Delhi District Court
The State Govt Of Nct Of Delhi vs Dinesh Alias Chandru on 9 September, 2025
DLND010068442025 Page 1 of 20
Cr Rev / 472/2025
THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI
Vs.
DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU
FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-05
NEW DELHI DISTRICT : PATIALA HOUSE COURTS : NEW DELHI
Criminal Revision No.472/25
In the matter of :-
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
.....Revisionist
(represented by Sh. Mukul Kumar, Ld. Addl. PP for the State)
Versus
Dinesh @ Chandru
S/o. Sh. K. Kalyan Sundram
R/o. E-5/3, Servant Quarter,
Vasant Kunj, New Delhi ....Respondent
CRIMINAL REVISION UNDER SECTION 438 BNSS 2023
Date of institution : 29.08.2025
Date when judgment reserved : 09.09.2025
Date of Judgment : 09.09.2025
JUDGMENT:-
Introduction
1. This criminal revision petition has been instituted under Sections 397/399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), read with Sections 438/440 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), by the petitioner, State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), challenging the legality, correctness, and propriety of the impugned order dated 23.09.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC)-07, Patiala House Court, New Delhi, in FIR No. 325/2020 registered at PS Vasant Vihar under DLND010068442025 Page 2 of 20 Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC Sections 380/454/511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The impugned order, passed during the stage of arguments on charge, declared a CD containing purported CCTV video footage of the alleged incident as not relevant to the case.
2. Aggrieved by this exclusion of what the State deems crucial evidence, the instant revision petition was filed on 03.08.2025, accompanied by an appli- cation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of a 235 days delay. The petitioner/State contends that the impugned order is vitiated by serious errors of law and fact, including a misappreciation of the evidence on record, an improper interpretation of the date reflected in the footage, and an overemphasis on the non-visibility of the accused's face, which allegedly amounts to conducting a mini-trial at the pre-charge stage. It is asserted that these infirmities have resulted in a miscarriage of justice, warranting revisional intervention by this Court to correct the course of pro- ceedings and ensure a fair trial.
3. This Court has heard the detailed arguments advanced by the learned Addi- tional Public Prosecutor for the petitioner/State. The trial court record has been called for and perused in its entirety, including the complaint, FIR, charge-sheet, seizure memos, and the impugned order. Relevant statutory provisions, including Sections 227/228 CrPC (corresponding to Sections 250/251 BNSS), Section 397 CrPC (Section 438 BNSS), and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, have been examined. This Court now proceeds to adjudicate the matter in a systematic manner, addressing the preliminary is- sues of maintainability and limitation before delving into the merits, if nec-
DLND010068442025 Page 3 of 20Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC essary.
Brief Facts
4. The factual matrix of the case originates from a complaint dated 02.06.2020 lodged by one Sameer Bali, a resident of First Floor, F-3/8, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. In his complaint, Mr. Bali stated that upon accessing his terrace that afternoon, he discovered the lock of his gate and room broken, as well as the lock of the neighboring servant quarter belonging to Br. G. Sangha on the ground floor. Alarmed by the apparent break-in, he immediately con- tacted PS Vasant Vihar, requesting an inquiry. A police constable visited the site, inspected the premises, and recorded the complainant's statement. Based on this, FIR No. 325/2020 was registered under Sections 380 (theft in dwelling house), 454 (lurking house-trespass or house-breaking in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment), and 511 (attempt to commit offences) of the IPC.
5. The investigation commenced forthwith. The Investigating Officer (IO), ASI Ram Ratan, visited the scene and examined the CCTV camera installed at F-3/8, Vasant Vihar. Upon reviewing the footage, the IO noted that at ap- proximately 08:27 AM on 02.06.2020, a person was seen entering the premises with apparent intent to commit theft. Relying on physical appear- ances such as build, gait, and clothing, the IO identified the individual as the respondent, Dinesh @ Chandru, son of Sh. K. Kalyan Sundram, a resi- dent of E-5/3, Servant Quarter, Vasant Vihar, who was reportedly a known bad character (B.C.) of PS Vasant Vihar. The CD containing the CCTV footage was seized vide seizure memo dated 03.06.2020 in the presence of DLND010068442025 Page 4 of 20 Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC witnesses, and it was duly incorporated into the file.
6. Further inquiries revealed no eyewitnesses to the incident, and no stolen property was recovered. The respondent was arrested based on the IO's identification from the footage. After completing the investigation, a charge-sheet under Section 173 CrPC was filed on 14.07.2020 before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, naming the respondent as the sole accused and relying primarily on the CCTV footage, the complainant's statement, and the IO's observations to establish a prima facie case.
7. The proceedings advanced to the stage of arguments on charge under Sec- tions 227/228 CrPC. On 23.09.2024, during the hearing, the IO produced a system in court to play the CD for judicial scrutiny. After viewing the footage, the learned JMFC passed the impugned order, declaring it irrele- vant due to discrepancies in the displayed date (06.02.2020 instead of 02.06.2020) and the muffled face of the person depicted, rendering identifi- cation unreliable. The matter was thereafter listed for further arguments on charge on 21.10.2024. Charges were finally framed by Ld. Trial Court on 24.02.2025.
8. Aggrieved by this exclusion of what the State deems crucial evidence, the instant revision petition was filed on 03.08.2025, accompanied by an appli- cation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of a 235 days delay. The petitioner attributes the delay to bureaucratic pro- cesses involving file movements through the Directorate of Prosecution and the Home Department for obtaining necessary approvals. The revision prays DLND010068442025 Page 5 of 20 Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC for setting aside the impugned order and directing the trial court to recon- sider the CD as relevant evidence at the charge stage.
Impugned Order
9. The impugned order dated 23.09.2024, reflects the learned JMFC's exami- nation of the evidence in open court. It reads as under:
"Present: Sh. Praveen, Ld. APP for the State. Accused produced from JC (admitted bonds not furnished). Ms. Niharika Yadav, Ld. LAC for accused. IO / ASI Ram Ratan in person.
IO has brought a system to play the CD of the alleged incident, which has been filed on record. The said footage reflects date of 06.02.2020 and timing of 08:25 AM. In the said video, a person in a muffled face could be seen breaking open a latch/lock.
It is pertinent to note that the face of the accused is not visible at any point in the said video. Also, perusal of record reveals the date of alleged incident as 02.06.2020 while the date being reflected in the aforesaid video is 06.02.2020.
Accordingly, in view of the above observation, the aforementioned video is not relevant to the alleged incident.
Put up for consideration on charge on 21.10.2024"
(emphasis supplied)
10. Though the order does not explicitly invoke a specific provision, it is evi- dently passed in exercise of the court's powers under Section 165 of the In- dian Evidence Act, 1872, read with Sections 227/228 CrPC (or Sections 250/251 BNSS), which mandate a prima facie evaluation of the material on record, to determine if sufficient grounds exist for proceeding against the accused and for framing of charges.
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11. The State assails the impugned order on several grounds, as detailed in the petition and supplemented during arguments:
1. The learned JMFC failed to appreciate that the IO had positively identi-
fied the respondent in the CCTV footage based on physical appearances, as explicitly recorded in the charge-sheet, stating that the person entering at 08:27 AM was the respondent.
2. Undue emphasis was placed on the non-visibility of the face, disregard- ing the settled principle that identity can be established through other features like build, gait, and clothing, without necessitating facial recog- nition.
3. The court misinterpreted the date format reflected in the footage as 06.02.2020 (February 6, 2020), whereas it should be read as June 2, 2020, in the MM/DD/YYYY format, matching the incident date of 02.06.2020 (DD/MM/YYYY). This ground, though not raised before the trial court, is urged as a patent error.
4. By delving into the minutiae of the footage's reliability, the learned JMFC conducted an impermissible mini-trial at the charge stage, con- trary to the mandate under Sections 227/228 CrPC, which requires only a prima facie assessment without weighing evidence as in a trial.
5. The exclusion of the CD undermines the prosecution's case, leading to potential acquittal and miscarriage of justice, necessitating revisional correction.
Scope of Revision under section 438 BNSS (397 Cr.P.C 1973)
12. Prior to adjudicating the case on its merits, it is essential to delineate the DLND010068442025 Page 7 of 20 Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC scope and extent of these proceedings as well as the authority vested in this court under section 438 BNSS.
13. Section 438 BNSS read as under:
"438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.
(1)The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sen-
tence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any pro- ceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be infe- rior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of sec- tion 439.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exer- cised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person ei- ther to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."
14. The wording of the section is verbatim the same as of section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
15. A plain reading of Section 438 of the BNSS clearly indicates that Section 438(1) allows aggrieved parties to challenge the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order issued by the trial court. Such challenges can be brought before a revisional court, namely the High Court or the Sessions Judge, as Section 438 confers concurrent jurisdiction upon both judicial authorities.
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16. Section 438 (2) BNSS prohibits the revision powers under Section 438(1) BNSS from being used on interlocutory orders in appeals, enquiries, trials, or other proceedings. This creates an explicit legislative bar against revising such orders.
17. It is well settled law that scope of revisional jurisdiction is limited to the ex-
tent of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order passed by the Trial Court and jurisdiction under section 438 BNSS to be exercised for setting right a patent defect or an er- ror of jurisdiction or law cannot be equated with the power of Appellate Court.
18. As regards the scope of section 397 Cr.P.C (analogous to section 438 BNSS) in judgment titled as 'Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander', (2012) 9 SCC 460, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under:-
"8. ....Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an er- ror of jurisdiction or law . There has to be a well- founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in ac- cordance with law......."
19.The Hon'ble Apex Court in 'New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Ku- mar Pandey', Crl. Appeal No.1852 of 2019 decided on 06.12.2019, made the following observations :
"8. The scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court (or Sessions Court) under Section 397 Cr.P.C, is limited to the extent of satisfying it-
self as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or DLND010068442025 Page 9 of 20 Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC order passed by an inferior Court. The revisional Court is entitled to look into the regularity of any proceeding before an inferior Court. As reiter- ated by this Court in a number of cases, the purpose of this revisionsal power is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law."
20.Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Sanjaysinh Ramarao Chavan Vs. Datta- tray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 held:
"14. .........Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-considera- tion of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely be- cause another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an ap- peal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be re- vised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discre- tion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction".
(emphasis supplied).
21.Scope of revision has been explained in para 9 of judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Taron Mohan Vs. State & Anr. 2021 SCC OnLine 312 which reads as under:
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Ses- sions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the le- gality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evi-DLND010068442025 Page 10 of 20
Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC dence. "
22.The precise purpose of Revision is to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the order in question and to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. Needless to say, that the power of revision needs to be exercised fairly, rationally and judiciously in order to put right any manifest error of law or jurisdiction.
Maintainability of Revision
23. The threshold inquiry pertains to maintainability under Section 438(2) BNSS/Section 397(2) CrPC, which prohibits revision against interlocutory orders. An order is interlocutory if it does not finally resolve the case or de- termine substantive rights, merely facilitating procedural progression.
24. The main question which arises for consideration is: whether the impugned order passed Ld. Trial Court is an interlocutory order or not?
25. In this regard catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the legal principle while holding that the meaning of the two words "final" and "interlocutory" has to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, generally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final and simultaneously, an interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, if the decision on an issue puts an end to the proceedings, the order is undoubtedly a final one, but if the proceeding is still left alive and has yet to be tried in the ordi-
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26. The term "interlocutory order" as mentioned in Section 438(2) BNSS [Sec- tion 397(2) Cr.P.C.] denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the par- ties. An order which is pure and simple interlocutory order, which do not decide anything finally is to be considered as interlocutory order and no re- vision against that interlocutory order is maintainable under Section 438(1) BNSS [Section 397(1) Cr.P.C.] in view of the express bar imposed under Section 438(2) BNSS [Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.].
27. There are three categories of orders that a Court can pass-final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a Court can exercise its revision jurisdiction- that is in respect of a final order of ac- quittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an inter- locutory order, the Court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the Court can exercise its revision juris- diction since it is not an interlocutory order. An intermediate order is one which is interlocutory order in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order.
28. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Amar Nath & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr.", {(1977) 4 SCC 137} that:-
"The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub- section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-DLND010068442025 Page 12 of 20
Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory or- ders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revi- sion to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular pro- vision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders sum- moning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a par- ticular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court".
29. It was also held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I.", (AIR 1980 SC 962] that:-
"(1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order; (2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained, in con-
tradistinction to a final order.
In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocu- tory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue; because, in our opinion, the term 'interlocutory order' in the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi final orders;
DLND010068442025 Page 13 of 20Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC (4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby termi- nates the entire proceedings before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused."
30. It was also held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Poonam Chand Jain and Anr. Vs. Fazru", (2004) 13 SCC 269 that:-
"Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edn. p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus:
'An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.' Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory or- der, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an inter- locutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocu- tory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular is- sue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all."
The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Li- maye Vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the prin- ciple that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immedi- ately come to mind - an order taking cognizance of an offence and sum- moning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her DLND010068442025 Page 14 of 20 Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC favour.
Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of dis- charging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a cer- tain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceeding would continue.
The view expressed in Amar Nath (supra) and Madhu Limaye (supra), was followed in K.K. Patel V. State of Gujarat (2000) (6) SCC 195 wherein a revision petition was filed challenging the taking of cognizance and issuance of a process. It was said:
"11. ..... It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order chal- lenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397 (2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharastra, V.C. Shukla v. State and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution pro- ceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable."
31. It was held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as "Neelam Maha- jan and Anr. Vs. The State & Ors.", (2016) 229 DLT (CN) 29 that:-
"........ In this regard catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court of In- dia has settled the legal principle while holding that the meaning of the two words "final" and "interlocutory" has to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, gen- erally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the principal mat- ter in question is termed final and simultaneously, an interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. Therefore, in the considered opin- ion of this Court, if the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the or- der is undoubtedly a final one but if the suit is still left alive and has yet to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could be attached to the order."DLND010068442025 Page 15 of 20
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32. On perusal of impugned order, in light of the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that same is neither final, nor intermediate but the same is purely an inter- locutory order. The impugned order cannot said to be a final or intermediate order in any manner. If the impugned order is set aside, then there would be no culmination of the proceedings. This interpretation is fortified by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam (2009) 5 SCC 153, where even an order under section 91 or Section 311 CrPC was deemed interlocutory, barring revision.
33. In Sethuraman (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held as under:-
"Secondly, what was not realised was that the orders passed by the trial court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC, were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) CrPC. The trial court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent-accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appel- lant complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The trial court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders i.e. one on the application under Section 91 CrPC for production of docu- ments and other on the application under Section 311 CrPC for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such cir- cumstances, the learned judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are al- lowed."
34. This ratio was reiterated in Situ Ramanath Shastri v. IFCI Factors Ltd. (CR- L.M.C. 586/2021, Delhi High Court, 30.08.2022), emphasizing non-inter- ference in evidential management absent finality.
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35. It is trite law that an order which does not decide an issue finally is purely an interlocutory order and a Criminal Revision against an interlocutory or- der is clearly barred under Section 438(2) BNSS [397(2) CrPC]. Therefore, the present revision petition filed against order dated 23.09.2024 passed by the Ld. Magistrate merely making an observation after seeing the CCTV footage in court, is thus, not maintainable.
36. In the instant case, the impugned order was passed during arguments on charge, a pre-trial stage under Sections 227/228 CrPC, where the court con- ducts a limited inquiry to ascertain if a prima facie case exists. The declara- tion of the CD as irrelevant does not terminate the trial; it merely excludes one piece of evidence from consideration at this juncture. The prosecution remains at liberty to argue on other materials, and if charges are framed, the CD could potentially be re-evaluated during trial or through appropriate ap- plications under Section 311 CrPC. This aligns with the ratio in V.C. Shukla v. State (1980) 2 SCC 665, where orders rejecting evidence at pre- liminary stages were held interlocutory. It may be noted that Ld. Trial Court framed charges against the accused on 24.02.2025 and as such, the trial is going on.
37. The petitioner's contention that the order is final qua the CD's admissibility is untenable, as it overlooks the iterative nature of evidentiary assessments in criminal trials. As reiterated in Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI (2017) 14 SCC 809, the bar under Section 397(2) CrPC (now 438(2) BNSS) is abso- lute for interlocutory orders to ensure speedy justice. Applying these princi- ples, the impugned order is patently interlocutory, and thus, the revision pe-
DLND010068442025 Page 17 of 20Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC tition is not maintainable on this ground alone.
Issue of Limitation and Condonation of Delay
38. Even if the revision were maintainable, it is beset by a significant proce- dural hurdle: limitation. Article 131 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes a 90-day period for filing revisions against orders of subor- dinate courts, commencing from the date of the order sought to be revised. Here, the impugned order was passed on 23.09.2024, making the limitation expire on 22.12.2024. The petition was instituted on 03.08.2025, entailing a delay of 235 days.
39. To surmount this bar, the petitioner has filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation on the ground of "administrative formalities/processes for seeking permission for filing revision," with the file purportedly passing through various channels in the Directorate of Pros- ecution and the Home Department. However, this explanation is perfunc- tory and bereft of particulars. No supporting affidavit from the concerned officials, chronological details of file movements, or documentary evidence such as dak receipts, notings, or correspondence has been furnished to sub- stantiate the claim of diligence.
40. The law on condonation under Section 5 is well-settled: it requires demon- stration of "sufficient cause" that prevented timely filing, interpreted liber- ally but not leniently for government entities without specific justification. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while bureaucratic delays may be condoned, they DLND010068442025 Page 18 of 20 Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC must be explained and generic assertions do not suffice. Similarly, in State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO (2005) 3 SCC 752, it was emphasized that the ex- pression "sufficient cause" implies bona fide efforts and absence of negli- gence, with the court balancing the right to speedy trial under Article 21 against the need for substantial justice.
41. In the present context, the State's vague averments fall short of this stan- dard. No timeline is provided for when the impugned order came to the no- tice of the authorities, when permissions were sought, or why the process took an inordinate 235+90 days. Such omissions smack of lethargy, prejudi- cial to the respondent's rights, as prolonged uncertainty in criminal proceed- ings violates fundamental fairness. Reference may also be made to Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563, where Hon'ble Apex Court refused condonation for similar unex- plained governmental delays.
42. Consequently, the application for condonation is dismissed, and the revision is barred by limitation.
Final Order
43. In summation, the revision petition fails on multiple fronts. It is not main- tainable, as it assails an interlocutory order barred under Section 438(2) BNSS. Independently, it is time-barred, with the 235 days delay uncon- doned due to insufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
44. Even on merits, no case for interference is made out. The observations ar-
DLND010068442025 Page 19 of 20Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC ticulated in the impugned order dated 23.09.2024, wherein the learned Judi- cial Magistrate First Class declared the CD containing the video recording of the occurrence as not relevant to the alleged incident, must be recognized as prima-facie assessments made solely at the stage of consideration on charge under Sections 228/240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Given that charges have subsequently been framed by the trial court on 24.02.2025, the prosecution shall be afforded a full opportunity during the evidentiary phase to substantiate the authenticity and pertinence of the CCTV footage, including demonstrating that the displayed date format ad- heres to the MM.DD.YYYY convention (thereby aligning 06.02.2020 with the incident date of June 2, 2020, rather than interpreting it as DD.M- M.YYYY), and to establish through the testimony of relevant witnesses-- such as the investigating officer and any experts--that the individual de- picted in the footage is indeed the accused and no other person. Concur- rently, the accused shall have the corresponding right to cross-examine these witnesses, thereby testing the veracity and reliability of such evi- dence. At the final stage of adjudication, following the completion of prose- cution evidence and defense submissions, the trial court shall independently evaluate whether the CCTV footage has been duly proved in accordance with legal standards, whether it pertains to the precise date of the incident, and whether the identity of the person captured therein can be conclusively attributed to the accused based on the depositions and surrounding circum- stances. Importantly, the preliminary observations in the impugned order, rendered at the charge-framing juncture, shall not constrain or bind the trial court from undertaking a comprehensive appreciation of the CCTV footage and associated evidence during the ultimate disposal of the case, ensuring DLND010068442025 Page 20 of 20 Cr Rev / 472/2025 THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI Vs. DINESH ALIAS CHANDRU FIR No.325/2020, PS Vasant Kunj, U/s.380/454/511 IPC that justice is administered on the merits after a thorough trial.
45. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay stands rejected and the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
46. Trial Court Records shall be remitted forthwith along with copy of this judgment.
47. File be consigned to the record room.
Digitally signed by SAURABH SAURABH PARTAP
PARTAP SINGH LALER
Pronounced in open court on this SINGH LALER Date: 2025.09.09
17:12:28 +0530
09th day of September, 2025 (Saurabh Partap Singh Laler)
ASJ-05 New Delhi
Patiala House Courts
Delhi/09.09.2025