Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia vs Revenue on 15 January, 2026
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No.1028 of 2024
Orders reserved on : 18.11.2025
Orders pronounced on : 15.01.2026
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia,
Aged around 39 Years,
S/o Shri Ashok Singh Ahluwalia,
Deputy Commissioner of Customs & GST
(GST Audit), Commissionerate, Jodhpur
Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs,
Department of Revenue,
Ministry of Finance ...Applicant
(Applicant in person)
VERSUS
1. Union of India
Through The Secretary,
Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance,
North Block, New Delhi-110001
2. The Chairperson,
Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs,
Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, North Block,
New Delhi- 110001
3. Mr. Alok Gupta
Commissioner, DGGI, Jaipur Zonal Unit,
C-62, Sarojini Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302001.
4. Ms. V. Usha
C.C., Banglarore Customs Zone
C.R. Building, Queen's Road, P.B. No. 5400, Bengaluru-56000
5. Mr. K.Tushar Parasshar,
Addl. Commissioner, Inland Container Depot ( I.C.D.),
Tughluqabad, New Delhi
6. Mr. Mandeep Batish
Jt. Commissioner, DGGI ( HQRs),
West Block- 8, Wing No..6, 2nd Floor,
R.K. Puram, New Delhi-110066 ...Respondents
(By Advocate: Shri R.K. Jain)
2026.01.29
RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01
+05'30'
Item No.44/C-2 2 OA No.1028/2024
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:-
"a. To allow this present Application;
b. To quash and set aside the impugned 'Charge-sheet' dated 16/08/2022;
c. To accordingly direct the Respondent nos. 1 & 2 to initiate 'Departmental Action' against Respondent nos. 3, 4, 5 & 6 & their coterie of vindictive 'associates' for their malafide & sinister role in furthering the undue harassment & torture of the Respondent & his dependent family members in the Society while mis-using their 'Official powers & capacity' to wreak their 'personal vendetta' and blatantly & glaringly violate all 'rules/ regulations/ norms/ principles' in this regard. d. To direct Respondent nos. 1 & 2 to take administrative action against the sham & fake 'witnesses' who have given untruthful 'Statements' against the Applicant & his family members to Respondent nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 & 6 in order to implicate the Applicant in the Department. That due to their untruthful & mendacious 'Statements'- Respondent nos. 1 & 2 got an excuse to drag the 'names & identities' of the Applicant's dependent family members in these vindictive & vicious Departmental 'Disciplinary Proceedings' instituted against the Applicant. e. to allow exemplary costs of the Application."
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
2. The applicant is a direct Indian Revenue Service (IRS) Officer (GST & Customs) of 2012 Batch, who has represented the country at several conferences/seminars/symposiums across the world as the applicant worked at the National Committee on Trade Facilitation (NCIF) Secretariat, Directorate General of Export Promotion (DGEP) and World Customs Organization (WCO) Cell of C.B.I.C. from 2016-19.
2026.01.29
RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01
+05'30'
Item No.44/C-2 3 OA No.1028/2024
The applicant had also played a critical role in conceptualizing, framing & finalization of India's first National Trade Facilitation Action Plan (NTFAP) (2017-2020) and was one of its 'three authors' as well and the same was prepared in accordance and in compliance with the 'Articles' of World Trade Organization (WTO) - Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which came in force across the globe in 2017. The applicant was also selected to represent the nation at several seminars/ conferences across the globe with respect to 'issues' related to 'Ease of doing Business & Trade Facilitation' and 'International Trade & Customs' such as :
(i) U.S.A. (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Department of Energy, Richmond, Washington);
(ii) U.K. (His Majesty 's Revenue & Customs Council H.M.R.C.);
(iii) E.U. (European Union) & Belgium (World Customs Organization,
-WCO)
(iv) Thailand (Asian Development Bank (A.D.B. ), Bangkok);
(v) South Korea (Customs Co-operation Council for Asia Pacific Countries at Cheonan & Seoul City) etc. 2.1 It is further stated that the applicant has always been appreciated by the heads of these various Customs/ bilateral & multilateral formations & organizations; each time the applicant was selected to represent the country at such Trade related forums/ conferences.
2.2 It is also stated that the applicant while discharging the duties of Deputy Commissioner (in short 'DC') in Central Board of Indirect Tax and Customs (in short 'CBIC') was allotted the Quarter No. A-2/D, Vatika Apartments, Mayapuri, New Delhi wherein he along with his dependent family members (senior-citizen parents, widow sister and her minor daughter) was residing.
2026.01.29
RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01
+05'30'
Item No.44/C-2 4 OA No.1028/2024
2.3 It is stated by the applicant that in the beginning of 2019
onwards, several officers residing in the same residential complex, such as Ms. Meghaa Gupta (AC), Shri S. Mahesh Kumar (IRS), Shri Dev Rajwani (DC), and others submitted multiple complaints accusing the applicant and his family of quarrels, misbehaviour, use of abusive language, threats, and physical altercations in the residential colony. These complaints were forwarded to CBIC along with resolutions passed by the RWA seeking eviction of the applicant's family from the said Government accommodation.
2.4 On receipt of these complaints, an Independent Inquiry Committee headed by Shri Ephrem Horo, AC (Directorate of Estates), was constituted. The said Committee recorded statements of several residents, staff, and workers, who alleged abusive behaviour by the applicant's mother and sister, including an audio recording dated 03.09.2019 in which the applicant's sister is heard hurling abuses at officers. Following repeated complaints, the CBIC took cognizance of multiple FIRs, including:
o FIR No. 179/2021 dated 03.03.2021 under IPC Sections 323/341/354/506/509/427/34;
o FIR No. 189/2021 dated 07.03.2021 under Sections 354/354A/506/509/34; and o Other criminal and civil proceedings between residents and the Applicant's family.
These were cited by the authorities as evidence of habitual misconduct.
2.5 Parallelly, complaints from the CGST Audit Commissionerate, Jodhpur alleged unauthorised absence, indiscipline, rude behaviour 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 5 OA No.1028/2024 with taxpayers, and insubordination. It was recorded that the applicant left headquarters on multiple occasions without prior sanction, adversely affecting official work.
2.6 Based on cumulative complaints made by (i) residents, (ii) RWA,
(iii) police FIRs, and (iv) Jodhpur Audit Commissionerate, the applicant was placed under suspension on 04.05.2021, which was repeatedly extended for reasons including alleged violent conduct, misuse of government accommodation, and insubordination. The applicant's suspension was revoked by the respondents on 16.08.2022. However, the official respondents issued the impugned Charge sheet dated 18.08.2022 (Annexure A/1), alleging the following articles of charges:
"Article-I Whereas Shri Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner while residing in Government residential colony at Vatika Apartments, Mayapuri New Delhi has indulged in frequent quarrels, physical/verbal assault and violent misbehavior with the fellow residents of the departmental Govt. accommodation at Vatika Apartment, Mayapuri, New Delhi and also used derogatory remarks against the fellow residents/officials. FIRs in the Rajouri Garden Police station, New Delhi have been filed against Shri Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner in these matters. By the above acts of omission, commission and misconduct, Shri Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner has acted in a manner unbecoming of a government servant, has failed to maintain courtesy and good behaviour with the public and to refrain from doing anything which is or may be contrary to any law, rules, regulations and establishment practices, thereby has contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(iii), (xi), (xviii) of Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and has rendered himself liable for action under Rule 14 read with Rule 11 of Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
Article-II Whereas Shri Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner while posted in CGST Jodhpur Audit Commissionerate went on unauthorized leaves and left Headquarters/station without prior sanction from the competent authority for the periods 09.11.2020 to 18.11.2020, 09.12.2020 to 22.12.2020 and 24.12.2020 to 01.02.2021. Instance of Sh. Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia's rude, indecent and insulting behaviour towards his seniors, subordinates and taxpayers have been informed by his controlling officer i.e. the Commissioner, CGST Jodhpur Audit Commissionerate. By the above acts of omission, commission and misconduct, Sh. Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner, has failed to maintain utmost devotion to duty, acted in a manner 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 6 OA No.1028/2024 unbecoming of a government servant, has failed to maintain courtesy and good behaviour with the public, failed to refrain from doing anything which is or may be contrary to any law, rules, regulations and establishment practices and has failed to maintain discipline in the discharge of his duties and be liable to implement the lawful orders duly communicated to him thereby has contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1) (ii) (iii), (xi), (xviii) & 3(1 )(xix) of Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and has rendered himself liable for action under Rule 14 read with Rule 11 of Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
2.7 The applicant submitted his representation dated 16.09.2022 (Annexure A-42) requesting the official respondents to supply him the relied upon documents as highlighted in Annexure-III of the impugned charge sheet dated 18.08.2022 (Annexure A/1). The applicant has further submitted a representation dated 17.10.2022 (Annexure A-43) making the similar request. However, vide representation dated 04.01.2023 (Annexure A-44), the applicant acknowledged the receipt of the relied upon documents on 03.01.2023 and sought time to file reply to the said charge sheet.
2.8 Ultimately, the applicant has submitted his written statement of defence dated 04.01.2023 (Annexure A-45) to the said impugned charge sheet.
2.9 Thereafter, the applicant through email dated 18.04.2023 (Annexure A-46) requested the Inquiring Authority for inclusion of certain critical CCTV footages, mobile phone recordings and other additional evidences as RUDs, which have earlier not been considered by Northern Zonal Unit (NZU) DGoV, New Delhi during its 'Preliminary enquiry' stage, which despite the non-inclusion of the above still recommended the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant which is against the principles of natural justice. Further it is stated therein that the applicant requested once again that his 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 7 OA No.1028/2024 'Statements' that were taken at the office of DGoV, Northern Zonal Unit (NZU) in January, 2022, whose copies were refused to be shared with him at that point in time despite his continual requests for the same, as is evident from the applicant's previous letters dated 17.10.2022 and
4.1.2023 etc. addressed to the Principal DGoV, New Delhi but for the reasons best known to the respondents, no answers have been provided to him.
2.10 Thereafter, the applicant submitted a representation dated 18.04.2023 (Annexure A-47) to respondent nos.1 and 2 requesting him for a change of the present Inquiring Authority, namely, Mr. Gyanendra K. Tripathi, Additional Commissioner, CGST (Appeals), Jodhpur. The applicant has also submitted a further representation dated 14.05.2023 (Annexure A-48) to respondent nos.1 and 2 again requesting for change of Inquiring Authority.
2.11 In the meanwhile, in the Crl. Rev. No.203/23 filed by younger Widow sister of the applicant against the four persons, titled Khushboo Walia vs. Mahesh Kumar and others, the learned Additional Session Judge vide order dated 02.06.2023 (Annexure A-
49) recorded that the summons to R-1, i.e., Mahesh Kumar, received back with the report that the given address, on one visit was found to be locked and on another visit despite knocking the doors, none came out from the house. Hence, the notice remained unserved and as the Revisionist has filed amended memo of parties furnishing the fresh address of R-1 at Chennai, directed that let R-1 be served on filing of registered AD on his new address.
2026.01.29
RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01
+05'30'
Item No.44/C-2 8 OA No.1028/2024
2.12 However, vide letter dated 25.10.2023 (Annexure A-50)
conveying the Order dated 05.10.2023 rejecting the applicant's aforesaid representations regarding change of Inquiring Authority. 2.13 Thereafter, vide email dated 15.12.2023 (Annexure A-51), the applicant made a request for 'video recording/videography' of all future hearing in his disciplinary proceedings case as he has raised concerns about his personal safety and security during ongoing hearings in the disciplinary proceedings case and also stated his inability to attend proceedings on 19.12.2023 to 22.12.2023.
2.14 Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid charge sheet, the applicant has filed the present OA.
3. Pursuant to notice, the respondents have filed short reply as well as detailed reply opposing the claim of the applicant. The applicant has also filed rejoinder to short reply as also to the detailed reply. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT
4. The applicant, who is appearing in person, contended that all proceedings initiated against him stem from a vindictive group of senior officials in his Department, who allegedly held a personal grudge and orchestrated a campaign to malign him and his family since 2019. The applicant further stated that these officials colluded with residents and repeatedly instigated false complaints.
4.1 The applicant claimed that the residents, who had filed complaints, were acting in close coordination ("close-chain") to shield one officer (Mahesh Kumar), whom the applicant accused of harassing his widow sister on 03.09.2019. Therefore, the subsequent complaints were retaliatory and designed to deflect his sister's allegations.
2026.01.29
RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01
+05'30'
Item No.44/C-2 9 OA No.1028/2024
4.2 The applicant maintained that the so-called "incidents" of
September 2019 and March 2021 were mutual neighbourhood disputes, in which counter-complaints were filed by both sides. However, only one-sided complaints were relied upon by CBIC to initiate disciplinary action, ignoring his own grievances and the FIRs filed by his family.
4.3 The applicant argued that the Internal Committee and DGoV relied on unverified audio-video clips and statements, ignoring his version and failing to conduct an impartial fact-finding exercise. 4.4 The applicant also contended that his transfer to Jodhpur on 22.10.2019 was engineered to force him out of Delhi, followed by denial of quarter retention, culminating in an aggressive eviction process. These events, he claims, were judicially criticized by the District Court and High Court.
4.5 The applicant contended that at this stage, it is relevant to note that based on the Committee's report, the Additional Commissioner-cum- Estate Officer, CGST Delhi North Commissionerate issued a notice dated 17.09.2019 calling upon the applicant to show cause as to why the allotment of his departmental residential quarter should not be cancelled in view of the alleged incidents, and why he should not be declared ineligible for future allotment of departmental accommodation. The applicant, vide reply dated 01.10.2019, denied all allegations and, instead, levelled counter-allegations against the complainant officers. He further sought clarification from the Estate Branch regarding the legal provisions under which eviction proceedings had been initiated, asserting that he had neither been transferred nor 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 10 OA No.1028/2024 retired and that there was no subletting of the premises. Meanwhile, in the Annual General Transfers, 2019, the applicant was transferred from New Delhi to CGST Jodhpur Audit Commissionerate vide Board's order dated 22.10.2019 and was relieved on 19.11.2019. After his transfer, he requested permission from the Estate Branch to retain his quarter at Vatika Apartments, New Delhi beyond the permissible two-month retention period ending on 18.01.2020. This request was rejected by the competent authority. A further notice dated 09.01.2020 was issued directing him to vacate the accommodation before or by 19.01.2020. The applicant again sought retention till May 2020, but this request was also rejected, which was communicated to him vide letter dated 17.01.2020. Since the applicant did not vacate the said quarter by 19.01.2020, the Estate Branch issued a show-cause notice dated 28.01.2020 under Rule 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 ("PP Act"), requiring him to explain why an eviction order should not be passed in view of his continued unauthorized occupation. Thereafter, an eviction order dated 14.02.2020 under Rule 5 of the PP Act was passed directing him to vacate the premises by 29.02.2020. On 11.03.2020, the applicant again sought extension for retention of the quarter till May 2020 in view of the final examinations of the daughter of his dependent sister. However, soon thereafter, the Covid-19 pandemic broke out and a nationwide lockdown along with other restrictions was imposed in the last week of March 2020, with phased unlocking started only from May 2020. Subsequently, the Estate Branch issued another letter dated 08.09.2020 directing the applicant to pay 40 times the revised licence 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 11 OA No.1028/2024 fee from 01.06.2020 until the date of vacation of the quarter. The applicant challenged both the eviction order dated 14.02.2020 and the licence fee order dated 08.09.2020 by filing an appeal on 22.10.2020 under Section 9 of the PP Act before the learned Court of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. The learned Court, by interim order dated 26.10.2020, directed the Department not to take any coercive action against the applicant pending disposal of the appeal. Ultimately, vide final order dated 17.02.2021, the learned Court decided the applicant's appeal as under:
"Result:
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present appeal is disposed of as under with the following directions:
(a) Firstly, the appeal against the impugned order dated 14.02.2020 is dismissed since the appellant already stands transferred to a different place of posting and he cannot be allowed to retain the accommodation indefinitely. However, in view of the circulars/notices issued by the Government of India referred above, his period of occupation, at the start of the "Lock down 01 " till the issuance of "Lock down measures 04"
cannot be said to be in the nature of "unauthorized occupation" and therefore, the appellant is entitled to retain the departmental pool accommodation till 30.09.2020.
That being the case, the appellant is now occupying the subject premises for over a period of four months, and therefore, the appellant shall vacate the subject premises in question on or before the 15th April, 2021;
(b) Secondly, the impugned order dated 08.09.2020, by which, the appellant has been called upon to pay 40 times of the revised license fee is non est in law as the same has been passed without issuance of any show cause notice under Section 7(3) of the PP Act but also in gross violation of the CGGPRA Rules, 2017, and therefore, the same is quashed.
However, the Competent Authority shall be at liberty to Initiate fresh proceedings against the appellant for assessment of damages and penal rent/charges for occupation of subject premises beyond 01.11.2020 [allowing grace period of one month to vacate) till the vacation of the premises as per due process of law laid down in Section 7 of the PP Act;
(c) Thirdly, the Principal Commissioner, CGST shall ensure that the matter is dealt with by an Estate Officer other than Mr. Alok Jha (IRS) in a fair and impartial manner in consonance with the procedure established by the law;
(d) Fourthly, the issue of the stoppage of HRA is not in the domain of this Court since it was passed prior to filing of this appeal. However, the Competent Authority is impressed upon to re-visit/re-consider its 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 12 OA No.1028/2024 order w.r.t. to stoppage of HRA on a representation that may be preferred by the appellant within 15 days from today and pass a reasoned order taking into consideration the observations made by this Court while disposing of the instant appeal.
(e) Since an interim injunction had been granted against the respondent directing it not to issue any coercive process till the decision of this appeal vide order dated 26.10.2020, the deduction of the damage/penal charges from the salary of the appellant subsequent to the said interim order is cannot be sustained in law and such charges be reimbursed to the appellant within 15 days from today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay interest @ 18% per annum.
31. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Nothing contained in this order shall tantamount to an expression of opinion with regard to any disciplinary proceedings, if any, pending against the appellant.
32. The records of the Ld. Estate Officer be returned forthwith along with a copy of this judgment. A copy of this order be given dasti to the appellant as well. The Appeal file be consigned to the Record Room."
(emphasis supplied) 4.6 Subsequent to the above order, the applicant vacated his departmental quarter before the deadline fixed by the said learned Court i.e. 15th April, 2021. Meanwhile, Estate office of CGST Delhi North has filed a Writ Petition (C) No.4713/2021 before the High Court of Delhi to challenge the above judgment of learned District Court dated 17.02.2021, which is pending adjudication before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in which the Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 22.12.2022 recorded that the only issue which is now pressed on behalf of learned counsel for petitioner is with respect to the findings by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi as made in para 22 of the impugned judgment dated 17.02.2021, wherein it has been held that Additional Commissioner (Estate) had proceeded with personal vendetta against respondent herein (applicant in the present OA).
4.7 The applicant asserted that that his suspension vide order dated 04.05.2021 (Annexure A-34) and extensions of suspension periods 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 13 OA No.1028/2024 were issued with pre-determined intent, long before any objective inquiry, and were based on fabricated allegations and the suspension of the applicant was revoked by the respondents on 16.08.2022. 4.8 The applicant also submitted that although his suspension was revoked vide order dated 16.8.2022, however, the charge-sheet dated 18.08.2022 has been issued by the official respondents, which is the final step of this pre-planned conspiracy, meant to justify earlier illegal actions and to ruin his reputation and career.
4.9 The applicant also contended that each period of alleged unauthorised absence was duly intimated through email/WhatsApp to the Jodhpur Commissioner and was necessitated due to medical emergencies involving his widow sister's minor daughter during the COVID-19 period. The applicant also stated that he also offered to work remotely via e-office.
4.10 The applicant also argued that withholding his salary and terming his absence as "unauthorised" was malicious and contrary to service rules.
4.11 The applicant argued that the allegations levelled against him vide the impugned chargesheet do not constitute "misconduct" under Rule 3(1) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, and that domestic disputes or neighbourhood quarrels cannot be equated with official misconduct unless directly related to discharge of duties. Therefore, the Articles of Charge levelled against the applicant vide the impugned charge sheet are vague, unsubstantiated, and based on hearsay, and no specific act of 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 14 OA No.1028/2024 his own personal misconduct is demonstrated as most allegations relate to his family members.
4.12 The applicant argued that although he was not supplied with all the relied upon documents as per Annexure-III of the impugned charge sheet despite specific requests made vide representations dated 16.09.2022 (Annexure A-42) and 17.10.2022 (Annexure A-43), impairing his ability to prepare a defence, however, the same had been provided to him as is evident from the applicant representation dated 04.01.2023 that he has received all the documents as mentioned in Annexure-III of the impugned charge sheet on 03.01.2023. 4.13 The applicant also argued that no proper preliminary inquiry including his statement or cross-examination of witnesses were conducted.
4.14 The applicant also argued that during the inquiry proceedings initiated by the Inquiring Authority, the applicant has submitted representations for change of Inquiring Authority vide his representations dated 18.04.2023 and 14.05.2023 stating plenty of reasons, however, the same were rejected by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 05.10.2023 communicated to the applicant vide letter dated 25.10.2023 (Annexure A-50) without application of mind to his contentions raised in those representations.
4.15 In support of his claim, the applicant has placed reliance on the following judgments:-
(i) Surath Chandra Chakrabarty vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 1971 AIR 752;
2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 15 OA No.1028/2024
(ii) State of Punjab vs. V.K. Khanna and others, reported in [2000] SUPP. 5 SCR 200;
(iii) Anant R. Kulkarni vs. Y.P. Education Society and others, reported in AIR 2013 SC 2098;
4.16 Lastly, applicant prayed that the instant OA deserves to be allowed.
REPLY OF THE RESPONDENTS
5. Shri Ravi Kant Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, by referring to the counter reply submitted that a charge- sheet is ordinarily not liable to be quashed at the threshold, as it neither determines rights nor causes any adverse civil consequences by itself. The settled law is that a charge-sheet may be quashed only on limited grounds, namely: (i) where the authority issuing it is not competent, or (ii) where the initiation or conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings is unduly delayed causing demonstrable prejudice to the charged officer. In support of above contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors. v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 565. Learned counsel further submitted that none of these grounds have been urged by the applicant in the present OA, and, therefore, the challenge to the charge-sheet is untenable.
5.1 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant's aforementioned representations alleging bias on the part of the Inquiry Officer have already been examined and rejected by the Disciplinary 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 16 OA No.1028/2024 Authority vide order dated 05.10.2023. The said order was passed prior to the filing of the present OA on 07.03.2024, yet the applicant has not challenged the said rejection order. In the absence of such a challenge, the present OA is not maintainable.
5.2 Learned counsel contended that the applicant has not disputed the incidents forming the basis of the Articles of Charge; instead, he has merely furnished his defence/explanation in the OA and seeks quashing of the charge-sheet on the strength of such defence. In this regard, learned counsel argued that the correctness or sufficiency of evidence, or the acceptability of the applicant's defence, can only be examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority, and not at this pre-inquiry stage. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on Union of India v. Upendra Singh, reported in (1994) 3 SCC 357, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Tribunal cannot assess the correctness of charges at the stage of issuance of charge-sheet.
5.3 Learned counsel also argued that the allegation of "vague charge"
is misconceived. Each Article of Charge is duly supported by a detailed Statement of Imputations, and a list of 59 relied-upon documents was supplied to the applicant along with the charge-sheet. The applicant was thereby fully informed of the factual foundation of the allegations.
In support of this contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Akhilesh Jha, reported in (2021) 12 SCC 460, and 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 17 OA No.1028/2024 submitted that where imputations and supporting documents are provided, the charge cannot be termed as vague.
5.4 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant seeking quashing of the charge-sheet on the basis of allegations levelled against Prosecution Witnesses 1 to 7 and also requesting action against them.
However, these witnesses have not been impleaded as respondents.
Reliefs affecting non-parties cannot be adjudicated. Hence, the prayers in the OA are not maintainable.
5.5 Learned counsel argued that the applicant has made allegations against Sh. Gyanendra Kumar Tripathi, Additional Commissioner (Appeals), Jodhpur and Sh. Alok Jha, former Estate Officer, yet has chosen not to implead them as respondents in this case. It is trite law that reliefs sought against persons not before the Tribunal cannot be considered. In support of this contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the order/judgment dated 16.01.2025 of the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shiv Narayan Singh Mehra v.
State of Madhya Pradesh and others in Writ Petition No.2592/2018.
5.6 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant has impleaded Respondents 4 to 6 in their personal capacity alleging mala fides. However, these officers merely conducted the preliminary inquiry in accordance with CVC guidelines, and the Disciplinary Authority issued the charge-sheet after independently applying its mind in the matter. The applicant was granted due opportunity during the inquiry, and his statements dated 14.01.2022, 17.01.2022 and 21.01.2022 were 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 18 OA No.1028/2024 recorded with his signatures. The allegations of mala fides are, therefore, baseless and unfounded.
5.7 Learned counsel also submitted that the allegations in the present charge-sheet cannot be categorised as "personal in nature". The residential quarter, where the incidents allegedly occurred was allotted to the applicant solely by virtue of his employment, and all residents were government officers. Misconduct within official residential premises involving government officers tarnishes the image of the department and is squarely within the ambit of official misconduct.
5.8 Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned charge-
sheet has been issued by the competent Disciplinary Authority after examining the entire record. The Disciplinary Authority has also appointed the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer vide order dated 21.02.2023 after considering the applicant's written statement of defence. The applicant will have full opportunity to present his defence before the Inquiry Officer, and, therefore, no interference is warranted at this stage.
5.9 Lastly, learned counsel argued that the instant OA deserves to be dismissed by this Tribunal.
REJOINDER OF THE APPLICANT
6. The applicant in his rejoinder besides reiterating his contentions as noted above stated that the disciplinary proceedings and the impugned charge sheet dated 18.08.2022 are the outcome of a sustained, multi-year vendetta by certain senior officers, who acted with 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 19 OA No.1028/2024 malice, bias, and personal animosity, and that the authorities (R-1 & R-
2) failed in their duty to maintain neutrality, fairness, and adherence to law.
6.1 The applicant in his rejoinder stated that the official respondents failed to grant the applicant or his dependent family members any meaningful opportunity to present their version of events either during the preliminary enquiry or before the issuance of the impugned Charge Memorandum dated 18.08.2022.
6.2 It is further stated that the applicant's multiple written representations, statements, and documentary evidence, including FIRs, medical records, and complaints of his family members were not considered or placed on record.
6.3 It is also stated that critical exculpatory materials were deliberately withheld, including:
(a) copies of the applicant's statements recorded during preliminary enquiry;
(b) the preliminary enquiry report recommending issuance of the charge sheet; and
(c) representations submitted by the applicant and his family members.
6.4 The applicant also stated that the enquiry process has been conducted in a biased and one-sided manner, amounting to a denial of fair hearing.
2026.01.29
RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01
+05'30'
Item No.44/C-2 20 OA No.1028/2024
6.5 The applicant further emphasised that the impugned
disciplinary proceedings stem from personal vendetta and systemic bias exercised by a group of officers, as evidenced by:
(a) long-standing hostility towards the applicant since 2019;
(b) threats of disciplinary action issued years before initiation;
(c) fabricated, frivolous and retaliatory allegations;
(d) use of preliminary enquiry to justify pre-decided conclusions.
6.6 The applicant also contended that the same group of senior officers against whom multiple criminal cases and FIRs are pending have been made prosecution witnesses in the impugned charge sheet, while their own criminal involvement has been suppressed. 6.7 The applicant also contended that the conduct of Respondent No. 3 and the previous Estate Officer reveals clear bias, including circulating defamatory messages and openly taking "credit" for orchestrating adverse action against the applicant.
6.8 The applicant stated that administrative power exercised for collateral purposes is vitiated.
6.9 The applicant also stated that primary FIRs and criminal cases are pending against the very officers now shown as witnesses in the charge sheet and there exists a direct overlap of facts, witnesses, and issues between the criminal proceedings and the departmental proceedings. As such, allowing the departmental enquiry to proceed at this stage would compel premature disclosure of the applicant's defence, causing irreparable prejudice to his case in the criminal trial.
2026.01.29
RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01
+05'30'
Item No.44/C-2 21 OA No.1028/2024
6.10 The applicant also stated that the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings after years of sustained harassment, together with withholding of salary for nearly four years on flimsy grounds, is arbitrary and disproportionate to the gravity of the charge levelled against him.
6.11 The applicant also contended that respondents have consciously ignored: (a) complaints filed by the applicant's family members; (b) medical documents, MLCs, and police reports; (c) judicial orders and strictures passed against the previous Estate Officer; (d) Applicant's APARs and exemplary service record; (e) MHA COVID-19 guidelines permitting elderly and co-morbid dependents to stay home. 6.11 A disciplinary action vitiated by suppression of exculpatory material is legally unsustainable.
7. We have heard applicant in person as well as learned counsel appearing for the respondents as also perused the pleadings available on record and the judgments on which reliance placed by both the parties.
ANALYSIS
8. Having regard to the above factual matrix of the case, we are of the considered view that the following issues are required to delve into by this Tribunal:
(i) Whether neighbourhood/private disputes amount to misconduct under Rule 3(1) CCS (Conduct) Rules, particularly, when incidents involve family members rather than the officer/applicant personally?
2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 22 OA No.1028/2024
(ii) Whether initiation of disciplinary proceedings was vitiated by mala fides, and whether such allegations can be adjudicated without full-fledged evidence?
(iii) Whether suspension and charge memo constitute continuation of a pre-planned hostile campaign, and if so, whether this is a permissible ground for quashing the impugned charge sheet dated 18.08.2022?
(iv) Whether denial/delay in supply of RUDs and refusal to consider defence material violates natural justice at the charge-sheet stage?
(v) Whether alleged unauthorised absence during COVID period can be treated as misconduct, where intimation was given and explanations cite compelling family circumstances? and
(vi) Whether the Tribunal can interfere at the stage of charge memo in light of judgments in Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, Kunisetty Satyanarayana, V.K. Khanna, etc. (supra)? 8.1 Since the core issue in the present case is to the challenge to impugned Charge Memorandum dated 18.08.2022, and the questions framed above arise directly from the rival submissions, we deem it appropriate to examine the aforesaid issues together.
9. Before adverting on it with reference to the pleadings and delving upon the issues, we deem it fit to refer some of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this issue.
9.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28, has held as under:-
"13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh [(1996) 1 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 23 OA No.1028/2024 SCC 327 : JT (1995) 8 SC 331], Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse [(2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826 : AIR 2004 SC 1467], Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr., Mysore [(2001) 10 SCC 639] , State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , etc.
14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show- cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance."
9.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Transport Commissioner, Madras- Vs. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 332, has held as under:-
"7. So far as the truth and correctness of the charges is concerned, it was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into-more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. As pointed out by this Court repeatedly, even when the matter comes to the Tribunal after the imposition of punishment, it has no jurisdiction to go into truth of the allegations/charges except in a case where they are based on no evidence, i.e., where they are perverse. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is power of judicial review. It only examines the procedural correctness of the decision- making-process. For this reason the order of the Tribunal insofar as it goes into or discusses the truth and correctness of the charges, is unsustainable in law."
(emphasis supplied) 9.3 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Upendra Singh, reported in (1994) 3 SCC 357, has held as under:-
"5. The said statement of law was expressly affirmed by a seven Judge Bench in Ujjam Bai v. State of UP. The reason for this dictum is self- evident. If we do not keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law, the exercise of jurisdiction becomes rudderless and unguided; it tends to become arbitrary and capricious. There will be no uniformity of approach and there will be the danger of the jurisdiction becoming personalized. The parameters of jurisdiction would vary from Judge to Judge and from Court to Court. (Some say, this has already happened.) Law does advance. Jurisprudence does undoubtedly develop with the passage of time, but not by forgetting the 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 24 OA No.1028/2024 fundamentals. You have to build upon the existing foundations and not by abandoning them. It leads to confusion; it does not assist in coherence in thought or action.
6. In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. The function of the court/tribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of which are repeatedly laid down by this Court. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal v. Gopi Nath & Sons. The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus: (SCC p.317, para 8) "Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself."
7. Now, if a court cannot interfere with the truth or correctness of the charges even in a proceeding against the final order, it is ununderstandable how can that be done by the tribunal at the stage of framing of charges? In this case, the Tribunal has held that the charges are not sustainable (the finding that no culpability is alleged and no corrupt motive attributed), not on the basis of the articles of charges and the statement of imputations but mainly on the basis of the material produced by the respondent before it, as we shall presently indicate." 9.4 In the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Others vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that ordinarily a writ petition does not lie against the charge-sheet or a show cause notice, as it does not give rise to any cause of action unless the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate departmental proceedings. The Supreme 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 25 OA No.1028/2024 Court has laid down the law in this regard by relying on several previous decision, in the following terms:-
"10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge sheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge sheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. [Vide : State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, (1987) 2 SCC 79; Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors., (1996) 1 SCC 327; Ulagappa & Ors. v. Div. Commr., Mysore & Ors., (2001) 10 SCC 639; Special Director & Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse & Anr., (2004) 3 SCC 440; and Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana , (2006) 12 SCC 28].
11. In State of Orissa & Anr. v. Sangram Keshari Misra & Anr., (2010) 13 SCC 311, this Court held that normally a charge sheet is not quashed prior to the conclusion of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. [See also: Union of India & Ors. v. Upendra Singh (1994) 3 SCC 357].
12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that chargesheet cannot generally be a subject matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings."
10. The respondents have not dispute that the applicant had served at the NCTF Secretariat, DGEP and the WCO Cell, CBIC, during which period he represented India at multiple international conferences on Trade Facilitation and Customs-related issues. He played a key role in conceptualizing and drafting India's first National Trade Facilitation Action Plan (2017-2020), being one of its three authors, prepared in alignment with the WTO and Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). In 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 26 OA No.1028/2024 recognition of his expertise, the applicant was nominated to represent India at several global forums including: (i) USA (Department of Energy, Washington); (ii) UK (HM Revenue & Customs); (iii) Belgium/EU (World Customs Organization); (iv) Thailand (Asian Development Bank, Bangkok); and (v) South Korea (Customs Cooperation Council for Asia Pacific) and the applicant consistently received commendation and appreciation from the leadership of the respective customs and multilateral bodies on every such representation. Given this background, we are of the view that the applicant is a competent officer and has richly contributed in his work due to which he has been assigned above tasks/assignments, admittedly, there are no questions on the integrity of the applicant.
11. The facts in nutshell are that the applicant is a Deputy Commissioner in CBIC and was allotted departmental accommodation at Vatika Apartments, New Delhi, where he resided with dependent parents, widow sister and minor niece. Beginning 2019, multiple residents, including departmental officers, lodged complaints alleging quarrels, abuse and physical altercations involving the applicant's family. RWA resolutions sought their eviction. FIRs dated 03.03.2021 and 07.03.2021 were registered under IPC sections involving assault, outraging modesty, criminal intimidation and mischief. An inquiry committee recorded statements and audio evidence against the applicant's family. Parallelly, CGST Jodhpur Audit Commissionerate reported unauthorised absence, insubordination and misconduct. Based on cumulative complaints, the applicant was suspended on 04.05.2021 (extended periodically) which was later on revoked on 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 27 OA No.1028/2024 16.8.2022. The Estate Authority initiated cancellation and eviction proceedings. The learned Principal District Judge, vide judgment dated 17.02.2021, upheld eviction in principle but held that the occupation during COVID lockdown could not be treated as unauthorised; quashed penal rent demand for breach of natural justice; mandated fresh consideration before a different Estate Officer; and directed refund of penal deductions. The applicant vacated the premises within the time granted. The department has challenged the said order of the learned District Judge before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court by way of Writ Petition (Civil) No.4713/2021 and the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide Order dated 22.12.2022 recorded that the applicant had submitted that he had vacated the quarter in question on 15.4.2021 and thus the only issue which is now pressed on behalf of the writ petitioner therein with regard to the findings by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi as made in para 22 of the impugned judgment dated 17.2.2021, wherein it has been held that Additional Commissioner (Estate) had proceeded with personal vendetta against the applicant and the said Writ Petition is still pending for consideration before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. 11.1 At this stage, we also deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant paras of the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge judgment dated 17.2.2021, which reads as under:-
"22. If that was the case, the Additional Commissioner (Estate) is caught on a wrong foot. Without any further ado, I have no hesitation in holding that the appellant has not been dealt with in a fair, impartial and judicious manner by the Additional Commissioner (Estate) and it appears that Mr. Alok Jha has been hell bent in teaching 'a lesson or two' to the appellant. His whole disposition towards the appellant seems to be a personal vendetta. This is not only fortified from the contents of the initial notice dated 17.09.2019 but also from the tone and tenor of 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 28 OA No.1028/2024 the reply submitted by the respondent in the present appeal, wherein paragraph (9) to (33) have been extensively devoted on the alleged disputes and quarrel between the appellant and the other co-officials. This clearly appears to be a case of malafide and arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the Additional Commissioner (Estate) concerned and the impugned Eviction order clearly suffers from vice of malafide and based on extraneous consideration, where ex facie he has chosen to believe the allegations against the appellant on its face value.
23. There is no gainsaying that in a society governed by the rule of law, fair play is one of the basic ingredients of which absence of any personal or official bias is the cornerstone. In the classic decision in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 , the need of "fair play"
or "fair hearing" in quasi-judicial and administrative matters was categorically laid down. Not only the hearing but also a decision by a quasi judicial authority has to arrived at with an unbiased mind. In an earlier decision in Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 468, it was held that the Revenue Minister, who had cancelled the petitioner's licence or the lease of certain land, could not have taken part in the proceedings for cancellation of licence as there was political rivalry between the petitioner and the Minister, who had also filed a criminal case against the petitioner. The maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa was invoked in Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 10 SCC 641, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to hold that it may not be possible to give proof of actual bias at times. There are many ways to discover the same and the Supreme Court observed as under:-
"Bias, as pointed out earlier, is a condition of mind and, therefore, it may not always be possible to furnish actual proof of bias. But the courts, for this reason, cannot be said to be in a crippled state. There are many ways to discover bias; for example, by evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case or applying the tests of "real likelihood of bias" or "reasonable suspicion of bias". De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 1980 Edn., pp. 262, 264, has explained that "reasonable suspicion" test looks mainly to outward appearances while "real likelihood" test focuses on the court's own evaluation of the probabilities. (paragraph 33).
In Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon, (1968) 1 WLR 815 it was observed that "whether there was a real likelihood of bias or not has to be ascertained with reference to right-minded persons; whether they would consider that there was a real likelihood of bias". Almost the same test has also been applied here in an old decision, namely, in Manak Lal v. Dr Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425. In that case, although the Court found that the Chairman of the Bar Council Tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court to enquire into the misconduct of Manak Lal, an Advocate, on the complaint of one Prem Chand was not biased towards him, it was held that he should not have presided over the proceedings to give effect to the salutary principle that justice should not only be done, it should also be seen to be done in view of the fact that the Chairman, who, undoubtedly, was a Senior Advocate and an ex-Advocate General, had, at one time, represented Prem Chand in some case. These principles have had their evaluation in the field of administrative law but the courts performing judicial functions only cannot be excepted from the rule of 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 29 OA No.1028/2024 bias as the Presiding Officers of the court have to hear and decide contentious issues with an unbiased mind. (Paragraph 34)"
24. Likewise, in the case of Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182, the Supreme Court went into the same controversy and referred to the fact that the doctrine of natural justice implies that it is not to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. It was held:-
"The word "bias" in popular English parlance stands included within the attributes and broader purview of the word "malice", which in common acceptation means and implies "spite" or "illwill" (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn., Vol. 3) and it is now well settled that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the purposes of indication of ill-will. There must be cogent evidence available on record to come to the conclusion as to whether in fact there was existing a bias which resulted in the miscarriage of justice. (paragraph 10)"
25. In the light of the said authoritative judicial pronouncements, reverting back to the instant matter, I find that the concerned Additional Commissioner (Estate) right from the time he issued the notice dated 17.09.2019 and throughout the subsequent stages of the procedure adopted acted in a biased and vindictive manner against the appellant. I am not oblivious of the fact that the other Government officials are not before this Court, and therefore, I refrain from making any comments on the merits of the allegations and counter allegations as between the appellant and his family members on his side with other officials of the establishment on the other side.
26. All said and done, this Court is sitting in appeal in terms of its jurisdiction under section 9 of the PP Act and not in writ jurisdiction. The appeal is a creation of the statute and continuation of the inquiry before the Estate Officer and it is within the jurisdiction of this Court to appreciate the facts and circumstances brought before it and come to a finding different from the one given by the Estate Officer. That being the judicial approach, it is admitted position that the appellant has already been transferred to a place outside Delhi, and in view of the aforesaid discussion, he could have retained the accommodation till 30.09.2020 plus one month as grace period, on payment of nominal charges due to the aforesaid orders passed by the Government of India in connection with the COVID-19 Pandemic situation. Thereafter, the appellant is duty bound to make payment of occupation charges in terms of the CGGPRA Rules, 2017 referred to herein above. To sum up, although the impugned order dated 14.02.2020 suffers from vice of malafide action, in view of changed circumstances, the same can not be quashed and the appellant shall remain duty bound to surrender the subject premises as per the directions passed hereinafter in this order."
12. The applicant claims denial of relied-upon documents, which were ultimately furnished on 03.01.2023. He filed written defence and sought inclusion of further evidentiary materials (CCTV/audio). He submitted representations seeking (i) addition of defence documents,
(ii) copies of his recorded statements during the preliminary inquiry, 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 30 OA No.1028/2024 and (iii) change of Inquiry Officer, all requests were rejected by the respondents. He later sought video recording of hearings of the departmental proceedings citing safety concerns, which has also not been considered by the respondents. Aggrieved, the applicant challenging the impugned charge-memo dated 18.08.2022, alleging malafides, non-application of mind, and absence of misconduct.
13. We have carefully perused the article of charges as levelled against the applicant vide impugned Charge Memorandum dated 18.08.2022 as well as the provisions of specific rules alleged to have been contravened by the applicants. The first article of charge related to alleged frequent quarrels, physical/verbal assault and violent misbehaviour with the fellow residents of the departmental Govt. accommodation at Vatika Apartment, Mayapuri, New Delhi and also used derogatory remarks against the fellow residents/officials, registrations of FIRs.
13.1 At this stage, we deem it appropriate to refer to the articles of charges levelled against the applicant vide impugned Charge sheet dated 18.08.2022 (Annexure A/1), which reads as under:-
"Article-I Whereas Shri Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner while residing in Government residential colony at Vatika Apartments, Mayapuri New Delhi has indulged in frequent quarrels, physical/verbal assault and violent misbehavior with the fellow residents of the departmental Govt. accommodation at Vatika Apartment, Mayapuri, New Delhi and also used derogatory remarks against the fellow residents/officials. FIRs in the Rajouri Garden Police station, New Delhi have been filed against Shri Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner in these matters. By the above acts of omission, commission and misconduct, Shri Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner has acted in a manner unbecoming of a government servant, has failed to maintain courtesy and good behaviour with the public and to refrain from doing anything which is or may be contrary to any law, rules, regulations and establishment practices, thereby has 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 31 OA No.1028/2024 contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(iii), (xi), (xviii) of Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and has rendered himself liable for action under Rule 14 read with Rule 11 of Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965."
13.2 The above quoted Article-I of the Charge Memorandum is stated to be in contravention of the provisions of Rule 3(1) (iii), (xi), (xviii) of Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The said Rules are reproduced below:-
(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant;
(xi) maintain accountability and transparency; and (xviii) refrain from doing anything which is or may be contrary to any law, rules, regulations and established practices.
13.3 On a plain reading of above Article-I, it is apparent that the same relates to neighbourhood or domestic disputes, particularly, those attributed to family members rather than the officer/applicant himself, which do not ipso facto constitute misconduct under Rule 3(1) CCS (Conduct) Rules. Only if such conduct crosses the threshold of moral turpitude, misuse of authority, or public disrepute, disciplinary action can be justified. Otherwise, mere private quarrels fall outside the ambit of service discipline. Further, it is admitted fact that counter FIRs have been registered by the family members of the applicant and the neighbourhood colleagues and the same are pending adjudication before the competent authorities.
13.4 Further, we observe that the alleged incidents occurred in personal sphere, arising out of civil/neighbourhood/family friction, not from official capacity. There is no allegations of misuse of office, corruption, behaviour at workplace, or adverse impact on public 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 32 OA No.1028/2024 interest. In a catena of cases, the Hon'ble Courts have repeatedly held that private acts do not invite departmental action, unless it affects office prestige, is morally reprehensible, or impairs efficiency. The logic behind this is that a Government servant does not surrender his civil rights of familial/domestic engagement. Further, the acts of family members cannot be attributed to the officer. If the department seeks to treat domestic quarrels as "misconduct", it amounts to moral policing beyond the scope of Rule 3 of the Rules ibid.
13.5 Article-II of the impugned charge sheet reads as under:-
"Article-II Whereas Shri Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner while posted in CGST Jodhpur Audit Commissionerate went on unauthorized leaves and left Headquarters/station without prior sanction from the competent authority for the periods 09.11.2020 to 18.11.2020, 09.12.2020 to 22.12.2020 and 24.12.2020 to 01.02.2021. Instance of Sh. Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia's rude, indecent and insulting behaviour towards his seniors, subordinates and taxpayers have been informed by his controlling officer i.e. the Commissioner, CGST Jodhpur Audit Commissionerate. By the above acts of omission, commission and misconduct, Sh. Manmeet Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Commissioner, has failed to maintain utmost devotion to duty, acted in a manner unbecoming of a government servant, has failed to maintain courtesy and good behaviour with the public , failed to refrain from doing anything which is or may be contrary to any law, rules, regulations and establishment practices and has failed to maintain discipline in the discharge of his duties and be liable to implement the lawful orders duly communicated to him thereby has contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1) (ii) (iii), (xi), (xviii) & 3(1 )(xix) of Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and has rendered himself liable for action under Rule 14 read with Rule 11 of Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
13.6 The above quoted Article-II of the Charge Memorandum is stated to be in contravention of the provisions of 3(1) (ii) (iii), (xi), (xviii) & 3(1) (xix) of Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The said Rules are reproduced below:-
(ii) maintain devotion to duty;
(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant;
(ix) maintain accountability and transparency;
2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 33 OA No.1028/2024 (xviii) refrain from doing anything which is or may be contrary to any law, rules, regulations and established practices; and (xix) maintain discipline in the discharge of his duties and be liable to implement the lawful orders duly communicated to him.
13.7 From a plain reading of Article-II, it is evident that the periods of alleged unauthorised absence relied upon by the respondents fall entirely within the Covid-19 pandemic phase. The applicant has already submitted that leave had been duly applied for and brought to the notice of the respondents. However, even assuming, without admitting, that the applicant remained on unauthorised absence during the said spells, the fact remains that these periods coincide with the extraordinary circumstances prevailing due to the Covid-19 pandemic. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020, took judicial notice of the unprecedented disruption caused by the pandemic and passed a series of orders suspending and extending limitation for all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The period of limitation was initially directed to be excluded from 15.03.2020 and subsequently extended from time to time, ultimately up to 28.02.2022. This authoritative recognition of the pandemic's impact underscores the abnormal conditions prevailing during the period in question, rendering penal consequences for alleged absence wholly unjustified and disproportionate. 13.8 We also observe that absence during the period of COVID pandemic is not per se misconduct. Absence becomes misconduct only if wilful, not when medical conditions, family emergencies, lockdown 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 34 OA No.1028/2024 movement restrictions, quarantine, containment-zone notifications exist. It is admitted position that the applicant gave intimation and sought leave this negates wilful absence. Government itself issued relaxations for attendance and Work From Home norms during COVID pandemic. We also find that the respondents failed to show of any breach of order, damage to work, or dishonest motive. Penalty for absence in a Covid pandemic ignores ground realities and human rights. When State was urging people to save lives and avoid public movement, penalising absence is absurdly disproportionate and unreasonable. However, the Disciplinary Authority, while approving the Articles of Charge in the impugned Memorandum dated 18.08.2022, failed to consider that the alleged periods of unauthorised absence fell squarely within the COVID-19 pandemic. It is an admitted position, as reflected in the respondents' own counter reply, that the competent authorities have not yet taken a decision on sanctioning leave for the said periods. In such circumstances, initiation of disciplinary proceedings without first determining the status of the applicant's leave demonstrates non- application of mind and renders the charge fundamentally premature. 13.9 One more aspect in this matter is that although the periods of alleged unauthorised absence of the applicant, i.e., from 09.11.2020 to 18.11.2020, 09.12.2020 to 22.12.2020 and 24.12.2020 to 01.02.2021 fall squarely within the Covid-19 pandemic, however, the respondents chose to issue the charge memorandum on this account only on 18.08.2022. At best, the respondents could have initiated disciplinary action in the year 2020 itself, or even in 2021; however, no explanation has been furnished for issuing the charge sheet on this count after such a long 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 35 OA No.1028/2024 lapse of time. When the alleged absence pertains to the period between November 2020 and February 2021, the initiation of proceedings on 18.08.2022 is inordinate and unexplained. Such delay is contrary to the settled position of law that disciplinary action must be commenced within a reasonable period, failing which it becomes vulnerable to interference on the grounds of prejudice, arbitrariness, and violation of the principles of natural justice.
14. Insofar as the allegation of mala fides is concerned, it is settled that the Tribunal may examine the circumstances leading to initiation of proceedings to ascertain whether the administrative action is tainted by arbitrariness or colourable exercise of power. While the Tribunal cannot adjudicate upon the truth or falsity of the charges at this stage, it is competent to scrutinize whether the disciplinary process itself stands vitiated. To ascertain, the following circumstances such as (i) initiation of proceedings pursuant to complaints emanating from rival or interested quarters; (ii) immediate resort to suspension without any preliminary fact verification; (iii) unexplained delay followed by sudden revival of stale allegations of unauthorised absence during the aforesaid periods; and (iv) failure or refusal to consider the applicant's explanation or version. Although mala fides are seldom capable of direct proof, and it may not be possible to establish them beyond reasonable doubt at the initial stage, the law requires only that the surrounding facts and circumstances disclose a prima facie case suggesting malice. Where the material placed on record reasonably indicates that the dominant purpose of the impugned action is punitive or vindictive, rather than corrective or bona fide administrative 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 36 OA No.1028/2024 regulation, judicial interference is warranted and as such, this Tribunal is empowered to intervene to prevent abuse of disciplinary machinery and to safeguard employee(s) from arbitrary exercise of power. However, it is pertinent to note that, while adjudicating the eviction proceedings, the learned District Court unequivocally recorded findings that the officers of the respondent-department had acted with bias and personal vendetta in the matter.
15. At this stage, we deem it appropriate to refer to the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment in the case of State of Punjab Vs. V.K. Khanna and others, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 330, the relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"24. Before delving into the contentions, we feel it proper to note that the general principles of law as recorded by the High Court pertaining to discharge of duty of a civil servant. The High Court observed:
"Indisputably, duty is like debt. It must be discharged without delay or demur. A civil servant must perform his duties honestly and to the best of his ability. He must abide by the rules. He should live by the discipline of the service. He must act without fear or favour. He must serve to promote public interest. He must carry out the lawful directions given by a superior. In fact, the Constitution of India has a chapter that enumerates the duties of the citizens of this country. Article 51- A contains a positive mandate. It requires every citizen 'to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity, so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement'. This provision can be the beacon light for every citizen and the 'mantra' for every civil servant. So long as he performs this duty as imposed by the Constitution and strives towards excellence, he has none and nothing to fear. Even God would be by his side.
At the same time it is undeniably true that whenever there is a dereliction in the performance of duties by the civil servant, the State Government has the right to intervene and punish the guilty. This is the undoubted prerogative of the State. But, to borrow the words of Professor Wade, this power has to be used 'for the public good'. The action of the authority must be fair and reasonable. It should be bona fide. It should not be arbitrary. It should not be based on extraneous considerations. It should be for public good. Bias or personal malice should not taint it. Bias is like a drop of poison in a cup of pure milk. It is enough to ruin it. The slightest bias would vitiate the whole action."
2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 37 OA No.1028/2024
25. Bias admittedly negates fairness and reasonableness by reason of which arbitrariness and mala fide move creep in -- issuance of the two notifications, assuming in hot haste, but no particulars of any mala fides move or action has been brought out on record on the part of Shri V.K. Khanna -- while it is true that the notings prepared for Advocate General's opinion contain a definite remark about the mala fide move on the part of Shri V.K. Khanna yet there is singular absence of any particulars without which the case of mala fides cannot be sustained. The expression "mala fide" has a definite significance in the legal phraseology and the same cannot possibly emanate out of fanciful imagination or even apprehensions but there must be existing definite evidence of bias and actions which cannot be attributed to be otherwise bona fide -- actions not otherwise bona fide, however, by themselves would not amount to be mala fide unless the same is in accompaniment with some other factors which would depict a bad motive or intent on the part of the doer of the act.
26. It is in this sphere let us now analyse the factual elements in slightly more detail -- the Chief Minister is desirous of having the files pertaining to two of the senior officers of the administration and concerning two specific instances in normal course of events, we suppose the Chief Secretary has otherwise a responsibility to put a note to the Chief Minister pertaining to the issue and in the event the Chief Secretary informs the Chief Minister through the note that there should be a further probe in the matters for which the files have been asked for, can it by itself smack of mala fides? Personality clash or personal enmity have not been disclosed neither even there is existing any evidence therefor: so in the usual course of events the Chief Secretary in the discharge of his duty sent a note to the Chief Minister recording therein that a further probe may be effected, if so thought fit by the Chief Minister and in the event the Chief Minister agrees therewith, and a probe is directed through an independent and impartial agency -- can any exception be taken therefor? Mr Solicitor General answers the same generally that it is the personal vendetta which has prompted the Chief Secretary to initiate this move but general allegation of personal vendetta without any definite evidence therefor, cannot be said to be a sufficient assertion worth acceptance in a court of law. There must be a positive evidence available on record in order to decry an administrative action on the ground of mala fides and arbitrariness. The ill will or spite must be well pronounced and without which it would be not only unfair but patently not in conformity with the known principles of law. On a scrutiny of the files as presented to court and the evidence thereon, unfortunately, however, there is no evidence apart from bare allegation of any spite or ill will, more so by reason of the fact that the same involves factual element, in the absence of which no credence can be attributed thereto. Incidentally, be it noted that submissions in support of the appeal have been rather elaborate and in detail but a significant part of which pertain to the issuance of the two notifications spoken hereinabove, the High Court decried the action as being tainted with malice and quashed the charge-sheet as being mala fide. If initiation of a proceeding through CBI can be termed to be a mala fide act then what would it be otherwise when Government acts rather promptly to rescind the notifications -- can it be an action for administrative expediency or is it an action to lay a cover for certain acts and omissions? We are not expressing any opinion but in the normal circumstances what would be the reaction pertaining to the issuance of withdrawal notifications, the answer need not be detailed out expressly but can be inferred therefrom.
27. The charge-sheet records that Shri Khanna has acted in a mala fide manner and in gross violation of established norms and procedure of government functioning and in utter disregard of the All-India 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 38 OA No.1028/2024 Service Rules, principles of objectivity, fair play, integrity and the high morals expected of a senior civil servant (emphasis supplied). The notification pertains to acquisition of assets disproportionate to the known source of income by a civil servant and it is in processing these cases that the aforesaid charge as emphasised, has been levelled against Shri V.K. Khanna. We, however, have not been able to appreciate whether initiation of an inquiry against the civil servant, would be in gross violation of established norms and procedure of government functioning. The processing was further stated to be in utter disregard of the All-India Service Rules; we are not aware neither any rules have been placed before this Court wherein initiation of an inquiry for assets disproportionate to the known source of income can be termed to be in disregard of the service rules or fair play, integrity and morals: Do the service rules or concept of fair play, integrity or morals expected of a senior civil servant provide a prohibition for such an initiation or such processing? If that is so, then, of course one set of consequence would follow but if it is other way round then and in that event, question of any violation or a mala fide move would not arise. The second charge is in regard to undue hurry and undue interest not being actuated by the nature of cases and as an illustration therefor, note of the Chief Minister was taken recourse to the effect that there was no direction in either of the notes that the cases were to be handled at "breakneck" speed. The note noted above, however, records that CBI enquiry be initiated and the reference may be made "immediately", the direction of the Chief Minister that the recording of action immediately if understood to mean undue haste and if acted accordingly then again one set of consequence follow, but in the normal course of events, such a direction from the Chief Minister ought to be adhered to with promptitude and no exception can thus be taken in that regard.
28. Shri V.K. Khanna was also said to have faulted Government instructions under which it is stipulated that in the event of any impending change, no important decisions would be taken by the Secretaries without having it seen by the new Ministers who were to take office shortly. Shri Khanna has been charged of failure to put up the cases for information to the Chief Minister and allegations have been levelled that statutory notification issued on 7-2-1997 were neither sent to the L.R. as required by the rules of business of the Punjab Government nor were they sent for gazetting as required by law. Both charges together, however cannot be sustained at the same time. If the Chief Secretary is not supposed to act by reason of the impending change then he cannot possibly be accused of not acting, as required by the rules of business or as required by law.
29. One of the basic charge of mala fides as ascribed by Mr Solicitor General, is that the papers pertaining to one of the cases was retained till the night of 24-2-1997 and till 26-2-1997 in another, and the same is unbecoming of the Chief Secretary of the State, more so by reason of the fact that when a new Secretary has already taken over charge. The issue undoubtedly attracted some serious attention but the factum of Respondent 1 Shri Khanna not being in the city and away in Delhi for placement in the Central Government by reason of the attainment of necessary seniority would cast a definite shadow on the seriousness of the situation. The new Government was declared elected on 9-2-1997. Obviously on a hint that the Chief Secretary may be removed and be transferred, if there is any inquiry as regards the placement and by reason wherefore a delay occurs for about two weeks, in our view, no exception can be taken therefor and neither it calls for any further explanation.
30. During the course of submission, strong emphasis has been laid on a linkage between CBI's endeavour to initiate proceedings and 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 39 OA No.1028/2024 the retention of the file, however, does not stand any factual justification since one of the files were returned to the Chief Secretary on 24th February itself whereas CBI lodged the FIR on 25-2-1997. Mr Subramanium however, contended that the contemporaneous noting which has been produced in Court does not indicate any perturbation on the part of the senior officers seeking to recover these papers. Mr Subramanium contended that the anxiety of the first respondent only was to see that the files be lodged in the custody of the responsible person in the administration and the delay caused in that regard can hardly be said to be self-serving or that he played any role in CBI for pursuing the investigation. We have dealt with the issue to the effect that no exception can be taken as regard the action of Respondent 1.
31. As regards the allotment of land to the Punjab Cricket Association Mr Solicitor General contended that as a matter of fact, there was a total disregard to ascertain the full facts and an emphatic statement has also been made during the course of hearing and which finds support from the charge-sheet that even the Assembly had categorically endorsed the decision of grant of land at nominal cost together with the release of funds. It is in this context the reply-affidavit filed by the first respondent to the counter-affidavit of the State Government in the High Court is of some consequence and the relevant extracts whereof, are set out hereinbelow for appreciation of the submissions made by the parties on that score, the same reads as below:
"7. The averments in para 7 of the WS are denied as incorrect and those of the petition are reiterated. The petitioner submits that he thoroughly examined the relevant record, cross-checked the facts and exercised due care and caution while submitting the factual report to the Chief Minister on 6-2-1997. Before submission of the factual report to the Chief Minister, the petitioner inter alia found the following material on record:
(i) There was no Cabinet approval, mandatory under the rules of business, for either construction of the cricket stadium or the transfer of about 15 acres of land to the Punjab Cricket Association, a private entity. Apparently, Cabinet had been deliberately and dishonestly bypassed by the Sports Secretary, Shri Bindra.
(ii) Shri Bindra's ACR file showed that he lacked integrity and he had abused his official position to extort huge amounts of money from government companies under his charge as Secretary, Industries.
(iii) PSSIEC (Punjab Small-Scale Industries and Export Corporation) reported in writing that they paid Rs 2 lakhs for laying the cricket pitch at Mohali.
(iv) The note dated 21-1-1997 of Chief Administrator, PUDA brought out many serious irregularities in regard to grant of funds for the cricket stadium and 'PCA Club'.
(v) It had also come to the petitioner's notice that Shri Bindra directed other companies like Punjab Tractors Ltd., Punwire, PACL etc. not to furnish any information to the Chief Secretary about payments made by them to the Punjab Cricket Association.
(vi) The glaring fact that Shri Bindra had transferred the land to the Punjab Cricket Association at his own level, without the approval of the Finance Department or any higher authority like Minister or Chief Minister, even though the approval of the Council of Ministers was mandatory under the rules. The Sports Department itself did not have any title to the property. It still does not have it.
2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 40 OA No.1028/2024
(vii) The land use was changed by the Housing Development Board from sports complex/cycle velodrome to cricket stadium at Shri Bindra's behest, following collusive and mala fide 'inter- departmental meetings' with Shri Mann.
(viii) The Housing Board connived at serious encroachments made by PCA which is actually in occupation of about 20 acres, as against 10.5 acres mentioned in the decision of the Governor-in- Council (order dated 29-4-1991) which in any case was not for a cricket stadium, but for a sports complex/velodrome."
32. It is on this score, Mr Subramanium for Respondent 1 contended, that the factual context as noted hereinbefore prompted the Chief Secretary to submit the note to the Chief Minister and the allegation of not assessing the factual situation in its entirety cannot be said to be correct.
33. While it is true that justifiability of the charges at the stage of initiating a disciplinary proceeding cannot possibly be delved into by any court pending inquiry but it is equally well settled that in the event there is an element of malice or mala fide, motive involved in the matter of issue of a charge- sheet or the authority concerned is so biased that the inquiry would be a mere farcical show and the conclusions are well known then and in that event law courts are otherwise justified in interfering at the earliest stage so as to avoid the harassment and humiliation of a public official. It is not a question of shielding any misdeed that the Court would be anxious to do, it is the due process of law which should permeate in the society and in the event of there being any affectation of such process of law that law courts ought to rise up to the occasion and the High Court, in the contextual facts, has delved into the issue on that score. On the basis of the findings no exception can be taken and that has been the precise reason as to why this Court dealt with the issue in so great a detail so as to examine the judicial propriety at this stage of the proceedings.
34. The High Court while delving into the issue went into the factum of announcement of the Chief Minister in regard to appointment of an enquiry officer to substantiate the frame of mind of the authorities and thus depicting bias -- what bias means has already been dealt with by us earlier in this judgment, as such it does not require any further dilation but the factum of announcement has been taken note of as an illustration to a mindset viz.: the inquiry shall proceed irrespective of the reply -- is it an indication of a free and fair attitude towards the officer concerned? The answer cannot possibly be in the affirmative. It is well settled in service jurisprudence that the authority concerned has to apply its mind upon receipt of reply to the charge-sheet or show-cause as the case may be, as to whether a further inquiry is called for. In the event upon deliberations and due considerations it is in the affirmative
-- the inquiry follows but not otherwise and it is this part of service jurisprudence on which reliance was placed by Mr Subramanium and on that score, strongly criticised the conduct of the respondents (sic appellants) herein and accused them of being biased. We do find some justification in such a criticism upon consideration of the materials on record.
35. Admittedly, two enquiries were floated through CBI but purity and probity being the key words in public service and in the event a civil servant is alleged to have assets disproportionate to his income or in the event, there was parting of a huge property in support of which adequate data was not available -- can the action be said to be the 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 41 OA No.1028/2024 resultant effect of the personal vendetta or can any charge-sheet be issued on basis thereof, the answer cannot possibly be but in the negative.
36. The contextual facts depict that there is a noting by an official in the administration that certain vigilance matters are pending as against one of the Secretaries but that stands ignored. We have dealt with this aspect of the matter, in detail hereinbefore, in this judgment. Thus suffice it to note that further effort on the part of Shri Khanna in bringing to notice to the Chief Minister would not have resulted any further development and in that perspective the conduct of Shri Khanna cannot be faulted in any way. These are the instances which the High Court ascribed to be not in accordance with the known principles of law and attributed motive as regards initiation of the charge-sheet. Opinion of the Court
37. As noticed above, mala fide intent or biased attitude cannot be put on a strait-jacket formula but depends upon facts and circumstances of each case and in that perspective judicial precedents would not be of any assistance and as such we refrain from further dealing with various decisions cited from the Bar since facts are otherwise different in each of the decisions.
38. On a perusal of the matter and the records in its entirety, we cannot but lend concurrence to the findings and observations of the High Court. The judgment under appeals cannot be faulted in any way whatsoever and in that view of the matter these appeals fail and are dismissed without however, any order as to costs."
(emphasis supplied)
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Probodh Kumar Bhowmick v. University of Calcutta and Ors., reported in 1994 (8) LR 300 (CAL) held that though the service Rules do not constitute a bar to such initiation since an employer has an inherent right to take disciplinary action against his employee. In the matter of Delhi Development Authority vs. H.C. Khanna, reported in (1993) II LLJ 303 (SC): AIR 1993 SC 1488: 1993 AIR SCW 1417, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings must proceed the charge sheet and such decision must be of the concerned authority and the result of his own application of mind and he cannot be directed by some other authority. In the matter of Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank, reported in(1991) 3 SCC 219, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the authority has 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 42 OA No.1028/2024 to decide whether inquiry is called for at all. Keeping in view the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted above, we observe that quashing of the charge Memorandum is rare but permissible if disciplinary power is invoked for a collateral purpose, not for a discipline misconduct but to harass or drive out the officer. In this case, having regard to above analysis, the cumulative pattern shows administrative victimisation, not bona fide disciplinary regulation. The Hon'ble Courts have repeatedly held that discipline cannot be weaponised to coerce, settle scores or punish dissent. If the entire chain of events reeks of pre-planned persecution, quashing becomes not only permissible but necessary to restore fairness.
17. We further observe that the charge has to be brief and to the point. In the matter of Union of India and others vs. Gyan Chand Chattar, reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held :
"29. In view of the above, law can be summarized that an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjunctures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct The authority must record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statute defining the misconduct."
18. It is well settled principle in service jurisprudence that charge has to be brief and to the point. Upon a perusal of the Statement of Imputations of Misconduct and Misbehaviour annexed with the impugned Charge Memorandum, we find that the imputation 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 43 OA No.1028/2024 pertaining to Article-I containing details which runs from pages 247 to 273 (27 pages), comprising approximately 42 paras and sub-para and similarly, the imputation relatable to Article-II extends from pages 272 to 280 (11 pages), containing approximately 40 paragraphs and sub- paragraphs. To issue charge sheet to the applicant to give credence to the charge, the name of the applicant is added in the Articles of charges and statement of imputation after the names of his mother and sister in the alleged FIR(s). It is pertinent to mention that copy of the FIR(s) has/have not been filed by the respondents and the applicant has vehemently questioned his involvement in the scuffle between his sister, mother and other person(s) residing in the above mentioned locality. Even if there is such a situation that the applicants named in the said FIR(s), such matters are under adjudication in the respective learned Court. We observe that the essential features of elements of disciplinary proceedings have been admirably encapsulated in Gyan Chand Chattar (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court pointed out that an enquiry is to be conducted against any person in strict adherence to the statutory provisions and the principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and setting out the details of the incident which formed the basis of the charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. The Court reiterated that there is a distinction between proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the findings of fact in the 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 44 OA No.1028/2024 context of the statute defining the misconduct. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory. Even if the delinquent does not take the defence or raise any protest saying that the charges are vague, that does not absolve the enquiring authority from being vitiated for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences.
19. So far as the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in support of the stand of the respondents are concerned, the same are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
20. In the peculiar facts and circumstances and for the reasons stated above, we find merit in the present OA and accordingly the impugned charge sheet dated 18.08.2022 (Annexure A-1) is quashed and set aside.
21. It is an utter failure on the part of the respondent No.2 to have an effective administrative control over the administrative formation under him. We are of the considered view that respondent No.2 has failed to look deep with due application of mind and has allowed this situation to prevail. Even the chargesheet issued to the applicant is without application of mind and we hold him responsible for this disdainful and reclusive approach. In view of this position, we deem it appropriate to impose cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) upon Respondent No.2 payable in the Prime Minister's Relief Fund for facilitating, permitting, and sustaining the harassment and victimisation inflicted upon the applicant. Compliance shall be ensured 2026.01.29 RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01 +05'30' Item No.44/C-2 45 OA No.1028/2024 within a period of four (04) weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order.
22. Pending MA(s), if any, shall stand closed.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ravi/
2026.01.29
RAVI KANOJIA17:02:01
+05'30'