Kerala High Court
K.K.Hamsa vs Athikottu Snehaletha on 3 December, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIR 2021 KERALA 17, AIRONLINE 2020 KER 1130
Bench: A.M.Shaffique, Sunil Thomas
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 12TH AGRAHAYANA, 1942
RCRev..No.258 OF 2018
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCA 146/2017 OF DISTRICT COURT &
SESSIONS COURT,KOZHIKODE
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 80/2014 OF PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF
COURT ,KOZHIKODE-II
REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
K.K.HAMSA
AGED 57 YEARS, S/O. KIZHEKKEKOTTYIL KUNJI
MUHAMMED,MELPALLI HOUSE, PUTTEKKADU, FEROKE
P.O,FEROKE AMSOM, NALLUR DESOM,KOZHIKODE 673 631.
BY ADVS.
SRI.NIRMAL. S
SMT.VEENA HARI
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT:
ATHIKOTTU SNEHALETHA
W/O. SUBRAMANYAN, AGED 56 YEARS,
"GIRIJALAYAM",FEROKE P.O, FEROKE AMSOM, NALLUR
DESOM,KOZHIKODE 673 631.
R1 BY ADV. R.K.MURALEEDHARAN
THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH OP (RC).2/2019 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:2:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020/12TH AGRAHAYANA,1942
OP (RC).No.2 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 14/2015 OF MUNSIFF
MAGISTRATE, SULTHAN BATHERI
PETITIONER:
M.K. FAISAL,AGED 41 YEARS
S/O MOIDU, RESIDING AT MAMMASRAYILLATH HOUSE,
BATHERY, BATHERY POST, BATHERY VILLAGE, BATHERY
TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT-673 592.
BY ADVS.
SRI.B.PREMNATH (E)
SRI.MANI GOVINDA MARAR
RESPONDENT:
VIKAS CHACKO,S/O CHACKO VELLAMMATTATHIL HOUSE,
NOOLPUZHA POST, NAGARAMCHAL, KUPPADI AMSOM,
DESOM, SULTHANBATHERY TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT,
REPRESENTED BY HIS AGENT AND POWER OF ATTORNEY
HOLDER V.M. CHACKO, AGED 57 YEAR, S/O MATHAI,
VELLAMMATTATHIL HOUSE, NOOLPUZHA POST-673592,
NAGARAMCHAL, KUPPADI AMSOM, DESOM,
SULTHANBATHERY TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT.
R1 BY ADV. SRI.NIRMAL V NAIR
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:3:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020/12TH AGRAHAYANA,1942
OP (RC).No.89 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 14/2014 OF MUNSIFF
MAGISTRATE, SULTHAN BATHERI
PETITIONER/PETITIONER/RESPONDENT:
BINDHUMOL PATHROSE,AGED 48 YEARS
W/O.CHORUKATTIL PAUL, MEPPADATH VEEDU,
MEENANGADI POST, PURAKKADI AMSOM, DESOM,
SULTHANBATHERY TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.
SRI.BABU CHERUKARA
SMT.ROSAMMA MATHEW
SRI.K.K.ALIAS
SRI.P.A.SALIM
SHRI.MATHEW C.T
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:
A P KADEESA,AGED 65 YEARS
W/O.ANDRU, KANAKKASSERY VEEDU, ANCHUKUNNU POST,
ANCHUKUNNU AMSOM, DESOM, MANANTHAVADY TALUK,
WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN-670645
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:4:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 12TH AGRAHAYANA,
1942
OP (RC).No.90 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 8/2012 OF MUNSIFF
COURT ,PATHANAMTHITTA
PETITIONER/RESPONDENT:
S.SURESH KUMAR
AGED 48 YEARS
S/OSIVARAMA PILAI,
PONNIES TEXTILES, PMC XX1/399,
MAVINPARAMBIL BUILDING,
OPP:ANURAG THEATRE,
PATHANAMTHITA P.O 689645,
RESIDING AT USHASREE HOUSE, MATTAM,
KANNAMANGALAM VILLAGE, MAVELIKKARA,
ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.
SRI.C.S.MANILAL
SRI.S.NIDHEESH
RESPONDENT/PETITIONERS:
1 IDUCULA MATHEW @ V.K.MATHEW
S/O KUNJUKUNJU, MAVINPARAMBIL HOUSE,
MUNDUKOTTACKAL PO 689649,
KAIRALIPURAM, VETTIPRAM KARA,
PATHANAMTHITA.
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:5:-
2 REJI MATHEW, S/O IDICULA MATHEW,
MAVINPARAMBIL HOUSE, MUNDUKOTTACKAL PO 689649,
KAIRALIPURAM, VETTIPRAM KARA,
PATHANAMTHITA.
R1 BY ADV. SRI.S.RANJIT (KOTTAYAM)
R-1 BY ADV. SRI.GOKUL DAS V.V.H.
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:6:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 12TH AGRAHAYANA,
1942
OP (RC).No.95 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 38/2016 OF PRINCIPAL
MUNSIFF COURT KOZHIKODE-I
PETITIONER/RESPONDENT:
UPPUKANDATHIL ABDUL KAREEM
AGED 58 YEARS
S/O.ASSAN KOYA, POST KARAPARAMBA, KACHERI
VILLAGE, KOZHIKODE-673 010.
BY ADVS.
SRI.R.SUDHISH
SMT.M.MANJU
RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS:
1 RASIYA
AGED 57 YEARS
W/O.UMMER, GREENS, KASABA AMSOM, DESOM, POST
CHALAPURAM, KOZHIKODE-673 002.
2 P.P.SHINAS,
AGED 34 YEARS
S/O.UMMER, GREENS, KASABA AMSOM, DESOM, POST
CHALAPURAM, KOZHIKODE-673 002.
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:7:-
3 P.P.NITHIL,
AGED 27 YEARS
S/O.UMMER, GREENS, KASABA AMSOM, DESOM, POST
CHALAPURAM, KOZHIKODE-673 002.
R1-3 BY ADV. SRI.E.NARAYANAN
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:8:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 12TH AGRAHAYANA,
1942
OP (RC).No.110 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 17/2016 OF MUNSIFF COURT,
THIRUVALLA
PETITIONER:
JOSEPH ANTONY @ THANKACHEN
AGED 66 YEARS
PARUKANNIL HOUSE, THIRUVALLA. P.O., THIRUVALLA
BY ADVS.
SRI.JACOB P.ALEX
SRI.JOSEPH P.ALEX
SHRI.MANU SANKAR P.
RESPONDENTS:
1 K V MATHAI
KUNNATHUPARAMBIL HOUSE, MANJADI P.O.,-689
105,THIRUVALLA
2 SHAJI K.MENON,
KUNNATHUPARAMBIL HOUSE, MANJADI P.O.,-689
105,THIRUVALLA
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:9:-
3 SHIBU K.MATHEW,
KUNNATHUPARAMBIL HOUSE, MANJADI P.O.,-689
105,THIRUVALLA
4 SHYNI PHILIP
KUNNATHUPARAMBIL HOUSE, MANJADI P.O.,-689
105,THIRUVALLA
5 SHEENA JOHN,
KUNNATHUPARAMBIL HOUSE, MANJADI P.O.,-689
105,THIRUVALLA
R1-5 BY ADV. SRI.T.P.PRADEEP
R1-5 BY ADV. SRI.S.SREEDEV
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:10:-
IIN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 12TH AGRAHAYANA,
1942
OP (RC).No.112 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 41/2016 OF MUNSIFF COURT,
TIRUR
PETITIONER/PETITIONER/RESPONDENT:
THIRUNILATH GANGADHARAN,
AGED 67 YEARS
S/O. KAKKU MASTER, TIRUR AMSOM DESOM, POST
TIRUR, TIRUR TALUK, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
BY ADV. SRI.C.M.MOHAMMED IQUABAL
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS:
1 SAFIYA,
AGED 54 YEARS
W/O. MECHERI ABOOBACKER, TIRUR AMSOM,
THUMARAKKAVU DESOM, POST TIRUR, TIRUR TALUK,
MALAPPUARAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676 101
2 ANSAS
AGED 33 YEARS
S/O. MECHERI ABOOBACKER, TIRUR AMSOM,
THUMARAKKAVU DESOM, POST TIRUR, TIRUR TALUK,
MALAPPUARAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676 101
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:11:-
3 ANSEERA
AGED 32 YEARS
D/O. MECHERI ABOOBACKER, TIRUR AMSOM,
THUMARAKKAVU DESOM, POST TIRUR, TIRUR TALUK,
MALAPPUARAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676 101
4 MUHAMMED HASID
AGED 28 YEARS
S/O. MECHERI ABOOBACKER, TIRUR AMSOM,
THUMARAKKAVU DESOM, POST TIRUR, TIRUR TALUK,
MALAPPUARAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676 101
5 HASEENA
AGED 24 YEARS
D/O. MECHERI ABOOBACKER, TIRUR AMSOM,
THUMARAKKAVU DESOM, POST TIRUR, TIRUR TALUK,
MALAPPUARAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676 101
6 MUHAMMED HASIM
AGED 15 YEARS
S/O. MECHERI ABOOBACKER, TIRUR AMSOM,
THUMARAKKAVU DESOM, POST TIRUR, TIRUR TALUK,
MALAPPUARAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676 101
R2, R4 BY ADV. SRI.JAMSHEED HAFIZ
R2, R4 BY ADV. SMT.T.S.SREEKUTTY
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:12:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020/12TH AGRAHAYANA,1942
OP (RC).No.133 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCOP 33/2017 OF PRINCIPAL
RENT CONTROL COURT, KOLLAM
PETITIONER:
BINDHU
AGED 39 YEARS
D/O.RADHAKRISHNA PILLAI, KAYALVARATHU,
CHOORATTU KIZHAKKATHIL, THRIKKARUVA VILLAGE,
PRAKKULAM P.O., KOLLAM TALUK, PIN-691602.
BY ADVS.
SRI.HARISH GOPINATH
SMT.RAGI P.
RESPONDENT:
SURESH KUMAR
AGED 50 YEARS
S/O.BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, GOSTHALAZHIKATHU VEEDU,
THRIKKARUVA VILLAGE, PRAKKULAM P.O.,
KOLLAM -691602.
R1 BY ADV. SRI.S.SARATH PRASAD
R1 BY ADV. SMT.AYSHA ABRAHAM
R1 BY ADV. SRI.G.G.MANOJ
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:13:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020/12TH AGRAHAYANA,1942
OP (RC).No.136 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 126/2015 DATED 12-06-2019
OF RENT CONTROL COURT,CHAVAKKAD
PETITIONER/PETITIONER IN IA/TENANT:
WILSON
AGED 64 YEARS
S/O.PULIKOTTIL PATHUKUTTY, PAZHANJI VILLAGE,
PERUMTHURUTHI DESOM, THALAPPILLY TALUK,
THRISSUR DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.
SRI.RAJIT
SRI.C.DHEERAJ RAJAN
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT IN IA/LANDLORD:
ABUL NAZAR
AGED 59 YEARS
INCHIKALAYIL HOUSE, S/O.ABDUL RAHMAN,
KATTAKAMBAL VILLAGE, CHIRAKKAL DESOM,
THALAPILLY TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT.
R1 BY ADV. SRI.P.RAMACHANDRAN
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:14:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020/12TH AGRAHAYANA,1942
OP (RC).No.149 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 26/2016 OF RENT CONTROL
COURT,CHAVAKKAD
PETITIONER/PETITIONER/RESPONDENT:
A.K.ASOKAN
AGED 39 YEARS
S/O.KUMARAN, AYINUR HOUSE, NEAR PAZHANJI
SCHOOL, PAZHANJI (P.O), PIN-680542, PAZHANJI
VILLAGE, THALPPILLY TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.
SRI.SANTHARAM.P
SMT.REKHA ARAVIND
SRI.PAUL P. ABRAHAM
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:
MANOJ
AGED 35 YEARS
S/O.APPU, ARAYARATH HOUSE ARTHATT DESOM ARTHATT
(P.O.), ARTHATT VILLAGE, THALAPPILLY TALUK,
THRISSUR DISTRICT.
R1 BY ADV. SRI.D.VIMAL DEV
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:15:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 12TH AGRAHAYANA,
1942
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 53/2014 OF RENT CONTROL
COURT, TIRUR
PETITIONER/RESPONDENT:
SHAJAHAN
AGED 45 YEARS
S/O. YOUSUF, KARAPARAMBIL HOUSE
KOTTARAM, P.O. VALANCHERY 676 552, TIRUR TALUK.
BY ADV. SMT.DEEPA NARAYANAN
RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS:
1 K.P.KHADEEJA
W/O. MUHAMMED, KOORIPARAMBIL THEKKUMBATT HOUSE,
MOOCHIKKAL P.O. VALANCHERY,
TIRUR TALUK 676 552.
2 SUHARA. K.T.,
AGED 51 YEARS
D/O.MUHAMMED, KOORIPARAMBIL THEKKUMBATT HOUSE,
MOOCHIKKAL P.O. VALANCHERY,
TIRUR TALUK 676 552.
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:16:-
3 ABDU SAMAD K.T.,
AGED 47 YEARS
S/O. MUHAMMED, KOORIPARAMBIL THEKKUMBATT HOUSE,
MOOCHIKKAL P.O. VALANCHERY,
TIRUR TALUK 676 552.
4 RASIYA.K.T,
AGED 45 YEARS
D/O. MUHAMMED, KOORIPARAMBIL THEKKUMBATT HOUSE,
MOOCHIKKAL P.O. VALANCHERY,
TIRUR TALUK 676 552.
5 ABDUL RASHEED K.T.,
AGED 43 YEARS
S/O. MUHAMMED, KOORIPARAMBIL THEKKUMBATT HOUSE,
MOOCHIKKAL P.O. VALANCHERY,
TIRUR TALUK 676 552.
6 SINAN.K.T.,
AGED 39 YEARS
S/O. MUHAMMED, KOORIPARAMBIL THEKKUMBATT HOUSE,
MOOCHIKKAL P.O. VALANCHERY,
TIRUR TALUK 676 552.
7 NIZAR K.T.,
AGED 43 YEARS
S/O. MUHAMMED, KOORIPARAMBIL THEKKUMBATT HOUSE,
MOOCHIKKAL P.O. VALANCHERY,
TIRUR TALUK 676 552.
8 AMEER K.T.
AGED 33 YEARS
S/O.MUHAMMED, KOORIPARAMBIL THEKKUMBATT HOUSE,
MOOCHIKKAL P.O. VALANCHERY,
TIRUR TALUK 676 552.
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 24.09.2020,
ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT
ON 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:17:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
and
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
THURSDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 12TH AGRAHAYANA,
1942
RCRev..No.61 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCA 100/2018 OF DISTRICT
COURT & SESSIONS COURT,KOZHIKODE
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 162/2012 OF PRINCIPAL
MUNSIFF COURT KOZHIKODE-I
REVISION PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS 1 AND 2 IN IA
AND RESPONDENTS 1 AND 3 IN RCP:
1 ABDU K.
AGED 48 YEARS
S/O.KUTTY HASSAN, RESIDING AT KAZHAKALI HOUSE,
KURUVATTUR AMSOM, CHERUVATTA DESOM,
PO.PARAMBIL, KOZHIKODE-673012.
2 AFSAL
AGED 44 YEARS
S/O.KATHIRI, RESIDING AT ERINGATT HGOUSE,
KURUVATTUR AMSOM, CHERUVATTA DESOM,
PO.PARAMBIL, KOZHIKODE-673012.
BY ADVS.
SRI.V.V.SURENDRAN
SRI.P.A.HARISH
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:18:-
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS AND 3RD PETITIONER IN
I.A. AND PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS 2, 4 AND 5 IN RCP:
1 NAZAR
AGED 48 YEARS
S/O.HAMEED SHA, RESIDING AT 32/1642,
KAILADIPARAMBA, CHELAVOOR AMSOM DESOM,
PO.CHELAVOOR, KOZHIKODE-673571.
2 SAFEERA
AGED 44 YEARS
D/O.P.P.ABOOBACKER, RESIDING AT KAILADIPARAMBA,
CHELAVOOR AMSOM DESOM.P.O., CHELAVOOR,
KOZHIKODE-673571.
3 ASHRAF
AGED 50 YEARS
S/O.ALIKUTTY, RESIDING AT KALATHINGAL HOUSE,
KURUVATTOM AMSOM, CHERUVATTA DESOM,
PO.PARAMBIL, KOZHIKODE-673012.
4 JAMSHEER.C.P.
AGED 34 YEARS
S/O.C.P.MAMMUKUTTY, RESIDING AT
CHINDAMPOUNATHIL HOUSE, KURUVATTOR AMSOM,
CHERUVATTA DESOM, PO.PARAMBIL, KOZHIKODE-
673012.
5 SHAMMER.P.
AGED 34 YEARS
S/O.VANKANAKKIL KOYA, RESIDING AT VANKANAKKIL
HOUSE, KURUVATTOR AMSOM, CHERUVATTA
DESOM.P.O.PARAMBIL, KOZHIKODE-673012.
R1-2 BY ADV. SMT.M.SHAJNA
R1-2 BY ADV. SRI.K.M.FIROZ
THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING BEEN HEARD ON
24.09.2020, ALONG WITH RC Rev.258/2018 AND CONNECTED CASES,
THE COURT ON THE 03.12.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases
-:19:-
ORDER
Dated this, the 3rd day of December, 2020 Shaffique, J.
The correctness of judgment in Ratheesh v. A.M.Chacko and Another (2018 (5) KHC 35) has been referred for consideration before us.
2. In Ratheesh's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not applicable to proceedings before the Rent Control Court under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rent Control Act').
3. In the reference order [Faisal v. Vikas Chacko (2019 (3) KLT 760)], the Division Bench doubted the correctness of Ratheesh's case (supra) and opined that the same needs a deeper scrutiny and accordingly, the matter was placed before us for consideration.
4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. The controversy had arisen when applications were filed RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:20:- before the Rent Control Court to set aside ex parte orders, after the period of limitation specified under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred as the '1979 Rules'). As per Section 23(1)(h) of the Act, the Rent Control Court is vested with all the powers of a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of matters provided under clauses (a) to (k) and clause (h) indicates "setting aside ex parte orders". Under S.31(1) of the Rent Control Act, the Government can frame rules for setting aside exparte orders. The 1979 Rules had been framed to regulate the procedure to be followed by the authorities under the Act. Rule 13(3) specifies a time-limit of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the order to enable a tenant or a landlord to apply to the Rent Control Court in order to set aside the ex parte order. In Ratheesh's case (supra), this Court held that the date of receipt of the order appearing under Rule 13(3) would mean date of knowledge of the order. However, the Rule does not provide for any extension of time.
5. S.29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under:-
"29. Savings (1) xxx RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:21:- (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
The Rent Control Act being a special and a local law does not expressly exclude the provisions of Limitation Act. Therefore, under normal circumstances, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under the Rent Control Act, if the Rent Control Court is a 'Court'.
6. In Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [(1995) 5 SCC 5], the Apex Court had occasion to consider whether the appellate authority under S.18 of the Rent Control Act has the power to condone delay in filing appeal after the expiry of period of limitation or rather whether S.29(2) of the Limitation Act would apply to such proceedings. After referring to the notification by which the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the area have been RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:22:- extended were given the power of the Appellate Authorities for the purpose of the Rent Control Act and having found that the Appellate Authority is not a persona designata, the Apex Court held that "it becomes obvious that it functions as a court". Paragraph 8 is relevant, which reads as under:-
"8. Once it is held that the appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. In the present case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been extended are constituted as appellate authorities under Section 18 by the Government notification noted earlier. These District Judges have been conferred the powers of the appellate authorities. It becomes therefore, obvious that while adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and tenant and while deciding the question whether the Rent Control Court's order is justified or not such appellate authorities would be functioning as courts." The test for determining whether the authority is functioning as a court or not has been laid down by a series of decisions of this Court. We may refer to one of them, in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. [(1967) 3 SCR 163 : AIR 1967 SC 1494] In that case this Court was concerned with the question whether the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies functioning under Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 was a court subordinate to the High Court for the RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:23:- purpose of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. While answering the question in the affirmative, a Division Bench of this Court speaking through Mitter, J. placed reliance amongst others on the observations found in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain [(1955) 2 SCR 955 : AIR 1956 SC 66] wherein it was observed as under:
"It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement."
Reliance was also placed on another decision of this court in the case of Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab [(1955) 2 SCR 1013 : AIR 1956 SC 153] . Following observations found (at SCR p. 1018) therein were pressed in service:
"It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:24:- Act it possesses all the attributes of a court."
When the aforesaid well settled tests for deciding whether an authority is a court or not are applied to the powers and functions of the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act, it becomes obvious that all the aforesaid essential trappings to constitute such an authority as a court are found to be present. In fact, Mr Nariman, learned counsel for respondent also fairly stated that these appellate authorities would be courts and would not be persona designata. But in his submission as they are not civil courts constituted and functioning under the Civil Procedure Code as such, they are outside the sweep of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is therefore, necessary for us to turn to the aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act. It reads as under:
"........"
"A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision.
(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application.
(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act."
7. Later, in M.P.Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise [(2015) 7 SCC 58], the Apex Court considered RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:25:- the question whether the Commissioner of Customs, while considering an appeal beyond the period of limitation as provided u/s 128 of the Customs Act, has the power to condone delay. The question was one of application of S.14 of the Limitation Act and after referring to Mukri Gopalan (supra), it was held at paragraph 28 as under:-
"28. Two other judgments of this Court need to be dealt with at this stage. In Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [(1995) 5 SCC 5] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that the Limitation Act would apply to the appellate authority constituted under Section 13 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. This was done by applying the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Despite referring to various earlier judgments of this Court which held that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to tribunals, this Court in this case held to the contrary. In distinguishing the Parson Tools case [(1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : (1975) 3 SCR 743] , which is a three-Judge Bench binding on the Court that decided Mukri Gopalan case [(1995) 5 SCC 5] , the Court held: (Mukri Gopalan case [(1995) 5 SCC 5] , SCC p. 23, para 18)
18. "... If the Limitation Act does not apply then neither Section 29(2) nor Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings before him. But so far as this Court is concerned it did not go into the question whether Section 29(2) would not get attracted because the U.P. Sales Tax Act Judge (Revisions) was not a court but it took the view that RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:26:- because of the express provision in Section 10(3-B) applicability of Section 14(2) of the Sales Tax Act was ruled out. Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that but for such an express conflict or contrary intention emanating from Section 10(3-B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act which was a special law, Section 29(2) would have brought in Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act even for governing period of limitation for such revision applications. In any case, the scope of Section 29(2) was not considered by the aforesaid decision of the three learned Judges and consequently it cannot be held to be an authority for the proposition that in revisional proceedings before the Sales Tax Authorities functioning under the U.P. Sales Tax Act Section 29(2) cannot apply as Mr Nariman would like to have it."
It then went on to follow the judgment in CST v. Madan Lal Das & Sons [(1976) 4 SCC 464 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 27] , which, as has been pointed out earlier, is not an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act would apply to tribunals. In fact, Mukri Gopalan case [(1995) 5 SCC 5] was distinguished in Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi [(2010) 9 SCC 183 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 648] , at para 22 as follows: (Om Prakash case [(2010) 9 SCC 183 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 648] , SCC p.
188)
22. "The decision in Mukri Gopalan case [(1995) 5 SCC 5] relied upon by Mr Ujjal Singh is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In the facts of the said case, it was the District Judges who were discharging the functions of the appellate authority and being a court, it was held that the District Judge, functioning as the appellate authority, was a court and not persona designata and was, therefore, entitled to resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. That is not so in the instant RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:27:- case where the Rent Controller appointed by the State Government is a member of the Punjab Civil Services and, therefore, a persona designata who would not be entitled to apply the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as in the other case."
The fact that the District Judge himself also happened to be the appellate authority under the Rent Act would have been sufficient on the facts of the case for the Limitation Act to apply without going into the proposition that the Limitation Act would apply to tribunals."
Thereafter, after referring to Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Irrigation Department [(2008) 7 SCC 169] , it was held at paragraph 32 as under:-
"32. Obviously, the ratio of Mukri Gopalan [(1995) 5 SCC 5] does not square with the observations of the three-Judge Bench in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises [(2008) 7 SCC 169] . In the latter case, this Court has unequivocally held that Parson Tools [(1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 :
(1975) 3 SCR 743] is an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. To the extent that Mukri Gopalan [(1995) 5 SCC 5] is in conflict with the judgment in Consolidated Engg.
Enterprises case [(2008) 7 SCC 169] , it is no longer good law". (emphasis supplied) It was further held that a bare reading of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act would indicate that such suits, appeals or application as are referred to in the Schedule are only to 'courts' and not to 'quasi- RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:28:- judicial bodies' or 'Tribunals'. Therefore, it was held that "it is clear, therefore, that only when a suit, appeal or application of the description in the schedule is to be filed in a Court under a special or local law that the provision gets attracted".
8. In Ganesan v. Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board [(2019) 7 SCC 108], the Apex Court had occasion to consider whether the Commissioner while hearing an appeal under the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 is a 'Court' and whether S.29(2) of Limitation Act would apply to such authorities and whether S.5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to condone delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner. Having considered almost all the judgments on the point, including that of M.P.Steel Corporation's case (supra), while holding that the Commissioner while hearing of the appeal under Section 69 of the 1959 Act is not entitled to condone the delay in filing appeal, it was held at paragraph 59 as under:-
"59. The ratio which can be culled from the abovenoted judgments, especially judgments of three-Judge Benches, as noted above, is as follows:
59.1.The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:29:- Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed in a court.
59.2.The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner under the 1959 Act.
59.3.Operation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is confined to the suits, appeals and applications referred to in a special or local law to be filed in court and not before statutory authorities like Commissioner under the 1959 Act. 59.4.However, special or local law vide statutory scheme can make applicable any provision of the Limitation Act or exclude applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act which can be decided only after looking into the scheme of particular, special or local law."
9. In M.P.Steel Corporation (supra), it was held that in the light of the three-Judge Bench judgments in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (supra) and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants [(1975) 4 SCC 22], the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals and to the extent Mukri Gopalan (supra) is in conflict with the said judgments is not good law. In Mukri Gopalan (supra), while referring to to the judgment in Parsons Tools (supra), it was held that "Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that but for such an express conflict or contrary intention emanating from Section 10(3-B) of the RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:30:- U.P. Sales Tax Act which was a special law, Section 29(2) would have brought in Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act even for governing period of limitation for such revision applications. In any case, the scope of Section 29(2) was not considered by the aforesaid decision of the three learned Judges and consequently it cannot be held to be an authority for the proposition that in revisional proceedings before the Sales Tax Authorities functioning under the U.P. Sales Tax Act Section 29(2) cannot apply as Mr Nariman would like to have it." The above finding is found to be not good law in M.P.Steel Corporation (supra). In Mukri Gopalan (supra), it was also held that when District Judges are appointed as Appellate Authorities under the Rent Control Act, it functions as a 'Court' and therefore Limitation Act would apply to applications filed before it. The said finding has not been held to be bad in law in M.P.Steel Corporation (supra), which is evident from the following finding: "The fact that the District Judge himself also happened to be the appellate authority under the Rent Act would have been sufficient on the facts of the case for the Limitation Act to apply without going into the proposition that the Limitation Act would apply to tribunals."
10. In Ganesan's case (supra), the Apex Court followed M.P.Steel Corporation (supra) as well. The proposition is now undoubted and it is rather clear that S.29(2) of the Limitation Act RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:31:- is confined to suits, appeals and applications referred to in a special or local law to be filed in Courts and not before any statutory authorities or Tribunals provided in a special or local law unless otherwise specifically stated. As far as the law laid down in Mukri Goplan (supra) is concerned, the portion of the judgment which held that Limitation Act may apply to quasi-judicial authorities or Tribunals, alone has been found to be not good law in M.P.Steel Corporation (supra). The finding in Mukri Goplan (supra) that the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act is a Court and therefore Limitation Act would apply and the reasoning thereof still holds good.
11. The fundamental question therefore would be whether Rent Control Court is a "Court" in order to apply the provisions of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act. Now let us understand the scheme of the Act as each enactment has to be considered on its own statutory scheme. S.2(5) of the Rent Control Act gives the meaning of 'Rent Control Court' as the Court constituted under Section 3. Section 3 reads as under:-
"3. Constitution of Rent Control Courts and appointment of Accommodation Controllers.-(1) The RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:32:- Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint a person who is or is qualified to be appointed, a Munsiff to be the Rent Control Court for such local areas as may be specified therein.
(2) The Government may, by notification in the gazette, appoint any Officer not below the rank of a Tahsildar to be the Accommodation Controller for any area to which this Act applies.
(3) The Accommodation Controller shall exercise his powers and perform his functions subject to such general directions as the Government may issue."
We are, in this case concerned with Section 3(1). Statute indicates that the Government may appoint a person who is or is qualified to be appointed a Munsiff. Therefore, a person who is a Munsiff or a person who is qualified to be appointed as a Munsiff can be the Rent Control Court. In other words, there is no mandate that a Munsiff alone be appointed as a Rent Control Court.
12. By SRO No. 390/1973, the Government of Kerala had issued a notification u/s 3(1) of the Rent Control Act, which reads as under:-
"1. Notification under Section 3(1) S.R.O No. 390/73.-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 1 of Section 3 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Act 2 of 1965). And in suppression RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:33:- of all previous notifications on the subject, the government of Kerala hereby appoint the Munsiff's both Principal and additional, if any, having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Act have been extended, to be the Rent Control Court for the said areas (Notn. No. 39445/B2/72/PW dt. 30-5-73 in KG No. 25 dt. 19-6-73)."
13. The question whether a Rent Control Court designated u/s 3(1) is a persona designata or Court came up for consideration before this Court in Abdul Rehiman v. Hameed Hassan Peruvad and Others [1995 (2) KLT 794]. In the said case, a learned Single Judge of this Court after following Mukri Gopalan (supra) held that the Rent Control Court is a "court" and is not acting as persona designata. In Balakrishnan v. Mariyumma [1997 (1) KLT 205], a Division Bench of this Court, after referring to Mukri Gopalan (supra) held that, even though Rent Control Court under the Rent Control Act is a 'Court' and is not a persona designata, it is not a civil court for the purpose of S.115 of Code of Civil Procedure. However, in Sadanandan v. Pradeepan (2001 (2) KLT 913), yet another Division Bench of this Court while considering whether Art.137 of the Limitation Act could be applied in a case where a claim of eviction is made under the Rent Control Act, held at paragraph 7 as under:-
RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:34:- "7. Then the question is whether Art. 137 of the Limitation Act could be applied in a case where a claim for eviction is made under the RentControl Act by filing an application under S. 11 of that Act. Art. 137 of the Limitation Act is a residuary article. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma (1976 KLT 810 = AIR 1977 SC 282) that any application to a civil court, whether it be under the Code of Civil Procedure or under a special enactment like the Indian Telegraph Act, is governed by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. The question is whether Art. 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to a Rent Control Court, notified under S. 3 of the Act. S.3 provides for appointment of the Rent Control Court by a notification as a person entitled to exercise jurisdiction over a particular local area. There is considerable controversy whether a Rent Control Court is a "Court" or merely "persona designata". In any event, the Rent Control Court is not a "civil court" in the strict sense of the term on the scheme of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. We are therefore, of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in T.P. Kuhaliumma's case cannot be applied to hold that Art. 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to initiation of a proceeding before the Rent Control Court. Of course, in execution of an order for eviction, in view of the fiction enacted by S. 14 of the Act, it is the Munsiff's Court that is approached and different considerations would apply."(emphasis supplied)
14. What exactly is the meaning of the word 'persona designata' came up for consideration before the Apex Court in RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:35:- Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad (AIR 1961 SC
606). Reference is made to paragraph 9, which reads as under:-
"9. The argument that the District Magistrate was a persona designata cannot be accepted. Under the definition of "District Magistrate", the special authorisation by the District Magistrate had the effect of creating officers exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the Eviction Act. To that extent, those officers would, on authorisation, be equated to the District Magistrate. A persona designata is " a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character." (See Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 253). In the words of Schwabe, C.J., in Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao personae designatae are "persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges." The same consideration applies also to a well-known officer like the District Magistrate named by virtue of his office, and whose powers the Additional District Magistrate can also exercise and who can create other officers equal to himself for the purposes of the Eviction Act. The decision of Sapru, J., in the Allahabad case, with respect, was erroneous."
15. In Gopakumar v. Ancy Thankachan Philip [2019 (3) KLT 346], a Division Bench of this Court after considering the judgments of the Apex Court in M.P.Steel Corporation (supra) as well as in Mukri Gopalan's case (supra) held that the judgment in Ratheesh's case (supra) shall not be taken as an RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:36:- authority to hold that S.5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by the Appellate Authority under the Act. Ratheesh (supra) was decided on the premise that in M.P.Steel Corporation (supra), the Apex court has held that the judgment in Mukri Gopalan (supra) is not good law. In fact, in Ratheesh (supra), the Division Bench failed to notice that Mukri Gopalan (supra) was decided taking into account two specific issues. One is that the Appellate Authority under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act is a Court and therefore Limitation Act would apply, and secondly that Parsons Tools (supra) was decided on its own facts and statutory scheme, or else Section 29(2) would have applied to quasi judicial bodies or Tribunals. In M.P. Steel Corporation (supra), the Apex Court held that the second part of the finding in Mukri Gopalan (supra) was not good law. The first part was in fact approved in M.P.Steel Corporation (supra). Hence, we are of the view that the judgment in Ratheesh (supra) does not lay down the correct law and to that extent, stands overruled.
16. In Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi [(2010) 9 SCC 183], the Apex Court while considering the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 held that in the absence RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:37:- of any specific provision vesting Rent Controller with the authority to extend time for seeking leave to contest the matter, S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked. That was a case in which a tenant was served with a summons of the eviction petition on 19/5/2005 and he ought to have submitted an application for leave to contest within 15 days. The time expired on 3/6/2005. He filed an application on 4/6/2005 without any application to condone delay. Subsequently, he filed an application to condone delay in filing the said application as well, which came to be dismissed on the ground that there is no provision to condone delay. Said order of the Rent Controller was upheld by the High Court which came to be considered by the Apex Court. Reference was made to Mukri Gopalan's case (supra) and a few other judgments. It was held that the decision in Mukri Gopalan (supra) is distinguishable on facts since in Mukri Gopalan (supra), the District Judges were discharging the functions of the Appellate Authority and it was held that the District Judge functioning as the Appellate Authority was a Court and not persona designata and was therefore entitled to resort to S.5 of the Limitation Act, which is not the case, when the Rent RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:38:- Controller appointed by the State Government is a member of Punjab Civil Services and therefore a persona designata who would not be entitled to apply for the provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act.
17. Therefore, the proposition that an Appellate Authority constituted u/s 18 of the Rent Control Act, being a District Judge, is a Court for the purpose of exercising power of the Appellate Authority, and it has the power to condone delay as well, is well settled. S.18 (1)(a) reads as under:-
"18. Appeal (1) (a) The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Gazette, confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order."
S.3(1) and S.18, are differently worded. As per S.3(1), the Government could appoint a person who is either a Munsiff or a person who is qualified to be appointed as a Munsiff to be the Rent Control Court, whereas under Section 18, the Government confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge, the powers of appellate authorities for the purpose of the Rent Control Act. Such officers or authorities not RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:39:- below the rank of Subordinate Judge means a District Judge. Therefore u/s 18, it is a conferment of power by the Government on a District Judge to exercise the power of Appellate Authority. Section 3(1), enjoins power on the Government to appoint any person qualified to be a Munsiff to be the Rent Control Court or a Munsiff to be the Rent Control Court. By usage of the words "a person" appearing in Section 3(1) and the words "a Munsiff"
appearing in the said Section to be appointed as a Rent Control Court for such local areas as may be specified therein, the intention of the legislature in appointing a Munsiff as the Rent Control Court was to treat the said court to carry on with the functions of a Rent Control Court subject to the limitations specified under the Statute. Of course, the Rent Control Court cannot go beyond the statutory powers vested in it. For example, if there is a bonafide dispute regarding title, the Rent Control Court will have to direct the parties to move the Civil Court for adjudication of their civil rights in terms of 2 nd proviso to S.11(1), in which event, the landlord will be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil Court.
18. Section 3(1) of the Rent Control Act, may at first blush RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:40:- give an impression that the intention of the legislature was to appoint a person as Rent Control Court. But, by virtue of the notification, SRO No. 390/1973, issued by the Government, the Principal Munsiff and Additional Munsiff of a jurisdictional area is appointed as the Rent Control Court. Even in the case of appellate authorities under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act, there is a conferment of power to the District Judge to function as appellate authorities.
19. As per Section 2 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957, Sub-ordinate Civil Courts are classified as under:-
"2. Classes of subordinate Civil Courts - In addition to the Courts established under any other law for the time being in force, there shall be the following classes of Civil Courts in the State, namely:-
(i) the Court of a District Judge (hereinafter referred to as the District Court):
(ii) the Court of a Subordinate Judge (hereinafter referred to as the Subordinate Judge's Court);
(iii) the Court of a Munsiff (hereinafter referred to as the Munsiff's Court)."
Therefore, when there is reference to Munsiff, it would necessarily mean Court of a Munsiff, just like that of a Court of District Judge. Therefore, when a District Judge as referred in Section 18 is RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:41:- considered as a Court, the same principle applies when a Munsiff is appointed as a Rent Control Court. The appointment of a Munsiff as Rent Control Court is not as a persona designata or a quasi judicial authority. We, therefore approve the judgment of this Court in Abdul Rehiman (supra) as laying down the correct law. In Om Prakash (supra), when the Rent Controller appointed by the State Government was a member of Punjab Civil Services, it was held to be an appointment as a persona designata, who would not be entitled to apply for the provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act. In that case, Mukri Gopalan (supra) was distinguished on facts since in Mukri Gopalan, the District Judges were discharging the functions of the Appellate Authority and entitled to resort to S.5 of the Limitation Act.
20. An argument was raised on behalf of the contesting respondents that the notification issued under Section 3(1) of the Rent Control Act, was not in accordance with purport of the said provision. Of course, the Government could have appointed a person as the Rent Control Court. It could either be a person qualified to be a Munsiff, or a Munsiff. But the Government in its wisdom felt it necessary to appoint the jurisdictional Munsiff's as RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:42:- Rent Control Courts. We don't think that the Government has in any way exceeded the power vested in it while issuing the said notification. That apart, there is no challenge to the said notification, which remained so for the last several years.
21. Of course, the scheme of the Rent Control Act and the rules framed thereunder envisages speedy disposal of the cases pending before it. If the legislature intended to exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act, being conscious of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, could have expressly excluded the said provision. Having not done so, application of the Limitation Act has to be inferred.
22. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the Rent Control Court is not a persona designata. It is a Court and in the absence of any express exclusion, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies. Consequently, the Rent Control Court has the power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Ratheesh (supra) does not lay down the correct law.
23. We appreciate the efforts taken by the learned counsel on either side in placing before us all the relevant judgments, RCR No.258/18 & conn.cases -:43:- with erudition and expertise.
Having answered the reference, the Registry shall place the matter before the appropriate Court for further orders.
Sd/-
A.M.SHAFFIQUE JUDGE Sd/-
SUNIL THOMAS JUDGE Sd/-
GOPINATH P.
Rp True Copy JUDGE
PS to Judge