Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dr. Suneer Sharma vs Dr. Madhurlata Sharma on 29 July, 1999
Equivalent citations: AIR2000MP26, 1999(2)MPLJ603, AIR 2000 MADHYA PRADESH 26, (2000) 1 CIVILCOURTC 315, (1999) 2 JAB LJ 325, (2000) 1 MARRILJ 357, (1999) 2 MPLJ 603, (2000) 3 CIVLJ 115
JUDGMENT N.G. Karambelkar, J.
1. Appellant/ Defendant-husband Dr. Suneer Sharma has filed this appeal against the Judgment and decree dated 8-5-1998 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in First Appeal No. 220/97 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in case No. 576-A/ 91.
2. Facts not disputed are that the appellant and the respondent were married on 16-11-1984 at Kherapati Colony, Gwalior. At the time of marriage, appellant was possessing M.B.B.S. degree and the respondent-wife was possessing post graduate degree in medical science. At that time, appellant was serving as a medical officer in Co-operative Sugar Factory at Panipat. In the same year the respondent wife got an appointment as medical officer in N.F.L. Panipat where she was also allotted an official residence in the campus of the hospital. The couple lived peacefully for a period of about 2 years in the ancestral residence of the appellant at Panipat. However, when after a lapse of 2 years, the respondent did not conceive, she was subjected to number of medical tests and Investigations and as per reports there were little chances of her conceiving. The respondent is living separate in her official residence since 3-9-1989. Father and Kusum Sharma, unmarried sister of the appellant were residing at Delhi, where the unmarried sister was serving as a teacher.
3. Respondent/wife filed suit under Section 13(1)(i)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of marriage on 12-9-1991. She alleged that after two years of their married life, when chances of her conceiving a child were found remote, her husband, mother-in-law Shakuntala Devi and unmarried sister began to ill-treat her on this count and were repeatedly taunting her that she was a Banlh (a barren woman incapable of conceiving a baby) and the mother-in-law and the sister-in-law were often threatening that they would go for a second marriage of the appellant/defendant. The mother-in-law went to the extent that she one day asked the respondent-plaintiff to consume a pill named 'Quick Phos' a poisonous drug in order to end her life and proposed that she would keep the pill in the bathroom where the respondent could conveniently consume it. The idea behind the proposal was to bring the life of the respondent to an end so that appellant could go for a second marriage without any problem. By this incident, the respondent was gravely hurt mentally. She, therefore, informed her mother and her mother came to her house at Panipat. The appellant, his mother and sister allegedly misbehaved with the mother of the respondent and on being objected by the respondent, she was subjected to beating in the presence of her mother and both were turned out forcibly on 3-9-1989. Thereafter, respondent never lived with the appellant. The respondent on her part went many a times to the house of the appellant and pleaded him and her mother-in-law not go for a second marriage of the appellant, but they did not respond and ultimately the appellant is reported to have married another lady named Pinki Bhaskar, somewhere near 30-4-1990. Pinki Bhaskar was renamed as Seema Sharma after her marriage with the appellant. She gave birth to first child in Feb. 1991 and thereafter two more issues were born from the wedlock and all the three issues are presently living with appellant and Seema Sharma. It was alleged by the plaintiff-respondent that because of the cruelty both mental and physical meted out to her by the appellant and his mother and sister and also because the appellant had contracted a second marriage and lastly because she had been deserted for a continuous period of more than two years, it was not possible for her to continue her matrimonial relationship with the appellant and wanted her marriage to be dissolved by a decree of divorce.
4. The appellant-defendant resisted the claim of the respondent-plaintiff denying all allegations against him and his mother and sister. He emphatically denied the fact of his second marriage with Pinki Bhaskar. He denied the fact of desertion and contended that despite his willingness to keep his wife with him and his efforts made in this direction, she herself was unwilling to live with him because of her superior official and financial status and wanted to lead an independent life.
5. Learned trial Court framed necessary issues on the point of cruelty, desertion and second marriage of the appellant. The trial Court after recording evidence, recorded findings against appellant and in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on all the aforesaid three Issues and on that basis passed a decree of dissolution of marriage by divorce. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant preferred an appeal in the High Court which too has been decided against him by learned single Judge and which order is impugned in the appeal.
Learned single Judge while upholding the judgment and decree of the trial Court has recorded concurrent findings on all the three issues.
6. We have heard learned counsel on the two sides and also perused the records.
7. We, at the outset, would like to discuss the legal position as regards scope of interference By this Court under Letters Patent Appeal in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. As noticed above, the two Courts have recorded concurrent findings on the material issues gn the point of cruelty, desertion and contracting a second marriage. A Division Bench of this Court has held in the case of Shyamlal Mishra v. Padmavati, 1964 MPLJ (Note) 114 that in a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10, a concurrent finding of fact cannot be disturbed. Another Division Bench of this Court has taken similar view in the case of Kalicharan Shukla v. State of M.P., 1977 MPWN (Note) 562. In another case Babu Ram Ashok Kumar v. Antarim Zila Parishad, AIR 964 All 534, a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court has observed that "A Court of appeal would not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court below, if the discretion has been exercised in good faith, after giving due weight to relevant matters and without being swayed by Irrelevant matters. If two views are possible on the question, then also the Court of appeal would not interfere, even though it may exercise discretion differently, were the case to come initially before it. The exercise of discretion should manifestly be wrong.
8. In the light of ratio of the aforesaid decisions, we do not feel satisfied that sufficient cause has been made out calling upon interference in the impugned judgment. From evidence on record, we concur with the findings of the learned single Judge that plaintiff-respondent has succeeded in establishing the allegations of cruelty, desertion as well as of contracting second marriage. She has produced ample convincing evidence both documentary and oral to prove that the appellant was keeping one Seema Sharma as his wife since about April, 1990 and from her he has three issues who are studying in different schools. Statement of appellant-defendant during trial that his marital relationship with the respondent continued till two years prior to the institution of suit being most unnatural is unbelievable. It is merely an afterthought device to escape from the offence of misconduct of continuous desertion for more than two years, so also, this gesture showing willingness to keep respondent with him is merely a pretext. When he has contracted a second marriage and is living with his second wife and children for last so many years, the respondent, wife has a just and reasonable cause to live separate from him. Contracting a second marriage in itself is an act of causing mental torture and tantamounts to cruelty for the purpose of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to take a different view from the one taken by the two Courts.
9. In the result, the appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed with costs.