Madras High Court
The Senior Superintendent Of Post ... vs The Coimbatore Diocese Society ... on 9 September, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1998)1MLJ314
Author: A.R. Lakshmanan
Bench: A.R. Lakshmanan
JUDGMENT A.R. Lakshmanan, J.
1. The writ appeal is directed against the order of Y. Venkatachalam, J., dated 10.1.1996 in W.P. No. 13298 of 1985 allowing the writ petition and setting aside the impugned order under the Land Acquisition Act, The 3rd respondent in the writ petition is the appellant in this appeal.
2. The learned single Judge proceeded on the basis that the 1st respondent/Coimbatore Diocese Society has ownership rights over the property but failed to see that the land acquisition proceedings initiated were in accordance with the legal formalities and were completed consequent to the application made for acquiring the land by the appellant, to the 3rd respondent. The learned Judge has proceeded to consider the case of the 1st respondent as though it is a case of eviction proceedings. In this case, the appellant is in possession of the building in question and using the same as post office for the past 70 years, and is rendering postal service on behalf of the Government of India, which fact has been totally aside by the learned Judge. The conclusion of the learned Judge that al-ternative place is available in and around the present premises where the post office could be located is not at all correct. In any event, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, that no other place will suffice the interest of the general public as the post office is in existence for the past 70 years. The learned Judge has not noticed the fact that in the land adjacent to the compound wall of the Red Fields Post Office, commercial complex has been constructed consequent to the land acquisition proceedings and therefore, the intention of the 1st respondent was otherwise and not the one as stated in the writ petition. Without considering the rival claims put forward in the affidavit and counter affidavits in their proper perspective, the learned Judge has proceeding. We, therefore, feel that the order of the learned Judge impugned in the writ appeal is not correct and the same is liable to be set aside. However, in order to decide the question at issue, we directed the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/writ petitioner to argue the case on merits with reference to the pleadings and the other documents relied on.
3. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent has made the following submissions for our consideration:
(a) Though the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act states that an extent of 13,608 Sq. ft. is required for a public purpose, such a large extent of land is not required since the post office is located and being run for the past 70 years only in a building of an area of 2.730 Sq. ft. The said building was leased out to the Postal Department and the Department is running its Red Fields Post Office on a monthly rent of Rs. 400. Therefore, the notification under Section 4(1) is bad in so far as it relates to the proposal of acquisition of the entire extent of 13,608 Sq. ft. In any event, the notification should have been issued only for the extent of 2,730 Sq. ft.
(b) Mr. A.L. Somayaji also contends that the future expansion is a very vague term and therefore the acquisition should be confined only to 2,730 Sq. ft.
(c) Inviting our attention to the various notifications and orders issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, Mr. A.L. Somayaji contended that the 1st respondent is a minority institution viz., Roman Catholic Mission, which is running schools, other educational institutions, orphanages, hos-pitals, etc., for the uplift of the poor people irrespective of caste, colour or creed from out of the income realised from the properties belonging to the said society. When the 1st respondent society themselves require the very same land for the purpose of constructing a Church, the said land cannot be acquired for any other public purpose except when it becomes inevitable and when no alternative land is available.
(d) Since alternative site is available adjacent to the subject matter of the land under acquisition, the Government should have initiated proceedings for acquiring that alternative site and ought not to have initiated proceedings for acquiring the land belonging to a minority community, which is required by that community for the purpose of constructing a Church, which is a place of public worship.
(e) When the inspecting authority viz., the District Revenue Officer, who inspected the place on 12.7.1974, has recommended in his report that the said site is suitable for the construction of a Church, the said report ought to have been accepted by the Government and further proceedings dropped.
(f) The Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is also bad, in that, it does not mention the existence of the superstructure when admittedly the superstructure was occupied and utilised by the appellant for the purpose of run-ning the post office for the past so many years.
4. Arguing contra, Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that all the procedures and formalities have been strictly complied with and therefore, the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the authorities concerned for acquiring the land of the 1st respondent for a public purpose cannot be easily interfered with in the absence of any procedural irregularities or illegalities pointed out by the 1st respondent.
5. As rightly pointed out by Mr. V.T. Gopalan, there cannot be any difficulty with reference to the public purpose for which the land is now sought to be acquired. In the instant case, all the procedural formalities have been strictly complied with. After completion of the enquiry under Section 5-A, the Government of Tamil Nadu issued the declaration under Section 6. Section 6(3) of the Land Acquisition Act states that the declaration is made to the effect that when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A, Seb-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, such a declaration is conclusive proof of the Government's intention to acquire the land in question for a public purpose and that therefore, such a declaration cannot be called in question, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this context, a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Scindia Employees Union v. State of Maharashtra, (106) 10 S.C.C. 150 can be beneficially looked into. The Supreme Court in the above judgment has held that the only scope of the enquiry under Section 5-A is, whether the land sought to be acquired is needed for a public purpose and whether the land is suitable for the purpose or is an arable land, and that the publication of declaration under Section 6 accords conclusiveness to public purpose. It is, therefore, for the appropriate Government to take a decision whether a particular land is needed for a public purpose or not and that the Court cannot sub-stitute its opinion on the public purpose to that of the appropriate Government. The Supreme Court has further held that the very object of compulsory acquisition is in exercise of the power of eminent do-main by the State against the wishes or willingness of the owner or person interested in the land. Therefore, so long as the public purpose subsists, the exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be questioned. Publication of declaration under Section 6 is con-clusive evidence of public purpose. As pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the Government have exercised the power of eminent domain and had published the notification under Section 4(1) and after conducting enquiry under Section 5-A, declaration under Section 6 has been made, which is conclusive evidence of public purpose.
6. The contention of Mr. A.L. Somayaji that the places of worship pertaining to all religious institutions shall not be acquired for public purposes except when it becomes inevitable and no alternative land is available can now be dealt with. It is true that the notification says that the State Government authorities shall ensure that as far as possible places of worship are not acquired for public purpose. But, we are of the view, that such notifications or Government Orders are only in the form of guidelines and in the nature of administrative instructions to the authorities con-cerned. The notification only says that as far as possible the places of worship pertaining to the religious institutions shall not be acquired for any public purpose. In the instant case, the land acquisition becomes inevitable for two reasons. The premises in question is occupied by the postal department for the past 70 years and that the alternative site suggested by the 1st respondent has been the subject matter of proceedings initiated under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act. It is stated that the said adjacent land owner has already put up some structure and has also applied to the Government of Tamil Nadu for exemption of the said land from the purview of the said Act. Thus, it is clear that even the alternative site suggested by the 1st respondent is not readily available and therefore considering the said suggestion by the Government of Tamil Nadu does not at all arise.
7. With reference to the contention of Mr. A.L. Somayaji that the subject matter of acquisition includes vast extent of vacant land, which can be used by the 1st respondent for the purpose of constructing a Church for public worship by the minority communty, which is also serving a public purpose and which is much more useful and important than the one tor which the land is being acquired, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd., v. State of Rajasthan we cannot go into the comparative utility of the public purposes and once we are satisfied that the acquisition is for a public purpose, no fault can be found with the proceedings on the ground that the land maybe re-quired or be used for some other beneficial purpose. This contention also, therefore, fails.
8. In regard to the contention of Mr. A.L. Somayaji that the report of the District Revenue Officer rec-ommending the site which is sought to be acquired, for constructing a Church, we are of the view that the said contention has no merit. As already noticed, the very object of compulsory acquisition is in exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State against the wishes or willingness of the owner or person interested in the land. The report of the District Revenue officer is only recommendatory in nature. It is for the appropriate Government to take a final decision whether a particular land is needed for a public purpose or not and the Court cannot substitute its opinion on the public purpose to that of the appropri-ate Government. This contention also, therefore, fails.
9. The next contention of Mr. A.L. Somayaji is that in the notification under Section 4(1), there is no reference to the existence of the superstructure in which the post office is being actually run by the appellant. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel merits acceptance. Mere nonmentioning of the existence of the post office does not in any way take away the rights of the 1st respondent to claim compensation for the superstructure as well. We, therefore, direct the authorities concerned to fix the value of the superstructure as well and pay the appropriate compensation to the 1st respondent.
10. Mr. A.L. Somayaji then contended that the specific purpose for which the land is required has not been mentioned or notified and therefore the notification under Section 4(1) is bad. We are unable to agree with the said contention. It must be remembered that what is vague is a question of fact to be decided in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. By saying that the public purpose in the said notification is vague, what the 1st respondent really means is not that it is not a public purpose but that since the public purpose is expressed in vague terms and is not particularised with sufficient specificity, they are not in a position to make an effective representation against the proposed acquisition. In our opinion, the nonspecification of the use to which each and every bit of land so notified would be put to does not invalidate the notification issued. The notification under Section 4(1) in this case clearly mentions that the property specified in the schedule is needed for a public purpose viz., for the construction of Red Field Post Office in Puliakulam village, Coimbatore taluk, for the Post and Telegraph Department. There is no ambiguity b the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent. This contention also is, therefore, rejected. There are no merits in any of the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent.
11. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed, the order of the learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
12. During the pendency of the writ petition, this Court has reserved the right of the 1st respondent herein in W.M.P. No. 2392 of 1989 in W.P. No. 13298 of 1985 by order dated 9.2. -1989 to resort to civil proceedings requesting for a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act if the 1st respondent is not satisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded. We have already made it clear that the 1st respondent will be entitled to compensation for the super-structure as well. Therefore, the 1st respondent is given eight weeks time from to-day to approach the concerned authority to seek a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. On such reference being made by the authorities, the Sub Court concerned shall consider the same on merits and decide the same in accordance with law after giving opportunity to both parties.