Karnataka High Court
Krishna Reddy vs State Of Karnataka And Others on 5 October, 1999
Equivalent citations: 2001(3)KARLJ44
ORDER V.P. Mohan Kumar, J.
1. The petitioner challenges Annexure-E order. There was a civil dispute between the predecessor of the petitioner-Jangama Reddy on the one hand and that of the father of the 4th respondent claiming title with respect to the land in Sy. No. 28 situate at Varnasi Village, Bangalore South, Bangalore. That dispute went up to Supreme Court, Jangama Reddy succeeding at all stages. To sustain his claim, he had set up title to the property basing on title acquired relying on the entries in Revenue document. Though disputed, the Court relied on these documents to uphold the claim and pass a judgment in favour of the predecessor of the petitioner. Subsequent thereto, it appears a complaint was made against the predecessor of the petitioner by the 4th respondent this father having died by then) to the Government alleging that the documents relied on by Jangama Reddy are forged, the forgery having been perpetuated by the public servant manipulating the public record and therefore it should be enquired into. The Government by Annexures-E and F orders ordered COD enquiry. The said order is questioned before me by the petitioner.
2. I have heard Mr. Suresh S. Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Tarakaram, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Heb-bar for the 4th respondent and Ms. Roja Paramel, learned Government Pleader.
3. The short question is as to whether there has been proper application of mind by the Government while issuing Annexures-E and F orders, and as to whether the 1st respondent is justified in issuing Annexure-E order and whether circumstances exist for the 1st respondent to order COD enquiry with respect to the allegations made by the 4th respondent.
4. Mr. Suresh S. Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that when once the issues were brought to the notice of the Civil Court and it reached the Supreme Court and when the Civil Court made the decrees placing reliance on the very same documents and that the said document having been acted upon by the Court and a judgment rendered placing reliance on the said document, the Government cannot now assume that the documents are forged whereby the effect would be to destabilise the basis of the judgment itself. He submitted that on a perusal of the order it is clear that there has not been any application of mind by the first respondent before issuing the same. According to him the order does not disclose reasonable exercise of power by the Competent Authority before forming an opinion as to the need of an enquiry. He relied on the decision in Padfield and Others v Minister of Agriculture and Others , in this behalf. According to him, when once such an administrative order has been issued by the authorities, such order should substantiate its reasons on the face of it. He also submitted that when discretionary orders are made it should be a reasonable one disclosing the definitiveness of power to be exercised. He further relied on the decision of Supreme Court in S.N. Sharma v Bipen Kumar Tiwari, to contend that there should be specific indication as to what has to be investigated by the COD/Police, as the case may be. The order, according to him, is thus vague and hence it is a colourable exercise of power.
5. The arguments of respective sides mainly centered on the authority of the first respondent to issue Annexure-E order. It is primarily argued that when several documents with respect to which investigation is ordered had been the subject-matter of judicial scrutiny and the matter reached the Supreme Court and the decision rendered therein were on the basis of the documents thus produced assuming the same to be genuine the 1st respondent cannot annul the process by issuing Annexure-E order, ordering COD investigation with respect to the very same documents which were subject-matter of judicial scrutiny. That would be according to him an attempt to review the decision rendered by competent Civil Court.
6. From the averments in the statement of objections filed by the contesting respondent the main thrust of the contention is that, the land belonging to the Government were fraudulently, in collusion with Government officials converted to that of the property belonging to the predecessor in interest of the petitioner, that the fraud was perpetuated by forging of revenue and other records, that the Government officials were privy to the same in defrauding the Government, that, this question could not have been gone into in the civil proceedings, that the true owner of the property, the Government is not party to the said proceedings and orders of the Civil Court is not binding on them.
7. I do not think various factual details urged in the proceedings need be gone into at this stage for more than one reason. The claim of the 4th respondent with respect to the subject-matter of property was agitated full breadth upto the Supreme Court. He cannot have a second trial in the form of a COD enquiry. But, what is highlighted now briefly by them, is that the title to the property claimed by the petitioner has been created by fraud and forgery. The contesting respondent contends that with respect to the property in Sy. Nos. 25 and 26 the petitioner's father's vendor by name Ramaiah Reddy had earlier applied to the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inam Regrant, for occupancy right under the Act which application was rejected. Likewise, the vendor of the petitioner's father Jangama Reddy in respect of properties in Sy. Nos. 27 and 28 had also applied to the same officer for grant of occupancy right. That application was also rejected. The consequent result is that the lands claimed by them for assignment vested in the Government under the provision of the Act free from all encumbrances. But it is alleged by the 4th respondent that there was subsequent manipulation of the Government records by the above said assignors of Jangama Reddy whereby it was shown in the records that the occupancy right was transferred to those persons whose application for regrant was rejected. Thereafter claiming title under such forged entry they claimed title, which title by subsequent devolution came to vest with the petitioner's father Jangama Reddy. It is further alleged that these documents were set forth by him in Civil Court to uphold his title and which right was upheld as well. According to the 4th respondent he only pointed out to the Government that the title of the petitioner's father Jangama Reddy originated in fraud and the fraud vitiated the entire proceeding.
8. The learned Government Pleader Ms. Roja Paramel also demonstrated that there has been a serious manipulation of the village records whereby title of the property set up by the petitioner's father Jangama Reddy was perfected. This manipulation, corrections etc., in village records may be genuine or may not be. But according to her it prima facie discloses that fraud has been practised on the Government.
9. Mr. Joshi strongly contended that the title of the petitioner's father was subject-matter in a long drawn out litigation between petitioner's father Jangama Reddy and the contesting respondent's father Kalappa and ended in the Supreme Court. He submits that the present proceedings are a surreptitious method to reopen the same.
10. I do not think the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is correct. Suppose J and K litigate with respect to the property belonging to G without him being made a party to the proceeding and J secures a decree in his favour non-suiting K, would that decree be binding on G? The answer is in the negative. If Mr. Joshi's contentions is to be accepted it is as if the question being answered in the positive. The Government, who claims now to be the owner of the property is not bound by the decree secured by Jangama Reddy against Kalappa. To the suit Government was not party. The investigation now initiated by the Government is like a suit being instituted to set aside the decree obtained by J against K. There is no finding as such that the property does not belong to the Government which, assuming for argument sake, may upset the decree in favour of J. Those stages are yet to follow. As such on merits of the case, the petitioner has no right to complain.
11. Now with respect to the proposition of law, advanced by Mr. Joshi, no doubt Annexure-E is a cryptic order. But, this is not the stage for the Government to set forth the reasons for the ordering of the inquiry. If they do so, it may amount to prejudging the issue and an attempt to control and guide the powers and discretion of the Investigating Officer. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied mainly on the decision of the House of Lords rendered in Padfield's case, supra. I do not think the decision of the House of Lords in Padfield's case, supra, is of any assistance in this case to the petitioner. The facts of the case in brief is as under:
"The Agricultural Marketing Act, 1958, contained (inter alia) provisions relating to the milk marketing scheme. By Section 19--
"(13) A Committee of investigation shall. . . .(b) be charged with the duty, if the Minister in any case so directs, of considering, and reporting to the Minister on. . .any. . .complaint made to the Minister as to the operation of any Scheme which, in the opinion of the Minister, could not be considered by a consumers' Committee. . . 1(6) If a Committee of investigation report to the Minister that any provision of a scheme or any act or omission of a board administering a scheme is contrary to the interests of consumers of the regulated products, or is contrary to the interests of any persons affected by the scheme and is not in the public interest, the Minister, if he thinks fit to do so after considering the report -- (a) may by order make such amendments in the scheme as he considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of rectifying the matter; (b) may by order revoke the scheme; (c) in the event of the matter being one which it is within the power of the board to rectify, may by order direct the board to take such steps to rectify the matter as may be specified in the order. .. . ].".
It was on this factual matrix that the HonTale Law Lords considered the following questions:
"(1) Was the Minister bound to refer the complaint to the Committee of investigation under Section 19(3) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1958?
(2) Can the Court intervene to control the exercise by the Minister of the power conferred on him by the statute?
(3) Should the Court intervene in the present case?"
Analysing the question, the learned Law Lords answered the question separately. Lord Denning M.R. answered thus:
"That was laid down by two of my predecessors in this place: Lord Esher M.R. in Reg. v Vestry of St. Pancras, said of a body who were entrusted with a discretion:
". . . .they must fairly consider the application and exercise their discretion on it fairly, and not take into account any reason for their decision which is not a legal one. If people who have to exercise a public duty by exercising their discretion take into account matters which the Courts consider not to be proper for the guidance of their discretion, then in the eye of the law they have not exercised their discretion"."
Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation said:
". . .a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider".
That passage has been repeatedly cited with approval in the House of Lords: see Smith vs East Elloe Rural District Council, by Lord Reid: Fawcett Properties Limited vs Buckingham County Council.
Applying these principles to this case, the Lord Chief Justice held that this was a case where the Courts should interfere. He said that the complaint by the South-Eastern farmers was "... a bona fide complaint and one which would be likely in the light of past history to be found to be justified and further that the conduct of the board in this regard would be likely to be held to be one which is not in a public interest".
After adverting to the above background, the learned Law Lord concluded thus:
"I do not think that was a proper approach to the complaint. The Minister ought not to make up his mind in advance. He could not tell what evidence the Committee might have before them, for what reasons might to their recommendations. He ought at least to the prepared to consider their report with an open mind. He ought not to shut down and investigation simply because he might be expected to act on the recommendations".
In his separate opinion Lord Reid after referring to the judgment in Julius' case , observed as under:
"In Julius' case no question was raised whether there could be a discretion but a discretion so limited that it must not be used to frustrate the object of the Act which conferred it; and I have found no authority to support the unreasonable proposition that it must be all or nothing--either no discretion at all or an unfettered discretion, Here the words "if the Minister in any case so directs" are sufficient to show that he has some discretion but they give no guide as to its nature or extent. That must be inferred from a construction of the Act read as a whole, and for the reasons I have given I would infer that the discretion is not unlimited and that it has been used by the Minister in a manner which is not in accord with the intention of the statute which conferred it".
Deplock L.J. (Russel L.J. agreeing with him) representing the minority view opined thus:
". . .It has not, in my view, been shown either that he has not exercised his discretion, or that in doing so he misconstrued his powers or duties under the Act, or that he took into his consideration any irrelevant matters or omitted to consider any relevant matters....".
The stress is that, material considerations while exercising the discretion is not to misconstrue his powers and duties but to eschew of irrelevant considerations while adhering to relevant consideration. In other words, in the absence of allegation in this behalf, the discretion should have deemed to have been exercised properly.
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest in the same judgment observed as under:
"In my view, this passage does not avail the appellants. I can see no provision in the Act showing that the appellants or others who might make a complaint similar to theirs were "entitled" to call upon the Minister to exercise the power given to him. At most their Entitlement was that the Minister should consider and should decide whether or not in the exercise of his discretion he would refer a complaint. It would have to be shown that the Act gave the appellants a "right" to have their complaint sent to the Committee before the power in the Minister could be held to be one that he was bound to exercise. Thus in his speech in Julius v Bishop of Oxford, Lord Blackburn said that-
"If the object for which the power is conferred is for the purpose of enforcing a right, there may be duty cast on the donee of the power to exercise it for the benefit of those who have that right, when required on their behalf."
So also Lord Blackburn said:
"The enabling words are construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right.
When some legal right on entitlement is conferred or enjoyed and for the purpose of effectuating such right or entitlement a power is conferred upon someone, then words which are permissive in character will sometimes be construed as involving a duty to exercise the power".
It is not shown that 4th respondent had any right to compel any COD enquiry. As such, if in such a circumstance an enquiry was ordered, it cannot be construed to be at the instance of the 4th respondent; and as such the petitioner cannot complain of an illegal exercise of discretion at the behest of the 4th respondent.
In his separate opinion Lord Hodson spoke thus:
"If the Minister has a complete discretion under the Act, as in my opinion he has, the only question remaining is whether he has exercised it lawfully.
It is upon this issue that much difference of judicial opinion has emerged all though there is no divergence of opinion as to the relevant law. As Lord Denning M.R. said, citing Lord Greene M.R. in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited, supra:
"..,.. .a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider","
Likewise Lord Upjohn in his opinion catalogued thus:
"The Minister in exercising his powers and duties, conferred upon him by statute, can only be controlled by a prerogative writ which will only issue if he acts unlawfully. Unlawful behaviour by the Minister may be stated with sufficient accuracy for the purposes of the present appeal (and here I adopt the classification of Lord Parker C.J., in the Divisional Court): (a) by an outright refusal to consider the relevant matter, or (b) by misdirecting himself in point of law or (c) by taking into account some wholly irrelevant or extraneous considerations, or (d) by wholly omitting to take into account a relevant consideration".
xxx xxx xxx "My Lords, I would only add this: that without throwing any doubt upon what are well known as the club expulsion cases where the absence of reasons has not proved fatal to the decision of expulsion by a club committee, a decision of the Minister stands on a quite different basis; he is a public officer charged by Parliament with the discharge of a public discretion affecting Her Majesty's subjects; if he does not given any reason for his decision it may be, if circumstances warrant it, that a Court may be at liberty to come to the conclusion that he had no good reason for reaching that conclusion and order a prerogative writ to issue accordingly".
Thus to conclude, it is clear from the discussions of the learned Law Lords, that where there exists in a person a legally enforceable right, the exercise whereof depends on the discretionary power conferred on an administrative body, then in such cases the permissive expression conferring discretionary power on that administrative body should be construed as casting a duty on that body to exercise that power in a reasoned manner. That is to say, that authority while exercising that power must direct itself properly in law, must call its attention to matters which it is bound to consider and must exclude from its consideration matters which are irrelevant to what it is considering. It would mean, that only when discretionary powers are conferred on the administrative agency the exercise of which can be demanded by the person on whom that right is conferred would the question arise whether the administrative agency has kept the correct parameters in mind while exercising that discretionary power. It is only then, as a corollary, the power of judicial review of the said decision can be made by a Court.
A person in whom a right vests to claim a discretionary relief from a statutory authority can apply for judicial review of the decision making process preceding the discretionary order; but in cases where there does not exist any such statutory right in that behalf in an individual to seek any discretionary relief, then, the doors of judicial review would be shut with respect to review of any of the decision made by such authority in exercise of its inherent powers.
12. The question in this case then would be whether while ordering the police investigation the administrative agency has acted in accordance with law. The subsidiary questions allied thereto would be whether any person has any right to seek police investigation as now undertaken by the 1st respondent and whether the 1st respondent has acted at the behest of any outside agency thereby abdicating its power. There is an instructive discussion in the judgment of my learned brother Justice Chinnappa in State of Karnataka v Thammalah and Others, tracing the conferment of power with the 1st respondent to order investigation. The following extract therefrom would suffice to show that the 1st respondent in appropriate cases, has independent power to order such investigations as it deems fit.
". . . To further substantiate the argument, he also has drawn my attention to the proceedings of the Government of Karnataka in regard to the establishment of Corps of Detectives in the Criminal Investigation Department vide Order HD 229 PEG 73, Bangalore District, 15th April, 1974. Subsequently, the Standing Order No. 630 was issued on 21-4-1994. From the preamble of that Standing Order, it is clear that the Government felt that it is necessary to establish Corps of Detectives in the Criminal Investigation Department for investigating cases involving economic and financial offences and major crimes which would require special knowledge of both law and investigation. In order to achieve maximum results in the detection of crimes and with a view also to inspire public confidence in the Police Administration, it has been decided to build up a Corps of Detectives in the State CID. It also provides eight squads with the Executive Police staff noted against each will be known as the 'Corps of Detectives' working under the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID, Bangalore. It was also subject to the general control of the Inspector General, the control of the personnel and their work rests with the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID. Except on ceremonial occasions, the officers and the men of the CID should not wear uniform and should not use Police salute in greeting superiors and others. Staff pattern attached to this is also mentioned. With the establishment of the Corps of Detectives, the F.P.B, the prohibition Intelligence Branch both permanent and temporary, the C.I.B. and the Food Cell, CB-II, CID is allowed to continue as heretofore with the existing staff. The permanent investigation staff of CID comprising of one SP, 2 DSPs, 14 Pis, 8 Sis, 12 HCs and PCs. According to the scheme application for taking over investigation by the CID for rendering assistance should be made to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID. Without the orders of the Inspector General of Police, no enquiry should be undertaken by the Corps of Detectives. In all cases where a request by the Superintendent is refused, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID should inform the Inspector General of Police. It also stipulates the classes of crimes to be investigated by the CID as enumerated in Order 1729 of Police Manual, Vol. II as follows:
(a) Currency note forgery cases;
(b) Cases for counterfeiting of coins;
(c) Cases of professional poisoning;
(d) Theft of Government arms and ammunition and illicit trade in arras;
(e) Important cases in which foreigners are concerned (including cases of international criminals and traffic, in women by foreigners);
(f) Cases of dacoity or house breaking of a peculiar nature which indicate the work of an adept gang not previously noticed or accounted for by the local police;
(g) Cases of fraud, theft or cheating of a peculiar nature which affect more than one District;
(h) Cases of smuggling of opium, cocaine and other narcotics of an inter-State nature;
(i) Important conspiracy cases whose ramifications extend to several Districts;
(j) Gang cases;
(k) Pornography;
(1) Any serious crime which appears to have a political motive, including all offences connected with arms and explosives which are suspected to be of a political nature;
(m) Cases of such a complicated nature as, in the opinion of the IGF or the DIGP or the District Authorities, call for investigation by an Officer of the Corps of Detectives.
The distribution of the classes of crimes among the 8 squads have been mentioned. They are Homicide Squad, Burglary Squad, Fraud Squad, Counterfeit Currency Squad, Illicit Arms and Explosives Squad, Vice Squad, Anti-smuggling Squad and Special Enquiries Squad.
8. According to the object of the proceedings in the establishment of Corps of Detectives in criminal investigations, it is stated thus:
"A Committee of senior Police Officers was appointed to examine this matter in all its details. The Committee has observed that an expansion of the Criminal Investigation Department along with the existing lines will not meet the needs of the situation. With the opening up of the interior and improved communication facilities and with the development of science and technology, criminals have acquired new and sophisticated methods for perpetrating crimes and these methods were unknown to the criminals of an earlier era. Further, while collar crimes are being committed more and more by intelligent cheats who adopt novel and scientific methods to defy detection. Again, counterfeit currency cases and cases relating to thefts of idols and antiques have also come to notice. Offences relating to persons such as abduction of girls for immoral purposes, maiming of children for begging are being committed. With the increase in international tourists traffic, various other types of crimes are also likely to be imported into India. In this race, the criminals should not be" allowed to get better of the police; the latter must keep themselves adequately equipped and trained to meet the challenge".
So from a reading of the proceedings, it is abundantly clear that the COD is a special branch established for special purposes to meet the type of crimes enumerated above".
13. A tracing of the power thus shows that with respect to commission of an offence against the State, the 1st respondent has suo motu powers to order investigation de hors the right of an individual to draw the attention of the State in that behalf. If then, the 1st respondent can set in motion an investigation into commission of crimes mentioned above of its own motion, then, it can equally do so if someone else reports the commission of such an offence. Such initiation cannot be described as acting at the behest of some other person. The investigating agency constituted under the Government Order has therefore the status of a Police Station, and the impugned order is merely an F.I.R. lodged. The present challenge would thus tantamount to examining the gravamen of the allegations in an F.I.R. lodged with the police at the pre-investigation stage. In these circumstances when State acts, in exercise of its Sovereign power to investigate the Crime, the commission of which is brought to its notice, I am of the view, that no one has any fundamental right to complain that the exercise of that power is vitiated by mala fide or for any of the reasons urged as in this writ petition.
14. Now, assuming we concede such a right in a person, would the Courts be justified in exercising its extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to set at naught such proceedings? The answer should be in the negative. What is alleged is the commission of fraud which deprived the State of its valuable property. The State has lodged an F.I.R. and commenced investigation. Any inference therewith would mean interfering and scuttling of the work of an investigative agency. That apart, that would result in scotching a proceeding initiated to ascertain whether fraud has been perpetuated on the State, the real owner of the property, it would amount in resurrecting an alleged commission of an illegality and acquiescing to a crime. It is a safe rule to adopt that the power of this Court shall not be invoked in aid of perpetuating illegality. A fraud if committed would vitiate the most solemn act and, a decree of a Court as confirmed by the Supreme Court is no exception. The petitioner cannot be heard to say that the decree obtained by him and his predecessors against the 4th respondent or his predecessor is a judgment in rem binding even those who are not parties to the proceedings. If this Court were to interfere with the impugned order it would amount to supporting illegality.
15. Ms. Roja Paramel, learned Government Pleader urged that any interference with the impugned order would amount to resurrecting of a fraud practiced by the petitioner. She relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nilkanth Prasad v State of Bihar and Others , as well as State of Maharashtra and Others u Prabhu2. The Supreme Court in Prabhu's case, supra, again stated as under:
"4. ... The distinction between writs issued as a matter of right such as habeas corpus and those issued in exercise of discretion such as certiorari and mandamus are well-known and explained in countless decisions given by this Court and English Courts. It is not necessary to recount them. The High Courts exercise control over Government functioning and ensure obedience of rules and law by enforcing proper, fair and just performance of duty. Where the Government or any authority passes an order which is contrary to rules or law it becomes amenable to correction by the Courts in exercise of writ jurisdiction, But one of the principles inherent in it is that the exercise of power should be for the sake of justice. One of the yardstick for it is if the quashing of the order results in greater harm to the society then the Court may restrain from exercising the power".
Likewise, she cited a judgment of this Court in All Karnataka Conductors Manufacturers Association v Karnataka State Electricity Board, where Justice Shivaraj Patil (as he then was) stated as under:
"32. By now it is the crystallised judicial view that the State whether by way of giving job or entering into contract or otherwise cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will but its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. The High Court does not interfere in cases under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and refuses to issue any writ in the event it is found that substantial justice has been done to the parties or in the larger interest it would not be prudent to issue such a writ. In this case on hand, it cannot be said the action of the respondents in opening the tender on 15-3-1990 has prejudiced the petitioners or public interest in anyway. On the other hand, interfering to the public exchequer in view of the fact that the respondent-Board will be put to financial loss in terms of few crores of rupees and public interest will also suffer in case the prayer made by the petitioners, namely, issuing writ of mandamus directing the respondents to renotify the tender for procurement of Squirrel, Weasel and Rabbit ACSR conductor".
16. Therefore from what is stated above it has to be held that, even if the exercise of the power by the administrative agency be either in excess of its jurisdiction or be vitiated due to taking into account irrelevant consideration and has arrived at a conclusion by eschewing relevant considerations, even then, if the result of interference by this Court with the discretionary order would result in perpetuating an illegality or fraud as the case may be, then in the interest of justice the Courts should refrain from doing so. Further, it is not the function of the Court to police every action of the Executive, if by the exercise of such power the Executive has only set right an illegality; and in such a situation if this Court invokes its power of judicial review it would be only perpetuating fraud and resurrecting an illegality.
17. Mr. Suresh S. Joshi then submitted that the impugned order is vitiated by mala fide and that there is total want of bona fides in the action of the 1st respondent. In such cases, he contends that as held by the Supreme Court in S.N. Sharma's case, supra, this Court can invoke its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and set right the illegality. In particular he relied on the following paragraph:
". . . .7. It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers. The fact that the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must be read in Section 159 of the Code".
18. The situation as the like referred to in the above case do not exist here. In this case, the allegation was that the property belonging to the State has been converted to that of the petitioner's father Jangama Reddy by manipulating official records. The allegation may be true or may not be so. If the allegations are true, then the State is the owner of the property and the sole affected party. Therefore, by the impugned order, it is as if the State has initiated the investigation and is only in the position of a complainant lodging complaint in a Police Station. Such an action can hardly be described as a mala fide act.
19. I do not find any illegality having been perpetuated by the 1st respondent by issuing the impugned order. The writ petition is dismissed. But however there will be no order as to costs.