Madras High Court
Srinivasan And Six Others vs Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami, ... on 30 April, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(1)CTC630, (1998)IIMLJ722
Author: V. Kanagaraj
Bench: V. Kanagaraj
ORDER Judgement pronounced by D. Raju, J.
1. The above second appeals were placed before us under the orders of the Honourable the Chief Justice pursuant to the order of reference dated 25.4.1989 made by K. Venkataswami, J.,(as the learned Judge then was), in view of an apparent conflict said to have been noticed by the learned Judge on account of diametrically opposite views found to have been taken in two decisions reported in Kannammal v. G. Panchakshara chetty, 1988 (2) L.W. 11 rendered by E.J.Bellie, J. and in Ramanujam Kavirayar v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannathi Avargal, 1988 (2) L.W. 513 rendered by M. Srinivasan, J., (as the learned Judge then was). The relevant portion of the order of reference, which explained the need and justification for making the reference reads as follows:-
"Justice Srinivasan has taken the view that the Notification under Section 3 will not have the effect of extinguishing the right in the land, but it recognises the pre- existing right. This is what the learned Judge has Said, on this aspects:-
''...On the other hand, a reading of the provisions of the Act makes it clear that there is a recognition of the pre- existing rights. The proviso to S.3 (d) of the Minor Inams Act protects the possession of any person who is considered prima facie to be entitled to a ryotwari patta under the Act pending the decision of the appropriate authority. If the Act is to be construed as one wiping out all the pre-existing rights and starting with a clean slate, there would have been no necessity for the inclusion of the aforesaid proviso. Again, S.8(l) of the Minor Inams Act declares that every person who will be lawfully entitled to the kudivaram in an inam land immediately before the appointed day, shall be "entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of the land. The exception thereto is provided in S.8(2). The provisions of S.11 of the Abolition Act. (sic.) In all cases which are not covered by S.8(2) of the Minor Inams Act, the Settlement officer will have to decide the question as to who is lawfully entitled to the kudivaram immediately before the appointed day. This necessarily involves a recognition of a pre- existing right".
7. Likewise, Justice Bellie has taken the view on the question of civil court's jurisdiction as follows:-
"...As stated above, under the provisions of the Act on and from the date of notification the title of the land stands transferred to and vested in the Government. Therefore, without any fresh conferment of title by the Government, no title subsists in the landholder. Hence no question of declaration of title arise. But if he is the person lawfully entitled to patta for declaration of that entitlement he may file a suit. This is because there is no clear provision in the Act to decide a question who is entitled to patta as between rival contenders and therefore the Civil Court's jurisdiction to decide such an issue is not ousted."
"According to Bellie, J., no suit for title can be maintained in civil court in matters arising out of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963. On the other hand, Srinivasan, J. has taken a view to the following effect:-
"...It has to be held that the finality conferred by S.46 of the Minor Inams Act on the orders passed by the authorities constituted under the Act will not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide questions of title. S.46 of the Minor Inams Act which deals with res judicata correspondents to S.64-A of the Abolition Act. S.3(d) of the Minor Inams Act contains the same language as S.3(d) of the Abolition Act. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, will apply to cases arising under Minor Inams Act."
From the above, it is clear that there is a clear conflict between the two decisions. Therefore, in the interest of all concerned, particularly the Subordinate Judiciary, the issue must be authoritatively decided by the larger Bench, preferably by a Full Bench in view of conflicting views on this issue by Division Benches.
8. I am not able to agree with Mr. Sundaravaradan that Second Appeal No.1088 of 1980 can be decided on merits without going into the question regarding the jurisdiction of Civil Court as that question has to be decided in as much as the lower appellate court has decided the case against the appellate on that issue alone.
9. In the result, I direct the Office to place the papers connected with these two second appeals before My Lord the honourable the Officiating Chief Justice for consideration to post the cases before a larger Bench or a Full Bench to decide the issue whether the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit for declaration of title and injunction is barred by reason of grant of patta under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963."
2. (a) So far as S.A.No.1088 of 1980 is concerned, the relevant facts which gave rise to the appeal are as follows:- The appellants in this appeal are plaintiffs 2, 4 to 6 and 8 to 10 in O.S.No.411 of 1965 on the file of the Court of District Munsif Kulittalai. The suit O.S.No.411 of 1965 was instituted on the file of the District Munsif, Kulittalai for (a) a declaration that the suit properties absolutely belonged to plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 14 and they are entitled to be in possession thereof and (b) for consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the first defendant from taking possession or in any manner interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit properties by the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 14. It was claimed for the plaintiffs that the suit properties were inam lands coming under the purview of the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963), that as a consequence of the Notification issued under Section 3 of the said Act, the entire Inam Estate Lands stood vested in the Government absolutely, that nobody, much less the first defendant, is entitled to any right other than those conferred under the said Act, that the suit lands do not come under the category of lands in respect of which the first defendant is entitled to ryotwari patta under Section 9 of the Act and on the other hand, the plaintiffs and their predecessors- in-interest have been in possession and enjoyment of the same for more than fifty years and consequently are entitled to ryotwari patta under the provisions of the said Act, that their long possession and title are also saved by the provisions of the said Act and that any attempt by the first defendant to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs would be illegal and wrongful. As for the right claimed in respect of the lands, the plaintiffs asserted that the suit properties were Village Service Inams granted by the Government in favour of Karnam Kuppu Iyer and Register No:126 of September, 1879 relating to Village Service Inams of Pettavaithalai Village, Tiruchirapalli District, showed that the lands were so granted to Karnam Kuppu Iyer and confirmed to him at 5/8 of the quit rent, viz., Rs.8-8-0 under Title Deed No.316, that he was doing the Village Karnam service by enjoying the properties and after his death, his son Sethu Iyer was doing the Karnam Service and was enjoying the lands along with Kittu Iyer and Ramachandra Rao and subsequent to the death of Sethu Iyer, plaintiffs 1 to 6 and defendants 2 to 6 have been in possession and enjoyment of the same as their ancestral properties and consequently, the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 6 are the absolute owners of the properties and are entitled to be in possession and enjoyment of the same. The Settlement Register relating to the suit village, it was claimed, also showed that the suit lands were registered in the name of Sethu Iyer and they and the members of their family have leased out the properties, paid kist and have received the income from the lands as owners for generations and by spending a sum of Rs.5,000 in the year 1955, the punja lands were improved and converted into Nanja lands and the aforesaid persons have also alienated portions of item No.4 of the suit properties to defendants 7 to 14, who have built also houses in the respective portions purchased by them. Consequently, both proprietary title as also acquisition of title by adverse possession by open, exclusive and continuous possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the first defendant was also accepted.
(b) The first defendant, per contra, contended that the claim of the plaintiffs about the so called grant as Service Inams is false and baseless, that the suit was not maintainable before the Civil Court, that the suit properties are Devadayam Inam granted to the first defendant, who is the absolute owner of the same, that the details given in the Register of 1879 are incorrect and the same cannot be relied upon to prove title claimed by them. In 1897, the first Settlement Registers were prepared and it was found that the suit lands were then, under Old Survey Numbers 57, 75, 112 and 128 and subsequent investigations disclosed that Kittu Iyer and Sethu Iyer, who were Government Karnams and Temple Accountant respectively, had altered the records with a view to benefit themselves and put the suit lands in T.D.No.316 as Government Karnam Service Inam in 1879 in their names, that the said Sethu Iyer was suspended by the Temple Authorities and in the enquiry which followed, he agreed to transfer the lands from his name to the temple and subsequently, after his death, Kittu Iyer became the Temple Accountant and was enjoying the income from the suit lands and hence the possession of the plaintiffs has been permissive in character and never proprietary and they have paid kist as temple servants and not owners. The alleged improvements were also disputed and the possession of the plaintiffs could not be claimed to be adverse. The Survey and Settlement Registers of 1897 and 1927 were said to disclose sufficient proof that the first defendant alone had absolute title to the suit property and accounts were written by Kuppu Iyer upto 1938 and by Kittu Iyer till 1952, when he was dismissed from service and the statement of Kuppu Iyer itself would show that the suit lands are temple properties and he was holding the lands by paying Chathurbagam, while contending that action under Section 101 of the Tamil Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 are valid and the order passed therein cannot be set aside, the defendant also contended by filing an additional written statement that the suit lands are covered under Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963) and not Inam Abolition Act under Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963 and that it is the first defendant, who is entitled to patta and as a matter of fact, the Inam Tahsildar, after due and elaborate enquiry, passed an order granting ryotwari patta to the first defendant by his Proceedings dated 5.11.1968 and, therefore, the suit is also barred by virtue of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963.
(c) On the above claims and counter claims, the suit was tried and both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. The learned trial Judge, by his judgment and decree dated 20.11.1978, dismissed the suit holding that the first defendant-temple alone has title to the suit property and that the possession of the plaintiffs was only permissive in character and never adverse. The appellants pursued the matter on appeal in A.S.No.14 of 1979. The learned appellate Judge also concurred with the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge and the appeal was dismissed holding that in the light of the fact situation that the patta issued in favour of the temple under Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963 was confirmed by the Tribunal below as also by this Court in S.T.A.23 of 1975 and, therefore, having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 43 and 46 of Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963, the decision of the Tribunal below as also of the Special Appellate Tribunal has been rendered final between the parties and the same cannot be reagitated afresh, in a civil suit. Hence, the above second appeal.
(d) At the time of admitting the second appeal, it was considered that the substantial question of law as to whether the suit land is a Service Inam and whether the adjudication under the Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963 resulting in the grant of patta in favour of the first defendant is final and conclusive arise for consideration.
3. S.A.No.1389 of 1980: (a) So far as S.A.No.l389 is concerned, the defendant in O.S.No.57 of 1978 on the file of District Munsif, Tirukoilur, who lost before both the Courts below, is the appellant. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit for a declaration of his title to the suit property and for recovery of possession, contending that the suit property measuring an extent of 22 1/2 in R.S.No.134/10, situated at Veerasozhapuram Village, which originally formed part of a whole Inam Village, and the said Inam was abolished under Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963, viz., the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, Subsequent to the abolition of the Inam and vesting of the same with the State, the lands were said to have been surveyed and ryotwari patta had been issued. The suit village was originally said to be a Shrodriem Village and out of 156 shares in both the melwaram and kudiwaram of the lands in the village, the plaintiff's grand-father was said to own 2.5/8 shares and that he had obtained compensation for that share, when the Government took over the Inam. Apart from the said share in the Shrodriem, the plaintiff's grand-father was said to have purchased 1.50 acres from one Raghava Chettiar and the father of the plaintiff-Narayanachariar purchased another 33 cents from one Srinivasa Naidu on 19.9.1943 on the western side of 1.50 acres purchased by the grand-father. By forming a ridge on the western side, he was said to have been in possession and enjoyment of 1.83 acres for over twelve years, when he died about twenty years back. The plaintiff, in support of his claim, has filed the Field Measurement Book for Field No.134. The line marked as P Q in the plan was said to denote the above ridge and the same was said to be the western boundary of the property enjoyed by the father of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was said to be in enjoyment of the lands on the eastern side of the P Q ridge, whereas the defendant's father and after him the defendant were said to enjoy the land on the west of the above ridge. When Patta No.160 was issued to the plaintiff, he was said to have been under the impression that the suit property formed part of R.S.No.134/11, included in his patta, and it is only on 16.9.1977, when the Village Karnam and the Block Surveyor came to the suit land measured it, the plaintiff came to know that the Resurvey No.134/10 shown in the Field Measurement Book, which is on the eastern side of the P Q ridge had an extent of 0.09 hectares, included in the patta of the defendant and they were proposing to put up Survey Stones for that land. The plaintiff claimed that he has raised paddy crops and he was not present at the time of measurement and on coming to know about the inclusion of the suit property in the patta of the defendant, the plaintiff moved the Tahsildar, Tirukoilur for correction of the Survey Account. The Tahsildar appears to have, on verification, found that though the plaintiff had been in possession and enjoyment of the property, since patta has been issued in the name of the father of the defendant, it is the plaintiff who has to seek reddress from the civil Court and this necessitated the filing of the present suit. A claim of perfection of title by adverse possession was also projected.
(b) Per contra, the defendant resisted the suit contending that the old Block Survey Number and the boundaries given for the Resurvey 134/10 as given by the plaintiff are wrong, that the suit property R.S.No.134/10 belonged to the father of the defendant by virtue of his purchase on 29.11.1964, that the suit property R.S.No.134/10 was included in the Patla of the father of the defendant along with other properties in Patta No.112 and no appeal was filed by the plaintiff challenging the same and since the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were in open possession of the property, they have also perfected title by adverse possession.
(c) On the above claims and counter-claims, the suit came to be tried and both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. On a consideration of the claims projected by the respective parties, in the light of the materials produced, the learned trial Judge held that the plaintiff has made out a case of this right to the properties and. therefore, decreed the suit as prayed for. The appeal filed by the defendant before the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.360 of 1978 was also dismissed by the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. Hence, the above Second Appeal.
(d) At the time of admission of the appeal, it was considered that the above appeal involves a substantial question of law as to whether the Courts below were right in considering the question and whether the ryotwari patta granted by the Tribunal constituted under Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963 could be questioned before the civil Court, having regard to Section 46 of the said Act.
4. The learned counsel appearing on either side, in the context of the reference made to the Full Bench, invited our attention to some of the relevant decisions touching the controversy raised before us, to which a reference has to be necessarily made to appreciate the principles ultimately to be applied to the case on hand, in answering the reference made to the Full Bench.
5. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, two learned Judges of the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the scope of Section 64-C of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the "Abolition Act" and Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the maintainability of a suit for declaration of title and protection of possession of the plaintiff. The mutt, which filed the suit, claimed titled on the basis of its long and uninterrupted possession and also under an order of assignment said to have been issued by the Zamindar of erstwhile Sivaganga Zamin. After the estate was notified, the Mutt appears to have made an application for Patta, but the Authorities seems to have stated that the petition would receive consideration when enquiry under Section 11 of the Act would be taken up. But, subsequently, without reference to all the above, the land was held to be non-ryoti on the notified date and was directed to be treated as a poromboke (village communal land) and, therefore, no one was entitled to Patta. The State opposed the claim contending that the land was actually communal land, that there could not have been any valid assignment of the same and inasmuch as the authorities under the Act decided the character of the land-the same was final and cannot be challenged before the Civil Court, whose jurisdiction has been barred. A Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in State of Madras v. Ramalingaswamigal Madam, 1969 (II) M.L.J. 281, took the view that there was no provision under Section 11 read with proviso to Section 3(d) of the Act for the ascertainment of the character of the land (whether it was ryoti or communal) and the decision of the Settlement Officer in this regard is only incidental for the purpose of granting patta and civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate on the nature of the land, when specifically put in issue and the same is not taken away. The Division Bench further held that the suit was not for obtaining ryotwari patta and, therefore, maintainable. The State pursued the matter before the Supreme Court. Even as the appeal was pending, in Arulandu Udayar v. Palaniappa Ambalam, 1982 (I) M.L.J. 257, a learned single Judge of this Court expressed the view that in view of the decision in Chenchulakshmamma v. Subrahmanya Reddy, , the decision of the Division Bench in State of Madras v. Ramalingaswamigal Madam, 1969 (II) M.L.J. 281 is not good law. Once again, in the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmighu Thirumaleswaraswami Deify, 1984 (97) L.W. 243, in a case arising under Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963, hereinafter referred to as the "Minor Inams Act", the view taken in Arulanda Udayar v. Palaniappa Ambalam, 1982 (I) M.L.J. 257 was followed and approved on the view that a Special Leave Petition against the same has been dismissed and also relying upon the decisions reported in Oduru Chengulalakshmamma and another v. Duvvuru Subramanya Reddy, and M Chayanna v. K Narayana, . But, the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Madras v. Ramalingaswamigal Madam, 1969 (II) M.L.J. 281 and the same is reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, . The Supreme Court came to such a conclusion after noticing the earlier decisions reported in Chenchulakshmakka v. Subrhmanya Reddy, and M. Chayanna v. & Narayana, , relied upon by the Division Bench, which decided the case reported in Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmighu Thirumaleswaraswami Deity, 97 L.W. 243. The Apex Court, while affirming the decision reported in State of Madras v. Ramalingaswamigal Madam, 1969 (2) M.L.J. 281, held as follows:-
11. It will be seen that elaborate provisions have been made in the enactment to carry out the main objective and other purposes of the Act and Sections 4 to 8 deal with constituting authorities like Tribunals and Board of Revenue and appointing various officers such as a Director of Settle ment, Settlement Officers and Managers of Estates etc. to carry out functions and duties assigned to them under the Act. It will be pertinent to observe that in between the provisions dealing with grant of ryotwari patta to a ryot (Section 11) and the grant thereof to a landholder (Sections 12 to 15) there is a difference of vital significance; whereas in the case of an application for a ryotwari patta by a landholder under Section 12, 13 or 14, Section 15 in terms enjoins a duty upon the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and character of the land and history thereof and then decide whether the claim of the landlord should be allowed or not, in the case of an application for a ryotwari patta by a ryot under Section 11 there is no similar express provision for any inquiry into the nature or character of the land before granting or refusing to grant such patta to the applicant. Even if Section 11 is read with the proviso to clause (d) of Section 3, where under some inquiry is contemplated before granting a ryotwari patta to a ryot there is no provision directing an inquiry for the ascertainment of the character of the land, namely, whether it is ryoti land or communal land and the Settlement Officer's decision on this aspect will be incidental to and impliedly rendered only for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant the ryotwari patta. There is also this further difference that the Settlement Officer's decision on the nature or character of the land under Section 15 is subject to a regular appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (2) thereof while the Settlement Officer's decision to grant or refuse to grant a patta to a ryot under Section 11 is subject to be revised by the Director of Settlement under Section 5(2) as also by the Board of Revenue under Section 7(c) and the relevant Rules in that behalf and the decision of the Director of Settlement in revision is further revisable by the Board of Revenue under Section 7(d) of the Act. Then comes Section 64-c which accords finality to the orders passed by the Government or other authorities under the Act which we have earlier quoted in extenso.
12. Now turning to the question raised in these appeals for our determination, it is true that Section 64-c of the Act gives finality to the orders passed by the Government or other authorities in respect of the matters to be determined by them under the Act and sub-section (2) thereof provides that no such orders shall be called in question in any itself is not, having regard to the two propositions quoted above from Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., , decisive on the point of ouster of the Civil Court's jurisdiction and several other aspects like the scheme of the Act, adequacy and sufficiency or remedies provided by it etc., wilt have to be considered to ascertain the precise intendment of the Legislature. Further, having regard to the vital difference indicated above, in between the two sets of provisions dealing with grant of ryotwari pattas to land holders on the one hand and ryots on the other different considerations may arise while deciding the issue of the ouster of Civil Court's juris diction to adjudicate upon the true nature or character of the concerned land. Approaching the question from this angle it will be seen in the first place that Section 64-c itself in terms provides that the finality to the orders passed by the authorities in respect of the matters to be determined by them under the Act is "for the purposes of this Act" and not generally nor for any other purpose. As stated earlier the main object and purpose of the Act is to abolish all the estates of the intermediaries like Zamin-dars, Inamdars, Jagirdars or under- tenure holders etc. and to convert all land-holdings in such estates into ryotwari settlements which operation in revenue parlance means conversion of alienated lands into non-alien ated lands, that is to say, to deprive the intermediaries of their right to collect all the revenues in respect of such lands and vesting the same back in the Government. The enactment and its several provisions are thus intended to serve the revenue purposes of the Government, by way of securing to the Government its sovereign right to collect all the revenues from all the lands and to facilitate the recovery thereof by the Government and in that process, if necessary, to deal with claims of occupants of lands, nature of the lands, etc. only incidentally in summary manner and that too for identifying and registering persons in the revenue records from whom such recovery of revenue is to be made. The object of granting a ryotwari patta is also to enable holder there of to cultivate the land specified therein directly under the Government on payment to it of such assessment or cess that may be lawfully imposed on the land. Section 16 is very clear in this behalf which imposes the liability to pay such ryotwari or other assessment imposed upon the land to the Govern ment by the patta-holder. The expression "for the purposes of this Act" has been designedly used in the section which cannot be ignored but must be given cogent meaning and on a plain reading of the section which uses such expression it is clear that any order passed by the Settlement Officer either granting or refusing to grant a ryotwari patta to a ryot under Section 11 of the Act must be regarded as having been passed to achieve the purposes of the Act, namely, revenue purposes, that is to say for fastening the liability on him to pay the assessment or other dues and to facilitate the recovery of such revenue from him by the Government; and therefore any decision impliedly rendered on the aspect of nature or character of the land on that occasion will have to be regarded as incidental to the merely for the purpose of passing the order of granting or refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose.
13. Secondly, the principle indicated in the second proposition enunciated in Dhulabhai case, requires that the statute, when it creates a special right or liability and provides for its determination, should also lay down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be determined by the Tribunal or authority constituted by it, suggesting thereby that if there is no such provision it will be difficult to infer ouster of the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate all other questions pertaining to such right or liability. Since from the notified date all the estate vests in the Government free from encumbrances it must be held that all the lands lying in such estate including private land of landholder and ryoti land cultivated by a ryot would vest in the Government and the Act would be said to be creating a new right in favour of a landholder (re; his private lands) and a ryot (re; ryoti land) by granting a ryotwari patta to them under Sections 12 to 15 and Section 11 respectively, and the Act provides for determination of such right by the Settlement Officer. Question is whether the Act also provides for determination of all questions about such right by the Settlement Officer? On this aspect, as has been indicated earlier unlike in the case of an application for a ryotwari patta by a landholder under Section 12,13, or 14 where an inquiry into the nature or character of the land and the history thereof is expressly directed to be undertaken by virtue of Section 15 in the case of an application for a ryotwari patta by a ryot under Section 11 there is no express provision for any inquiry into the nature or character of the land before granting or refusing to grant such patta to the applicant. It is true that some inquiry is contemplated if Section 11 is read with proviso to clause (d) of Section 3 but even then there is no provision directing inquiry for the ascertainment of the nature of the land, namely, whether it is a ryoti land or communal land but it is obvious that impliedly a decision on this aspect of the matter must be arrived at by the Settlement Officer before he passes his order on either granting or refusing to grant such patta. Obviously such decision rendered impliedly on this aspect of the matter will be an incidental one and arrived at in the summary manner only for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant the patta. A summary decision of this type in an inquiry conducted for revenue purposes cannot be regarded as final or conclusive so as to constitute a bar to a Civil Court's jurisdiction adjudicating upon the same issue arising in a suit for injunction filed by a ryot on the basis of title and/or long and uninterrupted possession. Since a full-fledged inquiry on the nature or character of land is provided for under Section 15 in the case of an application by a land-holder the character of the Settlement Officer's decision on such issue may be different but that question is not before us.
14. Thirdly, having regard to the principle stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai Case, it is clear that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the special tribunal the Civil Court's jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the special tribunal one will have to see whether such special tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of Civil Court's juris diction. Now take the case of an applicant who has applied for a ryotwari patta under section 11 staking his claim thereto on the basis of his long and uninterrupted possession of the ryoti land but the Settlement Officer on materials before him is not satisfied that the land in question is ryoti land; in that case he will refuse the patta to the applicant. But can he, even after the refusal of the patta, protect the applicant's long and uninterrupted possession against the Government interference? Obvi- ously, he cannot, for it lies within his power and jurisdiction merely to grant or refuse to grant the patta on the basts of materials placed before him. But such a person even after the refusal of the ryotwari patta would be entitled to protect his possessory title and long enjoyment of the land and seek an injunction preventing Government's interference otherwise than in due course of jaw and surely before granting such relief the Civil Court may have to adjudicate upon the real nature or character of the land if the same is put in issue. In other words since the Settlement Officer has no power to do what Civil Court would normally do in a suit it is difficult to imply ouster of Civil Court's jurisdiction simply because finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officer's order under Section 64-C of the Act.
15. Counsel for the appellants invited our attention to two decisions of this Court, one in M. Chayana v. K. Narayana, under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 26 of 1948 and the other in O. Chenchu-lakshmamma v. D. Subrahmanya, , under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 26 of 1948. It may be stated that both the enactments (the A.P. Act as well as the Madras Act) contain substantially identical provisions and in particular Section 56 with which the Court concerned in the two cases is in identical language. Sub-section (1) of Section 56 provides that---
Where after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer.
Sub-section (2) provides for an appeal to the Tribunal against the decision of the Settlement Officer and the tribunal's decision in appeal has been rendered final and not liable to be questioned in a court of law. In both the cases this Court has taken the view that a dispute between two rival claimants as to who is the lawful ryot entitled to the patta of the holding in question has been exclusively left to the determination of the Settle ment Officer under that provision and since finality has been accorded to such determination which is not liable to be called in question in any court of law the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such dispute has been excluded. Relying upon these decisions, counsel for the appellant urged before us that the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issue of real nature or character of the land should be held to have been excluded under Section 64-C of the Act which also accords finality to the Settlement Officer's order refusing to grant the ryotwari patta to a ryot under Section 11 of the Act on the ground that the land in question is not ryoti land. It is not possible to accept this contention for the two decisions are clearly distinguishable. In the first place Section 56 with which the Court was concerned in those cases does not contain the words "for the purposes of the Act" which occur in Section 64-C; and presumably in view of the absence of those words in the section this Court in M. Chayana Cast, observed that there was no warrant for taking the view that the Settlement Officer's decision under Section 56(1) (c) on the question as to who was the lawful ryot of the holding was only for the purpose of identifying the person liable to pay the arrear of rent. Secondly under Section 56(1) (c) the Settlement. Officer is expressly required to make an inquiry into and decide the question as to who is a lawful ryot, of the holding between two rival claimants whereas as stated earlier there is no express provision directing an inquiry into the question of the real nature or character of the land while considering a ryot's application for a patta under Section 11 read with the proviso to Section 3(d). In other words, the two provisions are dissimilar. Moreover, it may be pointed out that so far as the Madras Act is concerned by Madras Act 34 of 1958 Section 56 itself has been repealed with effect from December 27, 1958 and Section 9(2) of the repealing Act (34 of 1958) has gone on to provide that all proceedings pending before the Settlement Officer or Tribunal under that Section shall abate. As a result of such repeal the Madras High Court in two decisions, Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar, 1961 (l) MLJ 168 and A.R. Sanjeevi Naickar v. P.M. Shanmuga Udyar, 1965 (2) MLJ 204 had held that now there is no machinery available under the Madras Act to have a determination of the dispute between two rival claimants regarding their title as to who would be entitled to the patta and Section 11 does not contain machinery for deciding disputed questions of title. Whatever be the position in regard to dispute concerning rival claims or tides, the ratio of the two decisions of this Court on which counsel placed reliance is inapplicable to the issue raised in these appeals for our determination".
6. In yet another decision of this Court reported in Ramanujam Kavirayar, T.K. v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannathi Avargal, 1988 (2) L.W. 513, a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with a similar claim arising under the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963. The Division Bench reviewed almost all the earlier decisions oh the point and held thus:-
11. It is already seen that the Division Bench which decided Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmighu Thirumaleswaraswamy Deity, 97 L.W. 243 placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Chayanna v. Narayana, , and Chenchulakshmamma v. D. Subramanya, , taking the view that the removal of S.56 from the provisions of the Madras Abolition Act did not make any difference. Now that it is made clear by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, , that the decisions in Chayanna v. Narayana, and Chenchulakshmakka v. D. Subramanya, will not apply to cases under the Madras Act, the basis of the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmighu Thirumaleswaraswami Deity, 97 L.W. 243, Knocked off. Conse-quently, the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench in Second Appeal Nos.904 and 1250 of 1978 has to be taken as upheld by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, .
12. I have already referred to the fact that the distinction sought to be made by Varadarajan, J. in Chinnappa Gounder v. S. Sashadri, AIR 1981 Mad. 8, was impliedly disapproved by the Division Bench in Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmigu Thirumaleswaraswami Deity, 97 L.W. 243, when they proceeded on the footing that the Abolition Act and the Minor Inams Act were analogous to each other. Hence, the ratio of the Division Bench in Udaiyappan and another v. Karuppan and others, 1982 T.L.N.J. 490, will apply to cases arising under Minor Inams Act. It has to be held that the finality conferred by S.46 of the Minor Inams Act on the orders passed by the authorities constituted under the Act will not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide questions of title. S.46 of the Minor Inams Act which deals with res judicata corresponds to S.64-A of the Abolition Act. S.3(d) of the Minor Inams Act contains the same language as S.3(d) of the Abolition Act. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, , will apply to cases arising under Minor Inams Act.
13. The effect of the decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, is that the two decisions M. Chayanna v. Narayanan, and Chenchulakshmamma v. Subramanya Reddy, on the basis of which the later Division Bench consisting of V. Ramaswami and V. Ratnam, JJ. took their view have been held to be inapplicable to a case under the Madras Act 26 of 1948, and further the view of Ramanujam and Sengottuvelan, JJ. who had followed the earlier view of the Division Bench in The State of Madras v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, 1969 (II) M.L.J. 281 stands confirmed. The later decision of V. Ramaswami and V. Ratnam, JJ. in Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmighu Thirumaleswara Deity, 97 L.W. 243 cannot therefore be considered now to be good law at all and it is, therefore, not necessary to constitute any Full Bench to decide any conflict because the conflict now stands resolved by the latest decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nada v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, ".
7. A learned single Judge of this Court dealt with a similar question under the Abolition Act in the decision reported in Kannammal v. G. Panchakshara chetty, 1988(2) L.W. 11, in the context of a case wherein ryotwari patta was issued during the course of settlement proceedings in favour of the defendant and the suit came to be filed by the plaintiff for declaration of title and injuction against the defendant. The learned single Judge, after referring to the decisions reported in State of Tamil Nadu v.
Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, and Ramanujam Kavirayar, T.K. v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannathi Avargal, 1988 (2) L.W. 513, held that the jurisdiction of the civil Court, in dealing with the claim of a person for a property on the basis of his entitlement to patta under Section 15, is not ousted because there is no sufficient or clear cut provisions to enquire into and decide rival claims or disputes between two rival claimants, while at the same time observing that such suit must be one for declaration of one's entitlement for the grant of patta and not otherwise.
8 In the decision reported in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori V. Deeksshihulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228 , two learned Judges of the Apex Court, dealing with a case arising under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956, held the suit not maintainable and observed as hereunder:-
27. In State of T.N. v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, , strongly relied on by Shri Kanta Rao, the question therein was whether the jurisdiction of the Civil court was ousted to redetermine the nature of the land rendered by the Settlement Officer under Section 11 of the Estate Abolition Act. Tulzapurkar, J. speaking for the Division Bench proceeded on three fundamental postulates namely that the decision of the Settlement Authorities under Section 11 of the Act was for (I) 'Revenue purposes', (SCC p.22, para 12) "that is to say for fastening the liability on him to pay the assessment or other dues and to facilitate the recovery of such revenue from him by the Government; and therefore any decision impliedly rendered on the aspect of nature or character of the land on that occasion will have to be regarded as incidental to and merely for the purpose of passing the order of granting or refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose", (II) only revision against the order and not an appeal; and (III) that by Madras Amendment, Section 64-C was deleted. It was unfortunate that it was not brought to the notice of the court that the purpose of Estate Abolition Act was not solely for the purpose of collecting the revenue to the State.
The Act has its birth from a long drawn struggle carried on by the ryots in Madras Presidency for permanent ryotwari settlement of tenures and grant of permanent occupancy rights and the Indian National Congress espoused their rights and passed resolution at Avadi Session to make a legislation in that regard. The recovery Of revenue was only secondary. In Syamala Rao v. Radhakanthaswami Varu, 1984 (1) APLJ 113 : 1984 Andh LJ 286, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to which one of us (K.Ramaswamy, J.) was a member considered the historical background, the purpose of the Act and the scheme envisaged therein in extenso and held that the preamble of the Estate Abolition Act was to repeal the permanent settlements, the acquisition of the rights of the landholders in the estates and introduction of the ryotwari settlement therein; under Section 1(4) by issuance of the notification the pre existing rights shall cease and determine; shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances and declared that all rights and interests created in particular over the State `shall cease and determine as against the government' protected only dispossession of a person in possession of the ryoti land who was considered prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta.
Section 11 envisaged enquiry into "the nature of the land" and whether "ryotwari land immediately before the notified dates" be properly in cluded or ought to have been properly included in the holding of the ryot.
The enquiry under the Act was entrusted to .the revenue authorities who have intimate knowledge of the nature of the lands and the entries in the revenue records of the holders, etc. Act created hierarchy of the Tribu nals, namely Assistant Settlement Officer; Settlement Officer Director of Settlement and Board of Revenue; provided revisional powers to those authorities and ultimately the order is subject to the decision of the High Court under Article 226. In that view it was held that by necessary implication the jurisdiction of the civil Court was ousted, the decision of Settlement Authorities under Section 11 was made final and no civil suit was maintainable. The legislature having made the Act to render economic justice to the ryots and excluded the dispute between land holders and the ryots covered under Sections 12 to 15 and the ryots interse under Section 56(1) (c), from the jurisdiction of the civil court, it would not be the legislative intention to expose the ryots to costly unequal civil litigation with the State of the dispute under Section 11. It is not necessary in this case to broach further but suffice to state that unfortunately this historical perspective and the real purpose and proper scope and operation of Estate Abolition Act was not focused to the notice of the Court. Jyotish Thakur v. Tarakant Jha, , Section 27 of Regulation HI of 1872 provides that in respect of transfer of ryoti interest in contravention of the regulation revenue courts shall not take cognizance of such a transfer. It was contended that by necessary implication the civil suit was not maintainable. In that context this Court held that provisions therein were not intended to be exhaustive to bar the relief in a civil court. In Athmanathaswami Devasthanam v. K. Gopalaswami Aiyangar, , the question was whether the civil suit to recover damages and for ejectment of the ryoti lands belonging to the temple was barred. The findings were that the lands were ryoti lands and that the tenant acquired the occupancy rights, but the lease was granted in excess of 5 years. It was contended that it was a transfer without permission of the Endowment Department. While upholding that the lands were ryoti lands and the tenant acquired occupancy rights, this Court disagreeing with the High Court, held that there was no transfer and that the tenant is liable to pay the arrears of rent and the suit was maintainable. In Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru pattabhirami Reddy, , the contention raised was that Section 93 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 was a bar to maintain suit for rendition of accounts and recovery thereof against the ex-trus-tees.
This Court repelled the contention and held that the suit for rendition of accounts was not expressly or by necessary implication barred the jurisdiction of the civil court under. Section 93. In Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadha Rao panthulu Bahadur Garu v. State of A.P., , it was conceded that the question whether kalipatnam village is an inam estate was to be adjudicated before the tribunals appointed under the Rent Reduction Act. It was contended that the tribunals have no jurisdiction to decide the validity of the notification reducing the rent by operation of Section 8(1) thereof. It was held that there was no statutory prohibition to determine the nature of the land contemplated by the Rent Reduction Act. Accordingly the suit was held to be maintainable. In Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma v.Gyan Chandra, , it was found that under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee property Act, 1950, no proceedings were taken to declare the suit house as an evacuee property. No notification under sub-section (3) of Section 7 was published in the gazette. Under those circumstances it was held that Section 46 did not bar the civil suit. In Anne Besant National Girls High School v. Dy. Director of Public Instruction, , this Court held that the civil court has jurisdiction to examine whether action or decision of an administrative authority was ultra vires the relevant rules of Gran in-aid Code and Rule 9(vii) was held to be ultra vires. Accordingly the suit was held to be maintainable. In Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. Union of India, , two questions were raised, firstly the validity of the assessment and secondly recovery of the tax paid under Excess Profit Tax Act, 1940. On the first question it was held that the suit was not maintainable. On the second question without going into the technicalities of the maintainability of the suit, this Court granted the relief. In Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd. v. Dy. Commissioner, Lakshimpur, , the question were whether the workmen were ordinary unskilled labour or skilled labour; whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred. This Court held that the authorities did not hold any inquiry nor received any evidence for determining the issue. No proper hearing was given to the parties to tender evidence. Section 20 is not a complete code as there was no provision for appeal or revision against the orders passed under Section 20(3). There was no further scrutiny by any higher authority against the imposition of penalty. The Act in terms does not bar the employers from instituting a suit. In those circumstances, it was held that the legislature did not intend to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court. The ratio in K. Chintamani Dora v. G. Annamnaidu, , also does not assist Gram Panchayat for the reason that the decree therein originally granted became final. Subsequently it was sought to be reopened in a later suit. Under those circumstances the civil suit was held to be maintainable notwithstanding the provisions contained under the Estate Abolition Act.
28. Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the ratio in all these cases are clearly distinguishable and render little assistance to the Gram Panchayat. The scope, ambit and operation of the Inams Act was considered by P.Jaganmohan Reddy, J.(as he then was) in D. V. Raju v. B.G.Rao, AIR 1968 AP 220, and held that the paramount object of the legislature was to protect the tenant in occupation and is sought to be achieved by making effective orders of eviction made by the civil court either in execution or otherwise. It further prohibits the institution of any suit or proceeding in a Civil court under Section 14 to set aside or modify any decision of the Tahsildar, Collector or Revenue Court except where such decision has been obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion. Section 15 enjoins that the provisions of the Act and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding; anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of absolute jurisdiction on the Tehsildar, Revenue Court or the Collector; as the case may be, not with that matter even where evictions have taken place in pursuance of such decrees, the evicted tenants can be restored to occupation provided the requirements for the protection of the possession of the tenants are satisfied. In that case the occupant in possession laid proceeding before the Tehsildar for injunction restraining the writ petitioner from ejecting him from the lands. The Tehsildar in exercise of the power under Rule 16 of the Rules granted injunction pending consideration of his right to ryotwari patta. The order of injunction was challenged firstly on the ground of ultra vires of Rule 16 and secondly on the ground of jurisdiction. While upholding the order on both the grounds the learned judge held that Tehsildar, Revenue Court and the Collector have exclusive jurisdiction and the civil suit is barred. We respectfully approve it as correct law. The Inams Act did not intend to leave the decision of the revenue courts under Section 3 read with Section 7 to retry the issue once over in the civil court. Undoubtedly the decision of the Division Bench in P. Peda Govindayya V. P. Subba Rao, 1969 (2) ALT-336 is in favour of the contention that the civil suit is maintainable. It is not good law.
29. Thus, the glimpse of the object of the Inams Act, scheme, scope and operation thereof clearly manifest that Inams Act is a self-contained code, expressly provided rights and liabilities; prescribed procedure; remedies of appeal and revision, excluded the jurisdiction of the civil court, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, given primacy of Inams Act though inconsistent with any law or instrument having force of law. The jurisdictional findings are an integral scheme to grant or refuse ryotwari patta under Section 3, read with Section 7 and not collateral findings. It was subject to appeal and revision and certiorari under Article 226. The decision of the Revenue Tribunal, are final and conclusive between the parties or persons claiming right, title or interest through them. The trick of pleadings and the camouflage of the reliefs are not decisive but the substance or the effect on the order of the tribunal under the Inams Act are decisive. The civil suit except on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or collusion of the parties is not maintainable. The necessary conclusion would be that the civil suit is hot maintainable when the decree directly nullifies the ryotwari patta granted under section 3 of the Inams Act. Under the Gram Panchayat Act the statutory interposition of vesting the tank and the appurtenant land in the Gram Panchayat made it to retain possession, control and supervision over it, though the Gram Panchayat unlawfully took possession. The need to grant decree for possession in favour of the Gram Panchayat is thus redundant. The suit of the descendants was normally to be decreed On the finding that ryotwari patta under Section 3 of the Inams Act was granted in their favour and that they were unlawfully dispossessed. Since the grant of ryotwari patta, though in the name of individuals, was to maintain the public tank which stood vested under Section 85 of the Act in the Gram Panchayat, the descendants are divested of the right and interest acquired therein. Thus the suit of the descendants also is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the decrees of dismissal of both the suits are upheld and the appeals dismissed. But in the circumstances, parties are directed to beat their own costs.
9. In R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elumalai Naicker, , two learned Judges of the Apex Court, while dealing with a case arising under Minor Inams Act, in deciding an appeal from this High Court, dealt with the earlier decisions rendered in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, and Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori V. Deeksshihulu, 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 228, held that the sit is maintainable and observed as follows:-
15. It is also not possible to accept the contention of the appellant that jurisdiction of the civil court to determine title to the said land has been ousted by the said Act. Section 43 provides that the decision of a Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal in any proceeding under the said Act shall be binding on the parties insofar as such matter is in issue between the parties in a suit or proceeding. The decision of a Tribunal, or the Special Appellate Tribunal is in respect of the grant of ryotwari pattas. It is only in respect of matters which are covered by the said Act that the decision of the Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal is binding on the parties. Obviously, matters which are not the subject-matter of decision before such a Tribunal, cannot be considered as final or binding between the parties. Sub-section (2) of Section 43 expressly provides that the decision of the civil court (not being the Court of a District Munsif or a Court of Small Causes) on any matter falling within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties there to in any proceeding before a Tribunal under the said Act. Therefore, there is no question of ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil Court in respect of matters falling within its jurisdiction and which are out side the purview of the said Act. Section 46 also provides for finality only in respect of decisions of the Tribunal in respect of matters which are required to be determined by it for the purposes of the said Act. The jurisdiction of the civil court, therefore, to determine title to the lands in question or to determine whether the lessor has aright to evict the lessee from the lands in question is not ousted in any manner by the said Act.
16. In the case of State of T.N. v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, , this Court has construed the provisions of Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 which are similar to the provisions of the said Act. This Court said that the civil court's jurisdiction to adjudicate on the real nature of the land is not ousted by reason of the Settlement Officer's decision to grant or refuse to grant a patta. Construing the provisions of Section 64-C of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 which are similar to Section 46 of the present Act, this Court held mat the finality to the orders passed by the authorities in respect of the matters to be determined by them under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 is "for the purposes of this Act" and not generally, nor for any other purpose. The main object and purpose of the Act is to abolish all the estates of the intermediaries like zamindars, inamdars, jagirdars etc. and to convert all land-holdings in such estates into ryotwari settlements---which operation in revenue parlance, means conversion of alienated lands into non-alienated lands to deprive the intermediaries of their right to collect all the revenues in respect of such lands and vesting the same back in the Government. The enactment and its several provisions are thus intended to serve the revenue purposes of the Government by way of securing to the Government its sovereign right to collect all the revenues from all the lands and to facilitate the recovery thereof by the Government, and in mat process, if necessary, to deal with the claims of occupants of lands, nature of the lands etc. only incidentally in a summary manner and that too for identifying and registering persons in the revenue records from whom such recovery of revenue is to be made. The Court further observed that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal, the civil court's jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in the suit We need not, however, examine this aspect at any length because of the nature of the grant which has been made in the present case which expressly preserves the rights of the respondent in respect of the land.
17. In the case of Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Vendatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp(2) SCC 228, this Court considered, inter alia, the provisions of the A.P. Inams(Abolition and Conversion into Ryot wari) Act, 1956. After referring to the judgment of this Court in State of T.N. v. Ramaling Samigal Madam, , the Court said mat the introduction of ryotwari settlement in the place of inams should not be regarded only as for the purpose of recovery of revenue. The Act was designed to render economic justice to the ryots. The purpose of such Act was to repeal permanent settlements, to acquire the rights of the landholders in the estates and introduce ryotwari therein. Referring to the Andhra Pradesh Act, the Court said that Section 11 envisaged an enquiry into the nature of the land and whether it was "ryotwari land immediately before the notified dates", to be properly included in the holdings of the ryot. This enquiry was entrusted to revenue authorities and their decision would be properly included in the holdings of the ryot. This enquiry was entrusted to revenue authorities and their decision would be final and binding between the parties. The jurisdiction of the civil court in this regard was ousted. This judgment, which is relied upon by the respondent, in our view, does not help the respondent. Undoubtedly, in respect of the enquiry which the revenue authorities are required to hold under the provisions of the said Act, the decision of the revenue authorities is final and binding. We are, however, concerned in the present case with the rights of the landlord to evict his tenant for non-payment of rent. The tenant in the present case has not been granted any patta by the revenue authorities in respect of the land. The decision of the revenue authorities, therefore, does not, in any manner, hinder the civil court from exercising its jurisdiction."
10. Once again, in the decision reported in A. Vanathan Muthuraja v. Ramalingam, , which was rendered on an appeal from a decision of this Court in respect of a claim arising under the Minor Inams Act, two learned Judges of the Apex Court held that the grant of patta under the Act, if had become filial, none of the other parties have any right, title and interest in the property and a civil suit is not maintainable. Their Lordships of the Apex Court held, after referring to State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, and Vatticherukuru Village panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, but without noticing the decision reported in R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elumalai Naicker, , and chose to apply and follow the decision reported in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori V. Deeksshihulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, that a civil suit is not maintainable and that by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil Court stood excluded. Their Lordships of the Apex Court observed as here under:-
3. The patta under Ex.B-l dated 28.2.1974 granted under Section 8(2)(ii) of the Act by the Tehsildar was confirmed. On appeal, it was confirmed which order has become final. Thus, the title to the property was vested in the institution and thereby, hone of the parties has any right, title and interest in the property. Therefore, the suit of the appellant without impleading the institution is not maintainable. Under Section 9 CPC, the Courts shall, subject to the provisions contained therein, have jurisdic tion to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits cognizance of which is either expressly or impliedly barred. When a legal rights infringed, a suit would lie unless there is a bar against entertainment of such civil suit and the civil courts would take cognizance of it. Therefore, the normal rule of law is that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance is either expressly or by necessary implication excluded. The rule of construction being that every presumption would be made in favour of the existence of & right and remedy in a democratic set-up governed by rule of law and jurisdic tion of the civil courts is assumed. The exclusion, would, therefore, normally be an exception. Courts generally construe the provisions strictly when jurisdiction of the civil courts is claimed to be excluded. However, in the development of civil adjudication of civil disputes, due to pendency of adjudication and abnormal delay at hierarchical stages, statutes intervene and provide alternative mode of resolution of civil disputes with less expensive but expeditious disposal. It is settled legal position that if a tribunal with limited jurisdiction cannot assume exclu sive jurisdiction and decide for itself the dispute conclusively, in such a situation, it is the court that is required to decide whether the Tribunal with limited jurisdiction and decided the dispute within its limits. It is settled law that when jurisdiction is conferred on a tribunal, the courts examine whether the essential principles of jurisdiction have been followed and decided by the tribunals leaving the decision on merits to the tribunal. It is also equally-settled legal position that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunal the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such a provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in con formity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Where there is an express bar of jurisdiction of the count, an examination of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes neces-sary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary that the statute creates a special right or liability and provides remedy for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be deter mined by the tribunal so constituted and the question whether remedies are normally associated with the action in civil courts or prescribed by the statutes or not require examination. Therefore, each case requires examination whether the statute provides right and remedy and whether the scheme of the Act is that the procedure provided will be conclusive and there by excludes the juris diction of the civil court in respect thereof.
After the advent of independence, the land reforms was one of the policies of the Government abolishing feudal system of land tenures and conferment of the ryotwari patta on the tiller of the soil. Thereby, the land reform laws extinguish pre-existing rights and create new rights under the Act. The Act provides for the jurisdiction of the tribunals in matters relating thereto and hierarchy of appeals/revisions are provided thereunder giving finality to the orders passed thereunder. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cogni zance of the suits of civil nature covered under the land reform laws stands excluded giving not only the finality to the decision of the tribunal but also ensuring disposal of the matters by the tribunal and making the ryotwari patta granted to the tiller of the soil conclusive. Under the normal course of civil procedure, the jurisdiction for the trial of the civil suits, in relation to the matters covered under the Acts, being time-con suming and tardy, and there being the lack of financial resources or otherwise incapacity to defend or want of knowledge of the parties as to their right, energy- sapping civil suits, with hierarchy of appeals are intended to be avoided. Obviously, therefore, the civil suits by necessary implication stand excluded unless the fundamental principles of proce dure are followed by the tribunals constituted under the land reform laws. In this case, the Act concerned extinguishes the pre-existing right, creates new rights under the Act and requires tribunals to enquire into the rival claims and a form of appeal has been provided against the order of the primary authority. Thereby, the right and remedy made conclusive under the Act are given finality by the orders passed under the Act. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil court stands excluded.
4. That apart, in view of the law laid down by this Court in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228 wherein entire case-law including the law laid down in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, was discussed, we held that the suit is not maintainable as held by the learned Single Judge".
11. In a recent pronouncement of the Apex Court reported in Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad, their Lordships of the Apex Court observed, after advertising to the decisions reported Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, that a mere grant of patta in favour of individuals under A.P. (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956, would not affect the Wakf character of the property and the finding rendered in settlement proceedings that the property was not a Wakf property would not constitute res judicata, so as to debar the Wakf Board from filing a suit of possession of such properties. It was held therein as here under:-
12. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit filed by the Wakf Board was not maintainable in view of Section 14 of the Inams Act. We having found that the property was a service inam granted to individuals burdened with service, which answered the de-scription of all the ingredients of wakf, the Tahsildar under Section 3 of the Inams Act, was ;not required to adjudicate as to whether it is a wakf property or not. His decision holding that the property is not a wakf property was not within his domain, and the decision could not be said to have been passed under the Inams Act. Decision or order contem plated presupposes an order passed within jurisdiction. Since the order passed by the Tahsildar has been found to be without jurisdiction, Section 14 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court would not be attracted in the subsequent suit. In the present case, since it was not within the domain of the Tahsildar to embark upon an enquiry in respect of wakf property, Section 14 of the Inams Act cannot affect the maintainability of the suit filed by the Wakf Board. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of this Court in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228 in support of his argument that by virtue of Section 14 of the Inams Act, the decision of the Tahsildar cannot be challenged in a subsequent suit. No doubt, in this case, it was held that the Inams Act gives finality to the orders and decisions given by the authorities, but it is not the case here. We have already held that the Tahsildar under Section 3 of the Inams Act was not competent to enquire into or give decision in respect of the character of the wake property, therefore the said decision is of no assistance to the argument of the learned counsel.
13. Lastly, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that once patta, under the Inams Act, having been granted in favour of Mok-hasadars, it was not open to the High Court to hold that the property was a wakf property. In other words, the argument seems to proceed on the basis that once patta has been granted under the Inams Act to Mok-hasadars, the land has ceased to be a wakf property. It may be stated that a wakf is a permanent dedication of property for purposes recognized by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and the property having been found as wakf always retain its character as a wakf. In other words, once a wakf would always a wakf and the grant of patta in favour of Mokhasadar under the Inams Act does not, in any manner, nullify the earlier dedication made of the property constituting the same as wakf. After a wakf has been created, it continues to be so for all time to come and further continues to be governed by the provisions of the Wakf Act and a grant of patta in favour of Mokhasadar does not affect the original character of the wakf property. We accordingly find no substance in the last argument of the learned counsel for the appellant.
12. In Samsuddin Rowther and another v. Avvammal and 2 others, 1992 (1) L.W. 207 Srinivasan, J. (as the learned Judge then was), had an occasion to deal with the question of jurisdiction of civil Courts to decide questions of title in respect of inams. That was a case arising under the Minor Inams Act. The learned Judge compared and analysed exhaustively the basic provisions contained in Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948 (Abolition Act) and Minor Inams Act (Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963) and observed that it is not as if the entire provisions in both the Acts are in pari materia. While pointing out the facts that in so far as the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Court is concerned, the Acts are undoubtedly in pari materia, His Lordship applied the ratio of the decision reported in Ramanujam Kavirayar, T.K. v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannathi Avargal, 1988 (2) L.W. 513 and that the subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228 has no application to the case on hand and that it is the earlier decision AIR State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, 1986 SC 794 alone would apply. It may be pointed out even at this stage that even in the decision reported in R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elumalai Naicker, , identical view has been taken by the Apex Court also, as noticed in the earlier part of this judgment.
13. In Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board, the Etc. v. Umar Salai Mohamed Salt and 38 others, 1993 (2) L.W. 663, a Division Bench of this Court also took a similar view holding that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide questions of title is not ousted by the provisions of the Minor Inams Act. In Palaniswamy Gounder and others v. Varadaraja Perumal Temple, Etc., 1997 (2) L.W. 343, a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Raju, J.) was a party and who authored the judgment of the Division Bench, applying the principles laid down in the" decision reported in Ramanujam Kavirayar, T.K. v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannathi Avargal, 1988 (2) L. W. 513, the right to move the civil Court for a declaration of title and the entitlement to patta by a plaintiff was upheld and liberties were granted to approach the civil Court, if the parties in the suit would desire. The very same view was taken by the same Division Bench in the decision reported in Ramzanshaw Thaikkal mosque & Others v. Asst. Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai & ors., 1997 (2) L.W. 892. In Krishna Chettiar v. Subbiah Ambalam, 1996 (I) M.L.J. 213, Thanikkachalam, J. (as the learned Judge then was), considered a similar question and applying the decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, , held that the jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be said to have been ousted in deciding the question of title.
14. We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel appearing on either side in the light of the catena of cases noticed supra by us and the principles laid down therein. A comparison of the provisions contained in the Abolition Act, the Inam Abolition Act as also the Minor Inams Act would go to show that the ultimate object of one or the other of these legislations is the introduction of ryotwari settlement in the areas covered and notified under the respective enactments, after abolishing existing land tenure and acquiring the rights of the landholders or inamdars concerned, who, under the system of land tenure which Was in vogue in these areas, were considered to be intermediaries in between the actual tiller of the soil and the State ad that the other provisions pertaining to the constitution of authorities, their powers, jurisdiction and the finality given to the orders passed, or incorporation of a provision in the nature of res judicata providing for the binding nature of the orders on the parties to the same and persons claiming under them in any suit or proceeding in a civil Court insofar as such matters are in issue between the parties or persons in such suit or proceeding, are almost identical and similar, except certain differences which, in our view, may not be that much relevant for the issue before us. Even while dealing with this aspect of the matter, the Supreme Court in the decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, observed that the powers of the statutory authority constituted under the Act are exercised in a. summary manner and the claims of occupants comes to be determined only incidentally and they cannot be equated with the civil Courts in respect of what they could do or the nature of relief that they could grant. A careful analysis of the scheme underlying these Abolition laws would go to show that the vesting on abolition under everyone of these legislations are subject to the pre-existing rights of the occupants, except in respect of what are known as public or communal properties, meant for common use and the grant of patta has been always considered and held to be in recognition of their pre-existing rights. The provisions relating to abolition and vesting of the properties do not have the effect of obliterating or destroying such pre-existing rights, if any, except in respect of public or communal properties and the rights which inhere are the basis and fundamental rights which entitle a person to preferentially get patta under these legislations and the same could not be equated to the grant of patta by way of assignment under the Revenue Standing Orders or under rules of assignment outside the scope of the statutory enactments. Similarly, a meticulous analysis of the scheme underlying the provisions of the Act dealing with the nature of rights dealt with by the various authorities, the manner in which such authorities adjudicate such rights and the consequences of such adjudication, disclose that they do not mean and even intended to be a substitute or alternate mode of resolution of the ordinary civil right of a citizen or for that matter persons asserting competing claim, in their attempt to project a claim for patta. Consequently, in our view, the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, , R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elumalai Naicker, and Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad, and that of a Division Bench of this Court in Ramanujam Kavirayar, T.K. v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannathi Avargal, 1988 (2) L.W. 513 and of a learned single Judge of this Court in Samsuddin Rowther and another v. Avvammal and 2 others, 1992 (1) L.W. 207 would squarely apply and govern the case and consequently, it has to be necessarily held that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts cannot be held to have been completely ousted or barred at any rate in respect of adjudication of claims of title and questions or issues which are not obliged or required to be adjudicated for the purposes of enforcement of these laws which has, as their objection and aim, to implement ryotwari settlement in the areas governed by them.
15. Further, the mere fact that the orders passed or decisions rendered under these Acts were given finality for the purposes of those Acts or that the issues, which they are obliged or required to be decided, when so decided are ordained to bind the parties to the proceedings or their privies and successors-in-interest applying the principles of res judicata, does not have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court once and for all. It is by now well settled that even in cases where finality is accorded to any decision or order, there are certain well settled exceptions and proved and existence of such exceptional factors, the Civil Court is entitled to nullify any or all such decisions. Similarly, even in cases where the principles of res judicata are rendered applicable, the jurisdiction of the competent Civil Court to go into the question and find out whether the necessary ingredients to apply the principles of res judicata exist in a given case or not cannot be denied to the Civil Courts and from the mere fact of according finality to the orders or decisions rendered under the Act or the application of the principles of res judicata, a total or complete bar or ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts for all and any purpose cannot be automatically inferred or implied. Before a plea of res judicata can be given effect to, it must be sufficiently pleaded and established that the litigating parties must be the same, that the subject matter of the suit and the other proceedings also are identical, that the questions arising in the suit and the other proceedings were directly and substantially in issue and the same was finally decided and that too by an authority or Court of competent jurisdiction.
16. On coming to know of the existence of an unreported decision of the Apex Court rendered by a Bench consisting of three of their Lordships, efforts were made to secure the same when the judgment in this case was under preparation and it was ascertained that in Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal v. Smt. T. Parvathi Ammal & Ots., . Their Lordships of the Apex Court by a judgment dated 20.2.1996, not only approved the earlier decision of the Apex Court reported in R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elumalai Naicker, and set their seal of approval to the principles laid down therein, but has categorically held in unmistakable terms with the decision in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228 has no application to the provisions or in respect of claims arising under the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963. Their Lordships of the Apex Court in coming to such a conclusion, held as follows:-
"The only question for decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit which was filed by the respondents. The trial Court decreed the suit. The First appellate Court set aside the decree taking the view that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was barred. In the second appeal filed by the present respondents, the High Court has restored the judgment and decree of the Trial Court taking the view that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was not barred.
The plea of exclusion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the title of the parties in the present case is based on the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inam (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963. This Court in a recent decision in R. Manickanaicker v. E. Elumalinaicker, , has clearly held that the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate title of the parties, is not barred by virtue of the provisions of the said Act. This is a direct decision of this Court on the provisions of the Act with which we are concerned for the appellant placed reliance on the decision in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu and Ors., 1991 (Supp.) 2 SCC 228. It is sufficient to observe that this decision relates to the provisions under a different Act of Andhra Pradesh. Moreover, in R.Manicknaicker, this decision relating to the provisions in the Andhra Pradesh Act was considered and distinguished. In view of the direct decision of this Court in R. Manicknaicker, there is no merit in this appeal. The appeal and the contempt petition are dismissed.
17. In view of the above unreported decision of the Supreme Court, the decision in A. Vanathan Muthuraja v. Ramalingam, , rendered without even referring to the earlier reported decision of the very same Court in R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elumalai Naicker, and the unreported decision of even a larger Bench directly arising under the Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963, cannot be said to lay down or declare the correct position of law or constitute a binding precedent.
18. For all the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to the Full Bench in the negative by holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for declaration of title and injunction is not barred by reason of the grant of patta under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963.
19 We direct the respective appeals to be posted before the learned single Judge concerned for the disposal of the appeals on merits in the light of the answer given on the reference made to the Full Bench. The cost in the appeals shall abide by the result of the appeals on merits.