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[Cites 54, Cited by 22]

Gujarat High Court

Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel vs State Of Gujarat on 9 May, 2018

Bench: R.Subhash Reddy, Vipul M. Pancholi

       C/LPA/543/2017                                         CAV JUDGMENT



           IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO.  543 of 2017

             In SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO.  2508 of 2017
                                  With 
                    CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1 of 2017
                                  With 
                    CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3 of 2017
                                  With 
               R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 1128 of 2017
                                  With 
             R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11504 of 2017
 
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: 
 
 
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. R.SUBHASH REDDY
 
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI
 
=============================================

1      Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see         Yes
       the judgment ?

2      To be referred to the Reporter or not ?                         Yes

3      Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the         No
       judgment ?

4      Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as     Yes
       to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any 
       order made thereunder ?

=============================================
                        SHIVANGIBEN CHETANKUMAR PATEL
                                     Versus
                               STATE OF GUJARAT
=============================================
Appearance in Letters Patent Appeal No.543 of 2017:
C J GOGDA(7488) for the PETITIONER(s) No. 1
MR SN SHELAT, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MR VIKAS V NAIR(7444) for the 
PETITIONER(s) No. 1
MR PK JANI, ADDL. ADVOCATE GENERAL, MS. MANISHA SHAH, GP, MR. 
UTKARSH SHARMA, AGP WITH MR KM ANTANI, AGP for the 
RESPONDENT(s) No. 1


                                    Page 1 of 63
         C/LPA/543/2017                                           CAV JUDGMENT



MR MR DC DAVE, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MR DHRUV K DAVE(6928) for the 
RESPONDENT(s) No. 10,11,12,13,14,4,5,6,7,8,9
MR HS MUNSHAW(495) for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 2,3

Appearance in Letters Patent Appeal No.1128 of 2017:
MR NISHIT P GANDHI, ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER
MR RS SANJANWALA, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MS NIYATI K SHAH, 
ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.1

Appearance in Special Civil Application No.11504 of 2017:
MR RS SANJANWALA, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MS NIYATI K SHAH, 
ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER 
MR HS MUNSHAW, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.1 AND 2.
MR. NISHIT P GANDHI, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NOS.3,5,7 TO 14.
=========================================
   CORAM: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. R.SUBHASH REDDY
           and
           HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI
 
                            Date : 09/05/2018
 
                             CAV JUDGMENT

  (PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. R.SUBHASH REDDY) [1] The Letters Patent Appeal No.543 of 2017 is filed by the  appellant ­ original petitioner, in Special Civil Application No.2508 of  2017, aggrieved by the order dated 03.04.2017 passed by the learned  Single   Judge.     By   the   aforesaid   order,   the   learned   Single   Judge  dismissed the petition filed by the original petitioner.  [1.1] The   Special   Civil   Application   was   filed   by   the   original  petitioner   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution   of   India   with   the  prayers, which read as under :­ "8 (a). YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to admit and allow   the present petition;

Page 2 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT

(b).   YOUR   LORDSHIPS   may   be   pleased   to   issue   a   writ   of   mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other   appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside   the communication dated 10/2/17 at Annexure E and further   be pleased to declare the action of the respondent authority   issuing   the   notice   for   convening   the   meeting   as   unconstitutional and ultra vires Article 14, 16 and 243 of the   Constitution of India and Gujarat Panchayat Act;

(c).   YOUR   LORDSHIPS   may   be   pleased   to   issue   a   writ   of   prohibition or a writ in the nature of prohibition, and any   other   appropriate   writ,   order   or   direction,   prohibiting   the   Sankheda   Gram   Panchayat   from   convening   the   meeting   pursuant to requisition dated 25.01.2017.

(d). Pending the admission and final hearing of the petition,   YOUR   LORDSHIPS   may   be   pleased   to   stay   the   further   proceedings   pursuant   to   the   communication   dated   25.01.2017.

(e). Ad­ interim reliefs in terms of para (d) may kindly be  granted;

f. ... ... ..."

[2] The appellant herein is elected as Sarpanch of  Sankheda  Gram Panchayat of District Chhota Udepur, in the election held on  27.12.2016. The appellant - original petitioner was declared elected  on 29.12.2016. Electorate of election was,  qualified voters of village  Panchayat. First meeting of the Panchayat was held on 16.1.2017, in  which, Up­Sarpanch was elected. Election of Up­Sarpanch is in direct  Page 3 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT election.   He   is   elected   by   the   members   of   Panchayat   and   elected  Sarpanch. It is the case of the appellant that  second meeting was held  on 24.1.2017, in which, only agenda was with regard to formation of  Committees.     Thereafter,   on   25.01.2017,   members   of   Panchayat,  numbering   11   out   of   14   members   of   Gram   Panchayat  moved   no  confidence motion against the appellant - Sarpanch. It is stated that  Gram   Sabha   which   was   held   on   26.1.2017,   rejected   such   motion.  Thereafter, the members who had moved no confidence motion, who  are impleaded as party respondents in the petition, have approached  competent   authority   for   convening   the   meeting   to   discuss   No  Confidence   Motion   against   the   appellant   -   original   petitioner.  Pursuant   to   such   request,   notice   dated   10.2.2017   was   issued   for  convening   meeting   on   17.2.2017   to   discuss   no   confidence   motion  against the appellant. On receipt of the notice dated 10.02.2017, on  13.02.2017, the appellant has filed Special Civil Application and by  order dated 14.02.2017, learned Single Judge granted interim relief,  granting stay of further proceedings pursuant to communication dated  25.01.2017. Said interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge  continued during the pendency of the petition and the Special Civil  Application was dismissed, finally by the learned Single Judge  vide  order dated 03.04.2017. On filing Letters Patent Appeal, this Court  has also granted interim relief in favour of the appellant.  Page 4 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT [3] Before the learned Single Judge, mainly it was case of the  appellant   that   impleaded   respondents   have   moved   no   confidence  motion against her, immediately   after   first  meeting,   without   giving  any reasonable time to discharge, functions as Sarpanch.   It was the  case   of   the   appellant   that   accountability   and   transparency   in  functioning of Sarpanch can only be assessed, if the elected Sarpanch  is allowed to function for some time to discharge her / his duties and  obligations' as required under Section 55 of the Gujarat Panchayats  Act,   1993.   It   was   the   case   of   the   appellant   that   as   no   confidence  motion was moved immediately after 1st  meeting, such step on the  part of the respondents is irrational, unreasonable and arbitrary and  as   such,   violative   of   rights   guaranteed   under   Article   14   of   the  Constitution of India.   Further it was the case of the appellant that,  even in absence of any restriction for moving no confidence motion  after   election,   under   Section   56   of   the   Panchayats   Act,   1993,  reasonable time is to be read into, so as to allow the elected Sarpanch  to function as Sarpanch to discharge his / her duties and obligations'.  It is submitted that even if the appellant is removed from the post of  Sarpanch   by   way   of   no   confidence   motion,   same   is   not,   a  disqualification   to   contest   election,   as   such,   it   would   result   in   dis­ stability and continuity of the Panchayat institution. It is alleged that  unless the members of the  Panchayat  do  not  get their  own  person  Page 5 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT elected,  similar move will be  repeated,  which  will  ultimately  effect  stability and continuity of the Panchayat. 

[4] In the petition, it was the case of the appellant - original  petitioner that in absence of prescribed time limit, within which time,  such no confidence motion cannot be moved,   principles of fair play  has   to   be   read   into   before   taking   steps   for   moving   no   confidence  motion   against   directly   elected   Sarpanch.   It   was   the   case   of   the  appellant that such move on the part of the respondents is contrary to  the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. It was the case of the  appellant   that   if   objects   and   reasons   in   the   73rd  Constitutional  Amendment Act, 1992 are looked into, the object and spirit of such  amendment, is to give maximum power to local self government and  stability and continuity of such institutions was the concept behind  such amendment, as such, if the no confidence motion is allowed to  proceed,   it   will   run   contrary   to   the   spirit   of     73rd  Constitutional  Amendment Act, 1992. 

[5] Before   the   learned   Single   Judge,   learned   Government  Pleader appeared for State and learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.C.Dave  appeared   for   impleaded   respondent   Nos.4   to   14.   It   was   mainly  pleaded that in absence of any restriction or prohibition for moving  Page 6 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT no confidence motion against elected Sarpanch under Section 56 of  the   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993,   the   appellant   cannot   claim   any  protection after election. It was the case of the respondents that in  absence of challenge to vires of the provision, under Section 56 of the  Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, the principles of 'reading into' cannot  be applied.   It was their case that any interpretation, as pleaded by  the   appellant   -   original   petitioner   of   Section   56   of   the   Gujarat  Panchayats Act, 1993 is nothing but amounting to re­drafting of the  provision.     It   is   submitted   that   the   principles   of   'reading   into'   or  'reading down' in the field of interpretation of statute is to be invoked  only when the validity of the statutory provision is under challenge. It  was   their   case   that   in   absence   of   any   statutory   protection   under  Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, it is not open for the  appellant   to   plead   any   protection   under   Section   56   of   the   Gujarat  Panchayats Act, 1993 for any time. It is submitted that when members  of the Panchayat are not having confidence on the elected Sarpanch,  it is always open for them to move no confidence motion at any time  after election of Sarpanch. 

[6] The learned Single Judge upon hearing both the sides and  having   regard   to   material   placed   on   record,   has   held   that   Gujarat  Panchayats Act, 1993 is enacted to make law relating to Panchayat, in  Page 7 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT conformity with Part IX of the Constitution of India.  It is further held  that   Section   56   of   the   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993   provides   for  motion of no confidence and notice which is impugned is supported  by one­half of total members of Panchayat. The learned Single Judge  by drawing distinction of  Section 56 with  Section 57 of the Gujarat  Panchayats Act, 1993, has opined that legislature has in its wisdom  provided,   provision   for   motion   of   no   confidence   for   removal   of  Sarpanch or Up­Sarpanch and when legislature has thought it fit not  to   restrict   for   any   time,   for   moving   no   confidence   after   election,  motion of no confidence can be moved against Sarpanch by giving  notice   in   the   prescribed   format.     The   contention   on   behalf   of   the  appellant   that   no   confidence   motion   can   be   moved   only   after  reasonable   time,   is   not   accepted   by   the   learned   Single   Judge.  Referring   to   the   case   of  Vipulbhai   M.   Chaudhary   v/s.   Gujarat   Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and Ors. reported   in AIR 2015 SC 1960, the learned Single Judge has held that said  judgment was rendered under the  Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act,  1961 and in which there was no provision for moving no confidence  motion, and  further held   that   said   judgment   cannot  be   applied,   to  Panchayat institution, in view of section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayat  Act, 1993. Even the submission made on behalf of the appellant that  no confidence motion would result in dis­stability and unworkability  Page 8 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT of the panchayat institution, was also not accepted stating that when  statute clearly provided for moving no confidence motion, it would  not be permissible to read into any restrictions into Section 56 of the  Gujarat Panchayats Act. Placing reliance on the judgment in the case  of  Namit Sharma v/s. Union of India reported in (2013) 1 SCC   745 and Union of India v/s. Namit Sharma reported in (2013) 10   SCC 359,  the learned Single Judge did not accept the plea of reading  into any reasonable time into Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats  Act, 1993.   Further the learned Single Judge, with regard to similar  provisions in statutes of other States, has held that in other States,  time limit is prescribed by the respective legislatures prohibiting no  confidence   motion   ranging   from   six   months   to   four   years   after  election, however, such time is not prescribed, in Section 56 of the  Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 and therefore, no time limit can be read  into   by   this   Court   in   exercise   of   powers   under   Article   226   of   the  Constitution of India.

[7] Heard   Shri   S.N.Shelat,   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the  appellant,   learned   Additional   Advocate   General   Mr.P.K.Jani   for  respondent   Nos.1   and   2,   Shri   H.S.Munshaw,   learned   Counsel   for  respondent   No.3   and   Shri   D.C.   Dave,   learned   Senior   Counsel  appearing for impleaded respondents 4 to 14.

Page 9 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT [8] It is contended by Shri S.N.Shelat, learned Senior Counsel  appearing for the appellant that the requisition made by respondent  Nos.4 to 14 for expressing no confidence motion against the appellant  and   consequential   notice   issued   under   section   56   of   the   Act   is  arbitrary and illegal.  It is submitted that the object and spirit of 73 rd  Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, is to give constitutional status  to the village panchayat and to allow them to run with stability and  continuity. It is submitted that merely because there is provision for  moving   no   confidence   motion   under   section   56   of   the   Act,   same  cannot be exercised unreasonably and arbitrarily. It is submitted that  unless elected Sarpanch is allowed to work for reasonable period, no  such   move   can   be   permitted   by   the   members   to   remove   directly  elected Sarpanch on the ground that they lost confidence on him /  her.  It is submitted that only on the apprehension that the appellant  may   not   spare   time   to   function   as   Sarpanch,   such   no   confidence  motion is moved within a period of one month from election. It is  submitted that such move by the members is colourable exercise of  power, for throwing out elected Sarpanch on one ground or other and  same will run contrary to the democratic principles. It is submitted  that unless Sarpanch is allowed to work to discharge her duties and  obligations'   as   contemplated   under   section   55   of   the   Gujarat  Panchayats   Act,   1993,   for   reasonable   time,   there   is   no   basis   for  Page 10 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT the   members   of   the   Panchayat   to   express   no   confidence,   on   the  elected Sarpanch of the Panchayat.  It is submitted that when statute  provides   for   moving   no   confidence   motion,   it   is   implied   that   such  power is to be exercised keeping in mind objectives of such provision  in   legislation,   but   not   mechanically,   only   to   throw   out   elected  Sarpanch. It is submitted that even in absence of any restriction of any  period for moving such no confidence motion, in Section 56 of the  Gujarat Panchayats Act, reasonable period is to be read into. Learned  Senior   Counsel   Mr.   Shelat   in   support   of   his   arguments   has   placed  reliance on the judgments' in the case of  Bhanumati v/s. State of  U.P.   And   Ors.   reported   in   AIR   2010   SC   3796,  Usha   Bharti   v/s.  State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in 2014  (7) SCC 663,  Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v/s. Gujarat Co­operative Milk Marketing  Federation Ltd. And Ors. reported in 2015 8 SCC 1, N.Kannadasan  and Ajoy Khose and Ors. reported in 2009 (7) SCC 1,  Executive  Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Limited  and Anr. v/s.  Sri  Seetaram   Rice  Mill reported  in 2012  (2) SCC  108,  Pratap   Chandra   Mehta   v/s.   State   Bar   Council   of   Madhya  Pradesh   and   Ors.   reported   in   2011   (9)   SCC   573,  Nanduri  Yogananda   Lakshiminarasimhachari   and   Ors.   v/s.   Sri  Agastheswaraswamivaru   reported   in   AIR   1960   SC   622  and  Ishwardas v/s. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in AIR  Page 11 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT 1979 SC 551. 

[9] Mr.   P.K.Jani,   learned   Additional   Advocate   General  appearing   for   State   has   submitted   that   in   view   of   clear   and  unambiguous language of Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, it  is   always   open   for   the   members   of   the   Panchayat   to   move   no  confidence motion by majority members of the Panchayat at any time.  It is submitted that such move by the members of the Panchayat is  in  conformity   with   Section   56   of   the   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act.   It   is  submitted that in absence of any restriction for moving no confidence  motion under Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, for any time,  after   election,   there   is   no   illegality   in   impugned   proceedings.   It   is  submitted that if majority of members feel that they lost confidence  on the Sarpanch, it is always open for them to move no confidence  motion.   It is submitted that all the decisions are to be taken by the  majority members of Panchayat and if majority members of panchayat  do   not   repose   confidence   on   the   appellant   /   Sarpanch,   very  functioning of Panchayat will come to grinding halt. In support of his  arguments,   learned   Additional   Advocate   General   has   relied   on   the  judgments in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra), Munshi  Manzoor Ali Khan and Ors. v/s. Sukhbasi Lal and Ors. reported in  1974 SCC 706, judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in the  Page 12 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT case of  Narmadaben V. Parmar v/s. Taluka Development Officer,  Kheralu   and   Ors.   reported   in   1998   (1)   GLH   275,     judgment   of  Division Bench of this Court in the case of Thakore Gandaji Chundaji  and   Ors.   v/s.   Secretary,   Indrad   Gram   Panchayat   and   Ors.  reported in 2000 (2) GLH 758,  Bhanumati and Ors. v/s. State of  Uttar   Pradesh   reported   in   (2010)   12   SCC   1,  Mohanlal   Tripathi  v/s. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly reported in (1992) 4 SCC 80,  Ram Beti v/s. District Pachayat Raj Adhikari and Ors. reported in  (1998) 1 SCC 680 and Union of India v/s. Namit Sharma reported  in (2013) 10 SCC 359.

[10] Mr.   Dave,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   for  respondent   Nos.4   to   14   has   also   submitted   that   in   view   of   plain  language of section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, it is not open  for the appellant to seek 'reading into' reasonable period, as pleaded  by the appellant. It is submitted that the principle of 'reading down' or  'reading   into'   can   be   applied,   only   when  vires  of   the   statute   is  challenged.  It is further submitted that in absence of challenge to the  vires of the provision, Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, it is  not  open  for  the  appellant   to  apply   principle   of   'reading  into',   any  reasonable time into the  provision so  as to  prohibit  for  moving  no  confidence motion.  It is submitted that if the plea of the appellant is  Page 13 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT accepted, it will amount to re­drafting the provision i.e. Section 56 of  the Gujarat Panchayats Act, which is not permissible.   In support of  his argument, he has placed reliance on the judgments in the case of  Namit Sharma v/s. Union of India reported in (2013) 1 SCC 745,  (2013)   10   SCC   359,  Bharat   Aluminium   Company   v/s.   Kaser  Aluminium   Technical   Service   reported   in   (2012)   9   SCC   552,  Cellular Operators Association of India v/s. Telecom Regulatory  Authority of India reported in (2016) 7 SCC 703, Hiral P. Harsora  and Ors. v/s. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora reported in (2016) 10  SCC 165  and in the case of  R.S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer, Gujarat  and Ors. v/s. Ajit Mills Limited and Anr. reported in 1977 (4) SCC 

98.    It   is   further   submitted   that   draft   amendment   prayed   for   also  cannot be allowed which is subsequent event.

[11] In   response,   learned   Senior   Counsel   Mr.   Shelat   for   the  appellant has submitted that the impugned action of the respondents  is nothing but abuse of power and if the same is allowed, it will be  arbitrary and in breach of the rights guaranteed under Article 14 of  the Constitution of India. Learned Senior Counsel has relied on the  judgment   in   the   case   of  N.Kannadasn   and   Ajoy   Khose   and   Ors.   reported   in   2009   (7)   SCC   1  and   also   judgment   in   the   case   of  Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v/s. Gujarat Co­operative Milk Marketing   Page 14 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT Federation Limited and Ors. reported in AIR 2015 SC 1960. Lastly,  it is contended by Mr. Shelat appearing for the appellant that if no  confidence   motion   is   allowed,   it   will   lead   to   dis­stability   and  continuity of functioning of the panchayat and will run contrary to the  objects' and reasons of 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992.  [12] Before we consider submissions of learned Counsels, we  deem it appropriate to refer certain relevant provisions of the Gujarat  Panchayat   Act,   1993   to   decide   the   issues   which   arise   for  consideration. 

[13] Prior to the enactment of Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993,  in the State of Gujarat Panchayati Raj Institutions were governed by  the provisions under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961.  By virtue of  Section   276   of   the   Gujarat   Panchayat   Act,   1993,   earlier   Act   i.e.  Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1961   was   repealed.     In   the   preamble   of  Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 itself, it is categorically stated that by  the   Constitution   (Seventy   Third   Amendment)   Act,   1992,   Part   IX  relating to the panchayats has been inserted in the Constitution and it  is expedient to bring the law relating to Panchayats in the State of  Gujarat in conformity with the said Part IX of the Constitution.  Page 15 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT [14] Objects   and   reasons   of   the   73rd  Amendment   Act,   1992  reads as under :­ "Statement of objects and reasons Though   the   Panchayati   Raj   Institutions   have   been   in  existence  for a long time,  it has been observed that these   institutions  have   not   been   able   to  acquire   the   status   and  dignity   of   viable   and   responsive   people's   bodies   due   to   a   number   of   reasons   including   absence   of   regular   elections,   prolonged   supersession,   insufficient   representation   of   weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and   Women,   inadequate   devolution   of   powers   and   lack   of   financial resources. 

Article 40 of  the  Constitution  which  enshrines  one  of the   directive principles of State policy lays down that the State   shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow   them with such powers and authority as may be necessary   to enable them to function as units of self government. In   the light of the experience in the last forty years and in view   of   the   short   comings   which   have   been   observed,   it   is  considered that there is an imperative need to enshrine in  the   Constitution   certain   basic   and   essential   features   of   Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty, continuity   and strength to them." 

[15] Chapter - II of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993   deals  Page 16 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT with   the   provisions   relating   to   establishment   of   Panchayats.  Panchayats are established on three tier basis i.e. Village panchayat  for   each   Village,   Taluka   Panchayat   for   each   Taluka   and   District  Panchayat   for   each   District.     Constitution   of   Village   Panchayat   is  under Section 9 of the Act, 1993.  A village panchayat shall consist of  such number of members as provided in sub­section (4) of the Act,  1993   apart   from   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch.     Sarpanch   shall   be  elected by ballot, by the qualified voters of the village from amongst  themselves, whereas, Up­Sarpanch shall be elected   by the members  of the village panchayat from amongst themselves.   Thus, it is clear  that election of Sarpanch is direct election, elected by qualified voters  of entire panchayat and Up­Sarpanch is elected by the members of the  village panchayat amongst themselves. 

[16] As   per   section   13   of   the   Act,   1993,   every   Panchayat,  unless  sooner dissolved   under   the   Act   shall   continue   for  five   years  from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer.  Executive  functions   of   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch   are   in   accordance   with  provisions   under   Section   55   of   the   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993.  Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 provides motion of no  confidence   against   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch.   Section   57   of   the  Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993   empowers   competent   authority   to  Page 17 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT remove  Sarpanch  and Up­Sarpanch  for misconduct,  any disgraceful  conduct or abuse of powers conferred under the Act.   Under section  57(2)   of   the   Act,   1993,   powers   are   conferred   on   the   competent  authority  to   remove   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch   or   disqualify   for   a  period not exceeding five years.  

[16.1] Section 55 of the Panchayat Act, 1993 reads as under :

"55.   Executive   functions   of   Sarpanch,   or   Upa­ Sarpanch :­ (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by or under this   Act, the executive power, for the purpose of carrying out   the provisions of this Act and the resolutions passed by a   village panchayat shall vest in the Sarpanch thereof who   shall be directly responsible for the due fulfilment of the   duties imposed upon the panchayat by or under this Act.  

In   the   absence   of   the   Sarpanch   his   powers   and   duties   shall,   save  as   may   be  otherwise  prescribed   by   rules,   be   exercised and performed by the Upa­Sarpanch. 

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing   provision :­ 

(a) the Sarpanch shall­ 

(i)   preside   over   and   regulate   the   meetings   of   the  panchayat; 

(ii)   exercise   supervision   and   control   over   the   acts   done   and   actions   taken   by   all   officers   and   servants   of   the   panchayat; 

(iii) incur contingent expenditure upon fifty rupees at any   one occasion; 

(iv)   operate   on   the   fund   of   the   panchayat   including   authorisation of payment, issue of cheques and refunds; 

(v) be responsible for the safe custody of the fund of the   panchayat; 

Page 18 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT

(vi)   cause   to   be   prepared   all   statements   and   reports   required by or under this Act; 

(vii) exercise such other powers and discharge such other   functions as may be conferred or imposed upon him by   this Act or rules made thereunder. 

(b) the Upa­Sarpanch shall­ 

(i)   in   the   absence   of   the   Sarpanch   preside   over   and   regulate the meetings of the panchayat; 

(ii) exercise such of the powers and perform such of the   duties of the Sarpanch as the Sarpanch may, from time to   time delegate to him; 

(iii) in case the Sarpanch has been continuously absent   from   the   village   for   more   than   fifteen   days   or   is   incapacitated   to   exercise   the   powers   and   perform   the   duties of the Sarpanch. 

(3)   In   the  absence   of   both  the   Sarpanch  and  the  Upa­ Sarpanch,   every   meeting   of   the   panchayat   shall   be   presided over by such one of the members present as may   be chosen by the meeting to be Chairman for the occasion.  (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iv) of   sub­ section (2) no money shall be withdrawn from the  fund  of   the  panchayat   except  with  the  signature  of   the   Sarpanch and any one of the two other members of the   panchayat authorised in that behalf by the panchayat."  [16.2] Section 56 of the Panchayat Act, 1993 reads as under :­ "56. Motion of no­confidence :­ (1)   Any   member   who   intends   to  move  a   motion   of   no   confidence   against   the   Sarpanch   or   the   Upa­Sarpanch   may   give   notice   thereof   in   the   prescribed   form   to   the   panchayat   concerned.   If   the   notice   is   supported   by   one   half   of   the   total   number   of   member   of   the   panchayat   concerned, the motion may be moved. 

(2) Where in the case of the Sarpanch or, as the case may   be,   the   Upa­Sarpanch,   the   motion   is   carried   by   the  majority of not less than two­thirds of the total number of   Page 19 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT the members of the panchayat, the Sarpanch or, as the   case may be, the Upa­Sarpanch, shall cease to hold office   after a period of three days from the date on which the   motion   is   carried   unless   he   has   resigned   and   the   resignation   has   become   effective   earlier;   and   thereupon   the  office held  by  him shall be deemed  to have become   vacant. 

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or the   rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or, as the case may be,   an   Upa­Sarpanch,   shall   not   preside   over   a   meeting   in   which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him,   but he shall have a right to­speak or otherwise to take   part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the   right to vote). 

(4)   When   the   offices   of   both   the   Sarpanch   and   Upa­ Sarpanch become vacant simultaneously, such Officer as   the   Taluka   Development   Officer   may   authorise   in   this   behalf   shall,   pending   the   election   of   the   Sarpanch,  exercise all the powers and preform all the functions and   duties of Sarpanch but he .shall not have the right to vote   in any meetings of the panchayat. 

(5) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 91   or   95   a   meeting   of   the   panchayat   for   dealing   with   a   motion of no confidence under this section shall be called   within a period of fifteen days from the date on which the   notice of such motion is received by the panchayat; 

(b)   If   the   Sarpanch   fails   to   call   such   meeting,   the   Secretary of the panchayat shall forthwith make a report   thereof   the   competent   authority   and   thereupon   the   competent authority shall call a meeting of the panchayat   within a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt   to the report." 

[16.3] Section 57 of the Panchayat Act, 1993 reads as under :­ "57. Removal from office :­ The   competent   authority   may   remove   from   office   any  member of the panchayat, the Sarpranch or, as the case   may be, the Upa­Sarpanch, thereof, after giving him an   Page 20 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT opportunity of being heard and giving due notice in that   behalf to the panchayat and after such inquiry as it deems   necessary, if such member, Sarpanch or, as the case may   be,  Upa­Sarpanch  has   been   guilty   of  misconduct   in   the   discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct or   abuses   his   powers   or   makes   persistent   default   in   the   performance of his duties and functions under this Act or   has   become   incapable   of   performing   his   duties   and   functions   under   this   Act.   The   Sarpanch   or,   as   the   case   may   be,   the   Upa­Sarpanch,   so   removed   may   at   the   discretion   of   the   competent   authority   also   be   removed   from the membership of the panchayat. 

(2) The competent  authority may,  after following the  procedure   laid  down   in  sub­section   (1)  disqualify  for   a  period   not   exceeding   five   years   any   person   who   has   resigned   his   office   as   a   member,   Sarpanch   or   Upa­ Sarpanch, or otherwise ceased to hold any such office and   has been guilty of misconduct specified in sub­ section (1)   or   has   been   incapable   of   performing   his   duties   and   functions :

Provided   that   an   action   under   this   sub­section   shall   be   taken   within   six   months   from   the   date   on   which   the   person resign or ceases to hold any such office.  (3) Any person aggrieved by an order of the competent   authority   under   sub­section   (1)   or   (2)   may,   within   a   period of thirty days from the date of the communication   of such order, appeal to the State Government."

[17] From a reading of aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the  executive   functions   of   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch   are   enumerated  under Section 55 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993. Section 56 of  the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 deals with motion of no confidence  against   Sarpanch.   Section   57   of   the   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993  Page 21 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT deals   with   removal   of   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch   on   proved  misconduct.   At this stage, it is to be noticed that though power is  conferred on the competent authority to disqualify Sarpanch and Up­ Sarpanch   on   proved   misconduct   under   section   57   of   the   Gujarat  Panchayats Act, 1993 for a period not exceeding five years, however,  there is no provisions to disqualify a person who is removed by way of  no confidence motion under Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act,  1993.

[18] In exercise of powers conferred by sub­sections (1) and  (2)   of   Section   274   of   the   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993,   the  Government of Gujarat has framed rules titled as 'Gujarat Panchayats  (Procedure) Rules, 1997' ('the Rules, 1997' for short). Rule 20 of the  said Rules deals with no confidence motion against Sarpanch and Up­ Sarpanch. Said Rule reads as under :­ "20. Notice of no confidence motion (1) Any member of a   Panchayat who desires to move a motion of no confidence  against   the   Sarpanch   /   President   or   Up­Sarpach   /   Vice   President of the Panchayat, shall give notice thereof to the   Secretary in Form A. Where the motion of no confidence is   to be moved against the Sarpanch / President as well as Up­ Sarpanch   /   Vice   President,   two   separate   notice   shall   be   given.   If   the   motion   is   given   jointly   by   more   than   one   Page 22 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT member, the motion may be moved by any of the members  who   have   assigned   the   notice.   Every   such   notice   shall   be   supported   by   atleast   one   half   of   the   total   number   of  members of the panchayat.

(2) The   member   giving   any   notice   under   sub­rule   (1)   shall  forward  therewith   three   additional  copies  thereof  to   the Secretary who shall deliver one copy to the Sarpanch /   President, one copy to the Up­Sarpanch / Vice President and   one copy (I) to the Taluka Development Officer where the motion   relates to the Sarpanch or Up­Sarpanch or

(ii) to the District Development Officer where the motion   relates to President or Vice President of a taluka Panchayat.

(iii) To the Development Commissioner where the motion   relates   to   the   President   or   Vice   President   of   a   district  panchayat.

Explanation   -   For   the   purposes   of   this   rule,   if   the   total   number   of   members   of   a   panchayat   is   odd,   then,   in   calculating   the   number   for   the   purpose   of   this   rule,   a   fraction   shall   be   counted   as   one,   that   is   to   say,   if   the   number of members is thirty one, the member required for   supporting the notice so that a motion may be moved shall   be sixteen and so on."

[18.1] There is prescribed format in form A, which is referred  under Rule 20 of  the Gujarat   Panchayats   (Procedure)  Rules,   1997.  Form A reads as under :­ Page 23 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT "FORM A [see Rule 20] Notice of motion of No Confidence

1. I / We member / members of the village / Taluka / District   Panchayat propose to move a no confidence motion against the  Sarpanch   /   Up­Sarpanch   /   President   /   Vice   President   Shri   _______________   in   the   meeting   of   ____________   village   /   Taluka / District Panchayat for the following reasons.

(here specify the reasons)

2. I / We declare that the facts stated above are true to the   best of my / our information and knowledge.

Signature / signatures Name / Names"

[19] A copy of requisition by respondent Nos.4 to 14 is also  placed on record, which is submitted in Form A, as per Rule 20 of the  Rules,   1997.   In   form   A,   respondent   Nos.4   to   14   have   stated   that  elected Sarpanch is not in a position to spare time to work for  Gram  Panchayat.
[19.1] It is the case of the appellant that appellant was declared  elected   on   29.12.2016.   First   meeting   of   Panchayat   was   held   on  16.01.2017, in which, Up­Sarpanch was elected. It is also specific case  of the appellant that in the meeting held on 24.01.2017, only agenda  was   with   regard   to   formation   of   committees.   On   25.01.2017,  Page 24 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT respondent   Nos.4   to   14   moved   no   confidence   motion   against   the  appellant - Sarpanch.  Though there is no specific provision under the  Panchayat   Act   prohibiting   any   period   for   moving   no   confidence  motion after election, it is contended by learned Senior Counsel Mr.  Shelat for the appellant that such move on the part of the respondents  even   before   appellant   started   functioning   as   Sarpanch   of   the  Panchayat, is illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable.   It is pleaded that  unless elected Sarpanch is allowed to function for reasonable period  after   election,   it   is   not   open   for   the   members   of   the   Panchayat   to  move no confidence motion, alleging that they lost confidence on the  Sarpanch.  It is submitted that accountability and transparency in the  functioning   of   the   Sarpanch   can   be   assessed   only   after   elected  Sarpanch is allowed to function for reasonable period. 
[20] Learned   Senior   Counsel   Mr.   Shelat   appearing   for   the  appellant   has   placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   in   the   case   of  Bhanumati v/s. State of U.P. And Ors. reported in AIR 2010 SC  3796.       In   the   aforesaid   judgment,   U.P.   Panchayat   Laws  (Amendment) Act, 2007 was challenged, which provided for reducing  the period for brining no confidence motion and reducing majority  from   2/3rd  to   simple   majority   for   removing   elected   Chairman.   The  Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the said provision and held in paras  Page 25 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT 85 and 91 as under :­ "85.Democracy demands accountability and transparency in   the  activities   of   the   Chairperson   especially   in   view   of   the   important functions entrusted with the Chairperson in the   running of Panchayati Raj Institutions. Such duties can be   discharged   by   the   Chairperson   only   if   he/she   enjoys   the   continuous   confidence   of   the   majority   members   in   the   Panchayat. So any statutory provision to demonstrate that   the Chairperson has lost the confidence of the majority is   conducive to public interest and adds strength to such bodies   of   self   Governance.  Such   a   statutory   provision   cannot   be  called   either   unreasonable   or   ultra   vires   Part   IX   of   the   Constitution. 
91.   Upholding   the   concept   of   vote   of   no­confidence   in  Mohan Lal Tripathi (supra) this Court further elaborated   the concept as follows: 
"...Vote   of   no­confidence   against   elected   representative   is   direct check flowing from accountability. Today democracy   is not a rule of 'Poor' as said by Aristotle or of 'Masses' as   opposed to 'Classes' but by the majority elected from out of  the   people   on   basis   of   broad   franchise.   Recall   of   elected   representative   is   advancement   of   political   democracy  ensuring   true,   fair,   honest   and   just   representation   of   the   electorate. Therefore, a provision in a statute for recall of an   elected   representative   has   to   be   tested   not   on   general   or   vague   notions   but   on   practical   possibility   and   electoral  feasibility of entrusting the power of recall to a body which   Page 26 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT is   representive   in   character   and   is   capable   of   projecting   views of the electorate. Even though there was no provision  in the Act initially for recall of a President it came to be   introduced in 1926 and since then it has continued and the   power always vested in the Board irrespective of whether the   President was elected by the electorate or Board. Rationale   for it is apparent from the provisions of the Act..." 

[20.1] Reliance is also placed by the learned Senior Counsel  in  the   case   of  Usha   Bharti   v/s.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   and   Ors.   reported   in   (2014)   7   SCC   663.  In   the   aforesaid   judgment,   when  validity   of   Section   28   i.e.   provision   for   motion   of   no   confidence  against Chairperson (Adhyaksha) of the U.P. Kshettra Panchayats and  Zila Panchayats Act, 1961 was challenged, the Hon'ble Supreme Court  upheld the said provision and it was held that same is not inconsistent  with Part IX in particular Article 243N of the Constitution.  Paras 44  and 53 of the said judgment read as under :­ "44. We reiterate the view earlier expressed by this Court   in   Bhanumati   and   Ors.   (supra),   wherein   this   Court   observed as follows:­ "57. It has already been pointed out that the object   and   the   reasons   of   Part   IX   are   to   lend   status   and   dignity to Panchayati Raj institutions and to impart   certainty,   continuity   and   strength   to   them.   The   Page 27 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT learned counsel for the appellant unfortunately, in his   argument,   missed   the   distinction   between   an   individual   and   an   institution.   If   a   no   confidence  motion   is   passed   against   the   Chairperson   of   a   panchayat,   he/she   ceases   to   be   a   Chairperson,   but   continues to be a member of the panchayat and the   panchayat   continues   with   a   newly­elected   Chairperson.   Therefore,   there   is   no   institutional   setback or impediment to the continuity or stability of   the Panchayati Raj institutions.

58.   These   institutions   must   run   on   democratic   principles.   In   democracy   all   persons   heading   public   bodies   can   continue   provided   they   enjoy   the   confidence of the persons who comprise such bodies.   This is the essence of democratic republicanism. This   explains why this provision of no confidence motion   was   there   in   the   Act   of   1961   even   prior   to   the   Seventy­third Constitution Amendment and has been   continued   even   thereafter.   Similar   provisions   are  there in different States in India."

x­x­x­x­x­x­

53. In our opinion, the provision for removing an elected   representative   such   as   Panchayat   Adhyaksha   is   of   fundamental   importance   to   ensure   the   democratic  functioning   of   the   Institution   as   well   as   to   ensure   the   transparency and accountability in the functions performed   by the elected representatives."

Page 28 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT [20.2] Reliance is also placed by learned Senior Counsel in the  case   of  Vipulbhai   M.   Chaudhary   v/s.   Gujarat   Cooperative   Milk   Marketing Federation Limited and ors. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 

1.  In   the   aforesaid   judgment,   which   is   arising   out   of   Gujarat  Cooperative Societies Act, while holding that there is no uniformity  with   regard   to   the   procedure   and   process   regarding   motion   of   no  confidence in the different States in the country, the Hon'ble Supreme  Court   has   issued   guidelines,   while   upholding   the   judgment   of   the  High Court of Gujarat. In the aforesaid judgment, it is categorically  held that duty of the Court is to read constitutional requirement into  existing provision.  Paras 17, 20, 23, 25, 39, 44, 48 and 53 of the said  judgment read as under :­ "[17] In Bhanumati and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh   through its Principal Secretary and others, 2010 12 SCC   1   the   cooperative   principles   governing   democratic  institutions have been discussed in detail; no doubt while   dealing   with   the   Panchayati   Raj   institutions.   However,   the   basic   democratic   principles   governing   both   the   institutions,   enjoying   the   constitutional   status,   are   the   same and, therefore, it would be profitable to refer to the   discussion on the principles. To quote: 

"58.   These   institutions   must   run   on   democratic   principles. In democracy all persons heading public   bodies   can   continue   provided   they   enjoy   the   confidence of the persons who comprise such bodies.   This is the essence of democratic republicanism. This   explains why this provision of no­confidence motion   was   there   in   the   Act   of   1961   even   prior   to   the   Page 29 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT Seventy­third Constitution Amendment and has been   continued   even   thereafter.   Similar   provisions   are   there in different States in India. 
66.   Democracy   demands   accountability   and   transparency   in   the   activities   of   the   Chairperson   especially   in   view   of   the   important   functions   entrusted   with   the   Chairperson   in   the   running   of   Panchayati   Raj   institutions.   Such   duties   can   be   discharged by the Chairperson only if he/she enjoys   the continuous  confidence of the majority members   in   the   panchayat.   So   any   statutory   provision   to  demonstrate   that   the   Chairperson   has   lost   the   confidence   of   the   majority   is   conducive   to   public   interest   and   adds   strength   to   such   bodies   of   self­ governance.   Such   a   statutory   provision   cannot   be   called either unreasonable or ultra vires Part IX of   the Constitution." 

[20]  If a person has been selected to an office through   democratic   process,   and   when   that   person   looses   the   confidence of the representatives who selected him, those   representatives should necessarily have a democratic right   to remove such an office bearer in whom they do not have  confidence, in case those institutions are viewed under the   Constitution/statues as democratic institutions.  [23] In Usha Bharti case also, this Court eloquently held   at paragraph­ 53 as follows: 

"53. In our opinion, the provision for removing an   elected representative such as Panchayat Adhyaksha   is   of   fundamental   importance   to   ensure   the   democratic functioning of the Institution as well as to   ensure   the   transparency   and   accountability   in   the   functions performed by the elected representatives." 

[25]  Silence   in   Constitution   and   abeyance   as   well   has   been dealt extensively by Michael Foley in his celebrated   work   "The   Silence   of   Constitutions".   To   quote  from   the  Preface: 

Page 30 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT

"Abeyances refer to those constitutional gaps which   remain   vacuous   for   positive   and   constructive   purposes. They are not, in any sense, truces between   two  or   more   defined   positions,   but   rather   a   set   of   implicit   agreements   to   collude   in   keeping   fundamental   questions   of   political   authority   in   a   state   of   irresolution.   Abeyances   are,   in   effect,   compulsive   hedges   against   the   possibility   of   that   which   is   unresolved   being   exploited   and   given   meanings   almost   guaranteed   to   generate   profound   division   and   disillusionment.   Abeyances   are   important,   therefore,   because   of   their   capacity   to  deter   the   formation   of   conflicting   positions   in   just   those areas where the potential for conflict is most   acute. So central are these abeyances, together with   the   social   temperament   required   to   sustain   them,   that   when   they   become   the   subject   of   heightened   interest and subsequent conflict, they are not merely   accompanied by an intense constitutional crisis, they   are themselves the essence of that crisis." 

[39]  In   Veeramachaneni   Venkata   Narayana   v.   The   Deputy   Registrar   of   Co­operative   societies,   Eluru,   West   Godavari   District   and   others,1975   ILR(AP)   242   at   paragraph­10,   the   view   taken   by   the   High   Court   of   Andhra Pradesh, is as under: 

"10. ... As sufficient safeguards are provided in the   event   of   an   office­   bearer   of   the   committee   not   conducting   himself   properly   or   not   discharging   his   duties as required of him under the provisions of the   Act,   the   Rules   and   the   bye­laws,   the   Legislature   obviously did not intend to provide for the removal of   an office­bearer of a committee by way of passing of   'no­ confidence' motion against him." 

[44]  The   provision   simply   deals   with   removal   for   misconduct   or   persistent   default/non­performance.   A   person   with   good   conduct   may   still   not   earn   the   confidence  of  the people who selected him to the office.   Page 31 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT

The very concept of cooperation is to work jointly towards   the same end. Unless there is cooperativeness among the  elected cooperators who constitute the Governing Body for   achieving the object  for which the  society  is constituted   and   for   which   those   representatives   are   elected   by   the   members entrusting them with the management of affairs   of   the   society,   there   will   be   total   chaos.   Cooperation   among   the   cooperators   is   the   essence   of   democratic   functioning   of   a   cooperative   society.   If   there   is   no   democracy   in   a   cooperative   society,   it   ceases   to   be   a   cooperative   society   as   conceived   by   the   Constitution   of   India under the Ninety Seventh Amendment. 

[48] According to Donaldson J.: 

"The duty of the courts is to ascertain and give effect   to   the   will   of   Parliament   as   expressed   in   its   enactments.   In   the   performance   of   this   duty   the   judges do not act as computers into which are fed the   statues and the rules for the construction of statues  and   from   whom   issue   forth   the   mathematically   correct   answer.   The   interpretation   of   statutes   is   a   craft   as   much   as   a   science   and   the   judges,   as   craftsmen, select and apply to the appropriate rules   as the tools of their trade. They are not legislators,   but   finishers,   refiners   and   polishers   of   legislation   which   comes   to   them   in   a   state   requiring   varying   degrees of further processing. 
[53] Though for different reasons, we agree with the view   taken   by   the   High   Court   of   Gujarat.   The   contra   views   expressed by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay,   Kerala and Punjab and Haryana are no more good law in   view   of   the   Ninety   Seventh   Amendment   to   the   Constitution of India." 

[20.3] In support of his argument that "purposive construction" 

in   the   statute   is   certainly   cardinal   principle   of   interpretation,   the  learned Counsel for appellant has placed reliance on the judgment in  Page 32 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT the   case   of  Executive   Engineer,   Southern   Electricity   Supply  Company of Orissa Limited (Southco) and Anr. v/s. Sri Seetaram   Rice   Mill   reported   in   (2012)   2   SCC   108.  Para   46   of   the   said  judgment reads as under :­  "[46]  'Purposive   construction'   is   certainly   a   cardinal   principle of interpretation. Equally true is that no rule of   interpretation   should   either   be   over­stated   or   over­ extended. Without being over­extended or over­stated, this   rule of interpretation can be applied to the present case. It   points   to   the   conclusion   that   an   interpretation   which   would attain the object and purpose of the Act has to be   given precedence over any other interpretation which may   not further the cause of the statute. The development of   law   is   particularly   liberated   both   from   literal   and   blinkered interpretation, though to a limited extent." 

[20.4] Learned Senior Counsel Mr.Shelat for the appellant has  placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   in   the   case   of  N.Kannadasn   v/s.   Ajoy Khose and Ors. Reported in (2009) 7 SCC 1 in support of his  argument that provision under Section 56 of the Panchayat Act is to  be construed  purposively.   In  the  aforesaid   judgment,   while  dealing  with purposive interpretation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in  paras 54, 55 and 56 as under :­ "[54]  A   case   of   this   nature   is   a   matter   of   moment.   It  concerns   public   interest.   Public   information   about   independence and impartiality of a judiciary would be in   question. The duty of all organs of the State is that the   public trust and confidence in the judiciary may not go in   Page 33 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT vain.   Construction   of   a   statute   would   not   necessarily   depend upon application of any known formalism. It must  be done having regard to the text and context thereof. For   the aforementioned purpose, it is necessary to take into   consideration the statutory scheme and the purpose and   object it seeks to achieve. 

[55] A construction of a statute, as is well known, must   subserve the tests of justice and reason. It is a well­settled   principle of law that in a given case with a view to give   complete and effective meaning to a statutory provision,   some   words   can   be   read   into;   some   words   can   be  subtracted.   Provisions   of   a   statute   can   be   read   down   (although sparingly and rarely). 

[56]  In   Carew   and   Company   Ltd.   v.   Union   of   India   ,   Krishna Iyer, J. opined: 

21. The law is not "a brooding omnipotence in the   sky" but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is   an   operational   art   controlling   economic   life,   and  interpretative   effort   must   be   imbued   with   the   statutory   purpose.   No   doubt,   grammar   is   a   good   guide   to   meaning   but   a   bad   master   to   dictate.  

Notwithstanding   the   traditional   view   that   grammatical construction is the golden rule, Justice  Frankfurter used words of practical widom when he   observed: 

There is no surer way to misread a document than to   read it literally." 
[21] Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Jani, appearing  for the State has mainly submitted that in absence of any prohibition  for any period, after election for moving no confidence motion against  Sarpanch and Up­Sarpanch under Section 56 of the Act, 1993, it is  always open for the members of the Panchayat to move no confidence  Page 34 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT motion   at   any   time.     It   is   submitted   that   in   the   meeting   held   on  24.01.2017, there were nine subjects and thereafter, on 25.01.2017,  motion   of   no   confidence   was   moved   by   11   out   of   14   members   of  Panchayat.  It is also submitted that  appellant  is  elected  directly by  qualified voters of Panchayat with margin of 2739 votes. It is further  submitted that as members of Panchayat have lost confidence on the  Sarpanch, they moved motion of no confidence by way of requisition  on 25.01.2017.  It is also contended that if majority of members have  lost confidence on the Sarpanch, the functions of Panchayat will come  to grinding halt. Referring to Section 96 of the Gujarat Panchayats  Act, 1993, it is contended that  all  questions  before  a meeting  of  a  panchayat or committee thereof or of a gram sabha shall be decided  by a majority of votes of the members present.  It is submitted that for  moving no confidence motion, no reasons be mentioned. In support of  his argument, he has relied on the judgment in the case of Babubhai   Muljibhai Patel v/s. Nandlal Khodidas Barod and Ors. reported in  (1974) 2 SCC 706.  In the aforesaid judgment,  the Hon'ble Supreme  Court, while dealing with provisions relating to no confidence motion  under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, has held that in view of  language under section 36 of the Municipalities Act, no grounds be  mentioned when no confidence  motion is actually passed against the  President.  So far as mentioning of reasons, it is fairly stated that no  Page 35 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT confidence   motion   not   being   punitive,   no   reasons   be   recorded   for  removal. 

[21.1] Learned  Additional   Advocate   General   appearing   for   the  State has relied on the judgment in the case  Ram Beti v/s. District   Panchayat Raj Adhikari and Ors. reported in (1998) 1 SCC 680. In  the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the  validity of section 14 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The said  section provided for removal of Pradhan of Gram Sabha by members  of   Gram   Panchayat,   a   smaller   body,   instead   by   members   of   Gram  Sabha who are electorate. Said provision was held to be valid and it  was   held   that   it   will   not   destroy   the   democratic   functioning   of  Panchayat Raj Institutions.  

[21.2] Further reliance is placed by learned Additional Advocate  General Mr. Jani on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in  the   case   of  Thakore   Gandaji   Chundaji   and   Ors.   v/s.   Secretary,   Indrad Gram Panchayat and Ors. reported in 2000 (2) GLH 758.  In the aforesaid judgment, the Division Bench of this Court has upheld  Section   56   of   the   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993.     Validity   of   such  provision was questioned mainly on the ground that Sarpanch who is  directly elected by Gram Panchayat cannot be allowed to be removed  Page 36 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT by   way   of   no   confidence   motion   passed   by   members   of   Gram  Panchayat.  When   said  provision  was   challenged   as   being  arbitrary,  said contention was rejected in the aforesaid judgment and Section 56  of the Gujarat Panchayat Act is upheld.

[21.3] Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Jani, appearing  for   the   State   has   relied   on   the   judgment   in   the   case   Mohan   Lal   Tripathi  v/s. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly and Ors. reported in   (1992) 4 SCC 80.  In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme  Court has upheld the validity of provision relating to no confidence  motion in U.P. Municipalities Act.  In the said Act, there was provision  for   moving   no   confidence   motion   against   President   elected   by  electorate directly by the Board, instead of the electorate itself. Said  provision was held to be valid.

[21.4] Referring to judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the  case   of  Vipulbhai   M.   Chaudhary   v/s.   Gujarat   Cooperative   Milk   Marketing Federation Limited and Ors. reported in (2015) 8 SCC   1,  it   is   submitted   that   said   judgment   is   rendered   interpreting   the  provision   under   Gujarat   Cooperative   Societies   Act.     It   is   submitted  that in absence of any provision for prohibiting, moving no confidence  motion   at   any   time   after   election   of   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch,  Page 37 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT under Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, there is no embargo  for moving no confidence motion.  

[21.5] It   is   finally   submitted   by   learned   Additional   Advocate  General   that   in   view   of   clear   and   unambiguous   language,   under  Section   56   of   the   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993,   the   principle   of  reading into or reading down also cannot be applied, for prohibiting  no   confidence   motion   at   any   time   after   election.   In   support   of   his  argument, he placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Union of   India v/s. Namit Sharma reported in (2013) 10 SCC 359.  [22] Mr.   D.   C.   Dave,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   for  respondent   Nos.4   to   14   has   submitted   that   in   view   of   clear   and  unambiguous language of section 56 of the Act, 1993, no words can  be read into said provision.  Learned Counsel has also placed reliance  on the judgment in the case of  Namit Sharma v/s. Union of India   reported in (2013) 1 SCC 745. 

[22.1] It   is   further   submitted   by   Mr.Dave,   learned   Senior  Counsel   that   in   absence   of   any   challenge   to   the  vires  of   provision  under Section 56 of  the  Gujarat  Panchayats   Act,  it  is  not  open for  reading   into   or   reading   down   into   provision   of   Section   56   of   the  Page 38 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993.  It is submitted that judgment relied by  the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in the case of Vipulbhai   Chaudhari (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. [22.2] While   referring   to   the   judgment   in   the   case   of  Bharat   Aluminum Company v/s. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services INC   reported in (2012) 9 SCC 552, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Dave for  the  respondents   has   submitted   that   any   prohibition   of     moving   no  confidence motion against Sarpanch and Up­Sarpanch after election,  would result in re­writing the language of Section 56 of the Panchayat  Act and same is not permissible. 

[22.3] Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Dave for the respondents has  also   placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   in   the   case   of  Cellular   Operators Association of India and Ors. v/s. Telecom Regulatory   Authority of India and Ors. reported in (2016) 7 SCC 703.   It is  submitted   that   principle   of   'reading   down'   would   apply   only   when  general words used in a statute or regulation can be confined in a  particular manner so as not to infringe upon a constitutional right.  Para 50 of the said judgment reads as under :­ "50. But it was said that the aforesaid Regulation should be   Page 39 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT read down to mean that it would apply only when the fault   is that of the service provider. We are afraid that such a   course is not open to us in law, for it is well settled that the   doctrine of reading down would apply only when general   words used in a statute or regulation can be confined in a   particular   manner   so   as   not   to   infringe   a   constitutional  right.   This   was   best   exemplified   in   one   of   the   earliest   judgments   dealing   with   the   doctrine   of   reading   down,  namely the judgment of the Federal  Court in In Re: Hindu   Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, AIR 1941 FC 72. In   that   judgment,   the   word   "property"   in   Section   3   of   the   Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act was read down so as   not to include agricultural land, which would be outside the   central legislature's powers under the Government of India   Act,   1935.   This   is   done   because   it   is   presumed   that   the   legislature   did   not   intend   to   transgress   constitutional   limitations. While so reading down the word "property", the   Federal Court held:

"If   the   restriction   of   the   general   words   to   purposes   within the power of the Legislature would be to leave   an Act with nothing or next to nothing in it, or an Act   different in kind, and not merely in degree, from an   Act in which the general words were given the wider   meaning, then it is plain that the Act as a whole must   be   held   invalid,   because   in   such   circumstances   it   is   impossible   to   assert   with   any   confidence   that   the   Legislature intended the general words which it has   used   to   be   construed   only   in   the   narrower   sense:  
Page 40 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT
Owners   of   SS.   Kalibia   v.   Wilson,   Vacuum   Oil  Company   Ltd.   v.   State   of   Queensland,   R.   v.  
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration   and   British   Imperial   Oil   Co.   Ltd.   v.   Federal   Commissioner of Taxation."

[22.4] Further, reliance is placed by learned Senior Counsel Mr.  Dave on the judgment in the case of Hiral P. Harsora and Ors. v/s.   Kusum   Narottamdas   Harsoara   and   Ors.   reported   in   (2016)   10   SCC 165  in support of his submission that the principle of reading  into or reading down cannot be applied where the statutory provision  is clear and unambiguous.  

[23] From   the   submissions   made   by   learned   Counsels  appearing for both the parties, it is not in dispute that appellant - lady  was elected as Sarpanch of Sankheda Gram Panchayat in the elections  held   on   26.12.2016.  It   is   not   in   dispute   that   first   meeting   of   the  Panchayat was held on 16.1.2017, in which there was election of Up­ Sarpanch. The second meeting was held on 24.1.2017. Though there  is dispute with regard to agenda item, but the fact remains that said  agenda relates to formation of Committees.  Thereafter, immediately  on 25.01.2017, 11 out of 14 members of Gram Panchayat have moved  no confidence motion against the appellant - Sarpanch.  Precisely, it  Page 41 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT is clear that within a period of one month from the date of election,  such a motion is moved against the appellant. 

[23.1] From the submissions made by learned Counsels on both  the sides, the issue which arise for our consideration is whether any  restriction is to be read into Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act,  1993 for moving no confidence motion against the elected Sarpanch,  after   election.     Further,   the   issue   which   arises   for   consideration   is  whether such move on the part of respondent Nos.4 to 14 is illegal  and arbitrary, as much as, no confidence motion is moved against the  appellant, who is elected directly by the electorate of the panchayat,  within a period of one month from the date of declaration of result.  [24] It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.N.Shelat  for the appellant that keeping in mind objective of the Constitution  (73 Amendment) Act, 1992, if the elected Sarpanch is permitted to be  removed   by   way   of   no   confidence   motion,   within   a   period   of   one  month from the date of election, such move will run contrary to spirit  and  object of Constitutional  Amendment  Act,  1992.   It  is submitted  that Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 itself is brought into force to bring  the law relating to the panchayats in conformity with Part IX of the  Constitution.   It is submitted that even in absence of any protection  Page 42 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT for moving no confidence motion for a particular period from the date  of election under Section 56 of the Act,   unless elected Sarpanch is  allowed  to function for a  reasonable  period,   it cannot  be said  that  confidence   on   functioning   of   Sarpanch   is   lost.   It   is   submitted   that  accountability and transparency can be gauged, if Sarpanch is allowed  to work for a reasonable time, but at very beginning, no confidence  motion cannot be allowed to be moved on the apprehension that the  elected Sarpanch may not spare time to function as Sarpanch.   It is  submitted that though reasons need not be recorded for moving no  confidence   motion,   but   the   provision   under   Section   56   of   the   Act,  1993 is to be construed purposively. 

[25] Going to the objects and reasons of the Constitution (73rd  Amendment) Act, 1992, it was felt that Panchayati Raj Institutions,  though in existence for a long time, have not been able to acquire the  status   and   dignity   of   viable   and   responsive   people's   bodies   due   to  number of reasons including absence of regular elections, prolonged  supersession,   insufficient   representation   of   weaker   section   i.e.  Schedule Castes, Schedule Tribes and women, inadequate devolution  of powers and lack of financial resources. Further, it is evident that in  view of short comings which have been observed, it is considered to  have imperative need to enshrine in the Constitution certain basic and  Page 43 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT essential features of Panchayati  Raj Institutions to impart certainty,  continuity and to strengthen them. It is clear from the said objectives  that   one   of   the   basic   objects'   and   reasons   is   to   impart   certainty,  continuity and strength to the Panchayati Raj Institutions, which are  proposed   on   three   tier   basis   i.e.   Gram   Panchayat   at   Village   level,  Taluka Panchayat  at Taluka level and District Panchayat  at District  level.   From the preamble of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, it is  evident   that   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993   is   enacted   to   bring   law  relating to panchayats in State of Gujarat in conformity with Part IX of  the Constitution. 

[26] As per Section 55 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993,  executive powers of the Panchayat, for the purpose of carrying out the  provisions   of   the   Act   by   the     Village   Panchayat   shall   vest   in   the  Sarpach   thereof   who   shall   be   directly   responsible   for   the   due  fulfillment of the duties imposed upon the Panchayat under the Act.  Section 55(2) of the Act reads as under :­ "(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing   provision :­ 

(a) the Sarpanch shall­ 

(i)   preside   over   and   regulate   the   meetings   of   the  panchayat; 

(ii)   exercise   supervision   and   control   over   the   acts   done   Page 44 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT and   actions   taken   by   all   officers   and   servants   of   the   panchayat; 

(iii) incur contingent expenditure upon fifty rupees at any   one occasion; 

(iv)   operate   on   the   fund   of   the   panchayat   including   authorisation of payment, issue of cheques and refunds; 

(v) be responsible for the safe custody of the fund of the   panchayat; 

(vi)   cause   to   be   prepared   all   statements   and   reports   required by or under this Act; 

(vii) exercise such other powers and discharge such other   functions as may be conferred or imposed upon him by   this Act or rules made thereunder. 

(b) the Upa­Sarpanch shall­ 

(i)   in   the   absence   of   the   Sarpanch   preside   over   and   regulate the meetings of the panchayat; 

(ii) exercise such of the powers and perform such of the   duties of the Sarpanch as the Sarpanch may, from time to   time delegate to him; 

(iii) in case the Sarpanch has been continuously absent   from   the   village   for   more   than   fifteen   days   or   is   incapacitated   to   exercise   the   powers   and   perform   the   duties of the Sarpanch.

(3)   In   the  absence   of   both  the   Sarpanch  and  the  Upa­ Sarpanch,   every   meeting   of   the   panchayat   shall   be   presided over by such one of the members present as may   be chosen by the meeting to be Chairman for the occasion.  (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iv) of   sub­ section (2) no money shall be withdrawn from the  fund  of   the  panchayat   except  with  the  signature  of   the   Sarpanch and any one of the two other members of the   Page 45 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT panchayat authorised in that behalf by the panchayat."  [27] From a reading of the above said provision, it is clear that  all   the   responsibilities   vest   on   the   Sarpanch,   as   executive   head   of  village   panchayat.     Section   56   of   the   Act,   1993   empowers   any  member who intends to move no confidence motion against Sarpanch  or Up­Sarpanch to give notice thereof in the prescribed form to the  panchayat  concerned. If  the  notice  is  supported   by  one  half  of  the  total   number   of   members   of   the   panchayat   concerned,   the   motion  may be moved. In other Acts viz. The Gujarat Cooperative Societies  Act, 1961 and The Gujarat   Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963,  there is provision for prohibition of moving no confidence motion for  a period of six months from the date of election.  [28] It  is  the  case   of   the   appellant   that   the   provision   under  Section 56 of the Act, 1993 is to be interpreted purposively keeping in  mind objectives of the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992. On  the other hand, it is the case of the respondents that in view of clear  language used under Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993,  it is not open to read into the provision restricting the members to  move no confidence motion against the Sarpanch. At this stage, it is to  be noticed that as per section 9 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993,  Page 46 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT Sarpanch is elected by ballot, by the qualified voters of the village,  whereas, the Up­Sarpanch is elected by the members of the village  panchayat.     Though   the   Sarpanch   of   the   village   is   elected   by   the  qualified   voters   of   the   village   from   amongst   themselves,     but   the  power is conferred under Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act,  1993 on the elected members of the Panchayat to move motion of no  confidence   against   the   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch   of   the   Gram  Panchayat. As identical provision is upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme  Court, it is not necessary for us to delve in deep to examine whether  directly elected Sarpanch from the qualified voters of the Panchayat  can   be   removed   by   the   members   of   the   panchayat,   by   way   of   no  confidence motion.   Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993  permits   members   of   the   Panchayat   to   move   no   confidence   motion  against the Sarpanch of the Panchayat. It is also necessary to refer to  Section 57 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, which empowers the  competent authority to order removal of any member of panchayat on  proved   misconduct.   Under   section   57(2)   of   the   Act,   1993,   the  competent authority is also  empowered to disqualify such removed  person for a period, not exceeding 5 years for election of Sarpanch or  Up­Sarpanch of the Panchayat.

[29] On   close   scrutiny   of   Section   56   and   Section   57   of   the  Page 47 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993,   there   is   vital   distinction   i.e.   the  removal   of   Sarpanch   by   way   of   no   confidence   motion,   is   not   a  punitive one and no disqualification can be made for future contest,  whereas, a person removed on proved misconduct can be disqualified  under section 57(2) of the Act, 1993 for a period not exceeding 5  years   for   the   election   to   the   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch.   We   are  referring to the provision under Sections 56 and 57 of the Gujarat  Panchayats Act, 1993 so as to observe that removed Sarpanch under  no confidence motion can contest immediately next notified election  for the post, as much as, there is no disqualification attached to such  removed person.

[30] To   construe   provision   under   Section   56   of   the   Gujarat  Panchayats   Act,   1993,   by   applying   principle   of   purposive  interpretation,   we   are   of   the   view   that   unless   elected   Sarpanch   is  allowed to work for a reasonable time, he/she  cannot be permitted to  be removed by way of no confidence motion.   It is fairly stated that  while dealing with doctrine of purposive interpretation, construction  of statute, as is well known, must sub­serve the test of justice and  reasons.   Equally, it is fairly settled principle of law that in a given  case, with a view to give complete and effective meaning to statutory  provision,   some   words   can   be   read   into   and   some   words   can   be  Page 48 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT subtracted.

[31] In   the   judgment   arising   out   of   Gujarat   Cooperative  Societies Act, 1961, in the case of Vipulbhai Chaudhary v/s. Gujarat   Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and Ors. reported   in   (2015)   8   SCC   1,  the   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   while   considering  identical   provisions   in   various   States   in   connection   with   Municipal  Acts,   Panchayat   Acts   and   Cooperative   Societies   Acts,   has   held   in  paras­ 52, 52.1, 52.2 and 53 as under :­ "52. Now that this Court has declared the law regarding   the democratic set up of a cooperative society and that it is   permissible   to   remove   an   elected   office   bearer   through   motion   of   no   confidence,   and   since   in   many   States,   the   relevant statutes have not carried out the required statutory   changes in terms of the constitutional mandate, we feel it  just and necessary to lay down certain guidelines. However,   we   make   it   clear   that   these   guidelines   are   open   to   be   appropriately   modified   and   given   statutory   shape   by   the   competent legislature/authority. 

52.1. Having gone through the provisions regarding motion   of   no   confidence   in   local   self­governments,   we   find   that   there   is   no   uniformity   with   regard   to   the   procedure   and   process   regarding   motion   of   no   confidence.   Some   States   provide for a protection of two years, some for one year and   a few for six months, to the office bearers in office before  Page 49 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT moving a motion of no confidence. However, majority of the  States provide for two years and a gap of another one year   in   case   one   motion   of   no   confidence   is   defeated.   Bihar   Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 provides for a protection of two   years and one year, Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 provides for   a protection of two years and one year, Himachal Pradesh   Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two   years and two years, Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam   Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 provides for a protection of   two and a half years, Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act,   1961 provides for a protection of two years and one year,   Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection   of two years and  one year,  Orissa Panchayat  Samiti  Act,   1959 provides for a protection of two years, Orissa Grama   Panchayats Act, 1964 provides for a protection of two years,   Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection   of two years, Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides   for   a   protection   of   two   years   and   one   year,   Rajasthan   Municipalities   Act,   2009   provides  for  a  protection  of  two   years   and   Uttar   Pradesh   Panchayati   Raj   Act,   1947,   as   followed by Uttarakhand, provides for a protection of two   years and one year. 

52.2 Having regard to the set up in local self­governments   prevailing in many of the States as above, we direct that in   the case of cooperative societies registered under any Central   or State law, a motion of no confidence against an office   bearer   shall   be   moved   only   after   two   years   of   his  Page 50 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT assumption of office. In case the motion of no confidence is   once defeated, a fresh motion shall not be introduced within   another one year. A motion of no confidence shall be moved   only in case there is a request from one­third of the elected   members of the Board of Governors/Managing Committee   of   the   cooperative   society   concerned.   The   motion   of   no   confidence shall be carried in case the motion is supported  by more than fifty per cent of the elected members present in   the meeting.

53.  Though for different  reasons,  we agree with  the view   taken   by   the   High   Court   of   Gujarat.   The  contra  views   expressed by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay,   Kerala and Punjab and Haryana are no more good law in  view of the Ninety Seventh Amendment to the Constitution   of India."

In   the   aforesaid   judgment,   the   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court  has held that while exercising powers of judicial review, it is the duty  of the Courts to provide statute with meaning based on constitutional  prescriptions, aspirations and ideals.  It is also held that if the statute  is silent or imprecise on requirements under the Constitution, it is for  the Court to read constitutional mandate into provisions concerned  and declare it accordingly. It is also further held that if Rules or bye­ laws do not say what they should say in terms of the constitution, it is  the duty of the Court to read constitutional spirit and concept into  Page 51 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT such provisions. 

[31.1] While referring to the case of  Bhanumati v/s. State of   UP and Ors. reported in AIR 2010 SC 3796,  the Hon'ble Supreme  Court has held in para 17 of  Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary  (supra)  that  the   cooperative   principles   governing   provisions   of   Gujarat  Cooperative Societies Act and Panchyati Raj Institutions are same. In  the   said   judgment,   guidelines   are   issued   restraining   moving   of   no  confidence motion for a period of two years from the date of election,  so far as societies registered under Central or State law are concerned.  It is held that motion of no confidence against office bearer shall be  moved only after  two years of his / her assumption  of  office.  It is  further held that in case the motion of no confidence is once defeated,  a fresh motion shall not be introduced within another one year. It is  to be noticed that after above guidelines are issued in the aforesaid  judgment on 19.03.2015, the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961  is amended by Gujarat Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2015.  By   the   aforesaid   amendment,   Section   74E   is   brought   in,   which  provides motion of no confidence against President, Vice President,  Chairman and office bearers of the Society. As per provisio to section  74E (2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961,  no requisition  for a special  meeting shall  be  made  within a  period  of six  months  Page 52 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT from the date of assuming office of President, Vice President etc.  [32] The Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 was  also amended by inserting Section 17A, by Gujarat Act No.14 of 2015.  Here   also,   there   is   protection   for   moving   no   confidence   against  President and Vice President for a period of six months and further  protection of six months once it is failed.  Though identical provisions  in similar Acts cannot be the basis, but as it is brought to our notice,  we have mentioned such amendments made in Gujarat Cooperative  Societies Act, 1961 and the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act,  1963.

[33] In the  case  of  Usha   Bharti   v/s.   State   of   UP   and   Ors.   reported   in   (2014)   7   SCC   663,  while   upholding   the   amendments  made to the U.P. Kshetra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Act, 1961,  and while reiterating earlier view in the case of Bhanumati v/s. State   of UP and Ors. reported in (2010) 12 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme  Court has held that objects and reasons of Part IX are to lend status  and   dignity   to   Panchayati   Raj   Institutions   and   to   impart   certainty,  continuity and strength to them.

[34] In the judgment in the case of  N. Kannadasn v/s. Ajay   Page 53 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT Khose   and   Anr.   reported   in   (2009)   7   SCC   1,   relied   by   learned  Counsel   for   the   appellant,   while   considering   the   scope   of  interpretation of constitutional provision,  the Hon'ble Supreme Court  has held that the Court may have to change the interpretative tool in  the event it is necessary to give effective contextual meaning to the  Act.   It   is   further   held   that   while   constructing   a   statute,   for   giving  effective meaning to the statutory provisions, some words can be read  into and some words can be subtracted. Para 27, 55 and 56 of the  said judgment reads as under :­ "27. Interpretative tools of constitutional provisions and the   statutory   provisions   may   be   different.   Whatever   interpretative tool is applied, the Court must not forget that   its job is to find out the intention of the legislature. It can be   gathered from the words used. However, if plain meaning  assigned   to   the   section   results   in   absurdity   or   anomaly,   literal meaning indisputably would not be applied. It is also   well   settled   that   the   Court   may   have   to   change   the   interpretative   tool   in   the   event   it   is   necessary   to   give   effective contextual meaning to the Act.

55. A construction of a statute, as is well known, must   subserve the tests of justice and reason. It is a well­settled   principle  of law  that in  a  given  case with  a  view  to  give   complete   and   effective   meaning   to   a   statutory   provision,   some words can be read into; some words can be subtracted.   Page 54 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT Provisions   of   a   statute   can   be   read   down   (although  sparingly and rarely).

56. In   Carew   and   Company   Ltd.   v.   Union   of   India   [(1975) 2 SCC 791], Krishna Iyer, J. opined: 

"21. The law is not "a brooding omnipotence in the   sky" but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is  an   operational   art   controlling   economic   life,   and   interpretative   effort   must   be   imbued   with   the   statutory   purpose.   No   doubt,   grammar   is   a   good  guide   to   meaning   but   a   bad   master   to   dictate.   Notwithstanding   the   traditional   view   that  grammatical construction is the golden rule, Justice   Frankfurter used words of practical widom when he  observed4:
"There is no surer way to misread a document than to   read it literally."

[35] Similarly, in another judgment in the case of  Executive   Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Limited  (Southco) and Anr. v/s. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill reported in (2012)  2   SCC   108,   relied   by   learned   Counsel   for   the   appellant,   while  considering the interpretation of the provisions under Electricity Act,  2003,     the   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   has   taken   a   view   that   while  interpreting statute, an interpretation, which would attain the object  and purpose of the Act has to be given precedence  over any other  Page 55 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT interpretation which may not further the cause of the statute, is to be  adopted.  Paras 46 and 47 of the said judgment read as under :­ "46. 'Purposive construction' is certainly a cardinal principle of   interpretation.   Equally   true   is   that   no   rule   of   interpretation   should   either   be   over­stated   or   over­extended.   Without   being  over­extended or over­stated, this rule of interpretation can be   applied to the present case. It points to the conclusion that an   interpretation which would attain the object and purpose of the   Act   has   to   be   given   precedence   over   any   other   interpretation  which may not further the cause of the statute. The development  of law is particularly liberated both from literal and blinkered   interpretation, though to a limited extent.

47. The precepts of interpretation of contractual documents have   also undergone a wide ranged variation in the recent times. The  result has been subject to one important exception to assimilate   the way in which such documents are interpreted by judges on   the   common   sense   principle   by   which   any   serious   utterance   would   be   interpreted   by   ordinary   life.   In   other   words,   the   common   sense   view  relating  to  the  implication  and  impact  of   provisions is the relevant consideration for interpreting a term of  document so as to achieve temporal proximity of the end result." [36] Referring to aforesaid case law on the subject and in view  of   the   judgment   of   the   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of  Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v/s. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing   Federation Limited and Ors. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1, it is the  case   of   the   appellant   that   looking   to   the   objective   of   73rd  Page 56 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT Constitutional   Amendment   that   the   stability   and   continuity   of   the  Panchayat  is  intended  and   further   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993   is  enacted only to bring law of Panchayat in tune with the constitutional  amendment.   Unless   reasonable   time   for   prohibiting   moving   of   no  confidence motion is read into Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats  Act,   1993,   it   will   run   contrary   to   the   object   and   spirit   of   the  constitutional amendment.  It is also the case of the appellant that if  composite scheme of the Pancahayat Act is looked into, it is clear that  unless elected Sarpanch is allowed to work for reasonable time after  election, it is not open to the members of the Panchayat to move no  confidence motion immediately after election.   It is submitted that if  same   is   allowed,   it   will   destroy   the   object   and   spirit   of   73rd  Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. 

[37] Learned  Additional   Advocate   General   appearing   for   the  State  and learned Senior Counsel  Mr.  D.C.   Dave  appearing  for the  respondents   by   placing   reliance   on   the   judgments   in   the   case   of  Union of India v/s. Namit Sharma reported in (2013) 10 SCC 359   and Bharat Aluminium Company v/s. Kaiser Aluminum Technical   Service Inc. reported in (2012) 9 SCC 552  have submitted that in  view of clear language under section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats  Act, which is unambiguous, it is not open to interpret the provisions  Page 57 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT of Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, but at the same time, in  view of the judgment in the case of  Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v/s.  Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and Ors.   reported   in   (2015)   8   SCC   1,    provisions   of   the   statute   are   to   be  interpreted   keeping   in   mind   object   and   spirit   of   Constitutional  Amendment Act, 1992. By applying aforesaid principle, it is always  open for the Courts to interpret provisions keeping in mind object and  reasons   of   the   statute   and   also   constitutional   background.   We   are  unable to accede to submission made by learned Senior Counsel Mr.  D.C.   Dave   that   principle   of   reading   into   or   reading   down   is   to   be  applied only in cases where  vires  is challenged. Even in case, where  vires  is   not   challenged,   if   any   provision   of   statute   falls   for  interpretation,   it   is   always   open   for   the   Court   to   interpret   such  provision   having   regard   to   object   and   reasons   of   the   statute   and  constitutional background for such statute.

[38] In   the   case   of  Vipulbhai   M.   Chaudhary   v/s.   Gujarat   Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and Ors. reported   in (2015) 8 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that in  absence of any provision, no confidence motion can be moved against  elected   President   of   the   Cooperative   Societies,   has   also   issued  guidelines   noticing   restriction   for   moving   no   confidence   motion  Page 58 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT immediately   after   election   in   various   States   under   Cooperative  Societies Act, Municipal Act and Panchayat Act in the country. As a  measure   of   guidelines,   in   the   aforesaid   judgment,   the   Hon'ble  Supreme Court has held that no confidence motion cannot be moved  for a period of two years from the date of election and also further  held that similar attempt  to move no confidence motion cannot be  made for a period of one year, once it is failed.  Looking at Chapters  IX, IXA and IXB of the Constitution of India, having similar object and  reasons, said amendments were made in the Constitution.  [39] In   view   of   the   fact   that   continuity   and   stability   of  Panchayati Raj Institutions is one of the objectives of Constitutional  73rd Amendment Act, 1992, if no confidence motion is moved against  elected Sarpanch immediately after election, without even permitting  said elected Sarpanch to work for reasonable time to discharge his /  her functions, and obligation as contemplated under section 55 of the  Panchayats   Act,   any   move   for   removal   by   way   of   no   confidence  motion immediately after election will run contrary to the spirit and  object  behind 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. [40] Though the appellant  is elected in the election held on  27.12.2016 by the qualified voters of Panchayat, she is sought to be  Page 59 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT removed   by   way   of   no   confidence   motion   by   the   members   of  Panchayat  barely  within   a   period   of   one   month   from   the   date   of  declaration   of   election.   Though   no   reasons   are   required   to   be  mentioned   for   moving   no   confidence   motion,   but   unless   elected  Sarpanch   is   allowed   to   work   for   reasonable   time,   moving   no  confidence motion on the allegation that members of the Panchayat  have lost confidence is illegal and arbitrary. If the same is permitted,  it will result in vicious circle, as much as, there is no disqualification  attached once Sarpanch is removed by way of no confidence motion,  unlike   disqualification   attached   to   removal   as   contemplated   under  Section 57 of the Panchayats  Act.   It is fairly well settled that if a  person   is   removed   by   way   of   no   confidence   motion,   it   is   neither  censure   motion   nor   punitive   one   and   it   will   not   attach   any  disqualification for future contest. 

[41] Once   elected   candidate   is   removed   by   way   of   no  confidence motion, resulting in vacancy, again the very same person  may contest and also win the immediate election.   Same cannot be  the scheme under the provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993,  which   is   enacted   to   bring   law   relating   to   panchayat   in   tune   with  provisions under Chapter IX of the Constitution of India.  Page 60 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT [42] Then the next question which arises is, in absence of any  restriction   for   a   particular   time   under   section   56   of   the   Act,   what  should   be   the   reasonable   time,   within   which   time   no   confidence  motion   cannot   be   permitted,   so   as   to   read   into   section   56   of   the  Gujarat Panchayats Act.  Reasonable time is nothing but a time that is  fairly required to do whatever is required to be done, conveniently  under the permitted circumstances.  Reasonable time varies from the  contextual meaning, under which it is used.  In short, the reasonable  time   is   any   time   which   is   not   manifestly   unreasonable   under   the  circumstances. 

[43] Under   section   13   of   the   Gujarat   Panchayats   Act,   1993,  every panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under this Act shall continue  for five  years from the date  appointed   for  its first  meeting  and no  longer.   Keeping   such   provisions   in   mind,   and   executive   functions  entrusted to the elected Sarpanch under Section 55 of the Panchayat  Act, and object of the 73rd  Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 i.e.  continuity   and   stability   of   Panchayati   Raj   institutions,   we   deem   it  appropriate that reasonable time of one year should be considered as  reasonable time, within which time, no motion could be permitted for  removal   of   elected   Sarpanch   by   way   of   no   confidence   motion   as  contemplated  under section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats  Act from  Page 61 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT the   date   of   declaration   of   result.   Similarly,   once,   no   confidence  motion is moved and defeated, same cannot be permitted for a period  of one year from the date of such defeat.  

[44] So   far   as   President   of   Taluka   Panchayat   is   concerned,  initially period  can  be of   one   year   from   the   date   of   declaration   of  result, within which time, no motion can be permitted for removal of  elected   President   of   Taluka   Panchayat.   However,   keeping   in   mind  tenure of elected President of Taluka Panchayat being only two and  half   years,   once   motion   is   defeated,   same   can   be   permitted   to   be  moved only after six months from the date of defeat.  [45] We   have   issued   aforesaid   directions,   in   absence   of   any  specific   provision   for   prohibiting   no   confidence   motion   after  declaration   of   election   against   Sarpanch   and   Up­Sarpanch   under  Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 and so far as President  of Taluka Panchayat under Section 70 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act,  1993.  We make it clear that it is open for the competent authority to  make suitable amendment in aforesaid provisions.  [46] For   the   aforesaid   reasons,   the   Letters   Patent   Appeal  No.543 of 2017 is allowed. The order dated 03.04.2017 passed by the  Page 62 of 63 C/LPA/543/2017 CAV JUDGMENT learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.2508 of 2017 is  quashed   and   set   aside.   Consequently,   the   communication   dated  10.02.2017   and   further   communication   dated   04.04.2017   are  quashed   and   set   aside.     Consequently,   the   meeting   held   on  06.04.2017 to the extent of considering no confidence motion against  the appellant also stands quashed. No order as to costs.   The Civil  Applications also stand disposed of.

Order in Letters Patent Appeal No.1128 of 2017 and Special Civil  Application No.11904 of 2017 For the reasons recorded in Letters Patent Appeal No.543  of 2017, the Letters Patent Appeal No.1128 of 2017 stands dismissed  as   infructuous   and   Special   Civil   Application   No.11904   of   2017   is  allowed   by   following   the   judgment.   Consequently,   notice   dated  12.06.2017 and communication dated  03.07.2017 are quashed  and  set aside. Connected Civil Applications also stand disposed of.

(R.SUBHASH REDDY, CJ)  (VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J)  SATISH Page 63 of 63