Allahabad High Court
Naveen Chandra Seth And Others vs Commissioner, Allahabad And Others on 5 July, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(3)AWC2444, 1999 ALL. L. J. 2444, 2000 A I H C 411, 1999 ALL CJ 2 1279, (1999) 3 ALL WC 2444, (1999) 37 ALL LR 37
JUDGMENT O.P. Garg, J.
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks to quash the orders dated 9.3.1999 and 5.4,1999. respectively. Annexures-1 and 1A to the writ petition, passed by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division. Allahabad, respondent No. 1. The facts leading to the present petition are as follows :
2. The dispute relates to the mutation of the-names over the Nazul plot of land No. 34, George Town, Allahabad, admeasuring 1007 sq. yards. It is an admitted fact that the lease -agreement of the said plot was executed on 23.10.1914, to be effective from the retrospective date, i.e., 1.1.1910 for a period of 90 years subject to renewals after every 30 years in favour of Rai Keshri Narain Chaddha who left behind him one of his sons--Triyugi Narain Chaddha. A bungalow bearing Municipal number 34/2 (old) and new number 6A. C. Y. Chintamani Road, has come up over the said plot of land. After the death of Triyugi Narain Chaddha, lease rights were Inherited by his two sons, namely, Satyugi Narain Chaddha and Triloki Narain Chaddha. The tease was renewed in their names. Up to this stage, there is no dispute between the parlies. The present petitioners are the sons and daughter of Smt. Raj Kumari Seth who happens to be the daughter of Satyugi Narain Chaddha. Respondent No. 3, Tej Narain Chaddha and respondent No. 4 Deepak Narain Chaddha respectively are the son and grandson of Triloki Narain Chaddha. Satyugi Narain Chaddha executed a Will dated 19.4.1957 bequeathing his rights in the Nazul land in favour of Tej Narain Chaddha son of Triloki Narain Chaddha respondent No. 3 and In respect of his share in the house constructed on the Nazul land, in favour of his wife Smt. Shakuntala Devi and his daughter Smt. Raj Kumari Seth who was married to Amar Chand Seth. The Will dated 19.4.1957 allegedly executed by Satyugi Narain Chaddha who died on 2.1.1962 was acted upon, inasmuch as, an application for mutation was moved by Tej Narain Chaddha on the basis of the Will of his uncle. Smt. Raj Kumari Seth endorsed 'no objection' in her own handwriting on the application for mutation moved by the respondent No. 3 Tej Narain Chaddha. A copy of the application with the endorsement of Smt. Raj Kumari Seth is Annexure-C.A. 2 to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4. In pursuance of the Will dated 19.4.1957 executed by Satyugi Narain Chaddha, the name of Tej Narain Chaddha came to be mutated along with his father Triloki Narain Chaddha by order dated 20.6.1963. Similarly, the name of Raj Kumari Seth was mutated in regard to the house/bungalow built over the Nazul land. Triloki Narain Chaddha in his turn executed a Will in respect of the lease rights in favour of his grandson Deepak Narain Chaddha, son of Tej Narain Chaddha respondent No. 4 on 3.7.1983. Triloki Narain Chaddha died on 1.9.1983. Deepak Narain Chaddha, respondent No. 4 moved an application for mutation of his name on the basis of the Will dated 3.7.1983 executed in his favour by his grandfather. During the course of mutation proceedings, an objection was filed by Smt. Raj Kumari Seth on 10.12.1966. The mutation application was being dealt with by the Additional District Magistrate (Nazul) who rejected the objection of Smt. Raj Kumari Seth and ordered on 19.3.1997 for the mutation of the name of Deepak Narain Chaddha respondent No. 4. In this manner, the names of Tej Narain Chaddha respondent No. 3 and his son Deepak Narain Chaddha respondent No. 4 came to be mutated/recorded over the Nazul land in question.
3. Subsequently. Smt. Raj Kumari. Seth moved an application dated 23.4.1998 (Annexure-8 to the petition) asserting herself to be the lessee of half share in the Nazul property and prayed for mutation of her name over the same. Obviously the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 filed objections and informed the A.D.M. (Nazul) that the orders for mutation nave already been passed after rejecting the claim of Smt. Raj Kumari Seth and sons and since the mutation proceedings have become final, they cannot be reopened. The case of Smt. Raj Kumari Seth found favour with the Collector/District Magistrate who passed an order on 17.8.1998 rejecting the mutation of the names of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and directed that the name of Smt. Raj Kumari Seth be mutated. The order passed by the Collector was carried out. The respondent Nos. 3 and 4 challenged the order passed by the District Magistrate by making a representation before the Divisional Commissioner. They also filed a Writ Petition No. 36661 of 1998 which was finally disposed of on 15.1.1999 by a Division Bench of this Court. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows :
"Admittedly, the petitioner's representation against the order dated 17.8.1998 is pending before the Commissioner, Allahabad vide Annexure-18 to the petition. This petition is disposed of with the direction to the Commissioner to decide the said appeal within two months of production of a certified copy of this order in accordance with law after hearing the parties concerned. Till disposal of the representation by the Commissioner, the parties will maintain status quo."
Smt. Raj Kumari Seth died on 11.2.1999. Pursuant to the above order passed by this Court, the Divisional Commissioner allowed the representation/appeal of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by passing order dated 9.3.1999, Annexure-1 to the writ petition and set aside the order dated 17.8.1998, passed by the District Magistrate. The present petitioners filed a review application before the Divisional Commissioner who rejected the same by order dated 5.4.1999, a copy of . which is Annexure-1A to the writ petition. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners have come forward before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the orders passed by the Commissioner of the Division, fnter alia, on the grounds that the order dated 20;6.1963 passed on the basis of the alleged Will dated 19.4.1957 purported to have been executed by Satyugi Narain Chaddha and the order dated 19.3.1997 passed on the strength of the Will dated 3.7.1983 executed by Triloki Narain Chaddha in favour of Deepak Narain Chaddha respondent No. 4, by the Additional District Magistrate (Nazul) are untenable in law as in view of the provisions made in the Nazul Manual, it is the Collector/District Magistrate alone with whose approval the entries in the Nazul register can be amended/changed, meaning thereby the Additional District Magistrate did not have power, authority or competence to pass the aforesaid orders ; that the Commissioner of the Division is further not authorised to set aside the order passed by the Collector, in respect of the Nazul land and, therefore, the impugned orders passed by the Commissioner are illegal and without jurisdiction. The pleas that the Will dated 19.4.1957 alleged to have been executed by Satyugi Narain Chaddha is forged and fictitious and that the signatures of his daughter late Smt. Raj Kumari Seth were obtained on blank papers by Tej Narain Chaddha respondent No. 3 has also been taken, besides the stand that, in any case, Satyugi Narain Chaddha was not entitled to execute the Will in favour of Tej Narain Chaddha to the extent of half share in the Nazul property as late Smt. Raj Kumari Seth had acquired a right by birth to the extent of at least one fourth share.
4. It is an indubitable fact that in respect of the lease, which was granted in favour of Keshri Narain Chaddha in the year 1914 with regard to the Nazul plot No. 34 George Town, Allahabad, the names of the two real brothers Satyugi Narain Chaddha and Triloki Narain Chaddha sons of Triyugi Narain Chaddha came to be recorded and by operation of law, they became lessees of the moiety share in the Nazul land. Triloki Narain Chaddha had executed a Will dated 3.7.1983 in favour of his grandson Deepak Narain Chaddha, respondent No. 4. In this manner, lease rights to the extent of half share came to be acquired under the Will by respondent No. 4. The dispute between the parties centers round the question whether Satyugi Narain Chaddha had, in fact, executed the Will dated 19.4.1957 in favour of Tej Narain Chaddha, respondent No. 3 bequeathing his half share in the Nazul land and if so, did he have the competence and authority to deprive his only daughter Smt. Raj Kumari Seth of all her rights in the Nazul property by executing the Will in favour of Tej Narain Chaddha. Obviously, if no Will had been executed by Satyugi Narain Chaddha or the said Will is found to be legally inoperative in that event, undoubtedly Smt. Raj Kumari Seth would have inherited lease rights to the extent of half share in the Nazul land and her sons and daughter would have partaken their respective shares by inheritance after the death of their mother.
5. In the present writ petition, the controversial question whether or not Satyugi Narain Chaddha did, in fact, execute the Will or the said Will is the outcome of fraud committed by Tej Narain Chaddha, as alleged, 'cannot be gone into and sifted as it would require sifting of evidence and examination of highly controversial facts. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that prima facie Satyugl Narain Chaddha had executed the Will dated 19.4.1957. He was not an ordinary person who could be hoodwinked by someone. He was a practising Advocate in the High Court. A copy of* the Wilt has been filed as Annexure-1 to the Supplementary Affidavit of Tej Narain Chaddha. The Will is in the handwriting of Satyugl Narain Chaddha himself and runs into five legibly handwritten pages. Attesting witnesses of the Will are Justice J. N. Takru and Justice D. D. Seth, retired Judges of this Court, besides Dr. R. N. Darbari. Sri Laxmi Saran. Advocate and Laxman Chand, Advocate. The tone and tenor of the Will indicates that it was executed by Satyugl Narain Chaddha in his full senses with all consciousness realising the implications of what he was going to do. Me, it appears, was alive to the question whether his only daughter Smt. Raj Kumari Seth could be deprived of her rights in Nazul property or not. In the body of the first page of the Will, he had observed :
".....I understand that under the Hindu Law, as it stands now. 1 have the right to make a Will in respect of my share in the joint property without disrupting the joint status of the family......"
It appears that he was very fond of his real nephew Tej Narain Chaddha. On page 2 of the hand written Will, he has expressed his feeling unto Tej Narain Chaddha in the following words :
"He is the only male issue between two brothers and I am personally very fond of him and very attached to him. Therefore, for reasons of love and affection and he being the only male child of our blood in the whole family, it is my earnest desire that he should represent me after my death inasmuch as he would naturally do (for) his father."
It was not that he had totally forgotten his only daughter Smt. Raj Kumari Seth. He mentioned that :
"I am keenly aware of my only daughter and her children born and unborn who can be said to have a lawful claim upon my property ; but my intense desire to keep the bulk of my property in the male line impels me to make this Will."
On page 4 of the Will, under Clause (i) there is a mention of the fact that House No. 12/34 George Town was bequeathed in favour of Smt. Raj Kumari Seth. Relevant portion of this clause reads as follows :
"(i) That I give and bequeath house No. 12/34 George Town situate within the compound of the bungalow near the gate of C. Y. Chintamani Road and at present occupied by Sri R. P. Dixit, Joint Registrar, High Court and yielding monthly rental of Rs. 85 to my daughter Raj Kumari Seth absolutely."
6. The contents of the Will, circumstances in which it came to be executed and the status of the attesting witnesses as well as the testator prima Jade negative the assertion of the petitioners that Satyugi Narain Chaddha had not executed the Will in favour of Tej Narain Chaddha.
7. Now the question is whether Satyugi Narain Chaddha could change the course of devolution under the law. On this point, Sri U. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners painstakingly pointed out that inheritance is the rule of law and this normal phenomenon cannot be diverted or militated against by executing a Will. A reference was made to the various texts of Hindu Law with regard to the origin and growth of testamentary powers amongst Hindus and reliance was also placed on the opinions of Mayne and Mulla who have propounded and enunciated the principles of Hindu Law in their books. An attempt was made to stuff the arguments with certain necessary citations, such as Manohar Mukherjee v. Bhitpendra Nath Mukherjee and others, AIR 1932 Cal 791 (FB) ; K. Subhadramma v. P. Sakuntattamma and others, AIR 1964 Ori 158 : Purshottam Dass Tandon and others v. State of U. P.. Lucknow and others, AIR 1987 All 56. Manohar Mukherjee's case, (supra) deals with the position of Shebait with reference to the religious endowments while K. Subhadramma's case, (supra) lays down that a testator cannot lay down particular line of succession on legatee's death. It was held that where a Hindu testator had made it absolutely clear that he bequeathed his estate to his wife's brother as full owner, with right of alienation" and absolute enjoyment, and limited the line of succession to the male heirs of the legatee, the clause restricting the succession is invalid. After the death of the legatee the line of succession laid down by Hindu Law to a male must be followed. In Purshottam Doss Tandon's case, (supra) the mode and the procedure for the renewal of the lease of Nazul land have been laid down. These decisions are hardly of any relevance on the question in hand.
8. I would do better to skip the academic and literary part of the debate. The fact remains that though inheritance is a normal rule of law and there are general principles affecting the transfer of property and in the ordinary course must prevail wherever law exists, testamentary disposition has always been an integral part of Hindu society. Though in a different context, the matter came to be considered In the case of Pitam and another v. Umrao Singh and others, 1996 RD 174 (HC), in which it was held that Will is not a transfer and there is no question of transfer of rights. Will only changes mode of devolution. It was further observed that a person is quite competent to direct through the Will that his nephews Will succeed to his entire property Including sir land of his in preference to the daughter's son. The matter was also considered by the Apex Court in State of West Bengal and others v. Kailash Chandra Kapur and others, AIR 1997 SC 1348. It was a case of lease of Government land. There was a testamentary disposition of lease to lessee in favour of a stranger to his family. There was no express prohibition in indenture of lease for such bequest without prior permission of Government. It was held that a bequest cannot be held to be illegal though it was against public policy as object of assignment of Government land in favour of lessee was to provide him right of residence. It was held that the leasehold interest may be bequeathed by a tenant by a testamentary disposition. It is, therefore, well embedded proposition of law that a Hindu can make a testamentary disposition of his properties and thereby change the course of ordinary law of inheritance.
9. Unnecessary controversy seems to have been made whether or not the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, apply to the Government Grants. In this connection, a reference may straightaway be made to Section 2 of the Government Grants' Act, 1895. It provides that nothing in the Transfer of Property Act. 1882 contained shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or any interest therein.....or in favour of any person whosoever ; but every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed. Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants' Act. 1895. were amended by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1960 with retrospective effect. This controversy is not germane to the decision of the present writ petition as well as mutation applications moved on the basis of the Wills.
10. Turning to the point that prima facie Satyugi Narain Chaddha had executed a Will dated 19.4.1957 in favour of Tej Narain Chaddha, it would not be out of place to mention that the said Will was not only accepted by the parties as bona fide and genuine but was also acted upon. This fact cannot be lost sight of that there is a distinction between lease rights of Nazul land of plot No. 34 George Town, on the one hand, and the rights in House No. 34/12 (old) and 6A (new) C. Y. Chintamani Road, on the other, existing on a portion of the Nazul land. Satyugi Narain Chaddha had made the Will of his rights to the extent of his half share in the lease of the Nazul land in favour of Tej Narain Chaddha while he had willed his share in House No. 34/12 George Town in favour of his daughter Smt. Raj Kumari Seth. This position was accepted by the parties all eyes wide open, inasmuch as, late Smt. Raj Kumari Seth had made an endorsement of no objection on the mutation application filed by Tej Narain Chaddha and on the basis of which mutation was allowed in the year 1963. Not only this. Smt. Raj Kumari Seth had initiated proceedings by filing a P.A. Case No. 175 of 1983 under Section 21 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 against the tenant occupying a portion of the said house and came in physical possession and occupation of the house. The relevant documents about the said litigation have been filed with the counter-affidavit of Tej Narain Chaddha. Smt. Raj Kumari Seth has herself asserted in her objection filed in mutation proceedings that she has been living in the house which was willed in her favour by her father since 31.12.1986 and that prior to the said date, her tenants were living in it. In view of the above facts, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to assert that the mutation which was carried out in the year 1963 in the name of Tej Narain Chaddha was the product of his manipulations and fraudulent acts. It has also come on record that on the basis of the Wills executed by the various holders of the lease rights in the Nazul land, mutation of the names of the beneficiaries has been carried out. There was nothing unusual in the present case and. therefore, the A.D.M. (Nazul) rightly allowed the mutation of the name of Tej Narain Chaddha in place of Satyugi Narain Chaddha to the extent of half share over the lease rights in the Nazul land on the strength of the Will dated 19.4.1957 by order dated 20.6.1963 and similarly by a subsequent order dated 19.7.1997 A.D.M. (Nazul) has allowed mutation of the name of Deepak Narain Chaddha on the basis of Will dated 3.7.1983 executed by Triloki Narain Chaddha in favour of the former.
11. Now the question is whether the A.D.M. (Nazul) was competent to allow the mutation of the names of Tej Narain Chaddha and Deepak Narain Chaddha respondent Nos. 3 and 4. Sri U. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Rule 5 of the Nazul Manual which deals with the change of entries in Nazut register. This provision reads as follows :
"5. Change entries in Nazul register.--Entries in the Nazul register shall not be changed except under the orders, of the Collector. Where a local authority is entrusted with the management of nazul, it shall be the duty of the local authority to maintain nazul register up-to-date and where it proposes to change any entry in the nazul register as a result of succession, transfer or assignment of any lease for building purposes, or on the discovery of any error or omission in such register, it shall submit its proposal to the Collector, who if he is satisfied after such enquiry as he considers necessary, that a succession, transfer or assignment has taken place or that an error or omission exists, shall order the register to be corrected accordingly."
On the strength of above provision, it was urged that except for Collector, who is the pivotal and dominant authority With regard to Nazul land, no other officer or authority has the right or jurisdiction to effect any change of entries in the Nazul register. Reliance on Rule 5. 1 am constrained to observe, is misplaced. This Rule deals with the management of the Nazul land by the local authority and it is postulated that to change any entry in the Nazul register, as a result of succession, transfer or assignment etc.. a proposal shall be submitted to the Collector and the Nazul register shall be corrected only on his order. There is another Rule 5A which provides for the procedure for mutation. Relevant provisions are culled out as below :
"5-A, Mutation procedure.--(1) On each transfer by succession, sale, assignment or otherwise, the lessee and the person to whom the lease rights are so transferred, shall, within two months of the same, deliver a notice in writing to the Collector or the Nazul Officer appointed by the Collector, setting forth the names and other particulars of the persons from whom and to whom the transfer take place and the nature and description of the transfer.
(2) The Collector, on receiving such report, or upon the facts coming otherwise to his knowledge, shall decide the matter on the basis of possession, and shall order mutation in the name of the transferee in the records accordingly.
(3) If in the course of enquiry into a dispute under this rule, the Collector is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession, he shall ascertain by summary inquiry the person best entitled to the property, and shall order the name of such person to be entered in the records accordingly.
(4) No order passed under this rule shall debar any person from establishing his right to the property in any Civil or Revenue Court having jurisdiction."
There is no dispute about the fact that the A.D.M. (Nazul) is the person in the district who has been appointed by the Collector to discharge the duties and perform the functions of the Collector with regard to Nazul properties. The expression 'Collector' used in Rule 5A or. for that matter. Rule 5 would include an Additional Collector. In this connection, a reference may be made to the provisions of Section 14A of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. which provide for the appointment. powers and duties of Additional Collectors. In sub-section (3) of Section 14A, it is provided that an Additional Collector snail exercise such powers and discharge such duties of a Collector in such case or class of cases, as the Collector concerned may direct. In sub-section (4). the matter has further been clarified by providing that this Act (U. P. Land Revenue Act) and every other law, for the time being, applicable to a Collector shall apply to every Additional Collector when exercising any power or discharging any duties under sub-section (3) as if he were the Collector of the district.
12. From the above provisions, it is crystal clear that the expression 'Collector' includes Additional Collector. Unless the Additional Collector is stripped of his powers by the competent authority, he as well as the Collector exercise concurrent powers. Therefore, wherever the expression 'Collector' has been used in the Nazul Manual, it would also include the Additional Collector, who is popularly known as Additional District Magistrate. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Additional District Magistrates/Additional Collectors did not have the power to pass orders dated 20.6.1963 and 19.3.1997. Since these orders were passed by the Additional District Magistrates concerned for and on behalf of the Collector/District Magistrate, the latter was not competent to vary, rescind or set aside their orders. The District Magistrate, therefore, in the present case, was not justified in setting aside the orders dated 20.6.1963 and 19.3.1997 by passing an order on 17.8.1998 in a matter, which had already assumed finality.
13. Sri U. N. Sharma further urged that the Divisional Commissioner does not come in picture and has no role to play in the matters of Nazul land and, therefore, the orders passed by him are otiose as having no force of law. This submission is not well merited and has been stated simply to be rejected. There is no dispute about the fact that the District Magistrate is an officer subordinate to the Commissioner. In the hierarchy of administration, the District Magistrate works under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of the division. The order passed by the District Magistrate dated 17.8.1998 was, as a matter of fact, an administrative order as he was not competent to set aside the order passed by the Additional Collectors exercising powers of the Collector. A superior officer can always correct and rectify the mistakes, if any, committed by his subordinates. Administrative powers exercised by the District Magistrate are subject to correction and scrutiny by higher authorities, including the Commissioner on the administrative side. A superior officer has the implied and implicit administrative power to perform and function which its subordinates can discharge. If a subordinate officer has omitted to perform his administrative duty or function, the superior officer must certainly step-in to pass appropriate correct orders on the administrative side. Similarly, if a subordinate has assumed the powers which are not, In fact, vested in him the superior authority can undo the wrong committed by Its subordinate. From this angle also, the orders passed by the Commissioner of the division cannot be assailed. In nutshell, the fact remains that the orders passed by the A.D.Ms on 20.6.1963 and 19.3.1997 were passed in their capacity as the Collector and, therefore, their orders could not be set aside by the District Magistrate and if the District Magistrate has taken to his head in an Illegal manner to set aside the orders passed by the Additional Collectors. In that event, officer superior to District Magistrate could set aside the order passed by the District Magistrate. No exception can be taken to the orders passed by the Commissioner which appears to be quite appropriate, just and equitable.
14. The mutation proceedings are summary in nature. In clause (4) of Rule 5A of the Nazul Manual, it has been provided that no order passed under Rule 5A shall debar any person from establishing his right to the property in any civil or revenue court having jurisdiction. If the petitioners are really aggrieved of the orders passed by the Commissioner of the Division, or for that matter, the Additional District Magistrates, exercising the power of the Collector, in that event they can get their rights established by filing a suit before an appropriate Court to challenge the execution, validity and effect of the Wills. In question.
15. Sri Rajesh Tandon was emphatic enough in asserting that the petitioners have not come with clean hands and, therefore, not only that their writ petition should have been dismissed outright but they should also be proceeded against and punished for contempt of court. An application has been moved for initiating action to punish the petitioners, along with an affidavit of Tej Narain Chaddha, pointing out various inaccuracies, concealment and misrepresentations made by the petitioners. After having heard learned counsel for the parties on this point also, I feel that it would not be Just, proper and expedient to initiate any action against the petitioners. It may. however, be made clear that the law on the point is well-settled that a person who does not come with clean hands before the Court, is not entitled to the discretionary relief. A person who has been guilty of committing fraud is certainly not entitled to the benefit otherwise available under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Rajbir Singh v. Purushottam Lal and others, AIR 1996 All 170, this Court observed that it Is settled law that when a person approaches the Court of equity in exercise of Its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, he should approach the Court with clean objectives. There is no need to cite any authority for this but the reference may be made to the cases of the Ram/as Foundation v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 852 ; G. Narainaswami Reddy v. Government of Kamataka. AIR 1991 SC 1726 and K. R. Srinivas v. K. M. Premchand. (1994) 6 SCC 620. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re-Rolling Mitts, AIR 1994 SC 2151. observed thus :
"A Court of equity, when exercising its equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must so act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud and the Courts are obliged to do Justice by promotion of good faith, as far as it lies within their power. Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and subtleties Invented to evade law."
Likewise, in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481, the Apex Court observed that it is the responsibility of High Court as custodian of the Constitution to maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refusing to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. Tn S. P. Changalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and others, 1994 (1) SCC 1, Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that the Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court must come with clean hands. The conduct of the petitioners has certainly been blameworthy.
16. In the conspectus of the above facts, the writ petition turns out to be devoid of any merit and substance and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.