Allahabad High Court
Brij Bhal Singh Gautam vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 28 October, 1997
Equivalent citations: AIR1998ALL132, AIR 1998 ALLAHABAD 132, 1998 ALL. L. J. 767
Author: D.P. Mohapatra
Bench: D.P. Mohapatra
JUDGMENT S.R. Singh, J.
1. In the instant case, the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties prefaced his submission with a preliminary objection about lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court and it is in this perspective that we are called upon to dispose of the preliminary objection as a prologue to delving into the submissions on merits of the writ petition. Accordingly, the hearing in the matter was circumscribed to the moot question about territorial jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. A synoptical resumption of the relevant facts necessary to appreciate the moot question raised across the bar, may be set out and they are that the Divisional Manager, Central Railways with its Head Office stationed at Jabalpur invited applications from respectable and experienced caterers vide advertisement dated 10-11-1996 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) for grant of catering contract in respect of Manikpur Railway Station, that the petitioner and opposite party No. 3 were amongst the applicants for grant of Theka appertaining to Manikpur Railway Station for which interview was held on 24-2-1997 at Jabalpur and in the ultimate analysis, the decision tilted in favour of respondent No. 3, who was awarded Theka vide separate orders dated 14-5-1997, for running Tea, Coffee, Namkeen, Sweet and Fruit stalls as well as refreshment rooms - Veg. and non-veg; that the Theka aforestated, as mentioned in the order, is to ensure for a period of five years between 20-5-97 and 19-5-2002; and that it is these contracts awarded by two separate orders dated 14-5-1997, which are sought to be quashed by means of the present petition basically on ground that the opposite party No. 3 does not satisfy the experience criterion. The two contracts were awarded each on yearly licence fee fixed at Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 18,000/- respectively, subject to the conditions enumerated in the orders (Annexures 9 and 10).
3. It brooks no dispute that the decision to award Theka in favour of third respondent was arrived at Jabalpur, which place lies beyond the territorial bounds of this Court. It was urged by the Counsel appearing for the opposite parties that the "cause of action" for filing the writ petition stemmed within the territorial jurisdiction of Madhya Pradesh High Court and by this reckoning, Allahabad High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in opposition, canvassed that part of 'cause of action' arose at Manikpur Rail way Station, the situs of the contract -- which is located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Sri V.B. Singh, appearing for the petitioner urged that the situs of contract constitutes an integral part of 'cause of action' in a writ petition like the one in hand.
4. According to Article 226 of the Constitution as it originally stood, the High Courts had jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs, orders or directions for enforcement of fundamental rights or any other purpose to any person or authority or in a given case to any Government, whether Union or State, resident in or located in the territory in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. The concept of 'cause of action' was completely alien to Article 226 and it was so held by the Supreme Court in Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subbarao, reported in AIR 1953 SC 210, K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income-tax Investigating Commission etc. AIR 1954 SC 207: Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India; AIR 1961 SC 532; and the Collector Custom v. East India Commr. Company, AIR 1963 SC 1124. The view that the jurisdiction of the High Court to intervene under Article 226 depends not upon whether the Headquarters or the Capital of the Government is situate but upon the fact of the effect of the act done by the Government, whether Union or State, being within the territorial limits of the Court, taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Maqbulunissa v. Union of India, AIR 1953 All 477 : (1953 All LJ 148) was not received with approbation by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It was a decision against which Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1952 was dismissed by the Supreme Court by its judgment dated April 20, 1952. The first of the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above were not in existence when the Full Bench judgment of this Court came into being. However, it was weighed up but not approved by the Supreme Court in its subsequent judgments (supra).
5. As a result of the view taken by the Supreme Court in Election Commission (supra) and subsequent cases, it was location or residence of the respondents which gave territorial jurisdiction to a High Court under Article 226, the situs of the 'cause of action' being immaterial for the purpose. The decision of the Supreme Court led to the result that only the High Court of Punjab would have jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 226 against the Union of India and those other authorities which were located in Delhi. The plea of inconvenience had already culminated in being rejected by the Supreme Court in the cases aforestated and accordingly, Parliament supervened and inserted Clause (1 -A) in Article 226 by the Constitution (15th Amendment) Act 1963, renumbered as clause 2 by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, introducing concept of 'cause of action' for the purposes of determining the territorial jurisdiction of High Courts. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, being relevant for the purposes of discussion is quoted below.
"The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue, directions, orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."
The answer to the preliminary objection would depend upon the answer to the question whether any part of 'cause of action' has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court. In South-East Asia Shipping Company Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 443, the expression 'cause of action' was explicated as under :
"It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts which give cause to enforce the legal injury for redress in a court of law. The cause of action means, therefore, every fact which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim-relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant, since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise....."
6. Similar was the construction put upon the expression 'cause of action' in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Property, AIR 1985 SC 1289, wherein it was held, with reference to Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as under :
"11. The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a contract will depend on the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors.
12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since jn the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the materials facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Every thing which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.
13. Under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure subject to the limitation stated therefore, every suit shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. It may be remembered that earlier Section 7 of Act 7 of 1888 added Explanation III as under :
"Explanation III -- In suits arising out of contract the cause of action arises within the meaning of this section at any of the following places, namely - (1) the place where the contract was made;
(2) the place where the contract was to be performed or performance thereof completed; (3) the place where in performance of the 'contract any money to which the suit relates was expressly or impliedly payable."
14. The above Explanation HI has now been omitted but nevertheless it may serve a guide. There must be a connecting factor."
7. In Daya Shanker Bharadwaj v. Chief of Air Staff, New Delhi, AIR 1988 All 36, a Division Bench of this Court has expounded the following proposition of law (at page 39) :
"A right of action arises as soon as there is an invasion of right but 'cause of action and 'right of action' are not synonymous or interchangeable. A right of action is a right to enforce a cause of action (American Jurisprudence II Edn. Vol. I). A person residing anywhere in the country being aggrieved by an order of Government, Central or State or authority or person may have a right of action on law but it can be enforced or the jurisdiction under Article 226 can be invoked of that High Court only within whose territorial limits the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The cause of action arises by action of the Government or authority and not by residence of the person aggrieved."
8. Such being the concept of 'cause of action', the question that surfaces for examination in the instant case is whether any part of the because of action' arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. As already noticed, the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the situs of contract, i.e. the place where the contract is to be performed, is an integral part of 'cause of action.' The submission made by the learned counsel does not commend itself for acceptance in the spectrum of the allegations made in the writ petition and prayers made therein. We are of the considered view that in a writ petition seeking issuance of the writ of certiorari for quashing of the contracts awarded in favour of the Opposite Party No. 3 and for mandamus, order or direction directing the appropriate authority to award catering contracts in question to the petitioner, the place where the contract is to be performed i.e. the situs of contract cannot be posited as integral part of cause of action. The illegality, if any, in award of the contract in favour of the Opposite Party No. 3, cannot be said to have been indulged in at the place where the contract is to be performed inasmuch as the decision to award contracts in favour of the Opposite Party No. 3 was admittedly taken at Jabalpur. In order to qualify for the reliefs claimed in the writ petition, all that the petitioner has to do is to establish that the contracts have been awarded to Opposite Party No. 3 in breach of the conditions particularly the condition appertaining to experience stipulated in the advertisement and those contained in the new catering policy. The place where the contract is to be performed would have no bearing on the decision on the relevant question aforestated. In this view of the matter, the situs of contracts in the instant case, has no nexus with the alleged illegality in award of contract, the decision in respect of which was taken at Jabalpur and, therefore, we are of the firm view that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. We may, however, hasten to quip that position may alter in a petition raising grievances on breach of contract in which situation, the situs or the place where the contract has to be performed, may form part of 'cause of action.' The observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of Swaika Properties reported in AIR 1989 SC 1239 that the jurisdiction of the Court in a matter of contract, will depend on the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors will not apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch as that was a case founded on a concluded contract between the parties whereas in the present case no contract has been entered into between the petitioner on one hand and the Railway Administration on the other. The petitioner, on the other hand, is seeking a direction calling upon Railway Administration to award contracts in question in his favour after quashing the contracts in favour of Opposite Party. No. 3. As such, the observations made in para 12 of the Report, AIR 1989 SC 1239 are unavailing to the petitioner.
9. In the conspectus of what we have discussed above, we converge to the conclusion that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Needless to say, the petitioner shall be at liberty to seek his remedy elsewhere.