Karnataka High Court
Smt. Subbamma And Anr. vs The Executive Officer, Nanjangud ... on 22 April, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004(3)KARLJ99, 2003 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1903, 2003 AIHC 3476, (2004) 3 KANT LJ 99, (2003) 3 KCCR 2176
Author: N. Kumar
Bench: N. Kumar
ORDER N. Kumar, J.
1. The petitioners were elected as the members of the Taluk Panchayat. Subsequently, they were elected as Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of the Taluk Panchayat respectively on 19th March, 2002. The term of office is twenty months and it expires on 19th November, 2003. Thirteen members of the Taluk Panchayat on 7th February, 2002 requested the petitioners to call for a special meeting to consider the resolution regarding want of confidence in the petitioner. The first petitioner did not call for the meeting. A requisition was given to the Chief Officer to call for a meeting and a meeting notice was issued on 15th February, 2003. The said meeting notice was challenged by the petitioners before this Court in Writ Petition No. 7350 of 2003. The said writ petition was allowed. The meeting notice dated 15th February, 2003 was quashed and this Court issued the following directions:
"A direction is issued to the first petitioner herein viz., the Adhyaksha of Taluk Panchayat to receive any petition/representation that may be presented to her by 1/3rd of the total number of members of the Taluk Panchayat and act upon the same as contemplated under Section 141 of the Act".
It is in pursuance of the said direction issued by this Court, the petitioners preferred a Writ Appeal No. 3029 of 2003 which came to be dismissed on 10th April, 2003.
2. Thereafter, in pursuance of the aforesaid order, 13 members of the panchayat issued a notice to the first petitioner on 28th March, 2003 calling upon her to call for a special meeting of the Taluk Panchayat to consider the no confidence motion expressed by them. The said notice was received by 28th March, 2003 itself, a copy of which is produced as Annexure-B. The first petitioner with a view to ascertain as to whether the 13 persons have signed any such notice of no confidence motion, issued notice to each of the members separately on 9th April, 2003 requesting them to confirm whether they have actually signed notice on 28th March, 2003, a copy of which is produced as Annexure-C. As the first petitioner was expected to call for a meeting within 8 days from the date of receipt of the requisition and instead wrote a letter on 9th April, 2003, the intention became clear and therefore, respondents 2 to 18 on 11th April, 2003 issued notice to the first respondent complaining that the first petitioner has not called for a special meeting within 15 days from the date of receipt of notice dated 28th March, 2003 and therefore, they called upon him to call for a special general meeting for considering the resolution expressing want of confidence in her. Acting on the basis of the said requisition, first respondent has issued a notice on 16th April, 2003 calling for a meeting on 25th April, 2003 for expressing want of confidence in her, a copy of which is produced as Annexure-E. The petitioners in these writ petitions are challenging Annexure-E firstly, on the ground that the said meeting to be convened by the Executive Committee also should be called within 15 days from the date of request made by respondents 2 to 18 to the first petitioner to convene a meeting and secondly, on the ground that it is the respondents 2 to 18 who have to fix the date of meeting and the same cannot be left to the discretion of the first respondent. Therefore, the petitioners seek quashing of the said meeting notice Annexure-E.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits, as the said meeting notice issued is contrary to Section 141(2)(a) of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, it is illegal and liable to be quashed.
4. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 18 who had entered the caveat submits, that 15 days as contemplated under Section 141(2)(a) is to be computed from the date of the requisition made by respondents 2 to 18 to the Executive Officer complaining of non-convening of the meeting by the Adhyaksha and not from the date of requisition made to the Adhyaksha to convene the meeting and secondly, it was submitted that it is not the requirement of law that respondents 2 to 18 should fix the date of the meeting and it is left to the Executive Officer to fix the date of the meeting. As such, he submits, there is no illegality committed by the first respondent in convening the impugned meeting.
5. From the aforesaid facts and rival contentions, the facts which are not in dispute are as under. A special meeting convened by the Executive Officer on an earlier occasion to consider the no confidence motion against the petitioners was quashed by this Court and a direction was given to the Adhyaksha to receive the requisition if given by more that 1/3rd members of the committee and to convene a meeting. Admittedly, in pursuance of the same on 28th March, 2003, respondents 2 to 18 have made a requisition for convening a meeting which has been duly acknowledged by the first petitioner. A clear seven days notice is a must for convening the special meeting. Therefore, on 28th March, 2003 when a request was made, the first petitioner ought to have issued a notice convening a special meeting on or before 5th April, 2003. Admittedly, no such notice is issued.
6. On the contrary, on 9th April, 2003, a notice was issued to all the signatories of the requisition calling upon them to confirm whether it is their signatures or not? If the first petitioner had lost the right to convene the meeting on 5th April, 2003, the question of calling upon the respondents 2 to 18 to confirm the signature in the requisition was wholly unwarranted and it clearly shows the intention and the mind of the first petitioner. When once the respondents 2 to 18 became aware of the intention of the first petitioner, on 11th April, 2003, they have given a requisition to the Executive Officer as required under law bringing to his notice the failure on the part of the Adhyaksha to convene the meeting not only in accordance with law, but in obedience to the Court order and requested the first respondent to convene the meeting. No doubt in the said requisition, the request was only to convene a special meeting where they did not specify the date. The first respondent has now convened a meeting in accordance with law specifying 25th April, 2003 as the date for the said meeting to consider the resolution for no confidence against the petitioner.
7. In order to appreciate the legal contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners, it is necessary to have a look at Section 141(2)(a) of the Act, in particular the latter portion which deals with calling a special meeting which reads as under:
"The Adhyaksha may, whenever he thinks fit, and shall, upon the written request of not less than one-third of the total number of members and on a date within fifteen days from the receipt of such request, call a special meeting. Such request shall specify the object for which the meeting is proposed to be called. If the Adhyaksha fails to call a special meeting, the Upadhyaksha or one-third of the total number of members may call the special meeting for a day not more than fifteen days after presentation of such request and require the Executive Officer to give notice to the members and to take such action as may be necessary to convene the meeting".
8. A reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the Adhyaksha, shall, upon the request of not less than one-third total number of members and on a date within fifteen days from the receipt of such request, call a special meeting. Such request shall specify the object for which the meeting is proposed to be called. Once the request is in accordance with law, the Adhyaksha has no discretion except to call the special meeting to consider the object for which the meeting is proposed to be called. However, if the Adhyaksha fails to call a special meeting as aforesaid, the Upadhyaksha or one-third of the total number of members may call the special meeting for a day not more than fifteen days after presentation of such request and require the Executive Officer to give notice to the members and to take such action as may be necessary to convene the meeting. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that "such request" refers to the original request to the Adhyaksha and not the request to the Executive Officer, if accepted leads to absurdity. When the Adhyaksha has been given fifteen days time to convey a special meeting, until the intention of the Adhyaksha not to convene the special meeting is made known, the question of one-third members convening a special meeting and requiring the Executive Officer to give notice to the members, would not arise. Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 141 provides seven clear days' notice of a special meeting. Therefore, only in the event of the Adhyaksha not sending any meeting notice within eight days from the date of such request, his intention not to convey the meeting can be gathered by the members. It is only thereafter they can mobilise the necessary support and call for a special meeting, which also requires a clear seven days notice. Therefore, if such a meeting is to be called for, for a date not more than fifteen days after presentation of request to the Adhyaksha, the section becomes unworkable and it is not possible to comply with the legal requirement.
9. It is settled law that if the language used is capable of bearing more than one construction, in selecting the true meaning, regard must be had to the consequences resulting from adopting the alternative constructions. A construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which avoids such results. In selecting out of different interpretations, the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things, as it may be presumed that the Legislature should have used the word in that interpretation which least offends our sense of justice. If the grammatical construction leads to some absurdity or repugnance or inconsistency, it may be departed from so as to avoid such absurdity and inconsistency. A construction giving rise to anomalies should be avoided. The Supreme Court in the case of [Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh], held where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. When on a construction of a statute, two views are possible, one which results in an anomaly and the other not, it is our duty to adopt the latter and not the former, seeking consolation in the thought that the law bristles with anomalies.
10. Applying the aforesaid settled legal principles, it is clear "such request" referred to, if it is interpreted to mean such a request to the Adhyaksha and not to the Executive Officer, it leads to absurdity and anomaly. It has to be prevented. Certainly, that was not the intention of the Legislature. Therefore, "such request" necessarily refers to a request to the Executive Officer, after it becomes clear that the Adhyaksha is not convening the special meeting. Such an interpretation would not only serve the object enacting the aforesaid provision, it would also facilitate holding of a special meeting in accordance with law. Therefore, the contention that the meeting convened by the Executive Officer is not within fifteen days from the date of the request made to the Adhyaksha to convey the special meeting and as such, it is illegal and liable to be set aside, has no substance.
11. Regarding the next submission that the members themselves should specify the date of the meeting and the Executive Officer has no power to fix the meeting date is concerned, it is also without any substance. All that the aforesaid provision provides is, when the Adhyaksha fails to call a special meeting, members may call the special meeting for a day not more than fifteen days after presentation of such request and require the Executive Officer to give notice to the members. The section does not provide that not only the member should call the special meeting, but they should specify the date on which the meeting is to be called. When the Adhyaksha has not called the meeting, when the members want to call a special meeting and when they require the Executive Officer to give notice to the members of such special meeting, merely because the Executive Officer fixes the date of the meeting and sends the notice of the meeting to the members, such a meeting would not be vitiated. The whole object of the aforesaid section is, when the Adhyaksha fails to perform his statutory obligation, the members are not helpless. They have been conferred a right to call meeting and to request the Executive Officer to call such meeting and the date of the meeting has to be necessarily within fifteen days from the date of such request and depending upon the convenience, that date could be fixed either by the members themselves or by the Executive Officer. If the members fail to specify the date of calling of the meeting and leave it to the discretion of the Executive Officer to fix the date of the meeting, that would not vitiate the meeting as such, if other legal requirements of the meeting such as being called within fifteen days from the date of such request is complied with. Therefore, the meeting called by the Executive Officer, specifying 25th of April, 2003, is valid and legal, and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.
12. The petitioner, who has been elected with the support of the majority of members, has to bow to the wishes of the majority of members. That is the essence of democracy. When majority of members lose confidence in the petitioner and request her to convey a special meeting to express their no confidence in her, statutorily, a duty is enjoined on the petitioner to convey such meeting. When the petitioner fails to perform the said statutory obligation, the law confers a power on the members to convey a meeting to express their no confidence. Instead of facing the said no confidence motion, the petitioner is taking umbrage in the Court. Because of the technical defect in convening the meeting, the meeting notice was quashed on an earlier occasion and specific directions were issued by this Court to convey a special meeting to consider the no confidence motion. In spite of a statutory obligation and the direction issued by this Court, the petitioner has failed to convey the meeting. When a meeting is convened in accordance with law, she is trying to stall the said meeting by filing these writ petitions. It is apparent that the petitioner who has lost the confidence of the majority of the members is trying to stick on to the chair through judicial intervention. In fact, Section 140(3) of the Act categorically states even Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of the Taluk Panchayat should be deemed to have vacated his office forthwith if a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed by a majority of total elected members of the Taluk Panchayat at a meeting specially convened for the purpose. The material on record discloses that 16 out of 29 members have made the request for convening the meeting. The earlier request was made on 7th February, 2003 which was the subject-matter of the earlier writ petition.
13. The very fact that the majority of members are against the petitioners and if only a meeting had called for, the resolution would have been passed and in terms of Section 143 of the Act shall be deemed to have vacated her office forthwith, by virtue of the intervention of this Court passing stay orders and finally allowing the writ petition, the petitioners have survived a no confidence motion for more than three months.
14. Under these circumstances, I do not find any merit in any of the contentions urged. Accordingly, these writ petitions are rejected with exemplary costs of Rs. 5,000/-.
15. Sri R.L. Patil is permitted to file is vakalath to the first respondent.