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[Cites 18, Cited by 12]

Madras High Court

M.Banupriya vs M.Lakshmi on 1 October, 2012

Author: R.Subbiah

Bench: R.Subbiah

       

  

  

 
 
 In the High Court of Judicature at Madras
Dated 01.10.2012
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr.Justice R.SUBBIAH
Application Nos.1238 and 1457 of 2012
in
Civil Suit No.801 of 2011


M.Banupriya					..Plaintiff/Respondent

					.vs.

1. M.Lakshmi
2. M.Gopalakrishnan @ M.Gopi
3. P.S.Ravindran			    ..Applicant in A.1457/2012
4. M/s.HACIENDA REALTORS PVT.LTD.,
   rep.by its Managing Director
   Dr.G.Madusudhana Reddy,
   Old No.436, New No.766, Anna Salai,
   Chennai-600 035.

5. M/s.HAACIENDAA INFOTECH & REALTORS PVT.LTD.,
   rep.by its Director Mr.RM.Palaniappan,
   Rani Seethai Hall Building,
   603, Anna Salai, 5th Floor,
   Chennai-600 006.			    ..Applicant in A.1238/2012

6. M/s.NUZIVEEDU SEEDS LIMITED,
   No.905, Kanchunjanga Building,
   Barakhamba Road,
   Connaught Place,
   New Delhi-110 001.

7. M/.ZILLION ESTATES PVT.LTD.,
   6/12, Brodipet,
   Guntur,
   Andhra Pradesh.				..Defendatns





	For Plaintiff : Mr.R.Thiyagarajan

	For Defendants: Mr.P.T.Asha for 
				 M/s.Sarvabhauman Associates for D1 & D2

                     Mr.T.V.Ramanujan, Senior Counsel for
				 Mr.M.Narayanaswamy for D3				
				 Mr.Sathish Parasaran for D4 and D5

				 Mr.S.P.Meenakshi Sundaram for D6

 				 

				 

ORDER :

R.SUBBIAH, J., A.No.1238 of 2012 has been filed by 5th defendant to reject the plaint filed in C.S.No.801 of 2011 as against the 5th defendant.

A.No.1457 of 2012 has been filed by 3rd defendant to revoke the order of leave granted in Application No.5079 of 2011 dated 11.11.2011 in so far as against the 3rd defendant pertaining to C schedule properties mentioned in the plaint.

2. In A.No.1238 of 2012, 5th defendant is the applicant and plaintiff is the respondent. In A.No.1457 of 2012, 3rd defendant is the applicant and plaintiff and defendants 1, 2 and 4 to 7 are the respondents. For easy reference, parties are hereafter referred to as arrayed in the civil suit.

3. Before traversing through the averments made in the affidavits filed in both applications for revocation of the order of leave pertaining to 'C' schedule properties and for rejection of plaint, it would be appropriate to narrate brief facts about the case of plaintiff, as averred in the plaint, hereunder:

(a) Plaintiff filed the suit against the defendants numbering 7 for the following reliefs:
(i) to declare that the alleged registered Power of Attorney dated 07.12.2005 executed in favour of D2 in respect of Item No.1 of 'A' Schedule property is illegal and the transaction effected by virtue of the same is not binding upon the plaintiff;
(ii) to declare that the alleged settlement deed dated 21.12.2005 executed in favour of D1 by D2 in respect of item No.1 'A' schedule property is illegal and is not binding upon the plaintiff;
(iii) to declare that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of item No.2 of 'A' schedule property and to direct the defendants to deliver possession of the same;
(iv) to declare that the sale deed dated 24.02.2000 executed by D2 in favour of D3 in respect of item No.1 of 'C' schedule property as null and void and consequently direct D3 to deliver possession of the same to the plaintiff;
(v) to declare that the sale deed dated 24.02.2000 executed by D2 in favour of D3 in respect of item No.2 of 'C' Schedule property as null and void and consequently direct D3 to deliver possession of the same to the plaintiff;
(vi) to declare that the gift settlement deed dated 12.04.2000, registered as Doc.No.2601 of 2000 in the office of SRO., Neelankarai in favour of D1 in respect of agricultural lands, being a portion of 'B' schedule property is illegal and not binding upon the plaintiff;
(vii) to declare that the gift settlement deed dated 12.04.2000, registered as Doc.No.2602 of 2000 in the office of SRO., Neelankarai in favour of D1 in respect of agricultural lands, being a portion of 'B' schedule property is illegal and not binding upon the plaintiff;
(viii) to declare that the sale deed dated 11.06.2004 executed by D1 and D2 in the name of plaintiff and D1 in favour of D4 in respect of 'B' schedule property and consequently direct D1, D2 and D4 to deliver possession of the same to the plaintiff;
(ix) to declare that the lease deed dated 08.12.2006 entered into between D6 and D7 in respect of agricultural lands, being a portion of 'B' Schedule property is illegal and is not binding upon the plaintiff;
(x) to grant permanent injunction restraining D1 and D2 or their men from alienating, encumbering, or dealing with properties mentioned as items No.1 and 2 of 'A' schedule property;
(xi) to grant permanent injunction restraining D3 or his men from alienating, encumbering or dealing with the properties mentioned in 'C' schedule;
(xii) to grant permanent injunction restraining D4 to D7 or their men from alienating, encumbering or dealing with the properties mentioned in 'B' schedule; and
(xiii) to direct D1 and D2 to render true and proper accounts of the amounts realised on behalf of the plaintiff and also with regard to the investments, realisation of income derived therefrom, requiring settlement of accounts as the agents of the plaintiff.
(b) According to the plaintiff, she is the cine artist. D1 is her mother and D2 is her elder brother. Plaintiff was extremely busy in her work schedule. Hence, D2-elder brother has been handling the entire finances along with her mother-D1 and both of them used to regularly collect the remunerations and other emoluments payable to the plaintiff. Out of the money earned by the plaintiff, D1 and D2 purchased item No.1 of plaint schedule 'A' property, namely, land measuring to an extent of 4 grounds and 96 sq.ft.with building in the ground floor bearing old door No.14/8A, New No.4,Vijayaraghavachari Road, 1st Cross Street, T.Nagar, Chennai-17 for a sum of Rs.7 lakhs in the name of the plaintiff by a sale deed dated 24.11.1985, registered as Document No.3681/85 in the Office of SRO., T.Nagar,Chennai.
(c) On the very same day, item 2 of plaint 'A' schedule property i.e. first floor of the said premises having plinth area of about 2346 sq.ft.was purchased by D2 from and out of the funds of the plaintiff in the name of D1 for a sum of Rs.2 lakhs by a sale deed dated 24.11.1985 registered as Doc.No.3680 of 1985 in the office of SRO., T.Nagar, Chennai. Subsequently, during December 1987, plaint 'B' schedule property, measuring about 7.26 acres situated in Sholinganallur Village, Tambaram Taluk, Kancheepuram District, was purchased in the name of the plaintiff by D1 and D2 under 5 different sale deeds. Similarly, in the year 1989, plaint 'C' schedule property, namely, lands measuring about 4.25 acres situated in Semmencherry Village, Saidapet Taluk, Kancheepuram District was purchased in the name of the plaintiff by D1 and D2 from and out of the self acquired funds of plaintiff by three different sale deeds.
(d)On 28.08.1998, plaintiff granted power of attorney in favour of her elder brother-D2 by executing a General Power of Attorney Deed registered as Doc.No.848/98 in the office of the Sub-Registrar, T.Nagar, Chennai, to manage, administer and to safeguard her properties, which are described as schedule 'A', 'B' and 'C'.
(e) During January 2000, plaintiff came to know that D2 has been acting prejudicial to her interest and, hence, she decided to revoke the power of attorney deed granted by her in respect of suit schedule properties. In the meantime, plaintiff came to understand that D2, as the power agent of plaintiff, sold 'C' schedule property measuring 4.25 acres situated in Semmencheri village in favour of D3 - P.S.Ravindran. That apart, D2, by virtue of power deed, executed two gift deeds in favur of his mother-D1, by settling 'B' schedule property measuring 7.26 acres by two different settlement deeds.
(f) It is the contention of the plaintiff that no specific power was given to D2 in the power of attorney deed dated 28.08.1998 to execute the said settlement deeds in favour of D1 and as such, they are not valid and binding upon the plaintiff. Subsequently, plaintiff had duly cancelled the power of attorney deed dated 28.08.1998 executed in favour of D2 by a Deed of Cancellation dated 22.05.2000. Thereafter, plaintiff when applied for encumbrance certificate in respect of suit properties, to her shock and dismay, she noticed that D1, in favour of whom D2 executed two settlement deeds in respect of 'B' schedule property situated in Sholinganallur Village, had sold the same to D4-M/s.HACIENDA REALTORS PVT.LTD., for a valuable consideration of Rs.1,59,72,000/- in and by a sale deed dated 11.06.2004, registered as Document No.3256 of 2004 in the office of Sub-Registrar, Neelankarai, Chennai, claiming herself as the sole and absolute owner of the said property. D4 had also purchased certain other lands measuring 80 cents in and by a sale deed dated 09.06.2004 executed by D2, as power agent of plaintiff. Later, D4 had transferred certain lands purchased by them from D1 including the land measuring about 1.57 acres comprised in 'B' schedule property in favour of D5-M/s.HAACIENDAA INFOTECH & REALTORS PVT.LTD, who, in turn, entered into an Exchange Deed dated 07.12.2005 with D6-M/s.Nuziveedu Seeds Limited in respect of 4.15 acres including the land belonging to the plaintiff measuring about 1.57 acres situated in 'B' schedule property. Subsequently, D6 entered into a lease deed dated 08.12.2006, whereby the land measuring about 1.57 acres forming part of 7.26 acres of land situate in Sholinganallur Village, described as 'B' schedule property for 29 years with D7-M/s.Zillion Estates Pvt.Ltd. Plaintiff came to know that after revocation of power of attorney deed dated 28.08.1998, D2 created a fresh power of attorney deed alleged to have been granted by the plaintiff on 07.12.2005.
(g) It is the main submission of the plaintiff that the said documents were brought out by fraud and forgery by D1 and D2 in collusion and connivance with each other and D3 to D7, and hence, all the conveyances are illegal, invalid and not binding upon the plaintiff or her properties. Hence, the present suit filed for the reliefs as stated supra.

4. Along with the plaint, plaintiff filed A.No.5079 of 2011 to grant leave to her to institute the intending suit as against D6 and D7 since they are residing outside the jurisdiction of this Court and also as against immovable properties situated in schedule 'B' and 'C', which are situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court. This application was allowed by this Court on 11.11.2011. Similarly, plaintiff filed another application in A.No.6065 of 2011 to permit her to unite and join the several causes of action as against the defendants, who are jointly interested in the subject of the suit, in one comprehensive suit and permit her to file a single suit as against the defendants. This application was also ordered on 28.12.2011.

5. On appearance, D3 - P.S.Ravindran filed an application in A.No.1457 of 2012 for revocation of leave granted in A.No.5079 of 2011 dated 11.11.2011 as against D3 in respect of 'C' schedule property. It has been averred in the affidavit that in the suit filed by the plaintiff as against D3, namely, declaration to declare the sale deed dated 24.02.2000 as null and void, recovery of possession, and permanent injunction in respect of 'C' schedule property is nothing but a "suit for land". That being so, plaintiff cannot institute the suit before this Court and seek leave under clause 12 of Letters Patent because the suit is one for land. According to Clause 12 of Letters Patent, to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, land or property shall be situated within the jurisdiction of this Court. If the land or property is situated entirely outside the jurisdiction irrespective of the place of the residence of the defendant, then this Court will not have a jurisdiction to entertain the suit. So far as items 1 and 2 of 'C' schedule of property are concerned, they are situated within the jurisdiction of Kancheepuram District and not within the jurisdiction of this Court. Since the suit is a suit for determination of title of land and for recovery of possession and also for permanent injunction, reliefs sought for in the plaint would directly affect the title and possession of the land by D3. Therefore, the suit ought to have been instituted in a court which is having proper jurisdiction over the land and property. Further, plaintiff is abusing the process of law by filing a suit before this Court, which Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The sale deed was executed in favour of D3 for a valid sale consideration by registered documents No.807 and 1666 of 2000 dated 24.02.2000. The suit has been filed only in the year 2011 i.e.11 years after the date of execution. Therefore, the suit is hit by limitation. Thus, he prays for revocation of leave granted as against him pertaining to 'C' schedule property.

6. Resisting the application filed by D3, Plaintiff filed a counter stating that the present suit has been filed by her as against her mother and brother, who have colluded and connived together, and brought out various fraudulent alienations/conveyances as against the plaintiff. Suit has been laid by the plaintiff on discovery of fraud committed by D1 and D2 in collusion and connivance with other defendants and the fraud came to light only in March, 2011 and the suit has been filed in September, 2011. One of the reliefs sought for is to restrain D3 from alienating 'C' schedule property. The said prayer cannot be characterised as a suit for land. D2, who is the power of attorney agent of plaintiff, had conveyed the property in favour of D3, who resides within the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, it cannot be contended by any stretch of imagination that this Court shall not decide the lis between the plaintiff and D3.

7. It is the further case of the plaintiff that Power of attorney, on the basis of which D1 and D2 had entered into fraudulent transaction with other defendants, had taken place only within the jurisdiction of this Court and subsequently outside the jurisdiction of this Court and the sale deeds relating to suit properties have been registered at a later date by virtue of power of attorney granted in favour of D2, who purported to have created certain conveyance in favour of D1. Plaintiff is not seeking control over the properties situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court. When the properties are scattered under different jurisdiction and the transactions have originated by virtue of original power of attorney created by D1 and D2, through which alienations have been made in favour of third parties, such transactions had taken place within the jurisdiction of this Court and hence, this Court alone shall have jurisdiction to decide the same. Similarly, D1 to D5 are residing/carrying on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. D6 and D7 are concerned, D6 is at New Delhi and D7 is at Andhra Pradesh. Inasmuch as the major part of cause of action had arisen before this Court, both this Court as well as the Principal District court, Chengalpattu shall have jurisdiction. In such circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction to decide the lis between the parties. Hence, this application is liable to be dismissed.

8. In the affidavit filed in Application No.1238 of 2012 filed for rejection of plaint, it has been stated by D5 that D4 and D5 are not two distinct entities but are one and the same. Schedule 'B' was purchased by D5 for a valuable consideration of Rs.1.60 crores as early as on 11.06.2004, which is a part of large extent of land measuring approximately 60 acres and since then, they are in peaceful occupation of the same. The present suit filed by the plaintiff is ex-facie not maintainable and the plaint is liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation. Present suit has been filed after lapse of 11 years, well beyond the period of 3 years as stipulated under Limitation Act. Admittedly, plaintiff had appointed D2 as her power agent on 28.08.1998 and the same was cancelled only on 22.05.2000, by which time Schedule 'B' property was admittedly settled in favour of D1. Since no steps have been taken immediately after cancelling the power granted to D2, all acts done by D2 under the power of attorney during its continuance stands confirmed and cannot be questioned by her after a lapse of over 11 years. It is settled law that suit for land ought to be filed within the jurisdiction of the Court where the subject land is situated and not where the party is residing.

9. It is the allegation of the plaintiff that D2 - her brother did not have authority to alienate the suit properties on her behalf and that he had defrauded and cheated the plaintiff worth crores of rupees. It is the further allegation that the power of attorney granted in favour of D2 was revoked due to suspicion of fraud and that D2 forged documents in order to alienate the plaintiff's property. But it is apparent from the allegations that suit is nothing but a fraudulent collusive attempt of plaintiff, D1 and D2 to deprive bona fide purchasers of properties like D5 and the same would constitute a gross abuse of process of law. D1 and D2 have been residing with the plaintiff in the same residence at the time of alleged fraud and continue to do so despite the filing of the present suit. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground. Moreover, the suit is not properly valued.

10. Plaintiff has filed counter with similar averments in the counter filed in A.No.1452 of 2012. Apart from that, it has been stated that suit has been filed within three years from the date of discovery of fraud. Therefore, the suit is filed within the period of limitation as contemplated under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. D2, who is none other than the brother of plaintiff, had acted detrimental to the interest of the plaintiff by misusing powers conferred upon him by virtue of the power of attorney deed instead of protecting and preserving her rights relating to the property. Similarly, plaintiff's mother had also joined the brother in bringing out the fraudulent documents. Sale deed executed by D1 came to light only in March 2011 when plaintiff discovered the fraud committed by him. A meaningful reading of the entire plaint would reveal valid, tenable and plausible causes of action for institution of the suit. Cause of action is a bundle of actions which would be demonstrated at the time of trial of the suit by producing oral and documentary evidence on her behalf and the plaint cannot be cut into parts to suit the convenience of D5 and reject the plaint partly and direct the plaintiff to claim the other reliefs as against the respective defendants by way of separate suit. Plaintiff is not a party to any of the transactions and her power of attorney agent has colluded and connived with the purchasers without her consent or authority. No case has been made out to reject the plaint and thus, prayed for the dismissal of the suit.

11. Mr.T.V.Ramanujan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for D3 submitted that D3 is concerned about 'C' schedule property, which consists items 1 and 2. 'C' schedule property is totally measuring about 4.25 acres situated in Semenjeri Village i.e. outside the jurisdiction of this Court. D3 has purchased the property by two sale deeds dated 24.02.2000 from D2, who is the power of attorney agent of the plaintiff. Suit has been filed for a declaration to declare the two sale deeds through which D3 had purchased the property from D2 as null and void and consequently for permanent injunction restraining D3 from alienating or encumbering the said property. By seeking the prayer of declaration and injunction, plaintiff is claiming control over the property. Therefore, the present suit is only for suit for land. Since the suit property is situated outside the jurisdiction, leave granted by this Court is liable to be revoked. Under Clause 12 of Letters Patent, no leave could be granted if the entire suit property is situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon the judgments reported in Adcon Electronics Pvt.Ltd., .vs. Daulate and another (2001(4) CTC 39) and Parameswari Veluchamy and others .vs. T.R.Jayaraman and others (2002(1) CTC 134) in support of his contention.

12. Further the transactions held by D2, the power agent of the plaintiff and D3 with other defendants are in no way inter-linked with each other. Source of title of D3 is different from the source of title of other defendants. Cause of action against each defendant is separate and distinct. Under such circumstances, filing of a single suit against all defendants is not permissible in law. In such a situation, plaintiff is not entitled to seek clause 14 of Letters of Patent for joinder of cause of action.

13. Learned senior counsel for D3 further submitted that only in the event of plaintiff gives up her prayer of declaration and recovery of possession of land, this court will have jurisdiction. If the prayers of declaration and injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with possession are given up, then it cannot be said that it is a suit for land. In this regard, the learned senior counsel has relied on the decisions reported in A.C.Subba Reddy .vs. Jawahar International Trading Corporation Company (2008(4) CTC 160). Further, by relying upon the decision reported in Rev.Noble Gambeeran and others .vs. Peter P.Ponnan (1999-1-L.W.300) learned senior counsel has submitted that filing suit in a Court not having jurisdiction would amount to abuse of process of the Court and the very plaint itself could be struck off from the file of Court. Under such circumstances, leave granted is liable to be revoked.

14. Mr.Sathish Parasaran, learned counsel appearing for D5 (A.No.1238 of 2012) submitted that a close reading of clause 12 of Letters Patent, under which clause, plaintiff had obtained ex parte leave, would clearly show that this Court has jurisdiction to determine the suit for land, only if such land is situated within the jurisdiction of this Court. As far as D5 is concerned, he had purchased 'B' schedule property from D1 - mother of the plaintiff in the year 2004. The said property is situated within the Panchayat limits of Sholinganallur Village, Tambaram Taluk, Kancheepuram District, which is situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The present suit is filed for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of 'B' schedule property also. The prayers (vi), (vii), (viii), and (xii) pertaining to this defendant. The present suit for declaration and permanent injunction is a suit for land. When it is a suit for land, whether the cause of action for filing the suit arose within the jurisdiction of this Court or not or whether the defendants are residing within the jurisdiction of this Court are immaterial. When the land is situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court, the plaint is liable to be rejected. In this regard, the learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in Adcon Electronics Pvt.Ltd., .vs. Daulate and another (2001) 7 SCC 698) and Dhanasekar, S.K.J. .vs. S.V.S.Jawaharlal (2002(4) CTC 653). Learned counsel further submitted that even assuming and without admitting that the plaintiff gives up her claim for possession in the suit, the relief of declaration sought for by the plaintiff would affect D5's title to Schedule 'B' property and the suit would still be a suit for land. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied on the decisions reported in the case of Mooji Jaitha and Co., .vs. The Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills (AIR 1950 Federal Court 83) and Begum Sabiha Sultan .vs. Nawab Mohd.Mansur Ali Khan and others ((2007) 4 SCC 343).

15. Learned counsel further submitted that it is the specific averment that the plaintiff executed a power of attorney in favour of D2, his brother, on 28.08.1998. Further in the plaint, it is stated that plaintiff had cancelled the power of attorney on 22.05.2000 when D2 was acting prejudicial to the interest of the plaintiff. The said allegation would show that the plaintiff was aware of the alleged transaction of the brother as early as in the year 2000. So far as D5 is concerned, he had purchased the property from D2 directly in the year 2004; but the suit was filed in the year 2011 i.e.after 11 years from the date of knowledge. Therefore, the suit is hit by limitation. On that ground, the suit is liable to be rejected. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon the decisions reported in Ramanathapuram Market Committee, Virudhunagar .vs. East Omdoa Corporation (1989 L.W.426) Narne Ramamurthy .vs. Ravula Somasundaram and others ((2005) 6 SCC 614) and Appasamy Real Estates Ltd., .vs. Neelayathatchi Ammal and others (2005-3-L.W.152).

16. Ms.Asha, learned counsel appearing for D1 and D2 submitted that D1 had alienated 'C' schedule property in favour of D3 only on the power of attorney granted dated 28.08.1998 executed by the plaintiff. Similarly, by the strength of power of attorney, D2 executed two settlement deeds dated 24.02.2000 in respect of 'B' schedule property in favour of his mother, who, in turn, sold the same to D5. The power of attorney was cancelled only on 22.05.2000 i.e.subsequent to the alienation of 'B' and 'C' schedule properties. Even on the date of cancellation, plaintiff is fully aware about the alienation of properties in favour of D3 and D5. In this regard, by inviting the attention of this Court to the legal notice dated 24.05.2000 issued by plaintiff to D2, learned counsel submitted that the contents of the notice would show that even as early as in the year 2000, plaintiff had the knowledge about the transactions, and, hence, the suit is hopelessly bared by limitation.

17. Countering the submissions, Mr.R.Thyagarajan, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that this Court had granted leave in A.No.5079 of 2012 by considering the judgment reported in the case of Giridhar, A. .vs. A.Suresh (1988-2-L.W.308). Further, by relying upon the judgment reported in Bank of Madurai Ltd, .vs. Balaramadass & Brothers and others (AIR 1985 Madras 1), the learned counsel submitted that the dictum laid down in the judgment would show that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the suit when the defendants are residing within its territorial jurisdiction, irrespective of the place of the immovable property and the nature of suit.

18. So far as the present case is concerned, 'A' schedule property is situated within the jurisdiction of this Court. D1 to D5 are residing within the jurisdiction of this Court except D6 and D7 against whom leave was obtained by the plaintiff. Further, by relying upon the judgments reported in D.Ramachandran .vs. R.V.Janakiraman and others ((1999)(3) SCC 267, Prem Chand Vijay Kumar .vs. Yashpal Singh and another ((2005) 4 SCC 417), Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd., .vs. Hanuman Seva Trust and Others ((2006) 5 SCC 658) and C.Natarajan .vs. Ashim Bai and another (AIR 2008 SC 363), learned counsel submitted that in the instant case, it is the specific allegation that D1 and D2 by collusion and connivance among themselves had alienated the properties to D3 and D5 and other defendants. In that situation, plaintiff cannot expect to go to different courts to file different suits where the properties are situated. Therefore, plaintiff filed an application for joinder of cause of action since the entire transaction is based on fraud committed by D1 and D2. This Court has also ordered the application filed by the plaintiff for joinder of cause of action and the same is legally sustainable. Learned counsel further submitted that the cause of action is bundle of actions and those causes of actions as pleaded by the plaintiff can be established only by letting in oral and documentary evidence at the time of trial.

19. With regard to limitation, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that it is a mixed question of facts and law and the same could be determined only at the time of trial. Hence, on the ground of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected. In this regard, he relied on the decision reported in C.Natarajan .vs. Ashim Bai and another (AIR 2008 SC 363). Further, learned counsel submitted that it is incorrect to state that there is abuse of process of court to attract the mischief under Order 6 Rule 16 C.P.C. Admittedly the suit filed by the plaintiff would not fall within that category. Therefore, the question of striking off the plaint does not arise in this case. Thus, he prays for the dismissal of both applications.

20. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

21.In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, the points that arise for consideration are, Whether the suit is a 'suit for land'? If so, whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the said suit ?

Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected on the ground of misjoinder of cause of action ?

Whether the suit is liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation?

Whether the suit is liable to be struck off for abuse of process of Court?

22. Point with regard to Jurisdiction: It is the case of the plaintiff that D1 and D2 had purchased item 1 of 'A' schedule property, land measuring to an extent of 4 grounds and 96 sq.ft.,with superstructure in the ground floor at Vijayaraghavachari Road, T.Nagar, in the name of plaintiff on 24.11.1985 out of the income earned by her. On the very same day, item 2 of 'A' schedule property, namely, first floor in the said premises having plinth area of about 2346 sq.ft., was purchased in the name of D1, the mother of the plaintiff. Subsequently, 'B' schedule property situated at Sholinganallur Village, Tambaram Taluk and 'C' schedule property situated at Semmenchery Village, Kancheepuram District were purchased by the plaintiff through her Power Agent i.e. D2 in the years 1987 and 1989 respectively. It is the main allegation of the plaintiff that 'C' schedule property was sold by D2 to D3, by misusing the power of attorney granted to him. That apart, it is the specific allegation of the plaintiff that D2 had settled 'B' property in favour of his mother-D1 by two settlement deeds dated 12.04.2000. Hence, the plaintiff had cancelled the power of attorney given to D2 by deed of cancellation dated 22.05.2000. Since 'B' schedule property was allegedly settled in favour of D1, she had sold the same to D5 in the year 2004. Hence, in the year 2011, she has filed the present suit for declaring the sale deeds in respect of 'B' schedule property executed in favour of D3 and 'C' schedule property executed in favour of D5 as null and void and also for declaration to declare the settlement deeds executed in favour of the mother as null and void, before this Court since 'A' schedule property is situated within the jurisdiction of this Court and D1 to D5 are residing within the jurisdiction of this Court and hence, according to the plaintiff, suit is maintainable before this Court.

23. It is the core submission of the plaintiff that she had obtained leave of this Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent considering the judgment reported in Giridhar, A. .vs. A.Suresh (1988-2-L.W.308). Therefore, the suit is maintainable. That apart, the properties were sold by way of defrauding the plaintiff and by misusing the power of attorney deed. Hence, part of cause of action also arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, no infirmity could be found in the leave granted by this Court. But it is the submission of D3 and D5 that if the land is situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court and the suit is for recovery of possession, then the suit is one for 'suit for land'. Under such circumstances, no leave could be granted under clause 12 of Letters Patent. Plaintiff has to approach the concerned court within the jurisdiction where the property is situated.

24. In order to appreciate these submissions, it would be appropriate to refer the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for D3 and D5. In Adcon Electronics Pvt.Ltd.'s case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a "Suit for land" is triable under Clause 12 of Letters Patent if the other conditions thereunder are fulfilled. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:

"Thus, it is clear that under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction will have power to receive, try and determine: (1) suits for land or other immovable property if such property is situated within the local limits of original jurisdiction of the High Court; or (2) all other cases (a) if the cause of action has arisen wholly within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court; (b) if prior leave of the Court has been obtained and the cause of action has arisen in part within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court; or (c) if the defendant dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within such limits".

25. In S.K.J.Dhanasekar's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows:

"4. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court in a recently reported case which is directly in point here. That is the case of Adcon Electronics Pvt.Ltd v. Daulut, 2001(4)CTC 39 : 2001 (7) SCC 690. At paragraph 7 of the judgment clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court has been set out. That clause is in pari materia with clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court. In paragraph 9 of that judgment, the Court set out its analysis of the clause in the following terms:
....
5. It is thus clear that clause 12 refers only to two classes of case one suits relating to lands to other immovable properties, and the second, cases other than those relating to land or other immovable property. The dwelling of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court or the cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the court whether in whole or in part will be relevant only in cases where the subject matter of the suit is not land or other immovable property.
6. The decision of this Court in Bank of Madurai Ltd v. Balramadoss and Bros, AIR 1985 Mad.1 must be held been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court by the said judgment. We may also record that we do not find ourselves in agreement with the analysis of clause 12 made in the judgments of this Court reported in Bank of Madurai Ltd v. Balramadoss and Brs, AIR 1985 Mad.1".

From a reading of the above judgments, it is clear that clause 12 refers only two classes; (i) suit relating to lands or other immovable properties and the second, cases other than those relating to land or other immovable properties. If it is not a 'suit for land' and if part of cause of actin arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, then leave could be granted under clause 12 of Letters Patent. Similarly, if it is a 'suit for land' and if the said land is situated within the jurisdiction of this Court, then this Court can entertain the suit. If the suit is 'suit for land' and if the property is situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court, even if the part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, the Original Side jurisdiction of this Court cannot entertain the suit. Hence, the present suit is not maintainable on the Original Side of this Court, since admittedly schedule 'B' and 'C' properties are situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the contention of learned counsel for plaintiff that D1 to D5 are residing within the jurisdiction of this Court and part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court has no merits.

26. The next question falls for consideration is, whether the present suit is a "suit for land" or not. As far as the present case is concerned, suit is filed for declaration to declare the sale deeds executed in favour of D3 and D5 as null and void. Therefore, if the prayer of declaration is allowed, that would affect the defendants title to the suit properties. Under such circumstances, it has to be construed as "suit for land". In this regard, an useful reference could be placed in the judgment relied on by D5 in AIR (37) 1950 Federal Court 83 (supra), wherein it has been held as follows:

"26. The Advocate General, on behalf of the respondents, further urged that even if the appellant's contention on the interpretation of the first part of Cl.12 Letters Patent, were accepted the Court had still jurisdiction to try the suit and deal with prayers (a) and (b) by reason of the defendants carrying on business within the limits of the Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Although the appeal could be disposed of on the conclusion mentioned above, I shall express my opinion in respect of this contention, as it was fully argued before us. To decide this point, it is necessary to consider whether the last alternative in Cl.12, Letters Patent, which refers to the residence of the defendant or his carrying on business within the limits of the Court's original jurisdiction, is a provision which applies to suits of every description, including suits for land, or whether it applies "to all other cases", i.e.other than suits for land only. It is not disputed that the decisions of the Calcutta, Madras and Bombay High Courts treat this provision as an alternative, having reference only to the words "all other cases". "The construction put on this clause by the Courts therefore is that suits are divided between suits for land, where jurisdiction is founded on the situation of the land, and "all other cases" where the jurisdiction is based either on the accrual of the cause of action, wholly or in part, or alternatively on the residence of the defendant within the local limits of ordinary original jurisdiction of the Court. If these decisions are based on an erroneous interpretation of law, they cannot be held binding; but this Court will naturally be slow to disturb the uniform view of all these Courts which has prevailed for several decades in the past, unless the words of the Statute compel a different view. In my opinion, the words used in the clause do not compel the Court to accept the respondent's argument. It may be notified that the language of Cl.12 in the Letters Patent of 1862 was quite clear on this point. In that clause, the provision relating to the residence of the defendant was applicable only to cases other than suits for land. In amending the Letters Patent in 1865, the object was to give jurisdiction in regard to suits, other than those for land, not only when the cause of action arose wholly within the jurisdiction of the Court but also when it arose in part. In making the amendment, a change in the language became necessary and the whole argument of the respondents is based on the addition of the word "if" put after "or" and before the words "the defendant" in the last alternative. I do not think this change in the language necessarily prevents the last alternative from referring to "other cases" and makes it an alternative clause applicable to all suits. If the respondents' contention were accepted, it will mean that the legislature wanted to allow the High Court on its original side, merely because the defendant resided within the jurisdiction of the Court, to decide all questions of whatsoever nature, wherever the subject matter was, and wherever the cause of action arose. The Court will naturally hesitate to accept such a sweeping change in the legislative policy, if the alternative construction, which maintains the well-accepted principle of jurisprudence, could be properly sustained. In my opinion, it is not necessary to read the clause as contended by the respondents and this contention of the respondents must be rejected.
........
47. ...... the expression "suit for land" covers the following three classes of suits: (1) suits for the determination of title to land; (2) suits for possession of land; and (3) other suits in which the reliefs claimed, if granted, would directly affect title to or possession of land". (Emphasis supplied) The dictum laid down in the said judgment fortified the submission made by learned counsel for D3 and D5 that if the land is situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court and if suit is filed on the original jurisdiction of this Court for declaration of title of the suit, the said suit is only a "suit for land" and if the declaration prayer is granted, it would affect the defendants' title to the suit properties. Under such circumstances, the suit is maintainable only before the Court under whose jurisdiction the land is situated.

27. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon a judgment reported in 1988-3-L.W.308 (supra), wherein it has been held that it is well established that "even though a part of the land or immovable property is situated within such limits and part outside the limits, if leave has been first obtained, a suit for such land or immovable property can be entertained by the High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction". The factual aspects of that case would show that the suit was for partition of house property in Madras City and agricultural lands situated outside. In the suit for partition, right of the co-owners is involved in all the properties situated within the jurisdiction of this Court as well as properties outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, this court had granted leave under clause 12. Since the factual aspects of that case are totally different the said judgment cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case.

28. Another judgment relied upon by the plaintiff is that AIR 1985 Madras 1 (supra), wherein it has been held as follows:

"Madras Court has full jurisdiction to hear a suit when the defendants reside within its territorial jurisdiction, irrespective of the place of the immovable property and the nature of suit".

But subsequently, the Supreme Court in Adcon Electronics Pvt.Ltd v. Daulut, (2001(4)CTC 39) has clearly held that in a suit for land or other immovable property if such property is situated outside the local limits of original jurisdiction of the High Court, such suit is not maintainable. The Division Bench of this Court in 2002(4) CTC 653 (supra), by referring the judgment reported in Adcon's case, held that the decision of this Court in Bank of Madurai Ltd.,.vs. Balramadoss and Bros. (AIR 1985 Mad 1) had been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court and as such they are not inclined to accept the submission made by the appellant based on the judgment reported in AIR 1985 Madras 1. Therefore, I am of the opinion that if it is a suit for land, whether cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court or not is immaterial. If the relief sought for by the plaintiff leads a control over the land situated outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, then the suit is not maintainable on the Original Side of the High Court. In the instant case, as observed above, suit for declaration would affect the title of the defendants. Hence, the present suit is 'suit for land' and is not maintainable before this Court.

29. Point with regard to Misjoinder of Cause of action:It is the contention of D3 and D5 that cause of action between the plaintiff and each of the defendants is distinct and separate. Therefore, the question of combining cause of action does not arise in the case of this nature. Per contra, it is the submission of plaintiff that the plaint cannot be cut into pieces and the entire averments made in the plaint have to be read as a whole and the Court has to necessarily find out whether the plaint gives rise to a valid and plausible cause of action or not. If the entire allegations give rise to a valid cause of action, then no infirmity could be found in the relief seeking joinder of cause of action.

30. In order to appreciate this submission, it would be appropriate to narrate the allegations found in the plaint:

Plaintiff, D1 and D2 have purchased items 1 and 2 of schedule 'A' property in the year 1985 out of income earned by the plaintiff.
During 1987, plaint 'B' schedule property measuring to an extent of 7.26 acres situated in Sholinganallur village was purchased by way of separate sale deeds by D1 and D2 in the name of plaintiff.
In the year 1989, schedule 'C' property was purchased in the name of plaintiff by way of three separate sale deeds by D1 and D2.
Plaintiff executed power of attorney in favour of her brother - D2 on 28.08.1998. Thereafter, D1 executed two settlement deeds dated 12.04.2000 settling 'B' schedule property in favour of D1.
D2, the power agent of the plaintiff, had sold 'C' schedule property to D3 by two sale deeds dated 24.02.2000.
Subsequently, plaintiff had cancelled the power of attorney deed dated 28.08.1998 on 22.05.2000.
D1, in favour of whom Schedule 'B' schedule property was settled, alienated the same to D4 in the year 2004.
Suit was filed in the year 2011 stating that D1 and D2 colluded with each other and alienated the suit properties belonging to the plaintiff to the defendants without her knowledge.

31. A careful reading of the said averments would show that the allegation against each defendant is separate and distinct and not inter-related to each other. But it is the contention of plaintiff that since D2 had sold the property by misusing the power of attorney deed given to him, that would give rise to cause of action as against all the defendants. But I am unable to appreciate this submission made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff because there is no inter-connection between the defendants and the transactions, which they had with the Power Agent of the plaintiff, namely, D2. Therefore, on the allegation of collusion between D1 and D2, a single suit cannot be filed as against all the defendants.

32. The question of combining cause of action would arise only between the same set of defendants. In the instant case, if the averments of the plaint are taken into consideration as a whole, we find, absolutely there is no connection between the defendants and the transactions which they had with the power agent of the plaintiff. In these circumstances, umpteen judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiff cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case because the factual aspects of those cases would reveal that there is some connection between the defendants in having transaction with the plaintiff.

33. In fact, from the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff reported in the case of Shew Narayan Singh .vs. Brahmanand Singh and Others (AIR (37) 1950 Calcutta 479), I find in that case, plaintiff had instituted a suit as against one Ram Narain Singh for damages for breach of contract, alleging that Ram Narain Singh had entered into a contract with him agreeing to supply him with 10 lakhs of manufactures bricks in return for 250 tons of coal which the plaintiff would supply to him. Though plaintiff carried out his part of contract; but the said Ram Narain Singh in collusion with one Bindeswari Singh removed a large number of bricks which were manufactured by Ram Narain Singh for the purpose of contract. In spite of repeated demands made, Ram Narain Singh refused to perform his part of the contract and the plaintiff claimed damages to the extent of Rs.20,000/- for breach of the contract. Thereafter, plaintiff came to know that Ram Narain Singh conspired with other persons and pursuant to that, he broke the contract and hence, he filed an amended plaint by alleging this conspiracy and by adding the said Bindeswari Singh and other persons as defendants in the suit. In the said background of the facts, it has been held by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in its judgment as follows:

"18. ....It is true that the claim against defendant 1 is based on the breach of a contractual right while the claim against the other defendants is based on the breach of a common law right, but the right to relief is available in respect of both sets of defendants because the contractual right has been infringed. If it had not been infringed no question of tort would arise. In such a case one suit against all is in my opinion permissible.".

34. In my considered opinion, the factual facts in the said case are totally different from the case on hand. The factual aspect of the present case would show that the main allegation of the plaintiff is that there was a fraud between D1 and D2. Other defendants have no connection with each other. In fact, D3 and D5 do not know each other. Absolutely there is no connection between them. Under such circumstances, the question of combining cause of action does not arise in this case. Therefore, on this ground also, the plaint is liable to be rejected.

35. Point with regard to Limitation: According to the plaintiff, she came to know about the fraud committed by D1 and D2 only when she applied for encumbrance certificate during March-April 2011. Therefore, immediately she had filed the suit and as such, the suit is not hit by limitation. In para 14 of the plaint, plaintiff had alleged that she came to know that her brother, the power of attorney agent has been acting prejudicial to the interest of the plaintiff on the strength of the power of attorney granted to him. Hence, she had cancelled the power of attorney on 22.05.2000 itself.

36. It is to be noted that according to D1 and D2, plaintiff was aware of the entire transaction as early as in the year 2000. Therefore, it is apparent from the averments made in the plaint, plaintiff was aware of the entire transaction even in the year 2000 itself. Moreover, it could be seen from the cause title that plaintiff, D1 and D2 are residing under the same roof. For this, it is the submission of the plaintiff that the plea of limitation is mixed question of facts and law and, as such, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold stage and the same can be decided only at the time of trial.

37. But I am of the opinion that when it is apparently clear from the averments of the plaint that the suit has been filed beyond the period of limitation, then the plaint could be rejected even at the threshold stage. At this stage, it would be apt to rely on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Hardesh Ores Pvt.Ltd., and another .vs. Hede and Company ((2007) 5 MLJ 187 (SC) gives a fitting answer for this issue and the relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:

"21. The language of Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. is quite clear and unambiguous. The plaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation only where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be bared by any law. Mr.Nariman did not dispute that "law" within the meaning of clause(d) of Order VII Rule 11 must include the law of limitation as well. It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the paint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is whether the averments made in the plaint if taken to be correct in their entirety a decree would be passed. The averments made in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII is applicable. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. As observed earlier, the language of clause (d) is quite clear but if any authority is required, one may usefully refer to the judgments of this Court in Liverpool & London S.P.& I Association Ltd., .vs. M.V.Sea Success I and Another (2004) 9 SCC 512 and Popat and KotechaProperty v. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510".

38. A reading of the above paragraphs would show that when it is apparent from the averments made in the plaint and the materials that the suit is filed beyond the limitation period, then the same is liable to be rejected. As per the provisions under Order VII Rule 11(d), where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law, then the plaint is liable to be rejected. The wordings 'any law' envisaged in Order VII Rule 11(d) includes law of limitation also. So far as the present case is concerned, as observed, the present suit has been filed after 11 years from the date on which she got knowledge about the purchase of 'C' schedule property by D3 from D2 as power agent of the plaintiff and seven years from the date on which D4 purchased 'B' schedule property from D1. Therefore, I am of the view that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. In this regard, it would be necessary to refer some of the following judgments:

(a) In 2005(3) L.W.152 (supra), this Court has held as follows:
"4. ... The instrument challenged in the suit is sought to be set aside solely on the ground that the first defendant, by playing a "fraud" on Sivagami Ammal and Pushpakanthammal, brought the document in to existence in his favour by forging their signatures. The plaintiffs solely rely upon the act of "fraud" as referred to above alone to have the instrument set aside and they do not urge any other ground in the plaint. Therefore, section 17 of the Limitation Act gets attracted to the case on hand. Under that Act, where any period of limitation is prescribed for a suit (Article 59 of the Limitation Act) when the suit is based upon the "fraud" of the defendant, then the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the "fraud" or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the applicant, the document challenged in the suit is shown to have been executed in the year 1951 and therefore a duty is cast upon them to show that despite a reasonable diligence exercised by them, they were not in a position to discover the "fraud" and that it came to be discovered only in October 2002 as claimed by them...."

The dictum laid down in the above judgment would show that if the instrument is challenged in the suit on the ground of fraud, section 17 of the Limitation Act would get attracted and in such a situation, the suit has to be filed within three years from the date of knowledge of the fraud. In the instant case, the averments made in the plaint as well as the submissions made by D1 and D2, who are none other than the brother and mother of plaintiff, would show that the plaintiff had knowledge even in the year 2000. Hence, I am of the opinion, under such circumstances, plaintiff ought to have filed the suit within a period of three years from the year 2000.

(b) In (2005) 6 SCC 614 (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that when limitation is the pure question of law and from the pleadings itself it becomes apparent that the suit is barred by limitation, then it is the duty of the court to decide limitation at the outset even in the absence of a plea. The relevant paragraph reads as follows:

"5. We also see no substance in the contention that the suit was barred by limitation and that the courts below should have decided the question of limitation. When limitation is the pure question of law and from the pleadings itself it becomes apparent that a suit is barred by limitation, then, of course, it is the duty of the court to decide limitation at the outset even in the absence of a plea. However, in cases where the question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the suit does not appear to be barred by limitation on the face of it, then the facts necessary to prove limitation must be pleaded, an issue raised and then proved. In this case the question of limitation is intricately linked with the question whether the agreement to sell was entered into on behalf of all and whether possession was on behalf of all. It is also linked with the plea of adverse possession. Once on facts it has been found that the purchase was on behalf of all and that the possession was on behalf of all, then, in the absence of any open, hostile and overt act, there can be no adverse possession and the suit would also not be barred by limitation. The only hostile act which could be shown was the advertisement issued in 1989. The suit filed almost immediately thereafter".

From the said judgment, it is clear that when it is apparent from the pleadings that the suit is barred by limitation, the Court can consider the same. Therefore, I am not inclined to accept the submission made by the plaintiff that always the question of limitation has to be decided only at the time of trial. The question whether the plea of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law depends upon the averments made in the plaint of a particular case. So far as the present case is concerned, from the plaint averments it is apparent that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Hence, on the ground of limitation, the suit is liable to be rejected.

39. Point with regard to abuse of process of Court:

Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned Senior counsel appearing for D3 has relied upon the judgments reported in Rev.Noble Gambeeran and others .vs. Peter P.Ponnan (1999-1-L.W.300), Suguna Poultry Farm Limited andothers .vs. Arul Mariamman Textiles Limited and others (2004 (4)L.W.571) and Uttar Pradesh Cricket Association rep.by its President, etc. .vs. The Uttar Pradesh Cricket Association rep.by Treasurer (2007-2-L.W.1079) and submitted that when filing of suit in court is not having jurisdiction, then it would amount or abuse of process of the court. Under such circumstances, instead of returning the plaint or revoking leave, plaint could be struck off from the file of the Court itself since this Court has no jurisdiction. The relevant paragraphs from the said judgments are extracted hereunder.

40. In 1999-1-L.W.300 (supra), this Court has held that filing suit in a Court not having jurisdiction is abuse of the process of the Court and the relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:

"32. I also make it clear that if any suit is filed against the Bishop or against the Executive Committee of the Vellore Diocese or if any suit is filed against the Vellore Diocese itself, such a suit will be filed only within its jurisdiction where the defendant is having his business or residence. I give this direction only for the reason that the spiritual head should not be allowed to be harassed by filing suits one after another in various Courts. I am not preventing the filing of any suit, but only direct that the same must be filed in Court having jurisdiction, i.e., where the defendant is residing or having his business.
......
34. ..... Since I hold that the suit is not filed bona fide and the plaintiff is not an honest litigant, the Court is not expected to grant any relief to him. The Court process should not be allowed to achieve an oblique purpose. The present suit which has been filed as representative suit cannot, therefore, be maintained. O.S.No.279 of 1998 on the file of Judicial magistrate-cum-District Munsif's Court, Cheyyar, is struck off file...".

41. In 2007-2-L.W.1079 (supra), this Court has held as follows:

"31. Therefore, in a nutshell--
(a) The plaint is liable to be rejected on account of the same having been filed through the Honorary Treasurer contrary to the Bye-laws.
(b) The leave to sue originally granted is also liable to be revoked since the entire cause of action arose at Kolkatta where the Observer appointed by the Supreme Court to B.C.C.I., heard the representatives as well as the counsel for the plaintiff, on 26.11.2005 and 27,.11,2005 and pronounced a decision on 28.11.2005 at Kolkatta, recognising the second defendant as the full member and consequently allowed the second defendant to participate in the Annual General Meeting of B.C.C.I., at Kolkatta on 29.11.2005. The submission of a representation by the plaintiff on 23.11.2005 to the Observer, Chennai and a consideration of the same (even if any) on 25.11.2005 at Chennai, being a miniscule or a fraction of a part of the cause of action, is not sufficient to institute the suit before this Court.

32. Therefore, Application No.2450 of 2007 and Application No.2894 of 2006 in C.S.No.590 of 2006 are allowed. The leave to sue granted already is revoked and the plaint is rejected".

42. In 2004-4-L.W.571 (supra), this Court has held as follows:

"..... I am of the view, the learned Subordinate Judge without jurisdiction had taken the case on file, issued notice in the injunction application to the uninterested persons and on their failure to contest the case, naturally I.A.was allowed, which should be construed as "an abuse of process of court". Since, in my view, the trial Court had entertained the suit without jurisdiction and allowed the injunction application also, the illegality committed by the Court, that too without jurisdiction, has to be set aside, by the power conferred upon this Court under Article 227of the Constitution of India, failing which there would be miscarriage of justice, paving way, allowing the parties to chose the Court of their choice, against all established norms and procedures, creating chaos.
.... In this view, instead of ordering return of plaint, I am constrained to strike out O.S.No.264/2003 from the file of the Sub Court, Pollachi, since I had no jurisdiction, thereby ordering the learned Subordinate Judge, Pollachi, to delete the suit from the file".

43. The principles enunciated in the said judgments are applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In the instant case, suit filed by the plaintiff is one for one "suit for land", which lands are situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, this Court has no jurisdiction and moreover, the suit is hit by Law of Limitation and that apart, I find that there is misjoinder of cause of action. Therefore, I am of the view that the present suit is a clear abuse of process of Court. Therefore, I am of the opinion, instead of ordering returning of plaint and revoking leave, plaint itself could be struck off from the file of this Court.

Accordingly, Applications No.1238 of 2012 and 1457 of 2012 are allowed and Civil Suit No.801 of 2011 is struck off from the file of this Court. 

Index: Yes.							01.10.2012
Internet: Yes.
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R.SUBBIAH, J.,
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Pre-delivery common order in A.Nos.1238 and 1457 of 2012 in C.S.No.801 of 2011 01.10.2012