Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench
Fayaz Ahmad Shah @ Fareedi Aged 43 vs Govt. Of J&K Though Principle on 1 August, 2023
Author: Mohan Lal
Bench: Mohan Lal
Sr. No.
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
LPA No. 243/2022 IN
WP(Crl) No. 75/2022
Reserved on :13.06.2023
Pronounced on :01.08.2023
Fayaz Ahmad Shah @ Fareedi aged 43 .....Appellant(s)
years S/O Ghulam Nabi Fareedi R/O
Zahidpora Sheikh Colony Lalbazar District
Srinagar (through his wife Hameeda Bano
aged 42 years).
Through :- Sh. Shafqat Nazir, Advocate.
V/s
1. Govt. of J&K though Principle .....Respondent(s)
Secretary to Government Home
Department, Civil Secretariat Srinagar/
Jammu;
2. District Magistrate Srinagar;
3. Superintendent District Jail Kupwara.
Through :- Sh. Zahid Hussain, GA.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL, JUDGE.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAN LAL, JUDGE
J U D G M E N T
Per-Mohan Lal, J
1. This intra-court appeal (LPA under clause 12 of Letters Patent) has been preferred against the judgment and order of single judge dated 16.11.2022 rendered in writ petition bearing WP (Crl) No. 75/2022 titled Fayaz Ahmad Shah V. Government of J&K & Ors., whereby, the detention order bearing No. DMS/PSA/123/2021 dated 28.02.2022 passed by respondent No. 2 under the provisions of J&K Public Safety Act has been upheld.
2. Being aggrieved of and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment dated 16.11.2022, appellant/detainee has assailed it's legality, propriety and correctness, and has sought it's quashment on the following grounds:-
(i) that the appellant was implicated in case FIR No. 50/2006 and was acquitted in the year 2012 vide judgment of trial court dated 09.08.2012, appellant is also implicated in 2nd FIR No. 27/2007 which though sub-
judice and has not progressed for the inability of the prosecution to produce and examine its witnesses, there is no live and proximate link between the alleged activity of the detenue and detention order, appellant was not specifically shown to be involved in any subversive activities even then the respondents unjustifiably booked him under the provisions of 2 LPA No. 243/2022 J&K Public Safety Act vide detention order bearing No. DMS/PSA/123/2021 dated 28.02.2022;
(ii) that aggrieved of the aforesaid detention order, appellant challenged the same before Hon'ble Writ Court by filing writ petition bearing WP (Crl) No. 75/2022 titled Fayaz Ahmad Shah V. Government of J&K & Ors., respondents filed their counter affidavit in which the averments and grounds of challenge agitated by appellant were not specifically repelled, however without appreciating the grounds agitated in the writ petition and by incorrect appreciation of law the aforesaid writ petition came to be dismissed by the Ld. Writ Court vide impugned judgment and order dated 16.11.2022;
(iii)that the Ld. Single Judge has not appreciated the grounds of challenge while passing impugned judgment and order, has not considered the law referred and judgments supplied and relied upon by appellant nor any reference has been made to all the grounds taken in the writ petition, on this sole ground the impugned judgment and order of the writ court as well as impugned detention order is liable to be set aside;
(iv) that in the writ petition it was agitated that appellant/detainee has not been provided the relevant material which forms basis for passing of detention order, but while addressing this point in paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment, Ld. Single Judge has wrongly concluded that the requisite material has been supplied/provided to the detainee, whereby, the valuable right of the detenue to be informed about his right of making representation against his detention under Article 22(5) r/w Section 13 of J&K Public Safety Act has been infringed/violated;
(v) that the Ld. Single Judge has erroneously placed reliance on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Gautam Jain Vs. Union of India (2017) 3 SCC 133 to hold that detention order will survive even if one of the grounds is found to be unfounded or legally sustainable if detention order is passed on more than one ground, it is submitted that the aforesaid decision is applicable only in a case where detention order is based on more than one grounds independent of each other, however in the instant case the detention order is not based on various independent grounds but on sole ground that the detenue is allegedly involved in trafficking of narcotic drugs, the rest of the grounds are merely ancillary to this ground and not independent of it, thereby decision rendered in Gautam Jain's case (Supra) is not applicable to the instant case;
(vi) that the writ court has failed to appreciate the fact that no compelling reasons have been assigned by the detaining authority for taking recourse to the provisions of Public Safety Act instead of dealing with the appellant under ordinary law of land, where the ordinary law of land can deal with the situation, recourse to preventive detention law would be illegal.
3. The writ court upon hearing both the sides and going through the detention record came to the conclusion that the detention of appellant/detenue in terms of impugned judgment and order dated 16.11.2022 was necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of state and that all the procedural safeguards including providing of relevant material to appellant/detenue enabling him to make an effective representation have been adhered to. The writ court did not agree with the contentions of appellant that the impugned order of detention bearing No. DMS/PSA/123/2021 dated 28.02.2022 3 LPA No. 243/2022 passed by respondent No.2 was bad and legally unsustainable on the premises, that the whole of material relied upon by the detaining authority while framing grounds of detention have not been supplied to petitioner/detenue, that the grounds of detention are vague on the basis of which no effective representation could have been made by the petitioner/detenue, that the petitioner/detenue has not been informed about his right of making representation to the detaining authority as well as to the Govt. and the representation of petitioner/detenue against impugned detention order has not been considered.
4. Sh. Shafqat Nazir Learned Counsel for appellant, has sought the setting aside/quashment of impugned judgment dated 16.11.2022 and impugned detention order bearing No. DMS/PSA/123/2022 dated 28.02.2022 by vehemently canvassing arguments, that appellant/detenue has only been supplied copies of detention warrant and grounds of detention, but has not been supplied copies of FIR, statements of prosecution witnesses recorded u/s 161 Cr.pc by I/O as well as the relevant documents/material/record pertaining to the proceedings u/s 107 of Cr.P.C proceedings initiated against him to enable him to make effective representation against impugned detention order, detenue has a right to make representation to the detaining authority so long as the order of detention has not been approved by the Government, in the case in hand, non-supply of such essential material/communication to the appellant/detenue has debarred him from making effective representation which constitute infraction of valuable right of the appellant as guaranteed to him under Article 22 (5) Constitution of India r/w Section 13 of J&K PSA 1978, which makes the detention order invalid and legally unsustainable. It is argued, that the appellant/detenue, as depicted from contents of dossier/grounds of detention, has been booked in two (2) FIRs bearing No. 50/2006 u/s 20/28 NDPS Act & FIR No. 27/2007 u/s 20/28 NDPS Act of P/S Lal Bazaar Srinagar alongwith the proceedings initiated against him under the provisions of section 107/151 of Cr.pc, it is settled position of law that if the remedies to deal with criminal activities of the appellant/detenue are sufficient under ordinary law of land, the detention order is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. To support his arguments, Ld. Counsel for appellant has relied upon the judgments reported in, (i) AIR 2000 SC 2504 [State of 4 LPA No. 243/2022 Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Santosh Shankar Acharya] & (ii) AIR 2017 SC 2625 [V. Shantha Vs. State of Telangana & Ors.].
5. Sh. Zahid Hussain, GA has recapitulated the grounds urged in the grounds of detention/detention order and has strenuously argued, that all the safeguards have been adhered to and complied with by the detaining authority whereby the order of detention has been issued validly and legally. It is argued, that the detention order and grounds of detention alongwith material relied upon by the detaining authority have been handed over to appellant/detenue, the same has been read over and explained to him, the detenue was informed of his fundamental right to make representation to the Govt. as well as to the detaining authority against his detention, impugned detention order has been passed by the detaining authority after following the due procedure of law. Lastly, it has been argued, that the grounds urged by the appellant/detenue are factually incorrect and legally misconceived which requires the outright dismissal of the LPA.
6. We have heard learned counsel for appellant, Ld. GA for respondents, have perused the averments of appeal, counter affidavit filed by respondent No.2, gone through the detention record carefully and have bestowed our thoughtful consideration to the ratios of judgments relied upon by Ld. Counsel for appellant.
7. The 1 argument canvassed by Ld. Counsel for appellant is, "that the st appellant/detenue has not been supplied/provided the entire material/record viz; copies of FIRs Nos. 50/2016 & 27/2007, statements of prosecution witnesses recorded u/s 161 Cr.pc alongwith relevant documents/record pertaining to section 107/151 Cr.P.C on the basis of which he has been detained under PSA vide detention order bearing No. DMS/PSA/123/2021 dated 28.02.2022, non-supply of aforesaid relevant material/record has violated/infringed appellant's fundamental right guaranteed to him under Article 22 (5) Constitution of India r/w Section 13 of the Jammu Kashmir PSA 1978 to make effective representation against the impugned detention order, thereby, vitiating the detention order" .
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a case law reported in AIR 2000 SC 2504 [State of Maharashtra & Ors-Appellants v. Santosh Shanker Acharya-Respondent] relied by Ld. Counsel for appellant quashed the detention order on the ground, that the detenue was not supplied the copies of material from which detention order was made, which amounted to denial of representation to the detenue and infraction of a valuable constitutional right guaranteed to the detenue under Article 5 LPA No. 243/2022 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. A Single Bench of this Court in a case law titled "Hilal Ahmad Khuroo Vs. Union Territory of J&K & 5 WP (Crl) No. 245/2021 Ors. [WP (Crl.) No. 80/2022, decided on 10.08.2022] has also held, that respondents are duty bound to provide to the appellant/detenue the material as regards the proceedings u/s 107/151 of the Cr.P.C and non-supply thereof renders the detention order illegal and unsustainable. Ratio's of the judgments (supra) and the principles of law deduced there from are squarely applicable to the facts of the case in hand. In the instant case, on the perusal of the detention record, it is discernable, that vide Annexure-III to the appeal (grounds of detention) appellant/detenue has been indicted in cases bearing FIR nos. 50/2006 & 27/2007 for commission of offences punishable u/ss 20/28 of NDPS Act of P/S Lalbazar Srinagar and additionally he has been found involved in the proceedings u/ss 107/151 Cr.pc on 08-01-2020 and 01-03-2020. Copy of execution of PSA warrant with the appeal demonstrate that ASI Mohd Ashraf No. 1018/S of Police Station Lalbazar Srinagar has executed the warrant upon appellant on 04.03.2022 which specify that the detention warrant and grounds of detention have been read over to the appellant/detenue in English and Urdu translated papers of the order of detention has been explained to appellant in Kashmiri Language and the detenue alongwith relevant documents i.e. copies of detention warrant and grounds of detention has been handed over to the authorities of District Jail Kupwara. Copy of receipt of grounds of detention with appeal, make it abundantly clear, that detention warrant/PSA warrant one leaf only has been handed over to the appellant. As per the detention record submitted by respondents, copies of FIRs Nos. 50/2006 & 27/2007, statements of prosecution witnesses recorded u/s 161 Cr.pc, site plans, record of proceedings initiated against appellant u/s 107/151 Cr.pc have never been provided to the appellant. The essential material/record forming the edifice for issuance of impugned detention order against appellant has not been supplied to him, therefore, the appellant/detenue's constitutional right guaranteed to him under Article 22(5) Constitution of India r/w Section 13 of J&K PSA 1978 has been infringed/violated, which renders the impugned detention order illegal and legally unsustainable.
8. The 2 nd argument canvassed by Ld. Counsel for appellant is, "that the appellant/detenue has been booked in FIR Nos. 50/2006 & 27/2007 6 LPA No. 243/2022 under Sections 20/28 of NDPS Act of Police Station Lalbazar Srinagar alongwith proceedings against him u/ss 107/151 Cr.pc , it is settled law that if the remedies to deal with the criminal activities of detenue/appellant are sufficient under ordinary law of the land, the detention order becomes unsustainable and liable to be set aside/quashed".
In AIR 2017 SC 2625 (V. Shantha - Appellants Vs. State of Telangana and Ors. - Respondent) relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant, Hon'ble Supreme Court while quashing the detention order and observing that if the remedies to deal with the detenue are sufficient under the ordinary laws of the land, taking recourse to the provision of preventive detention is contrary to the Constitutional guarantees whereby the detention order becomes invalid and legally unsustainable, in para 12 held as under:
12. The detenu was the owner of Laxmi Bhargavi Seeds, District distributor of Jeeva Aggri Genetic Seeds. Three FIRs were lodged against the detenu and others under Sections 420, 120-B, 34, IPC and Sections 19, 21 of the Seeds Act, 1966. It was alleged that the chilli seeds sold were spurious, as they did not yield sufficient crops, thus causing wrongful loss to the farmers, and illegal gains to the accused. Whether the seeds were genuine or not, the extent of the yield, are matters to be investigated in the FIRs. Section 19 of the Seeds Act provides for penalty by conviction and sentence also. Likewise, Section 20 provides for forfeiture. Sufficient remedies for the offence alleged were, therefore, available and had been invoked also under the ordinary laws of the land for the offence alleged.
In Criminal Appeal No. 733 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4729 of 2021 titled Banka Sneha Sheela - Appellant versus The State of Telangana &Ors - Respondents) relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant, Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that when the offences complained against detenue are of a nature which can be dealt under the ordinary law of land, taking recourse to the provisions of preventive detention is contrary to the constitutional guarantees enshrined under Article 19 and 21 of Constitution, in para 20, 22 held as under:
20. In Rekha V. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court spoke of the interplay between Articles 21 and 22 as follows:
"13. In our opinion, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India which permits preventive detention is only an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution. An exception is an exception, and cannot ordinarily nullify the full force of the main rule, which is the right to liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Fundamental rights are 7 LPA No. 243/2022 meant for protecting the civil liberties of the people, and not to put them in jail for a long period without recourse to a lawyer and without a trial. As observed in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Stafford [(1998) 1 WLR 503 (CA)]: (WLR p. 518 F-G) "...The imposition of what is in effect a substantial term of imprisonment by the exercise of executive discretion, without trial, lies uneasily with ordinary concepts of the rule of law." Article 22, hence, cannot be read in isolation but must be read as an exception to Article 21. An exception can apply only in rare and exceptional cases, and it cannot override the main rule.
14. Article 21 is the most important of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Liberty of a citizen is a most important right won by our forefathers after long, historical and arduous struggles. Our Founding Fathers realised its value because they had seen during the freedom struggle civil liberties of our countrymen being trampled upon by foreigners, and that is why they were determined that the right to individual liberty would be placed on the highest pedestal along with the right to life as the basic right of the people of India .xxx xxxxxx
17. Article 22(1) of the Constitution makes it a fundamental right of a person detained to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice. But Article 22(3) specifically excludes the applicability of clause (1) of Article 22 to cases of preventive detention. Therefore, we must confine the power of preventive detention to very narrow limits, otherwise the great right to liberty won by our Founding Fathers, who were also freedom fighters, after long, arduous and historical struggles, will become nugatory." This Court went on to discuss, WP (Crl) No. 313/2022 10 in some detail, the conceptual nature of preventive detention law as follows:
"29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. No such law exists in the USA and in England (except during war time). Since, however, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India permits preventive detention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the power of preventive detention within very narrow limits, otherwise we will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India which was won after long, arduous and historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinary law of the land (the Penal Code and other penal statutes) can deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will be illegal.
30. Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is: was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling 8 LPA No. 243/2022 expired drugs after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the Penal Code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation. Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention order in question was illegal." [emphasis supplied] In an important passage, this Court then dealt with certain general observations made by the Constitution Bench in Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 198 as follows:
"33. No doubt it has been held in the Constitution Bench decision in HaradhanSaha case [(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] that even if a person is liable to be tried in a criminal court for commission of a criminal offence, or is actually being so tried, that does not debar the authorities from passing a detention order under a preventive detention law. This observation, to be understood correctly, must, however, be construed in the background of the constitutional scheme in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution (which we have already explained). Article 22(3)(b) is only an exception to Article 21 and it is not itself a fundamental right. It is Article 21 which is central to the whole chapter on fundamental rights in our Constitution. The right WP (Crl) No. 313/2022 11 to liberty means that before sending a person to prison a trial must ordinarily be held giving him an opportunity of placing his defence through his lawyer. It follows that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried, for a criminal offence, but the ordinary criminal law (the Penal Code or other penal statutes) will not be able to deal with the situation, then, and only then, can the preventive detention law be taken recourse to.
34. Hence, the observation in SCC para 34 in Haradhan Saha case [(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] cannot be regarded as an unqualified statement that in every case where a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried, for a crime in a criminal court a detention order can also be passed under a preventive detention law.
35. It must be remembered that in cases of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often described as a "jurisdiction of suspicion" (vide State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande [(2008) 3 SCC 613 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 128] , SCC para 63). The detaining authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clauses (1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest.
To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power the law of preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the 9 LPA No. 243/2022 procedural safeguards, however technical, is, in our opinion, mandatory and vital. 36. It has been held that the history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. (See Kamlesh kumar Ishwardas Patel v.
Union of India [(1995) 4 SCC 51: 1995 SCC (Cri) 643] vide para 49.) These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu. As observed in Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 853] : (SCC p. 483, para 4) "4. ... May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers WP (Crl) No. 313/2022 12 increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus." xxx xxxxxx
39. Personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is the obligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugned detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by law. The stringency and concern of judicial vigilance that is needed was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Pelham Dale case [(1881) 6 QBD 376 (CA)+ :
(QBD p. 461) "Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. It is a general rule, which has always been acted upon by the courts of England, that if any person procures the imprisonment of another he must take care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and that if he fails to follow every step in the process with extreme regularity the court will not allow the imprisonment to continue."" [emphasis supplied]
22. In YummanOngbiLembiLeima Vs. State of Manipur (2012) 2 SCC 176, this Court specifically adverted to when a preventive detention order would be bad, as recourse to the ordinary law would be sufficient in the facts of a given case, with particular regard being had to bail having been granted. This Court held:
"23. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are inclined to hold that the (sic exercise of) extraordinary powers of detaining an individual in contravention of the provisions of Article 22(2) of the Constitution was not warranted in the instant case, where the grounds of detention do not disclose any material which was before the detaining authority, other than the fact that there was every likelihood of YummanSomendro being released on bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested, to support the order of detention.10 LPA No. 243/2022
24. Article 21 of the Constitution enjoins that: "21. Protection of life and personal liberty.--No person WP (Crl) No. 313/2022 13 shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." In the instant case, although the power is vested with the authorities concerned, unless the same are invoked and implemented in a justifiable manner, such action of the detaining authority cannot be sustained, inasmuch as, such a detention order is an exception to the provisions of Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution.
25. When the courts thought it fit to release the appellant's husband on bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested, the mere apprehension that he was likely to be released on bail as a ground of his detention, is not justified. xxx xxxxxx
27. As has been observed in various cases of similar nature by this Court, the personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the issuance of such an order. An individual incident of an offence under the Penal Code, however heinous, is insufficient to make out a case for issuance of an order of preventive detention." This judgment was followed in MungalaYadamma v. State of A.P. (2012) 2 SCC 386, as follows:
"7. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the State in view of the fact that the decision in Rekha case [(2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] , in our view, clearly covers the facts of this case as well. The offences complained of against the appellant are of a nature which can be dealt with under the ordinary law of the land. Taking recourse to the provisions of preventive detention is contrary to the constitutional guarantees enshrined in Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and sufficient grounds have to be made out by the detaining authorities to invoke such provisions.
8. In fact, recently, in Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur [(2012) 2 SCC 176] we had occasion to consider the same issue and the threeJudge Bench had held that the personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and 11 LPA No. 243/2022 prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws, as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the issuance of such an order.
9. No doubt, the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant are such as to attract punishment under the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, but that in our view has to be done under the said laws and taking recourse to preventive detention laws would not be warranted.
Preventive detention involves detaining of a person without trial in order to prevent him/her from committing certain types of offences. But such detention cannot be made a substitute for the ordinary law and absolve the investigating authorities of their normal functions of investigating crimes which the detenu may have committed. After all, preventive detention in most cases is for a year only and cannot be used as an instrument to keep a person in perpetual custody without trial. Accordingly, while following the three-Judge Bench decision in Rekha case [(2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated 20-7-2011 [ The High Court dismissed the same vide MunagalaYadamma v. State of A.P., WP (Cri) No. 13313 of 2011, order dated 20-7-2011 (AP)] and also quash the detention order dated 15-2-2011, issued by the Collector and District Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh."
Ratios of the judgments (supra) settles the legal controversy, that if the offences complained of against the detenue are of a nature which can be dealt with under the ordinary law of land, the detention cannot be made substitute for the ordinary law for absolving the investigating authorities of their normal functions of investigating crimes and bringing the detenue/offenders to book, after all, preventive detention in most cases is for a year or two only and cannot be used as an instrument to keep a person in perpetual custody without trial. Applying the ratios of the judgments (supra) to the facts of the case in hand, it is unambiguously reiterated here, that the offences complained of against the appellant/detenue are of a nature which can be dealt with under the ordinary criminal law of the land.
12 LPA No. 243/2022Therefore, taking recourse to the provisions of preventive detention under J&K Public Safety Act is contrary to the constitutional guarantees available to the appellant/detenue.
9. For what has been discussed above, we are of the firm opinion that instant LPA requires to be allowed, and the same is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 16.11.2022 rendered by Ld. Single Judge (writ court) is set aside/quashed, whereby, the detention order of appellant/detenue passed by respondent No.2 (District Magistrate Srinagar) bearing No. DMS/PSA/ 123/2021 dated 28.02.2022 also stands quashed. Appellant/detenue is directed to be released from the preventive custody forthwith if not required in any other case. LPA is disposed off alongwith connected CMPs if any. Detention record be handed over to the concerned authorities under proper receipt.
10. Disposed off accordingly.
(Mohan Lal) (Vinod Chatterji Koul)
Jammu Judge Judge
01.08.2023
Vijay
Whether the order is speaking? Yes
Whether the order is reportable? Yes