Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kulwant Singh, Managing Director Of The ... vs State Of Punjab Through Secretary To ... on 22 September, 1994
Equivalent citations: (1994)108PLR731, 1995 A I H C 1765, (1994) 3 PUN LR 731, 1994 REVLR 2 392, (1994) 2 BANKLJ 443, (1995) 1 LANDLR 9
Author: R.P. Sethi
Bench: R.P. Sethi
JUDGMENT
R.P. Sethi and Sat Pal, JJ.
1. The vires of Punjab Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act of 1993 (being Act No. XIX of 1993) in so far as newly incorporated Sections 26(1B) and 26(B)(2) of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act are concerned, have been challenged by the petitioners who were elected as members of the Cooperative Societies for a term of three years under the unamended Act. Admittedly, the petitioners have completed their tenure for which they were elected. It is not disputed that the State Legislature had the competence to legislate the amending Act XIX of 1993 but it is submitted that as the amendment of Section 26 IB and 26 B (2) has resulted in the discrimination, the same is required to be set aside. Elaborating his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that as the persons who were to be elected under the amended Act have to serve for a period of five years, the petitioners cannot be deprived of the benefit of serving for the aforesaid term despite the fact that they were elected for a period of three years only under the unamended Act. Our attention has been drawn to the aims and object of the amending Act which envisages longer tenure and better continuity avoiding frequent elections.
2. It is settled proposition of law that the right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right or fundamental right but is the creation of statute or special law which is "subject to the limitations imposed by the relevant statute.
3. Relying upon the earlier judgments in N.P Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 64 and Jagan Nath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 201 it was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Jyoti Basu and Ors. v. Debi Ghosal and Ors. , A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 983 as under:-
" A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common Law Right. It is pure and simple a statutory right. So, is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitations. An election petition is not an action at Common Law, nor in equity."
4. While approving the law laid down in Jyoti Basu's case (supra), the Supreme Court in 'Rama Kant Pandey v. Union of India, J.T.I. 1993(1) S.C. 440 has held that right to vote or right to elect is neither a fundamental nor a civil right but was a pure and simple statutory right.
5. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal Tripathi v. The District Magistrate, Rao Bareilly and Ors., J.T. 1992(4) S.C. 363 again held:
" Democracy is a concept, a political philosophy an ideal practised by many nations culturally advanced and politically mature by resorting to governance by representatives of the people elected directly or indirectly. But electing representatives to govern is neither a 'fundamental right' nor a 'common law right' but a special right created by the statutes, or a 'political right' or 'privilege' and not a natural' 'absolute' or 'vested right'.
Concepts familiar to common law and equity must remain stranger to Election Law unless statutorily recognised."
6. A perusal of the various judgments on the subject would clearly show that no citizen can prefer a claim to hold the post to which he was elected for a specified term. As the holding of the term is a creation of statute itself beyond which the Court cannot traverse but it does not, however, mean that the action of the respondents either on the administrative side or on the legislative side is not open to judicial review and wherever it is found that the legislature has exceeded its jurisdiction or that the statutory provisions are contrary to Part III of the Constitution or destructive of the basic features of the Constitution, this Court would not hesitate to interfere. In the instant case, the petitioners have mainly attempted to persuade us to hold that the amending Act has resulted in discrimination in as much as they have been deprived to serve as members for a period of five years instead of three years as was the mandate of the amendment particularly in view of the aims and objects of the amending Act. As we have already held that no person has a civil or fundamental right to hold the elected post for a specified period or beyond the period prescribed by a statute, the contention is not worth consideration and is required to be rejected.
Stmilarly, the argument of the counsel for the petitioners that the amendment has resulted in discrimination is also without any substance. Article 14 is the heart and soul of the Constitution which guarantees equality among equals and permits reasonable classification. The principle of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be stretched to mean that every law must have a universal application to all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. Differential treatment does not ipso facto violate Article 14. If a law deals equally with members of a well defined class, it cannot be termed to be discriminatory. In the instant case, the persons elected under the unamended Act and the persons likely to be elected after the amendment constitute two distinct classes regarding which differential treatment can be prescribed. However, the respondents cannot be permitted or allowed to discriminate between the persons forming one class. The persons who were elected under the Act before its amendment constitutes one class and there is no allegation that there has been any discrimination between them rather it is conceded that all of them have been equally treated. While making the amendment, the respondents had to prescribe a cut out line which under the amending statute is well defined and reasonable.
7. This Court has consistently held that amending Act to be a valid piece of legislation. A Division Bench of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6585 of 1993 'Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors.' decided on June 2, 1993 held:-
"We find no merit in the submissions made. It is not suggested that the amendment Act is not within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. It is also not suggested that the amended Act is hit by the vice of arbitrariness. If the Legislature is competent to enact legislation. It is competent to amend the same. If the Legislature was competent to provide that the term of office of a committee of the society elected under the provisions of the parent Act would be three years, the same Legislature is equally competent to amend the parent Act and say that the term of the office of a committee would be five years."
8. Another Division Bench of this Court, while disposing of Civil Writ Petition No. 15033 of 1993 'Hakim Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors.' on 7.12.1993 dismissed the writ petition by which the amending Act was challenged. The Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its orders dated February 14, 1994.
9. For the reasons stated herein above, we do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed in limine.