul Miah Choudhury, on the night of the occurrence, went out of his house to answer the nature's call and, suddenly, on hearing the sound of shooting, when PWs-1 and 3 came out of the house, they found Abdul Miah Choudhury lying in the courtyard with bullet injury and, on witnessing the condition of the said injured, while PW-3 fell unconscious, PW-1 raised hue and cry and, on hearing the hue and cry, so raised, Rashid Mia (PW-2), Ershad Miah (PW-7), Ali Hossain and several other co-villagers came there. The evidence of these two witnesses, namely, PWs- 1 and 3, however, clearly show that none of them claim, on oath, to have witnessed the occurrence nor did they claim to know as to who had actually injured and killed Abdul Miah Choudhury.
11. In the face of what transpires from the evidence of PWs- 1 and 3, when we turn to the evidence of PW-2, (Abdul Rashid), we find that this witness has deposed that on 29.11.1995 at about 11 pm, he was in his house, which is situated at a distance of half-a-kilometre away from the house of PWs- 1 and 3, he hard a sound of bullet and hue and cry from the house of the deceased, he, immediately, rushed to the house of the deceased along with others and, on reaching there, found some villagers carrying the dead body of the deceased from his dwelling house towards his courtyard and he also found PW-1 and her daughter, Tanu Begum, Ali Hossain, Ana Miah, Sahid Miah and others present there. It is in the evidence of PW-2 that on a query made by him, PW-1 told him that her husband was assaulted by Nurul Miah, Munna Miah, Karun Miah, Nur Islam and Japan Marak. It is also in the evidence of PW-2 that the said dead body was carried to Dataram Police camp with the help of the co-villagers and at about 12.30 p.m., Daragababu (i.e. Sub Inspector of Police) came to Dataram Police Camp and prepared inquest report of the said dead body.
12. So far as PW-7, (Erashad Miah), is concerned, his evidence is that the deceased was his father-in-law and his house is situated about half-a-kilometre away from the house of deceased and on 29.11.1995 at about 11.30 pm, on hearing hue and cry from the house of deceased, he (PW-7) alongwith his wife (PW-15) came to the house of his father-in-law and found him lying in his dwelling house with bullet injury and he was told by Khadeja Bibi (PW-1) and Tanu Begam (PW-3) that accused Nurul Miah, Munna Miha, Karun Miah, Nur Islam and Japan Marak had entered into their dwelling hut and shot the said deceased.
13. Broadly in tune with the evidence of her husband, Erashad (PW-7), his wife, Bishunu (PW-15), i.e., daughter of the said deceased has deposed that on the day of occurrence at about 11/11.30 p.m., while she was present in her house along with her husband, they, suddenly, heard due and cry from the house of her father, she along with her husband rushed to the spot and found her father lying on a bed with bullet injury and she also found PW-1 and her sister, Tanu Begum (PW-3) and others present there. It is the evidence of PW-15 that on a query made by her, PW-1 told them that accused Nurul Miah, Munna Miah, Nur Islam, Japan Marak had assaulted the said deceased and Narul Miah had caused bullet injury on the person of the said deceased. It is also in the evidence of PW-15 that the PW-1 had told them that she had identified the miscreants with the help of Kupi bati, i.e. an oil lamp.
14. PW-5 (Lakman Hossain), son of the said deceased, PW-6 (Sova Miah), younger brother of the said deceased, and PW-16 (Latani Bibi), first wife of the said deceased, have given evidence lending support to the evidence of PW-2, PW-7 and PW-16. While PW-6 has deposed that on being informed about the said occurrence, he rushed to the house of the deceased and found that the deceased was being carried to Dataram Police Camp he accompanied the deceased, FW-1 and their other co-villagers to the police camp. PW-5 and PW-16 have deposed to the effect that on being informed about the occurrence, they came to Dataram Police Camp and found the deceased lying there. All these three witnesses have asserted that PW-1 reported to them the names of the accused-appellants as persons, who were involved in the alleged occurrence.
15. A combined reading of the evidence of PW-2, PW-5, PW-6, PW-7, PW-14, PW-15 and PW-16 show that while PW-2, PW-7, PW-14 and PW-15, being co-villagers of the said deceased, came to the place of occurrence on hearing hue and cry raised from the dwelling hut of the said deceased, PW- 5, PW- 6 and PW-16 came to the house of the said deceased on being informed about the occurrence. The consistent evidence of all these witnesses, namely PWs- 2, 5,6, 7,14,15 and 16 is that PWs-1 and 3 had reported to them that they (PWs-1 and 3) had witnessed the occurrence and the accused-appellants were the ones, who had come to the house of the deceased and killed him.
16. Now,, in view of the fact that PWs-2, 5, 6, 7, 14,15 and 16 have, in tune with each other, deposed that they had been reported by PWs-1 and 3 that PWs-1 and 3 had witnessed the occurrence in which Abdul Miah Choudhury sustained bullet injury and died, the learned trial Court has taken the view that it was, but natural on the part of the witnesses, namely, PWs 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 to be inquisitive and ascertains from PWs-1 and 3 as to who were involved in the occurrence and since PWs- 1 and 3 had reported to these witnesses, who had so arrived at the house of the deceased and the police camp, that the accused-appellants were the ones involved in the occurrence, there was no reason to dis-believe PWs. 2,5,6,7,14,15 and 16 and their evidence proved that it was the accused-appellants, who were involved in the occurrence, and that the accused-appellants Nurul Miah was the one, who had short dead Abdul Miah Choudhury. Can such an approach and conclusion reached by the learned trial Court be sustained ?
17. The answer to the above question brings us to the very concept of hearsay evidence, its scope and ambit. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with by this Court in the case of Bishewar Baori @ Khetrapal v. State of Assam, reported in 2002 (2) GLT 395, in the following :
"It needs to be carefully noted that while dealing with a piece of evidence, which is regarded as hearsay, the Courts must bear in mind that there is a difference between factum of an information and truthfulness/veracity of such information. In a given case, if the object is to merely establish that a statement was made, it may not be hearsay; but if the object is to prove that what was stated was true, then, it may become hearsay. Thus, when 'X', an eyewitness of an occurrence of murder, comes to a police station and reports the occurrence to a police officer, the evidence given by the police officer; at the trial, that he was given such an information is not hearsay if the object is merely to prove that such a report was, indeed, received by the police officer, but if the object is to prove that what the police officer was reported was true, then, the police officer's evidence as to what he was reported by 'X' would be. hearsay unless 'X' appears as a witness at the trial and deposes not only that he had so reported the occurrence to the police officer, but also that what he had reported was true as he had witnessed the occurrence himself. Reference may be made to AIR 1961 MP 45, AIR 1983 All. 87 and 1983 Cr. LJ 127 {Supreme Court)".
18. Thus, the evidence given by PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 that PWs- 1 and 3 had told them the names of the accused may not be hearsay if the Court has to determine if PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 had really heard from PWs-1 and 3 the names of the accused persons involved in the alleged occurrence; but if the Court is required to determine as to whether what PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14,15 and 16 had been told by PWs-1 and 3 was true or not, then, the evidence given by PWs-2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 would be hearsay and ought to have been held as hearsay inasmuch as PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7,14,15 and 16 had no personal knowledge if the accused named by PWs- 1 and 3 had really been involved in the alleged occurrence, for, in order to prove that the information received by PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 was true, PWs-2, 5, 6, 7,14,15 and 16 depended on the evidence of PWs-1 and 3 and since none of these, two witnesses, namely PWs-1 and 3 came forward to assert that they had actually witnessed the occurrence and/or that the accused persons were really involved in the occurrence, the evidence of the PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 as to what they had heard from PWs- 1 and 3 was nothing, but hearsay.
19. Even if PWs- 1 and 3 were held to be unreliable and/or they were treated as the witnesses, who had suppressed the truth, such an inference could not have, as a corollary, enabled the learned trial Court to conclude that the PWs- 1 and 3 had told to PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16, on the night of the occurrence, was the truth.
20. In short, thus, the evidence of PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 could not have legally enabled the Court to hold, on the basis of what they had heard from PWs- 1 and 3, that the accused appellants were the ones, who were involved in the alleged occurrence. So far as the remaining witnesses, namely, PW- 4, PW- 8, PW- 9, PW- 10, PW- 11, PW- 12 and PW- 13 are concerned, their evidence do not improve the case of prosecution inasmuch as none of them was an eye-witness to the alleged occurrence.
21. Keeping in view what have been discussed above, we, now come to the evidence of PW- 20, who was the Investigating Officer of the case. According to this witness, on 30.11.1995 at about 12:30 a.m., he received a wireless message from Dateram Police Camp to the effect that the Es-Gaon Pradhan of Dataram had been shot dead by some miscreants and he reduced this information into writing in the form of GD Entry No. 1506, dated 30.11.1995, and upon the direction of the Officer-in-charge of the RK Pur Police Station, he (PW- 20) came to Dataram Police Camp and, on finding the dead body of the said deceased lying in front of the said police camp, held inquest thereon. It is also in the evidence of PW- 20 that at the police camp, he examined PW- 1 and recorded her statement, which is marked at Ext. P/l, and treating the same as FIR, a police case was registered against the accused appellants.
22. A careful reading of the evidence of PW- 20 shows that he did received a message of commission of cognizable offence of murder, i.e. of a person having been shot dead. This witness's evidence also shows that on the basis of this message, he made GD Entry No. 1506, dated 30.11.1995, aforementioned and, acting on the information so received, he came to the police camp at Dataram. It is, thus, clear that before PW- 20 left his police station for the place of occurrence, the information regarding commission of cognizable offence of murder had already been received by him and a GD Entry already stood made in this regard at the police station and it was, thus, on the basis of the information, so received, that the machinery of law had moved into motion, PW- 20 came to the police camp, found the dead body of Abdul Miah Choudhury, lying there and it was, then, that he (PW- 20) recorded the statement of PW- 1. This statement (Ext. P/1) has been treated as the First Information Report by the prosecution.
23. From the narration of the facts as deposed by PW- 20, it is abundantly clear that the investigation into the cause of death of the said deceased had commenced before the statement of PW- 1 was recorded. Thus, the statement of PW-1 recorded by PW- 20, which has been treated as the First Information Report, was not really an FIR in the eye of law; rather, the same was a statement made under Section 161 CrPC during the course of investigation of the case. Since the police had already received the information of cognizable offence of murder and had recorded the said information in the GD Entry and acting upon this information, the police machinery came into motion for the purpose of ascertaining as to how the person had actually died, it is the GD Entry No. 1506 dated 30.11.1995, aforementioned, which ought to have been treated as the First Information Report.
24. What emerges from the above discussion is that notwithstanding the fact that Ext. P/1 has been treated as the FIR, the nomenclature so used was misconceived under the law and the same was nothing, but a statement made by PW-1 to the police during the course of investigation of the case. The utility of the previous statement of a prosecution witness is settled by a catena of judicial decisions. A statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C is not a substantive piece of evidence and the same can be used only for the purpose of contradiction and not for corroboration. (See Som Nath v. Union of India report in 1971 Cr.L.J. 142; Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, reported in 1976 Cr.L.J. 295; Chinnamal v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1971) 1 SCC 145; Bulu Das v. State of Bihar, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 130 and Abdul Kalam v. State of Tripura, reported in 2001 (3) GLT 35.
25. In view of the facts that PWs-1 and 3 had not deposed, at the trial held against the accused-appellants, that they (PWs- 1 and 3) had seen the alleged occurrence and/or that the accused-appellants were involved in the occurrence in which Abdul Miah Choudhury had been shot dead, there was no substantive evidence on record to show that the accused appellants were the perpetrators of the crime. The previous statements of PWs- 1 and 3 made before the police, as indicated hereinabove, were not at all substantive pieces of evidence and the same could have been used under the law for the purpose of merely contradicting PWs-1 and 3 and for impeaching their credibility. In the case at hand, however, the learned trial Court has freely used the previous statements of PWs- 1 and 3 recorded by the Investigating Officer for the purpose of corroboration of the evidence of other witnesses by using such previous statements of PWs- 1 and 3 as substantive evidence. Such approach of the learned trial Judge was wholly contrary to the established principles of law.
26. We are also constrained to observe that PW-1 was not declared as hostile by the prosecution nor was she cross-examined. No statement of hers recorded by the Investigating Officer, other than Ext. P/l aforementioned, was proved. When the contents of Ext. P/1 were read out to her, she denied to have made such a statement and she was not afforded opportunity to explain the inconsistencies or contradictions occurring between her evidence given in the Court and the contents of Ext. P/1. Such an approach, on the part of the learned trial Court, was wholly against the concept of proof of previous statement. Time and again, this Court has pointed out that when a witness is sought to be contradicted by any of his or her previous statement made to the police, the attention of the witness must be drawn to that part of the statement by which he or she is sought to be contradicted. The duty of the prosecution does not really end there. If the witness admits to have made the statements as recorded by the investigating officer, then, the contradiction stands proved; but if the witness denies to have made the statement, the statement has to be put to the investigating officer and if the investigating officer confirms that such a statement was, indeed, made, then, that particular statement has to be exhibited and proved as previous statement of the witness concerned. No such thing was done in the present case, This apart, even in the case of PW- 3, she was cross-examined by the prosecution and when her alleged previous statement was put to her, she too denied to have made such a statement before the police. Notwithstanding such a denial by PW- 3, the prosecution did not put to the Investigating Officer (PW- 20) and did not elicit from him if PW- 3 had really made the statement with which she was sought to be contradicted. The previous statement of PW- 3 having, thus, not been proved at all, the same could not have been 'used against the accused-appellants. Strictly speaking, therefore, the previous statements allegedly made by PWs- 1 and 3 were not proved. This apart, their previous statements were not, as already indicated above, substantive evidence and based on such evidence, no conviction of the accused-appellants could have been founded nor could have such previous statements been made the basis for seeking corroboration to the evidence of PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16.
27. Because of what have been discussed above, we may pause here to point out that in view of the fact that no animosity has been alleged by PWs- 1 and 3, on the one hand, and PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 10 on the other hand, and since nothing has been elicited from the cross* examination of PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 to show that what they claimed to have been reported by PWs- 1 and 3 were not true, the inference would be that PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16 were, indeed, informed by PWs-1 and 3 that the accused-appellants were the ones, who were involved in the occurrence of entry into the house of the deceased and in the act of killing of the deceased. This inference, however, was not enough to hold the accused-appellants guilty of the charges framed against them. One needs to bear in mind that moral conviction of an offence is distinct from its legal conviction. On the basis of moral conviction, none can be convicted and it is only on the basis of the evidence legally adduced on record and substantive in nature that the conviction of an accused can be founded, provided that the evidence, so given, is found to be trust-worthy, reliable and true. In the case at hand, the learned trial Judge appears to have got swayed away by the volume of evidence adduced by the prosecution showing that a number of witnesses has been reported by PWs- 1 and 3 the names of the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime and there was no reason to discard the evidence of PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16. The evidence of PWs- 2, 5, 6, 7,14, 15 and 16 being, however, hearsay in nature, as indicated hereinabove, the same was wholly inadequate to sustain the charge framed against the accused-appellants.
28. Because of what have been discused above, we are of the view that though there may be some elements of truth in the case of the prosecution, the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell substantially short of the standard of proof, which is insisted in criminal trials, and the accused-appellants, in the face of the evidence on record, ought to have been acquitted.
29. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal succeeded. The conviction and sentences passed against the accused appellants are hereby set aside. The accused appellants are directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if they are not on bail, and if they are not wanted in connection with any other case.
30. Send back the LCR forthwith.