Delhi District Court
Through Its Trustee Ms. Sakshi ... vs Smt. Rani on 26 August, 2015
1
In the Court of Ms. Namrita Aggarwal
CCJ Cum Additional Rent Controller1 (Central)
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
Case No. E 109/14
Unique I.D. No. 02401C0203482014
In the matter of :
Seth Sunder Lal Sonthalia Trust (Regd.)
Through its trustee Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia,
D/o Sh. Rajdeep Sonthalia,
R/o H. No. 1760, Cheera Khana,
Nai Sarak, Delhi110006. ...........Petitioner
Versus
Smt. Rani
W/o Sh. Gyan Singh,
1761(First Floor)
Seth Sunder Lal Sonthalia Dharamshala,
Cheera Khana, Nai Sarak, Delhi110006. ....... Respondent
Page 1 of 16 E. No. 109/14
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ORDER
26.08.2015
1. Vide this order, I shall dispose off the application moved by respondent for grant of leave to defend the eviction petition filed by the petitioner u/s 14(1)(e) Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [in short, 'the Act'].
2. An eviction petition has been filed by the petitioner Seth Sunder Lal Sonthalia Trust (Regd.) through its trustee Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia against the respondent Smt. Rani for vacation of the tenanted premises, i.e., one room on the first floor of property bearing no. 1761, Cheera Khana, Nai Sarak, Delhi110006, as shown in red colour in the site plan annexed alongwith the petition on the ground of bonafide requirement under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act. (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
3. The case of the petitioner is that Sh. Sunder Lal Sonthalia was great grandfather of the petitioner who died on 01.04.1958 leaving behind his wife Smt. Kamla Devi and adopted son Sh. Ganeshi Lal Sonthalia. That smt. Kamla Devi also died on 20.03.1976 while her adopted son pre deceased her as he died in June 1963 leaving behind the following legal heirs, 1. Sh. Shyam Bihari Lal Sonthalia, 2. Sh. Kunj Bihari Lal Sonthalia, Page 2 of 16 E. No. 109/14 3
3. Sh. Vijay Bihari Lal Sonthalia, 4. Sh. Mukut Bihar Lal Sonthalia (all sons) and 5. Smt. Chand Kiran (mother). Out of the above said legal heirs, Sh. Mukut Bihari Lal Sonthalia died issueless in the year 1965. That Sh. Sunder Lal Sonthalia was the owner of number of properties including property No. 1761, Cheera Khana, Nai Sarak, Delhi110006 which he had purchased vide sale deed dated 10.11.1945. This property is a double storied structure constructed on a plot of land admeasuring 450 sq. yards approximately and is adjacent to property No. 1760 already owned by him. That soon after the purchase of the said property Sh. Sunder Lal Sonthalia decided to create a religious and charitable trust and dedicate a portion of property No. 1761, Cheera Khana, Nai Sarak, Delhi11006 roughly measuring 225 sq. yards to a trust known as Lal Sunder Lal Trust created by Trust Deed registered on 18.10.1946. That after the death of Sh. Sunder Lal and Sh. Ganeshi Lal Sonthalia, the management of the estate of Sh. Sunder Lal including trust property was taken over by his widow Smt. Kamla Devi who was later on assisted by the grandfather of the petitioner Sh. Shyam Bihari Lal Sonthalia. That Sh. Shyam Bihari Lal Sonthalia died in 2007 and after his demise, the petitioner was substituted as his legal heir in the suit property as she had attained the age of majority. During the time when the petitioner was minor, the property was looked after and managed by his grandmother Smt. Prem Sonthalia who used to deal with Page 3 of 16 E. No. 109/14 4 the tenants including receiving rent. However, now the trust property is being managed by Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia as a sole trustee. It is averred by the petitioner that the tenanted premises is bonafidely required by the trust for opening its office. That almost entire property is occupied by the tenants and there is no place in the property where from the office of the trust can be run. The petitioner is finding it very difficult to manage the trust property, to keep the record, to hold the meetings as well as regular employees for the purpose of management of trust activities, thus the petitioner bonafidely requires the tenanted premises for furtherance of activities of the trust and for using the trust property for the purpose of its office. That the petitioner has no other reasonable, suitable accommodation available to it in the property in dispute. That the premises in dispute is situated on first floor and therefore would be more suitable for opening the office of the trust since the portion situated on the ground floor is not suitable because throughout the day the customers visit the property which is likely to cause disturbance in the activities of the trust. On the above stated grounds, prayer is made for eviction of the respondents from the tenanted premises.
4. Summons were served upon the respondent who filed the leave to Page 4 of 16 E. No. 109/14 5 defend application on the following grounds:
● That the petitioner is not the owner / landlord of the premises in question. Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia is a stranger to the premises in question and has no legal authority to file the present eviction petition against the respondent. It is averred that the premises in question was under the landlordship of Smt. Prem lata Sonthalia wife of late Sh. Shyam Bihari Lal Sonthalia and she used to collect rent on behalf of the petitioner but now the person namely Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia is allegedly claiming herself to be the trustee of the petitioner trust without having any legal right or ownership in property in question.
● That the site plan filed by the petitioner is incorrect and the petitioner has deliberately and malafidely not mentioned the store which is very much part and parcel of the premises in question. That one of the trustee who was earlier claiming himself to be the landlord used to issue rent receipt with respect to premises in question wherein the store was also included.
● That the respondent has no other accommodation either in any part of India or in Delhi except the small portion in question wherein she is residing for the last 30 years.
● That the petitioner is having lot of immovable properties in Delhi. Page 5 of 16 E. No. 109/14 6
● The will filed by the petitioner is fabricated.
5. Reply to the application for leave to defend has been filed by the petitioner wherein the petitioner has denied all the averments made by the respondent in her leave to defend application stating that the respondent admitted the ownership of the petitioner in respect of the suit property by paying rent regularly. It is further submitted that respondent is having an alternative accommodation in Trans Yamuna area. That her children are major and independent and even otherwise, the respondent is a working woman. It is further submitted that the respondent has failed to disclose the name of any other owner / landlord of the tenanted premises. The petitioner has also stated that the trust has no immovable in Delhi and around Delhi anywhere except property No. 1761, Cheera Khana, Sai Sarak, Delhi.
6. Rejoinder has been filed wherein respondent has reaverred what was averred by her in her leave to defend application denying all the submissions made by the petitioner in reply to the leave to defend application further submitting that one Sh. Pooran Chand had purchased the property in question from its earlier owners by virtue of registered sale Page 6 of 16 E. No. 109/14 7 deed dated 29.01.1998 after paying the sale consideration and therefore the present petitioner has no locus standi to file the present eviction petition.
7. I have heard the arguments and gone through the documents.
8. Proviso (e) to Section 14(1) is a special provision which has been enacted by the legislature for the class of landlords who require the premises genuinely and their requirement is bonafide and they do not have any suitable accommodation. The essential ingredients for attracting the proviso (e) of the Section 14(1) are :
a) The said premises are bonafide required by the landlord either for himself or for his family member.
b) The landlord or the family member has no other reasonable suitable accommodation.
These twin thresholds are to be satisfied conjunctively in order to attract the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) and the absence of even one of the said ingredients clearly makes the said provision inapplicable.
9. The satisfaction of the two requirements of bonafide need and no reasonably suitable accommodation has been time and again emphasized Page 7 of 16 E. No. 109/14 8 by the Supreme Court of India in several cases and more recently in the case Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 wherein the Supreme Court observed thus:
"The Legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to avoid any arbitrary or whimsical action of a landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must be bonafide which is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The 'bonafide requirement' must be in presenti and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made further clear by making the provision that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted Page 8 of 16 E. No. 109/14 9 from the accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in subsection (e) of Section 12(1) of the Act in respect of accommodation let for residential purposes.
Thus, the legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the Court is dutybound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also whether any other reasonably suitable nonresidential accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is available. The judgment/order of the court/authority for eviction of a tenant which does not show that the court/authority has applied its mind to these statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the superior court will be justified in upsetting such judgment/order in appeal/second appeal/revision. Bonafide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a question of fact. But in recording a finding on the question the court has to bear in mind that statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(1)(f). If it is found that the court has not applied the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its Page 9 of 16 E. No. 109/14 10 proper perspective then the finding regarding bonafide requirement would cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous finding illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment."
10. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean "in good faith and genuine i.e. without fraud or deceit". Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bonafide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities Page 10 of 16 E. No. 109/14 11 of life. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own.
11. The meaning of "bonafide" in the context appears to be in two folds. (a) the need of the landlord must be a genuine one and not a frivolous one. (b) landlord is not motivated by extraneous considerations in trying to recover the possession from the tenant with a view to let it out again to another tenant on higher rent.
12. In the present case, the respondent has disputed the title of the petitioner over the suit premises stating that earlier Smt. Prem Lata Sonthalia used to collect the rent from the respondent for the tenanted premises and that Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia has no right, title or interest in the suit premises. Per contra, the petitioner has placed on record the will by virtue of which Sh. Shyam Bihari Lal Sonthalia, i.e., husband of Smt. Prem Lata Sonthalia had bequeathed property bearing No. 1761, Cheera Khana, Nai Sarak, Delhi110006 in favour of his grand daughter Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia. Copy of will has been placed on record. Further the petitioner has also placed on record the declaration by which Sh. Shyam Page 11 of 16 E. No. 109/14 12 Bihari Lal Sonthalia has sought to have declared that he is sole trustee of M/s Seth Sunder Lal Sonthalia Trust and that he had executed will in favour of his grand daughter Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia who would manage the trust property. Even a resolution has been filed by M/s Seth Sunder Lal Sonthalia Trust by virtue of which Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia trustee of M/s Seth Sunder Lal Sonthalia Trust was authorized to proceed with the matter. The petitioner has also filed the copy of rent receipt by virtue of which respondent used to deposit rent in the name of Smt. Prem Lata Sonthalia, i.e., the grand mother of the petitioner Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia. Even otherwise, the respondent has been depositing rent under Section 27 of DRC Act in the name of petitioner itself. Since it is admitted by the respondent that Smt. Prem Lata Sonthalia was the owner of the tenanted premises, therefore Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia being the grand daughter had all the rights to claim rent from the respondent. Even otherwise, the petitioner has filed on record the will and declaration in her favour wherein she was declared by Sh. Shyam Bihari Lal Sonthalia her grand father to be the trustee of the petitioner society. The respondent on the other hand had filed the copy of sale deed executed by Smt. Prem Lala Sonthalia, Sh. Rajdeep Sonthalia and Smt. Deepali Dewan in favour of one Mr. Pooran Chand by virtue of which 1/3rd share of undivided property no. 1761, Cheera Khana, Nai Sarak, Delhi was sold to Sh. Pooran Chand on Page 12 of 16 E. No. 109/14 13 29.01.1998. It is averred by the respondent that since fore fathers of the petitioner has already sold 1/3rd share in the property in favour of Sh. Pooran Chand, therefore the petitioner has no right, title or interest in the suit property. Perusal of the sale deed shows that the sale deed is executed with respect to only 1/3rd share of property No. 1761, Cheera Khana, Nai Sarak, Delhi admeasuring 150 sq. yards out of total 450 sq. yards. In the original eviction petition, it was clearly mentioned by the petitioner that the entire property was 450 sq. yards out of which in 225 sq. yards was decided to be created as a religious and charitable trust. By virtue of the said sale deed the portion of 150 sq. yards was sold by ancestors of the petitioner in favour of Sh. Pooran Chand. It is not stated that whether that 150 sq. yards pertains to the tenanted premises or not. Even otherwise, after execution of sale deed, the said Pooran Chand never approached the respondent for collecting rent from him. The respondent was continuously depositing rent in favour of Smt. Prem Lata Sonthalia till date. Had a portion in occupation of the respondent in property no. 1761, Cheera Khana, Nai Sarak, Delhi would have been sold in favour of Sh. Pooran Chand he would have definitely approached the respondent after execution of sale deed in the year 1998 for collecting rent. In these circumstances, it is clearly proved that the petitioner is the owner / landlord of the tenanted premises for the purpose of Delhi Rent Control Act. In Daya Ram Page 13 of 16 E. No. 109/14 14 Prajapati Vs. Smt. Vidya Devi RC Revision No. 458/2012, it has been held that "concept of absolute ownership is not required to be determined in rent cases and 'ownership' contemplated in his provision is vizaviz 'tenant' which means that the ownership is something more than the tenant".
In the present case, Ms. Sakshi Sonthalia is able to claim that she has right over the suit premises which is more than that of the tenant and therefore her right over the suit premises is proved for the purpose of DRC Act.
13. The other contention of the respondent is that the petitioner has not filed the correct site plan of the suit property and has also not properly explained the tenanted premises since in addition to one room there is also one store which is in occupation of the respondent as tenant. However, the respondent has failed to file any site plan in order to disprove the site plan filed by the petitioner society and to show that there is any store in addition to a room. In these circumstances, the averment of the respondent seems to be a mere bald allegation without any substance. The other Page 14 of 16 E. No. 109/14 15 contention made by the respondent is that the petitioner has in its occupation number of other commercial properties but the respondent failed to give number and address of even a single property. In these circumstances, the averment of the respondent again seems to be mere bald allegation without any substance and thus cannot be relied upon in absence of any description or number of the alternative alleged property. It is averred by the respondent that she has no other accommodation either in any part of India or in Delhi except a small portion in question wherein she is residing for the last 30 years. Under the DRC Act, it is the comparative hardship of the petitioner which is to be looked into and not that of the respondent and therefore this contention of the respondent is not material for deciding the petition under Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. The petitioner has clearly stated that it requires the tenanted premises for opening its office to keep the record, to hold the meetings as well as regular employees for the purpose of management of trust activities. The respondent has failed to disclose any other alternative suitable accommodation available with the petitioner to open its office or that there is existing place for office of the trust at any place. In these circumstances, bonafide requirement of the petitioner society stands proved.
Page 15 of 16 E. No. 109/14 16
14. Thus, from the discussion made above, respondent has failed to raise any triable issue, which requires evidence to be proved. The petitioner, on the other hand, have clearly established its bonafide requirement regarding tenanted premises. Hence, the application for leave to defend filed by respondent is ordered to be dismissed. Consequently, eviction order is liable to be passed against the respondents under Section 25 B (4) of the Act. In view of above, petitioner is held entitled for recovery of the tenanted premises, i.e., one room on the first floor of property bearing no. 1761, Cheera Khana, Nai Sarak, Delhi110006, as shown in red colour in the site plan annexed with the petition. However, the petitioner would not be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of possession of the tenanted premises before expiration of six months from today in view of provisions given in Section 14 (7) of the Act.
Announced in open Court (Namrita Aggarwal)
on 26th Day of August, 2015 CCJ cum ARC1 (Central)
[This order contains 16 pages.] Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
Page 16 of 16 E. No. 109/14