Bombay High Court
Shri Devadeveshwar Sansthan, Parvati ... vs Sushila Raghu Kadu on 25 January, 2002
Equivalent citations: [2002(94)FLR766], (2002)IVLLJ28BOM
Author: Nishita Mhatre
Bench: Nishita Mhatre
JUDGMENT Nishita Mhatre, J.
1. The petitioner challenges the Part-1 Award dated March 10, 1995 passed by the 3rd Labour Court, Pune in Reference (IDA) No. 68 of 1989 declaring them as an "Industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. The petitioner claims to be a charitable trust registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The trust maintains four temples in Pune which are historical monuments. According to the petitioner, it receives donations from well wishers but the trust gets no grant from the Government. The petitioner states that Nanasaheb Peshwa established the private temple in the year 1749 adjacent to the main temple at Parvati. The lands adjacent to the temples were also donated by the family to the public. A memorandum of management was drawn up in the year 1941 to look after the management and administration of the temples. The trust was then registered by the Charity Commissioner under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and a scheme was finalised in the year 1971. The objects of the trust were to maintain the idols, to perform pooja, to protect and maintain the temples and the property, to grant donations, to run schools and libraries, to grant scholarships to the students, to provide facilities for drinking water to the pilgrims, etc. The initial objects of the trust were then modified by an application made by the trustees to the Charity Commissioner. The application was made as the income of the trust was increasing day by day and it was necessary to have additional objects for the trust. The objects added were to construct residential quarters for employees of the trust, to render pre-primary, secondary and higher secondary education facilities to students having priority to Sanskrit language, to construct residential quarters especially for low-income group families, etc. The trust also employs about 40 workmen in the category of Malis, Peons, Watchmen and Sweepers. The offerings made in the temple were auctioned. This can be inferred from the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner, Maharashtra, Mumbai dated March 16, 1971 passed while settling a scheme for the trust. One of the members of the public had suggested that the practice of auctioning of offerings should be discontinued. There is nothing on record to show that this system has been discontinued. The trust also has vast properties and is maintaining the same. Abhisheks and poojas performed in the temples maintained by the trust are performed by the Pujaris on payment of certain amounts to them, part of which is retained by the trust.
3. The respondent was employed with the petitioner as a Sweeper. Her services were terminated on December 19, 1987 and, therefore, she raised an industrial dispute. Reference was made for adjudication. The Labour Court decided the question as to whether the petitioner was covered by the definition of the term "industry" as defined in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as the relevant issue. By its Part-1 Award dated March 10, 1985, the Labour Court held that the petitioner is an "industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act.
The Labour Court based its order on the evidence led before it by the Special Officer of the petitioner. Certain documents which were vital for determination as to whether the petitioner is an industry or not were also placed on record.
4. Mr. Damle, learned advocate for the petitioner, submits that since the petitioner is a religious organisation carrying out an activity for attaining celestial bliss; it should not be considered as an industry. He urges that there is no systematic activity which is being carried out nor is there any profit being earned by the petitioner and therefore it could not be considered as a commercial establishment or an "industry". Mr. Damle has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Bharat Bhawan Trust v. Bharat Bhawan Artists' Association and Anr., where the Apex Court considered whether an artist engaged in an institute for promotion of art and culture, could be termed as a "workman". The Apex Court held on the facts and circumstances in that case that the trust was established only for the promotion of art and preservation of artistic talent and held that it was doubtful whether in spite of the wide connotation given to the industry, the trust could be termed as an industry. However, the Apex Court was considering whether the artists employed in such an organisation are workmen and held that such artists were not workmen as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
5. Mr. Satam, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, submits that the Labour Court has considered the judgment of the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, and has rightly drawn the conclusion that the petitioner trust was carrying out a systematic activity where the employer and employees were together involved not because they share the passion for obtaining celestial bliss. He urges that the employees worked in order to earn salary. It is on record that the workers are being paid Rs. 34,000/- to Rs. 38,000/- as salary and, therefore, according to the learned advocate it has to be considered that the petitioner is running a systematic activity. The Dakshina paid by the devotees also goes to the trust. The trust charges the devotees for having Abhisheks performed by its Pujaris. Part of this amount goes to the coffers of the trust. Therefore, it could not be said that the activity was such that was not covered by the definition of the term "industry". He also relies on the judgments of this Court in Shri Cutchi Visa Oswal Derawasi Jain Mahajan v. B.D. Borude, I.T. Maharashtra and Ors. 1987-I-LLJ-81, and Shri Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan v. Industrial Tribunal, Amravati and Ors. 1997-II-LLJ-256.
6. Evidence before the Labour Court amply indicates that the petitioner is an "industry" and, therefore, covered by the definition contained in Section 2(j) of the Act. The petitioner trust maintains not only the temples but also a Museum and Gallery. An entrance fee is charged by the petitioner for the Museum and the Gallery. The poojas and Abhisheks are conducted on collection of charges from the devotees. Huge properties are being maintained by the petitioner trust. 40 employees are working with the petitioner trust on regular salary with fixed conditions of service. The offerings-made in the temples are auctioned and the petitioner trust also runs a sugarcane juice stall at the Parvati Deoasthan. Mrutunjay Mandir which is maintained by the petitioner is let out on hire for the purpose of marriage ceremonies. The petitioner collects this amount as also the hire charges for utensils used for such functions. Therefore, I do not find any error committed by the Labour Court much less an error on the face of the record.
7. In the case of Shri Cutchi Visa Oswals case (supra), this Court considered whether the religious trust owning extensive properties and doing service at such properties by engaging large number of persons could be termed as an "industry". This Court came to the conclusion that merely because part of the activity of the trust is religious and spiritual, it should not be said that the trust was not an "industry". In Shri Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan's case (supra) this Court on the basis of the Bangalore Water Supply case (supra) of the Apex Court, has held that the systematic activity wherein 157 workmen were involved could by no stretch of imagination be considered not an "industry"'. Applying the ratio in these-cases to the facts and circumstances in the present case, the inescapable conclusion is that the petitioner is an "industry".
8. I see no reason to differ with the findings recorded by the Labour Court. Hence, writ petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.
9. Since the matter is very old, it is desirable that the Labour Court disposes of the same within three months from today.
10. Issuance of certified copy expedited.