Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On : 08.08.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Others on 26 August, 2025
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
2025:HHC:28748 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No. : 572 of 2022 .
Reserved on : 08.08.2025
Decided on : 26.08.2025
Prem Raj ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Others ...Respondents
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the petitioner : Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. Tejasvi Sharma and Mr. Mohinder Zharaick, Additional Advocate General with Ms. Ranjna Patiala, Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 to 3.
None for respondent No.4.
Mr. Ranbir Singh, Advocate, for respondents No.5 to 7.
Virender Singh, Judge (oral).
Petitioner-Prem Raj has filed the present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.PC'), for quashing of FIR No.67/2021, dated 13.06.2021 (hereinafter referred ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 2 2025:HHC:28748 to as the FIR, in question), registered with Police Station, Chirgaon, District Shimla, H.P., under Sections 188, 269, .
270 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC'), as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, which are stated to be pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.II, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial Court'). r
2. According to the petitioner, he is elected member of the Gram Panchayat Ranol and the private respondents are having political animosity with him. Due to the said animosity, they had filed a frivolous complaint before respondent No.3, on the ground that the petitioner had been tested positive for Covid19, in the month of June, 2021, and as per the protocol, the petitioner was directed to remain under home isolation, from 06.06.2021 to 15.06.2021. They have alleged that despite being tested positive for Covid19, the petitioner was moving freely, at the Bus Stand, Ranol and when objected to by private respondents No.4 to 7, the petitioner allegedly starting hurling abuses and quarreling with them. It has also ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:28748 been mentioned in the complaint that they were beaten by the petitioner by a stick, hence, the complaint was made to the .
police against the petitioner, upon which, the FIR in question has been registered.
3. After completion of the investigation, chargesheet has been filed before the learned trial Court.
4. The relief of quashing of the FIR in question, as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, pending before the learned trial Court, has been sought on the ground that the petitioner has been named as accused, in the above noted case, as the private respondents were having the political animosity with him. In order to wreck vengeance, the FIR in question has been lodged against them.
5. The relief of quashing has also been sought on the ground that the petitioner was having two houses, one is situated in village Ranol and another at Bus Stand Ranol. The petitioner was tested positive for Covid19 on 5.6.2021 and he was directed to remain under home isolation from 06.06.2021 to 15.06.2021. According to the petitioner, before 06.06.2021, he was in Shimla and came to his native place thereafter.
During his home isolation period, he has started residing in his house, which was situated near Bus Stand, Ranol.
::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS4 2025:HHC:28748
6. According to the petitioner, on 13.06.2021, he was on routine walk on the terrace of his house and the .
private respondents, specifically respondent No.4, who belongs to the ruling party and his followers, respondents No.5 to 7, started hurling abuses from the Bus Stand to the petitioner, by stating that since he was tested positive for Covid19, why he was roaming around freely, in his house. The petitioner has apprised them that there was no bar for him to roam around, in his terrace, and he was not violating any norms.
7. Highlighting the fact that the petitioner was also hurt in the scuffle, but, he was not medicolegally examined, whereas, medicolegal examination of respondents No.5 and 6 was conducted and respondent No.5 was found to be under the influence of alcohol.
8. All these facts, have been pleaded to show that the commotion was started by the private respondents.
9. The relief of quashing of the FIR, in question, has also been sought, on the ground, that the present FIR, ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:28748 is nothing, but, abuse of process of law, as, the petitioner has not violated any order promulgated by public servant.
.
10. According to the petitioner, compliance of Section 195 Cr.PC, has not been done, as, cognizance of the offence, under Section 188 of the IPC, can only be taken, on the basis of a written complaint by the public servant concerned or the officer superior to him.
11. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the petition.
12. When put to notice, respondents No.1 to 3 filed status report, disclosing therein, that on 13.06.2021, Diwan Singh, respondent No.4, moved a complaint before the police, disclosing therein, that on 13.06.2021, in Gram Panchayat Ranol, Prem Raj (petitioner), was moving freely, whereas, the said person was tested positive for Covid19 for the last 9 days. He has further got recorded that when his activities had been objected to, then, he started quarreling with the villagers and beaten some of them. The persons, who had been beaten, their names had been mentioned as, Banka Ram son of Hukmi Chand, Rahi Ram son of Hukmi Chand, Durga Singh son of Hari Ram. The ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:28748 said incident is stated to have happened on 13.01.2021, at about 1.30 p.m., as such, a request had been made to take .
action against the petitioner.
13. Thereafter, the police has conducted the investigation. Both the injured were medicolegally examined and the injuries, on their persons, were declared as simple. The petitioner was arrested and released on bail. After obtaining the notification regarding Covid19 Curfew, issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Section 270 IPC was added, in this case.
14. Lastly, it has been submitted that the matter is pending adjudication before the learned trial Court.
15. Police has filed the charge sheet, under Sections 188, 269, 270 and 323 of the IPC. The provisions of Section 188, 269, 270 of the IPC are reproduced, as under:
188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.-- Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction,shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 7 2025:HHC:28748 obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two .
hundred rupees, or with both;and if such disobedience causes or trends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
Explanation.-- It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm.
Illustration An order is promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, directing that a religious procession shall not pass down a certain street. A knowingly disobeys the order, and thereby causes danger of riot. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
269. Negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life.-- Whoever unlawfully or negligently does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS8 2025:HHC:28748
270. Malignant act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life.-- Whoever malignantly does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, .
likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
16. The petitioner has sought the quashing of FIR on the ground of noncompliance of Section 195 Cr.PC.
The provisions of Section 195 Cr.PC, are reproduced as under:
195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.
(1) No Court shall take cognizance
(a)(i)of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or(ii)of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or(iii)of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate;
(b)(i)of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or
(ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476 of the said Code, when such offence ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:28748 is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or .
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in subclause (i) or subclause
(ii),[except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.] [Substituted by Act 2 of 2006, Section 3 for "except on the complaint in writing of that Court, of of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate" (w.e.f. 1642006).] (2)Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of subsection (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint :Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded.
(3)In clause (b) of subsection (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section.
(4)For the purposes of clause (b) of subsection (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinarily original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate :
::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS10 2025:HHC:28748 Provided that (a)where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate;
.
(b)where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.
[195A. Procedure for witnesses in case of threatening, etc. A witness or any other person may file complaint in relation to an offence under Section 195A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).] [Inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009), Section 17. ]
17. Bare reading of the above provisions, makes out a case, according to which, the compliance of Section 195 Cr.PC, has not been done regarding the offence punishable under Section 188 of the IPC. In this case, the police has also filed chargesheet under Sections 269, 270 and 323 of the IPC.
18. It has vehemently been argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that all the offences are interconnected and cannot be separated, as, they form part of the same transaction.
19. In order to buttress his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:28748 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. Muniappan & Others versus State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 Supreme Court .
Cases, 567, wherein it has been held that the provisions of Section 195 Cr.PC, cannot be evaded, by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other Section of the IPC. Relevant paragraph 29 of the judgment is reproduced as under:
21. The test of whether there is evasion or non compliance of Section 195 Cr.PC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In BasirulHaq & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293; and Durgacharan Naik & Ors v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775, this Court held that the provisions of this Section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 Cr.PC.
Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.
20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the decision of this Court, in Ram Lal Thakur versus the State of Himachal Pradesh & Others, 2023 (2) Him.L.R (HC) 771, wherein it has been held, as under: "19. In the present case, the offences which have been alleged to have been committed by the petitioner besides Section 188 of Cr.P.C.
::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS12 2025:HHC:28748 which is contained in Section 195 of Cr.P.C. are alleged to have committed in the same transaction and these offences form an integral part of the main transaction and even as per the .
prosecution, the offences committed were part of the same transaction that is the lodging of the FIR by the petitioner on the basis of a concocted and a created story.
20. That being the case, this Court is of the considered view that as the provision of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. was not followed while charging the petitioner for commission of offence punishable under Section 188 of IPC along with other offences, the proceedings so initiated against the petitioner are per se bad and liable to be quashed and set aside in terms of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court.
21. This petition, accordingly, succeeds and as prayed for by the petitioner, the prosecution of the petitioner as also the ensuing criminal proceedings, arising out of FIR No.239 of 2018, dated 26.10.2018, registered under Sections 143 and 188 of IPC, at Police Station Sadar, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P., are ordered to be quashed and set aside, as these proceedings were not initiated in terms of the provisions of Section 195 of Cr.P.C."
21. In a recent decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Criminal ) No.12373 of 2025, titled as Devendra Kumar versus The State (NCT of Delhi) & Another, 2025 INSC 1009, has elaborately discussed the provisions of Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.PC and held that where an accused commits some offences ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 13 2025:HHC:28748 which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences .
mentioned therein, unless such offences form an integral part, so as to, amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in such case, the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Code.
Relevant paragraph 43 to 59 of the judgment, are reproduced as under:
"43. Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. bars the court from taking cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 186 I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by the public servant for voluntarily obstructing him from discharge of his public functions. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of voluntarily obstructing a public servant from discharging his public functions. The court lacks competence to automatically take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, illwill or frivolity of disposition and also to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 Cr.P.C. that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in the Cr.P.C. like sections 196 and 198 respectively do not lay ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS
14 2025:HHC:28748 down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described in those .
Sections. [See: Govind Mehta v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1708; Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 SC 1935; Surjit Singh & Ors v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533; State of Punjab v. Raj Singh & Anr., (1998) 2 SCC 391; K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 352; Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 2119] r to
44. The test of whether there is evasion or non compliance of Section 195 Cr.P.C. or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In BasirulHaq & Ors.(supra) and Durgacharan Naik & Ors. (supra), this Court cautioned that the provisions of this Section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of I.P.C., though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 Cr.P.C.
Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.
45. In M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana & Anr. reported in AIR 2000 SC 168, this Court considered the matter at length and held as under: "[...] Provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. are mandatory and no court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing as required under that section."
(Emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:28748
46. In Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (1998) 2 SCC 493, this .
Court while dealing with this issue observed as under: "7. Section 190 of the Code empowers "any magistrate of the first class" to take cognizance of "any offence" upon receiving a complaint, or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of the magistrate, and the general right of a person to move the court with a complaint to that extent curtailed. It is a well recognised canon of interpretation that provision curbing the general jurisdiction rof the court must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or the context requires otherwise."
(Emphasis supplied)
47. In Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1962 SC 1206, this Court considered the nature of the provisions of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. In the said case, cognizance had been taken on the police report by the Magistrate and the appellant therein had been tried and convicted, though the concerned public servant i.e., the Tahsildar, had not filed any complaint. This Court held as follows: "The cognizance of the case was therefore wrongly assumed by the court without the complaint in writing of the public servant, namely, the Tahsildar in this case. The trial was thus without jurisdiction ab initio and the conviction cannot be maintained. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the conviction of the appellant and the sentence passed on him are set aside."
(Emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:28748
48. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarized to the effect that there must be a .
complaint by the public servant who was voluntarily obstructed in the discharge of his public functions. The complaint must be in writing. The provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. are mandatory. Noncompliance of it would vitiate the prosecution and all other consequential orders. The Court cannot assume the cognizance of the case without such complaint. In the absence of such a complaint, the trial and conviction will be void ab initio being without jurisdiction.
49. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would submit that the bar of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., so far as the offence punishable under Section 186 of the I.P.C. is concerned, is absolutely unlike Section 195 (1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. In other words, Section 195(1)(b) would apply provided certain conditions are fulfilled, and if those conditions are not applicable, then it is open for the police to carry out the investigation after registering an F.I.R.
50. The heading of Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure is "Conditions Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings". The first provision in this Chapter is Section 190 and it deals with the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences. There are some other provisions in this Chapter which create an embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance of offences committed by persons enumerated therein except on the complaint in writing of certain specified persons or with the previous sanction of certain specified authorities.
51. A plain reading of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. would indicate that no Court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 186 of the I.P.C., except upon a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 17 2025:HHC:28748 whom he is administratively subordinate. The opening words of the Section are "No Court shall take cognizance", and consequently, the bar created by the provisions is against taking of .
cognizance by the Court. There is no bar against the registration of a criminal case or investigation by the police agency or submission of a report by the police on completion of the investigation, as contemplated by Section 173 of the Cr.P.C.
52. This Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah reported in AIR 2005 SC 2119, while interpreting Section 195 Cr.P.C. has held as follows: "9. [...] This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195, viz., rthat the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a Court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the Court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in Court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 Cr.P.C. This indicates that clause (b)
(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any Court."
(Emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:28748
53. This Court, referred to its earlier decision in Sachida Nand Singh (supra), wherein it had been held that Section 195 Cr.P.C. is invoked .
where the offences affected the administration of justice. It is for that reason, that only the concerned Court can take cognizance, and the procedure under Section 340 Cr.P.C. also empowers the same Court before whom the offence is committed in respect of documents produced or given in evidence before that Court. The reason why the jurisdiction to take cognizance of such an offence is restricted to the concerned Court is also noted by this Court and the same is culled out from the previous decision in Patel Lalji Bhai Samabhai (supra). The purpose underlying Section 195(1)(b) seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous, vexations or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process or the administration of public justice which is the direct and immediate object or the victim of these offences. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party who might ultimately suffer can persuade the Civil Court to file the complaint.
54. In Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), this Court took note of the legal position that in view of the language used in Section 340 of the Cr.P.C., the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by the words "court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice". The concerned Court would file a complaint only if the interest of justice so requires and not in ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 19 2025:HHC:28748 every case. Even before making the complaint, the Court would hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interest of justice that enquiry should be .
made into any of the offences referred to Section 195(1)(b). This expediency would be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged documents, but having regard to the effect or impact that such commission of offence as upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged documents or forgery may cause very serious or substantial injury to a person, inasmuch as, it may deprive him of very valuable property or status or the like. If it is held that in a case it would be the concerned Court alone, which would be entitled to lodge the complaint, it would render the victim of such forgery or forged documents remediless. This Court held that any interpretation which leads to such a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless has to be discarded. This Court also took a note of the fact that the holding of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. by the concerned Court would normally get unduly delayed. This important aspect also dissuaded this Court from accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed on Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. to the effect that Section 195 is a bar to private prosecution. This Court held that an enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery, the document is subsequently produced in Court, is capable of great misuse. After preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get the proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue Court either by himself or someone set up by him, or simply file the document in the said proceeding. If the broad interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is accepted, he would be protected from prosecution either at the instance of a private ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:28748 party or the police, until the concerned Court, where the document is filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society .
at large. This Court also took notice of the fact that the Courts are generally reluctant in directing filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. The Court held that it would not be fair and appropriate to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in Clause (b)(ii) is not placed for trial on account of nonfiling of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Such a broad interpretation would also lead to impracticable results, which should be avoided.
55. In State of Punjab v. Raj Singh reported in AIR 1998 SC 768, this Court further stated that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be seen as prohibiting the entertainment of, and investigation into the offence(s) by the police.
The bar comes into operation only when the Court intends to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 Cr.P.C. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Cr.P.C. is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 Cr.P.C. The legal position was elaborated in the following words: "2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the F.I.R.
Lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 I.P.C. by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C.
prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 Cr.P.C. it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the Court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) Cr. P.C.; and it has ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:28748 nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an F.I.R. which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code .
even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in Court. In other words, the statutory power of the Police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 Cr.P.C. It is of course true that upon the chargesheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the Court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) Cr. P.C., but nothing therein deters the Court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the F.I.R. (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in section 340 Cr.P.C. [...]"
(Emphasis supplied)
56. A more elaborate discussion is found in M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 2004 SC 555, wherein this Court has held as follows: "8. [...] The question whether Sections 195 and 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code affect the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence has already been considered by this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Raj Singh reported in 1998(2) SCC 391 [...] Not only are we bound by this judgment but we are also in complete agreement with the same. Sections 195 and 340 do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate, under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 22 2025:HHC:28748 into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the .
material collected during investigation provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code is followed. Thus no right of the Respondents, much less the right to file an appeal under Section 341, is affected.
xxx xxx xxx
10. The law on the point is clear. At the stage of investigation Section 195 has no application. We are therefore not concerned with the question whether Section 195 applies to documents forged/fabricated prior to their being produced in Court. That question only arises after the Court takes cognizance. At this stage the only question is whether the investigation should be permitted to proceed or not. As stated above there is no ground or reason on which the complaint/FIR can be quashed."
(Emphasis supplied)
57. We may note that the decision of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) does not in any way express its disagreement with the view in Raj Singh (supra) and M. Narayandas (supra). On the contrary, a perusal of Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) shows that the Court has leaned in favour of giving an interpretation, which limits the scope of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. There is no contradiction in invocation of Section 156(3) by the learned Magistrate, the registration of the F.I.R. and the conduct of the investigation by the police, with Section 195 read with Section 340 Cr.P.C. As noticed in M. Narayandas (supra) once the investigation is completed, then the embargo under Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However, the concerned Court could ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 23 2025:HHC:28748 then file the complaint for the offence mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) on the basis of the F.I.R. and the material collected during investigation and by following the procedure laid down in .
Section 340 Cr.P.C.
58. The procedure contemplated under sub section (1) of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is limited to such cases, as are provided in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. only. Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. does not envisage a procedure with reference to an offence described in Section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. However, the observations made in Raj Singh (supra) and M. Narayandas (supra), more specifically that Section 195 Cr.P.C does not have any application at the stage of investigation holds good as regards both Section 195(1)(a) and 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. respectively. The overall bar contemplated under Section 195 could be said to kick in only at the stage of cognizance. E. CONCLUSION
59. We may summarize out final conclusion as under:
(i) Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 respectively of the I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned or his administrative superior, for voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharge of his public functions.
Without a complaint from the said persons, the court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein.
(ii) If in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of Section 195(1)(a)
(i), it is not open to the court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 24 2025:HHC:28748 disclosed in the same set of facts. However, it also cannot be laid down as a straitjacket formula that the Court, under all circumstances, cannot .
undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would depend upon the facts of each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on record.
(iii) Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C., which requires a complaint by a public servant for certain offences against public justice. This means that if the core of the offence falls under the purview of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it cannot be prosecuted by simply filing a general complaint for a different, but related, offence. The focus should be on whether the facts, in substance, constitute an offence requiring a public servant's complaint.
(iv) In the aforesaid context, the courts must apply twin tests. First, the courts must ascertain having regard to the nature of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR and other materials on record whether the other distinct offences not covered by Section 195(1)(a)
(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade the mandatory bar of Section 195 of the I.P.C. and secondly, whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court or a public servant is required.
(v) Where an accused is alleged to have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 25 2025:HHC:28748 mentioned therein. However, the courts should ascertain whether such offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected so as to amount .
to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.
This would all depend on the facts of each case.
(vi) Sections 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and 340 of the Cr.P.C. respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate, under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However, that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation, provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is followed."
(self emphasis supplied)
22. Now, this Court would proceed further to ascertain the fact as to whether the offences committed by the accused, in this case, form part of the same transaction, for which, the prohibition, as contained under Section 195 Cr.PC, is applicable.
23. Admittedly, in this case, complaint has not been filed by a public servant, the same has been initiated at the instance of respondent No.4, Diwan Singh.
::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS26 2025:HHC:28748 Considering the allegations levelled by respondent No.4, according to which, on 13.06.2025, petitioner Prem Raj .
was roaming freely, despite the fact that he had been tested positive for Covid19 and when, the villagers opposed, he had allegedly given beatings to them, the main offence is under Section 188 of IPC, as per the charge sheet, petitioner was ordered to quarantine himself from 6.6.2021 to 15.06.2021, as per the order passed by the Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Sandasu. In such situation, the remaining offences form integral part of the offence, punishable under Section 188 of the IPC and the same cannot be separated. All the offences had allegedly taken place in the same transaction.
24. When the offences punishable under Sections 269, 270 and 323 of the IPC, cannot be separated from Section 188 of the IPC, for which, the legislature, in its wisdom, has created a specific bar of taking cognizance, unless or until, complaint is made by public servant, cognizance of other offences cannot be taken by the Court.
25. In view of the above, due to the noncompliance of Section 195(1) Cr.PC., the FIR, in question, as well as, ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS 27 2025:HHC:28748 the proceedings, resultant thereto, are required to be quashed. Ordered accordingly.
.
26. The present petition is allowed in aforesaid terms, so also the pending application(s), if any.
( Virender Singh ) Judge August 26, 2025(ps) ::: Downloaded on - 26/08/2025 21:28:26 :::CIS