Kerala High Court
Paul Francis Ambukkaram And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 1 January, 1986
Equivalent citations: (1987)IILLJ150KER
JUDGMENT V. Sivaraman Nair, J.
1. Petitioners in these Original Petitions were employees of the Bank of Cochin Ltd, (hereinafter referred to as the transferor bank), which, after a short-span of moratorium declared under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, was amalgamated with the State Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the transferee bank) under a statutory scheme approved by the Government of India under Section 45(7) of the above enactment. Petitioners challenge their inclusion in the schedule attached to the Scheme. The effect of such inclusion was that they were excluded from continuance in service under the State Bank of India unlike other employees.
2. Petitioners were officers of the Bank of Cochin Ltd. Some of them had undergone special trainings and acquired other qualifications, which equipped them for higher responsibilities in the banking industry. During the course of their service in the Bank, indiscretions and irregularities were committed in the discharge of their official duties allegedly at the behest of the Chairman or one of the other of the Directors of the transferor-bank. Acts so attributed to them were of lesser gravity, and magnitude than those committed by some of their colleagues. The transferor bank came to grief due to the improper manner in which its affairs were conducted by the Board of Directors and a moratorium had to be declared under Section 45(1) and (2) of the Banking Regulation Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Subsequently, a scheme was drawn up by the Reserve Bank of India and the same was approved by the Government of India under Section 45(7) of the Act. Though there was no schedule annexed to the draft scheme, one such was annexed to the approved scheme including the names of 21 officers of the transferor bank who were not to be employed by the transferee bank. The petitioners are some of such officers. They assail their inclusion in the Schedule and consequent refusal of employment in the transferee bank as discriminatory, arbitrary and unconstitutional. They allege mala fides in the choice of employees of the transferor bank for continuance and exclusion, the less guilty and less influential like the petitioners being excluded from employment and the more guilty, but more influential being continued in employment. This is said to be due to the influence of totally irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The finalisation of the scheme annexing a schedule of employees without notice to the petitioners who were denied employment is said to violate the principle of natural justice.
3. Separate counter affidavits have been filed by respondents 1 to 3. Some of the other party respondents, who were continued in service in the transferee-bank pursuant to the scheme of amalgamation, have also filed counter affidavits.
4. All the three respondents maintain that by reason of the provisions contained in Article 31A(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, the challenge of the petitioners against their exclusion from employment by reason of the scheme of amalgamation has to be thrown out by this court. They urge that the provisions of Section 45(7A) of the Banking Regulation Act similarly precludes judicial review of the provisions of the scheme. Understandably, these respondents urge that the schedule is also part of the scheme; and exclusion of some of the employees from employment by the transferee-bank is an integral part of the scheme of amalgamation. It is stated that the transferee-bank prepared the schedule with reference to the case of each of the employees including the petitioners, with reference to records of the transferor bank, the confidential records of each of the employees and other relevant materials on record. Reserve Bank of India is said to have finalised the schedule on a careful consideration of all relevant factors including the views of the transferee bank. The Government of India then undertook a detailed review of the scheme inclusive of the schedule with reference to relevant matters. Such a three tier scrutiny by high-ranking expert organisations into the various aspects of the working of the transferor bank and the parts played by the petitioners, it is averred, has left nothing to be desired. It is the case of the respondents that the provisions of the Act do not enjoin notice to be given to the employees of the transferor-bank, whose names are to be included in the schedule annexed to the scheme. Alternatively they urge that the requirements of natural justice had been duly complied with. It is urged on behalf of the transferee-bank that even after inclusion of the name of an employee in the schedule, it is competent for the transferee-bank to consider any of the scheduled employees for re-entertainment in service and the petitioners can avail of that opportunity if they so desire. The transferee bank maintains that those who were continued in service and who were alleged to be involved in allegations of greater magnitudes of impropriety and misconduct are so retained not for purposes of conferring any benefit on them, but only since it was felt that the allegations against them should be enquired into and disciplinary proceedings should be finalised against them. It is also stated that none of these "Suspect officers" are put in any sensitive position. On the other hand, they are continued in service nominally. It is also submitted that if they were included in the schedule, they would have escaped penal action against them. Some of the other officers, against whom such proceedings were not contemplated, are those against whom proceedings were completed, but only minor penalties were imposed, since the allegations against them were so trivial that no further action was found necessary, on examination of the records. It is also submitted that the plea of discrimination on the basis of the extent of penalty as between the offenders may not be countenanced by this court.
5. Now to the relevant facts: The Reserve Bank of India wrote to the Government of India requesting the latter to declare moratorium in respect of the transferor-bank; and, on the recommendations of the Reserve Bank of India, under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, the Government of India made an order of moratorium in respect of the transferor-bank on 27th April 1985. The Reserve Bank of India required the State Bank of India to look into the feasibility of amalgamation of the bank with the State Bank of India. A special officer appointed by the transferee bank conducted investigations into the affairs of the bank. The transferee-bank thereafter suggested to the Reserve Bank of India that they had no objection to the proposal for amalgamation. The Joint Chief Officer of the Reserve Bank of India in his letter dated 8th June 1985 proposed that the transferee bank would carry out examination of the books of accounts of the transferor-bank as at the close of business on 27th April 1985. A draft scheme, as proposed by the Reserve Bank of India, was enclosed with that letter. In paragraph 10 of the draft scheme, with which alone we are mainly concerned, it was stated that ail employees of the transferor-bank, other than those specified in the schedule referred to in the succeeding paragraph therein, would be deemed to have been appointed by the transferee-bank, under the same remuneration and terms and conditions of service, as were applicable to them in the transferor bank as on 27th April 1985. It may be necessary to refer to this clause in further detail later. In paragraph 11 of the draft scheme, the Reserve Bank of India pointed out for exclusion, employees to be included in the schedule, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or any agreement or contract, on payment of such pension, gratuity, provident fund and other retirement benefits, as may be ordinarily admissible under the rules or authorisation of the transferor bank immediately before the close of the business on 27th April 1985. About 100 copies of the draft scheme were sent over to the transferor-bank, inviting suggestions and objections in terms of Section 45(6) of the Banking Regulation Act. The transferor-bank published copies of the scheme on its notice board. No suggestions or objections were made in respect of their employees, officers and workmen by the transferor bank. The transferee bank, however, expressed their unwillingness to employ 35 officers and 3 workmen in their employment; such persons were grouped as: (a) employees on contract appointment, (b) employees who have attained the age of superannuation as per respective service rules in the State Bank of India, (c) employees for whom there is no provision for corresponding placement in the State Bank of India e.g. part time officer etc., (d) employees under suspension (e) employees against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated, and (f) employees under cloud. Most of the petitioners were included in the last category. The petitioner in O.P. No. 9768/85 was included in category (c)-no corresponding post in transferee-bank, part time employee. The petitioner in O.P. 10382 of 1985 was included in category (b)-past the age of superannuation in the transferee bank. There are some who have been suspended from service.
6. The Reserve Bank of India, however, eliminated 14 officers and 3 workmen from inclusion in the schedule. The schedule, there- tore, consisted of only names of 21 officers. The scheme with the schedule consisting of 21 names of officers, was approved by the Government of India under Section 45(7) of the Banking Regulation Act. As I have already noticed, respondents 1 to 3 assert that the case of each of the officer-employee who was proposed to be continued in service, and who were proposed to be excluded from or included in the schedule annexed to the scheme were specifically considered with reference to the records of the bank and other relevant considerations. It is also asserted that such determination for conclusion of employees or continuance in service was the product of consideration initially by the transferee-bank, then by the Reserve Bank of India, and finally by the Government of India. They also dispute the assertions made by the petitioners, that the exclusion of some employees from continuance in service was in any manner influenced by any of the Directors or officers of the transferor-bank.
7. Now to the relevant statutory provisions: Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 enables the Reserve Bank of India to apply to the Central Government for suspension of business of a banking company and to prepare scheme of reconstitution or amalgamation. The relevant provisions are the following:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Part or in any other law or any agreement or other instrument for the time being in force, where it appears to the Reserve Bank that there is good reason so to do, the Reserve Bank may apply to the Central Government for an order of moratorium in respect of a banking company.
(2) The Central Government, after considering the application made by the Reserve Bank under Sub-section (1), may make an order of moratorium staying the commencement of continuance of all action and proceedings against the company for a fixed period of time on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit and proper and may from time to time extend the period so however that the total period of moratorium shall not exceed six months.
(3) Except as otherwise provided by any directions given by the Central government in the order made by it under Sub-section (2) or at any time thereafter, the banking company shall not, during the period of moratorium, make any payment to any depositors or discharge any liabilities or obligations to any other creditors.
(4) During the period of moratorium, if the Reserve Bank is satisfied that-
(a) in the public interest; or
(b) in the interests of the depositors; or
(c) in order to secure the proper management of the banking company; or
(d) in the interests of the banking system of the country as a whole-
it is necessary so to do, the Reserve Bank may prepare a scheme-
(i) for the reconstruction of the banking company, or
(ii) for the amalgamation of the banking company with any other banking institution (in this section referred to as "the transferee bank").
(5) The scheme aforesaid may contain provisions for all or any of the following matters, namely:
(i) the continuance of the services of all the employees of the banking company (excepting such of them as not being workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are specifically mentioned in the scheme) in the banking company itself on its reconstruction or, as the case may be, in the transferee bank at the same remuneration and on the same terms and conditions of service, which they were getting or, as the case may be, by which they were being governed, immediately before the date of the order or moratorium:
Provided that the scheme shall contain a provision that
(i) the banking company shall pay or grant not later than the expiry of the period of three years from the date on which the scheme is sanctioned by the Central government to the said employees the same remuneration and the same terms and conditions of service as are applicable to employees of corresponding rank or status of a comparable banking company to be determined for this purpose by the Reserve Bank (whose determination in this respect shall be final);
(ii) The transferee bank shall pay or grant not later than the expiry of the aforesaid period of three years, to the said employees the same remuneration and the same terms and conditions of service as are applicable to the other employees of corresponding rank or status of the transferee bank subject to the qualifications and experience of the said employees being the same as or equivalent to those of such other employees of the transferee bank.
Provided further that if in any case under Clause (ii) of the first proviso any doubt or difference arises as to whether the qualification and experience of any of the said employees are the same as or equivalent to the qualifications and experience of the other employees of corresponding rank or status of the transferee bank, the doubt or difference shall be referred to the Reserve Bank whose decision thereon shall be final:
Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (i) where any of the employees of the banking company not being workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are specifically mentioned in the scheme under Clause (i), or where any employees of the banking company have by notice in writing given to the banking company or, as the case may be, the transferee bank at any time before the expiry of one month next following the date on which the scheme is sanctioned by the Central Government, intimated their intention of not becoming employees of the banking company on its reconstruction or, as the case may be, of the transferee bank, the payment to such employees of compensation, if any, to which they are entitled under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and such pension, gratuity, provident fund and other retirement benefits ordinarily admissible to them under the rules or authorisations of the banking company immediately before the date of the order of moratorium.
(6)(a) A copy of the scheme prepared by the Reserve Bank shall be sent in draft to the banking company and also to the transferee bank and any other banking company concerned in the amalgamation, for suggestions and objections, if any, within such period as the Reserve Bank may specify for this purpose.
(b) the Reserve Bank may make such modifications, if any, in the draft scheme as it may consider necessary in the light of the suggestions and objections received from the banking company and also from the transferee bank, and any other banking company concerned in the amalgamation and from any members, despositors or other creditors of each of those companies and the transferee bank.
(7) The scheme shall thereafter be placed before the Central Government for its sanction and the Central Government may sanction the scheme without any modifications or with such modifications as it may consider necessary; and the scheme as sanctioned by the Central Government shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may specify in this behalf.
Provided that different dates may be specified for different provisions of the scheme.
(7A) The sanction accorded by the Central Government under Sub-section (7) whether before or after the commencement of Section 21 of the Banking Laws (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1963, shall be conclusive evidence that all the requirements of this section relating to reconstruction, or, as the case may be, amalgamation have been complied with and a copy of the sanctioned scheme certified in writing by an officer of the Central Government to be a true copy thereof, shall, in all legal proceedings (whether in appeal or otherwise and whether instituted before or after the commencement of the said Section 21), be admitted as evidence to the same extent as the original scheme.
We have to particularly notice Sub-section (7A) to deal with the objections of the respondents that the statutory finality of the scheme conferred thereby precludes judicial scrutiny of the provisions thereof.
8. Article 31A(1)(c) of the Constitution of India provides as follows:
Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for-
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(c) the amalgamation of two or more corporations either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corporations, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19.
It is convenient at this stage to deal with the preliminary objection based on the above Article and Section 45(7A) of the Banking Regulation Act.
9. Article 31A(1)(c) of the Constitution of India disables the Court to declare a law providing for amalgamation of two or more corporations either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corporations on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the right conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. The above provision will be attracted, only if the challenge is against a law providing for amalgamation of two or more corporations. Petitioners submit that they are not challenging any law providing for amalgamation. They do challenge, on grounds of arbitrariness, their exclusion from employment consequent on their inclusion in the schedule annexed to the scheme. True it is that the scheme of amalgamation may be law since Sub-section (11) of Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act provides that copies of the scheme or of any order made under Sub-section (1) shall be laid before both houses of Parliament, as soon as may be, after the scheme has been sanctioned by the Central Government, or, as the case may be, the order has been made. Sub-section (14) thereof is to the effect, the "the provisions of the section and of any scheme made under it shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other provision of the Act in any other law or any agreement, award or other instrument for the time being in force" The effect of these provisions is undoubtedly to provide for legislative approval of the scheme, and incorporation of the terms thereof as if they are part of the statute, notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary contained in the Banking Regulation Act, or any other law or agreement. The effect of these provisions is undoubted: the scheme is statutory; it has the force of law, and necessarily, it is law for purposes of Article 31A of the Constitution of India. The question, however, is, does the prohibition contained in Article 31A of the Constitution apply to all actions referable to the scheme of amalgamation or only to the law, in this case, the scheme, providing for amalgamation of the two corporations?
10. The Additional Advocate General appearing for the Reserve Bank of India drew my attention to Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution defining 'law' as including any Ordinance. Notification etc., and also to the decisions , in support of his submission that the scheme of amalgamation is law, and therefore, beyond challenge by reason of Article 31A(1)(c) of the Constitution. I have already indicated that by reason of the provisions contained in Sub-sections (11) and (14) of Section 45 of the Banking Regulations Act, the provisions of the scheme are incorporated as if they are part of the statute, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act or any other law. It is, therefore, not necessary for me to examine these decisions in any greater detail.
11. The question still is open as to what is meant by the provisions of the scheme? Does it include individuals who were included in the schedule? If any action taken by an executive authority pursuant to a scheme, which is law, is also beyond the purview of attack as violative of Articles Hand 19 of the Constitution, by reason of Article 31A(1)(c) thereof, the Courts would not have considered the challenges to the implementation of statutory schemes like those under the Motor Vehicles Act, or the Life Insurance Corporations Act, or the General Insurance Corporations Act. In all such cases, executive action implementing the scheme, or the law, has been considered by the Supreme Court though the question of exclusion of such challenges by reason of Article 31A(1)(c) of the Constitution was not expressly raised in the decisions of the Supreme Court relating to the amalgamation of companies dealing in Life Insurance business , or the amalgamation of General Insurance Companies (AIR) 1984, SC 1130. The Court proceeded on the assumption that a challenge against executive action, pursuant to schemes of amalgamation, are liable to be assailed in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I have no doubt that the very large contention, that no challenge, even against executive action, can be made if such action is referable to a law, which is protected under Article 31A(1)(c) of the Constitution, deserves serious consideration.
12. It can hardly be doubted that the rights, conferred by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution are fundamental to our constitutional system. May be, in some situations, exclusion of such rights may be necessary. But, such exclusion may not be easily inferred and may have to be specifically spelt out of definite provisions of the Constitution and may have to be related to emergent situations of public interest like an internal emergency or external aggression, or the like. Courts are not expected to expand the scope of the prohibition against enforcement of constitutional rights by interpretative exercises. On the other hand, courts shall confine themselves to the specific terms of such exclusionary provisions when the rights, which are sought to be excluded, are fundamental in nature. Prohibition will, therefore, be operative only in cases where a law providing for the amalgamation of two or more corporations in public interest or to secure proper management of any of the corporations is sought to be attacked as violative of the rights conferred under Article 14 or Article 19 of the Constitution of India. A number of decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on the effect of Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India were cited at the bar. They elaborate the effect of the prohibition contained in the above Article against any attempt to challenge any law for violation of Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution. But, none of these decisions deals with the problem on hand in this case, namely whether executive action referable to laws having the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution of India also can claim such immunity. I am of the opinion that the "Provisions of the scheme" mentioned in Sub-section (14) of Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act do not take in the names of individuals included in the schedule annexed to the scheme. Such provisions of the scheme may include provisions regarding inclusion of some of the employees in the schedule annexed thereto. But, the specific elimination of individual employees, according to me, is not within the comprehension of the term 'Provision of the scheme'.
13. Article 31A of the Constitution of India is not meant to be charter for any illegality passing under a law for amalgamation of corporations. Arbitrary actions taken under a law are not rendered immune from attack by reason thereof. The protective umbrella of Article 31A of the Constitution of India saves the law from invalidation, but does not provide any immunity to executive action. I am clear in my mind that Article 31A of the Constitution does not preclude challenge against executive action under a law providing for amalgamation of two or more corporations in public interest or to secure proper management of any of the corporations.
14. Next, we have to consider the effect of the finality attached to the scheme on its approval by the Central Government as provided in Sub-section (7A) of Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act. We have already seen that it provides that the sanction accorded by the Central Government to the scheme under Sub-section (7) thereof shall be conclusive evidence of compliance with the requirements of Section 45. That provision hardly has the effect of requiring the court to throw out any challenge against the scheme as violative of the Constitutional rights of the citizens, who are affected thereby. It engrafts a rule of evidence that the sanction accorded by the Central Government shall be proof of compliance with all requirements of the section relating to reconstitution or amalgamation. This indication is made amply clear by the provision, that a copy of the sanctioned scheme certified in writing by an officer of the Central Government to be a true copy thereof, shall, in all legal proceedings be admitted as evidence to the same extent as the original scheme. "Conclusive evidence" provision in Sub-section (7A) was not meant to exclude scrutiny by the courts into details of the scheme. Even in cases where statutory determinations are made final, or conclusive, it has been repeatedly held, that judicial review is not totally precluded.
15. It is useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Somawanti v. State of Punjabi .The provisions of Section 6(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 deals with finality to declarations under Section 6 and constitutes such declaration as conclusive evidence. It was argued, as in the present case, that those provisions preclude any judicial review of the land acquisition proceedings. It was observed by the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court:
Though we are of the opinion that the courts are not entitled to go behind the declaration of the Government to the effect that a particular purpose for which the 4and is being acquired is a public purpose we must emphasise that the declaration of the Government must be relatable to a public purpose as distinct from a purely private purpose. If the purpose for which the acquisition is being made is not relatable to public purpose, then a question may well arise whether in making the declaration there has been, on the part of the Government, a fraud on the power conferred upon it by the Act. In other words, the question would then arise whether that declaration was merely a colourable exercise of the power conferred by the Act, and, therefore, the declaration is open to challenge at the instance of the party aggrieved. To such a declaration the protection of Section 6(3) will not extend. For, the question whether a particular action was the result of a fraud or not is always justiciable, provisions such as Section 6(3) notwithstanding.
16. The same question had been considered in a number of decisions by the English Courts. In R.V. Medical Tribunal, ex-parte Gilmore (1957) 1 QB 574, it was observed:
I find it very well settled that the remedy by certiorari is never to be taken away by any statute except by the most clear and explicit words. The word "final" is not enough. That only means "without appeal". It does not mean "without recourse to certiorari". It makes the decision final on the facts, but not final on the law. Notwithstanding that the decision is by a statute made "final", certiorari can still issue for excess of jurisdiction or for error of law on the face of the record.
I have no doubt that it shall be far more so when a complaint is made by a citizen of invasion of his rights. I will read the finality clause contained in Sub-section (7A) of Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act as conclusive evidence or conclusive proof of compliance with requirement of that section relating to the procedure for reconstruction, or amalgamation and not final in the sense of excluding judicial review by superior courts.
17. It is next to be considered whether the petitioners should have been notified before their names were included in the schedule attached to the scheme. The basic facts are not disputed. In the draft scheme prepared by the Reserve Bank of India, and which was published, there was an indication that some of the employees might be included in the schedule to be annexed to the scheme. Section 45(5)(i) and (j) of the Act and Clauses (10) and (11) of the draft scheme enable an annexure of such a schedule. The draft did not contain a schedule, and therefore, particular individuals, who were likely to be included in the schedule had no notice. The State Bank of India recommended 35 officers for such inclusion. The Reserve Bank of India eliminated 14 out of the 35, and annexed the schedule to the scheme sent up for approval by the Government of India. The scheme with the schedule annexed to it was approved by the Government of India. At no stage of these various processes were the individuals included in the schedule notified about such inclusion. Petitioners contend that the inclusion in the scheme amounts to1 termination of their services. Such premature termination of services cast a stigma on them affected their reputation and could therefore have been effected only in compliance with the principles of natural justice, viz., by notifying them about the proposal and after conducting an enquiry into the allegations against them. It is also submitted that persons against whom more serious allegations were raised could get an opportunity to face the disciplinary enquiry and vindicate themselves due to continuance in service, whereas less offending individuals like the petitioners were unceremoniously sent out of service. This is said to be not only unfair, but discriminatory and arbitrary as well. Reliance was placed on a number of decisions to make out that the respondents were bound to act fairly, without arbitrariness and in compliance with the principles of natural justice. Respondents contend that they had not terminated the services of the petitioners: such termination of service was the effect of statutory provisions. Counsel for the Reserve Bank of India submitted that such termination of service approximates termination of service on termination of posts, or on the winding up of companies, under Section 433 of the Companies Act.
18. It is far too late in the day to contend that if there was a premature termination of service casting a stigma on the employees, such termination of service need not be preceded by notice. Even a decision short of termination but having evil consequences on a person in service has to be made only in compliance with the principles of natural justice. This proposition is not seriously disputed by the respondents. I need not therefore elaborately consider the decisions bearing on these aspects. The basic question, however, is whether there was a termination of service casting stigma on the petitioners.
19. It is not disputed that the inclusion of the petitioners in the schedule effects premature termination of service in the case of most of the petitioners. They are, however, not deprived of any of the benefits which they would have been entitled to, had such termination been effected in the normal course without any punitive consequences by the transferor bank on 27th July 1985, the date on which moratorium was declared. Inclusion in the schedule denies the petitioners' right to continue in service. In the case of some of the petitioners, such continuance would have been for fairly long periods of time, had there not been the intervention of moratorium and amalgamation. Can it be said that for that reason the termination of service was punitive and should have been preceded by an enquiry?
20. In Ramanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala 1973 II LLJ 409 the consequences of termination of service on the abolition of the post was considered by the Supreme Court. It was observed:
The abolition of post may have the consequence of termination of service of a Government servant. Such termination is not dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. The opportunity of showing cause against the proposed penalty of dismissal or removal does not therefore arise in the case of abolition of post. The abolition of post is an executive policy decision. Whether after abolition of the post, the Government servant who was holding the post would or could be offered any employment under the State would therefore be a matter of policy decision of the Government because the abolition of post does not confer on the person holding the abolished post any right to hold the post.
The effect of an order of moratorium followed by an order of reconstruction or amalgamation under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act can no longer be a matter of any doubt. Though the termination of a service may be automatic as in the case of abolition of a post, the employees have ordinarily a just and reasonable expectation of continuance in service in the former, whereas there is no justification for such an expectation in the latter.
21. May be, that even after the order of court winding up a company the company may be reconstructed with permission of the court. In such an event, it may be possible that some of the employees may be appointed in the reconstructed company. In the case of abolition of post also, it may be possible for the employer to offer alternative employment, but those are matters of policy. The only fact that in all these cases there is a likelihood of continuance in employment in the reconstructed company or in the reconstituted or amalgamated Banking company or in other alternative employment under the State cannot convert the statutory termination of service into a personal penalty against the employees.
22. The Additional Advocate General appearing for the Reserve Bank of India contends that the effect of art order of moratorium followed by an order of reconstruction or amalgamation under Section 45 of the Act is the same as that of abolition of a post. Right of an employee to hold the post comes to an end when the post is abolished. Right of an employee under the Bank terminates on the passing of an order under Section 45 of the Act. Just as in the case of abolition of a post, provision of alternative employment in any other post is matter of policy and discretion as in the case of Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act. Emphasis was laid on the provisions of Section 45(5)(i) of the Act and Clauses (10) and (11) of the scheme, which, according to the respondents, provide only for employment of the non-scheduled employees. They contend that the employees of the transferor bank have no right to insist on such continuance in service since it depends entirely on the discretion of the Reserve Bank of India and Government of India to continue or eliminate all of them. The fact that some were continued in service does not give others a right to claim continuance in service. It is further submitted that if there is no right to claim employment, and therefore, none of the rights of the petitioners are affected by the inclusion in the schedule, they cannot claim notices prior to the inclusion of their names in the schedule annexed to the scheme. It is also submitted that in the absence of a right to be continued in service, petitioners cannot urge that they were discriminated against. The respondents contend that the existence of a right shall ordinarily be the basis of a complaint against discrimination.
23. A number of decisions of various Courts were cited in the course of arguments relating to these aspects. I do not think it necessary to consider all of them in detail in view of the land-mark decision of the Supreme Court in National Textile Workers Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan 1983 I LLJ 45 at p. 59. That decision deals with the right of employees of a company to be heard in proceedings relating to the winding up of the company under Sections 433 and 439 of the Companies Act. It was noticed that those provisions do not confer any right or entitlement on the employees of the company to move or to participate in winding up proceedings. It was contended that the workers should not have been heard in the winding up proceedings, because absence of mention of employees as entitled to move for winding up or be heard in opposition to the winding up disabled such employees from participating in the proceedings. Bhagwati J., as he then was, in his leading judgment, held at page 59 In deciding whether the Court should wind up a company or change its management the Court must take into consideration not only the interest of the shareholders and creditors, but also public interest in the shape of the need of the community and the interest of the employees. This in my opinion, is the requirement of Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act. If in deciding whether the Court should wind up a company or change its management, the Court must take into consideration not only the interest of the shareholders and creditors, but also, amongst other things, the interest of the workers, it is axiomatic that the workers must have an opportunity of being heard for projecting and safeguarding their interest before a winding up order is made by the Court.
*** *** *** We are therefore of the view that the workers are entitled to appear at the hearing of the winding up petition whether to support or to oppose it so long as no winding up order is made by the Court. The workers have a locus to appear and be heard in the winding up petition both before the winding up petition is admitted and an order for advertisement is made as also after the admission and advertisement of the winding up petition until an order is made for winding up the company. If a winding up order is made and the workers are aggrieved by it, they would also be entitled to prefer an appeal and contend in the appeal that no winding up order should have been made by the Company Judge. But when a winding up order is made and it has become final, the workers ordinarily would not have any right to participate in any proceeding in the course of winding up the company though there may be rare cases where in proceeding in the course of winding up, the interest of the workers may be involved and in such a case it may be possible to contend that the workers must be heard before an order is made by the Court. We think that even when an application for appointment of a provisional liquidator is made by the petitioner in a winding up petition, the workers would have a right to be heard if they so wish because the appointment of a provisional liquidator may adversely affect the interest of the workers. But we may make it clear that neither the petitioner nor the Court would be under any obligation to give notice of such application to the workers. It would be for the workers to apply for being heard, and if they do so, they would be entitled to appear and be heard on the application for appointment of provisional liquidator.
Amarendra Nath Sen J., who was in the minority, added a note of caution to his dissent as follows at p. 83 of (1983 I LLJ 45):
I, however, wish to make it clear that although an employee of a company as an employee of a company cannot claim to appear and be heard in a petition for winding up of the company as a matter of right, yet in any appropriate case the Court in a winding up proceeding may require or permit any employee to appear at any stage of a winding up proceeding and hear him, if the Court be of the opinion that the employee or the employees should be heard in the interests of administration of justice and for proper disposal of any matter.
24. It is beyond dispute that the effect of the winding up of a company is almost the same as the effect of an order under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act on the employees. In both cases, there is an automatic statutory termination of service. In both cases the statute does not provide specifically for notice to the employees, nor even prescribe that the employees may be heard in the proceedings leading to the order. The employees of a company proposed to be wound up are held to be entitled to be heard in the course of winding up proceedings, and even thereafter, if they moved the Court at the appropriate time. Similar right cannot be denied in the case of employees of a banking-company in relation to which an order under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act is issued. The essential difference between the winding up of the company or moratorium of a banking company on the one hand and abolition of post on the other is that in the case of the latter, offer of alternative employment is a matter purely and exclusively of policy and discretion, whereas in the case of an order under Section 45 of the Act, there is a definite possibility of continuance in service of the employees of the transferor bank, subject of course to the exclusion of some under the transferee-bank. There is, therefore, no such extinction of all rights as in the case of abolition of a post in the present case. The employees are entitled, not-withstanding the absence of a specific provision in the Banking Regulation Act, to urge their contentions against their exclusion from employment before final orders are passed under Section 45(7) of the Act.
25. I should take note of the decisions of Delhi High Court reported in Piara Lal Anand v. State Bank of India 1972 II LLJ 495 which was cited by the Additional Advocate General in support of his submission, that an employee of the transferor bank has no right to be heard, and therefore, no question of violation of principles of natural justice arises in upholding the scheme for inclusion of some employees in the schedule. I need only state, that the principles stated therein are no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1983 I LLJ 45).
26. This, however, does not mean that the petitioners are entitled to contend that they should have been notified individually about the proposal to include them in the schedule proposed to be annexed to the scheme. The limited extent to which the principles of natural justice are held to be applicable in the case of employees of a company during the course of its winding up, as extracted above, alone will apply in the case of approval of the scheme under Section 45 of the Act. It would have been open for the employees of the transferor bank to object to the inclusion of any one of them in the schedule which could be annexed to the scheme by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 45(5)(i) and (j) of the Act, when once an order under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 45 of the Act was issued, they were put on notice of the possibility of amalgamation under Section 45(5) of the Act. They had sufficient notice of the provisions of Clauses (i) and (j) of Sub-section (5), that the scheme may be framed and. may contain specific provision for inclusion of at least some of the employees in the schedule to be annexed to the scheme. Specific mention of such possibility was made in the draft scheme, though the names of persons proposed to be included were not mentioned in the draft. At least at that stage, the petitioners could have moved the Reserve Bank of India, or the Government of India, that either the employees individually or their association should be heard before the schedule annexed to the scheme was finally approved. That not having been done, petitioners are not entitled to contend that the schedule annexed to the scheme is liable to be avoided due to contravention of the principles of natural justice.
27. The point of discrimination urged by the petitioners needs examination. The submission is that some of the persons who were continued in service are those who were involved in irregularities of greater magnitude than the petitioners. Specific reference is made to respondents 5, 6 and 7 in O.P. No. 8513 of 1985. Irregular advances made by them were to the extent of Rs. 474 lakhs, Rs. 123 lakhs and Rs. 120 lakhs respectively, whereas the maximum amount involved in the case of the petitioners were to the extent of about Rs. 20 lakhs. The submission is that without conducting an enquiry into the allegations against the petitioners, they are found to be undersirable to continue in service, whereas the greater offenders are continued in service with ail benefits. It is further submitted that the explanation of the respondents that such persons are continued in service for the only purpose of facilitating enquiries is not factually sustainable; and even if true, there is still discrimination, since they get an opportunity of defending themselves in a duly constituted enquiry, whereas the petitioners happened to be victims of ex-parte determination without notice to them. It is stated by the State Bank of India that 14 officers of the transferor-bank, who were removed from the list of officers proposed for inclusion in the schedule by the transferee-bank were so removed because proceedings by way of investigation or departmental proceedings were pending against them at the time of amalgamation. Amongst the 21 persons who were included in the schedule there were only 16 regular officers, others being the Chairman, the Vigilance Officer, the Part-time Programme Co-ordinator, the General Manager, and the former Personnel Manager. Details relating to the action proposed to be taken in respect of the 14 officers who were excluded from the list of officers proposed by the transferee-bank, have been furnished. Disciplinary proceedings have been completed against 7 out of the 14, two of them have already been dismissed from service and action against the others are being expedited. I am also assured that details in relation to everyone of the 53 officers, who had granted unauthorised advances/advances which are not readily recoverable were examined by the transferee-bank. In some cases wherein the transferor-bank had taken action and closed the proceedings, the transferee-bank has reopened the proceedings in view of the gravity of the allegations. It is pertinent to find that in all cases of serious irregularities appropriate action has either been taken or such action is assured expeditiously by the transferee-bank, I am also informed that appropriate action has been or is being initiated even against persons other than the 35 officers action against whom were closed. Further action against some were dropped or because it appeared that no serious offences were committed by them.
28. There seems to be considerable force in the submission that some of the delinquent officers were continued in service, only to complete the disciplinary proceedings/investigations which were pending against them at the time of amalgamation. Such persons form a separate class different from persons like the petitioners, against whom no further action was to be taken since the irregularities involving substantial amount of irregular/irrecoverable advances had been virtually admitted. The only defence sought to be made out is that the Chairman or one or the other of the Directors of the Bank had issued oral instructions to give such advances. It is not disputed that there were internal instructions of the transferor bank delimiting the powers of each of the officers/authorities of the Bank. General guidelines issued in this regard by the Reserve Bank of India are also referred to. In the light of these instruments which could not have been ignored by the officers, the transferee bank cannot be held to have gone wrong in grouping the admitted offenders against whom further action was not contemplated into a separate class, Among those in whose cases the transferor-bank had completed the proceedings, there seems to be some who had escaped rather lightly. Those cases are required to be reopened. That would have been possible only if they were continued in service. I am assured by the transferee-bank that steps have been taken in most cases to bring the offenders to book, final decisions have been come to at least in 7 cases and action against others are being1 expedited. Counsel informs me that none of the officers involved in irregularities will be exonerated or lightly dealt with due to - extraneous considerations. Such personal penalties would naturally deprive them of benefits arising out of normal termination of service. The petitioners, whose inclusion in the schedule has resulted in discontinuance in service, have obtained all benefits of a normal termination of service. It cannot, therefore be said that in that sense they have been put to any disadvantage.
29. However, one fact remains, that among the offenders some have been given opportunities of proving their innocence during the course of the disciplinary enquiry, whereas the others have not been. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that denial of opportunity to more deserving is definitely arbitrary and discriminatory.
30. Shri Mathai Paikkaday referred to me the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das (AIR) 1961 SC 1715 wherein it was held, that it two sets of rules apply in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against a Government employee, one of them involving a procedure harsher and more onerous than the other, and the choice was left to the disciplinary authority to choose one or the other, the resultant proceedings would be discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Specific reference was made to the following observation:
If the two sets of rules were in operation at the material time when the enquiry was directed against the respondent and by order of the Governor, the enquiry was directed under the Tribunal Rules which are "more drastic" and prejudicial to the interests of the respondent, a clear case of discrimination arises and the order directing enquiry against the respondent and the subsequent proceedings are liable to be struck down as infringing Article 14 of the Constitution.
That decision was rendered on 18th August, 1960. In Jaqannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh , decided on 16th March, 1961, by the same Bench, the same question was considered. It was held in the latter decision, after referring to (AIR) 1961 SC 1715.
The fact that an order made by a police authority in an enquiry under U.P. Police Regulations is made appealable whereas the order passed by the Governor in an enquiry under U.P. Disciplinary proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 is not made appealable is not a ground on which the validity of the Tribunal Rules can be challenged. In either case, the final order rests with the Governor who has to decide the matter himself.... Therefore, by providing a right of appeal against the order of Police Regulations imposing penalties upon a member of the police force, and by providing no such right of appeal when the order passed is by the Governor, no discrimination inviting the application of Article 14 is practised.
In the light of the observations contained in the latter decision of a co-ordinate Bench, I am not in a position to accept the principle of the earlier decision that difference in procedure in the conduct of an enquiry prescribed by two rules both of which are equally applicable, the choice of the harsher procedure invalidates the proceedings against the employees. It is significant in this context to remember that the proviso to Clause I of the scheme of amalgamation expressly authorises the transferee-bank, which is also disciplinary authority, to consider the schedule employees for re-employment.
31. Counsel for the petitioners referred me to the following decisions of the Supreme Court. Meenakshi Mills v. Viswanatha Sasthri Iron & Metal Traders Pvt. Ltd. v. M.S. Haskiel Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab 1984 I LLJ 161, Workmen Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. 1985 I LLJ 267 at 270 and W.B.S.E. Board v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh 1985 I LLJ 373, in support of the submission that adoption of a harsher procedure in the case of some and more beneficial procedure in the case of others among the persons involved in offences of similar irregularities is unfair, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
32. In Meenakshi Mills Case, (supra) the Supreme Court had to consider classification of tax evaders into those whose cases were referred to the Investigation Commission before 1st September 1948 and others whose cases were not so referred. The former was subjected to a drastic procedure, leaving other tax evaders to be dealt with under the ordinary law. It was held, that both being tax evaders to a substantial extent, differentiation based entirely on the fact that the case of the former group were referred to the Investigation Commission earlier was clearly discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The same question was considered later in Thangal Kunju Musailar v. Venkatachalam . Dealing with the provisions of Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 14 of 1124 ME., a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held, that the enactment was not discriminatory, since the background and circumstances under which the Act was passed indicated with reasonable certainty the class of persons who were intended to be subjected to drastic procedures contemplated by the Act, even though the word "substantial" as used in Section 5(1) of the Act did not afford a definite measure or yard-stick for including particular individuals. It was observed by Bhagwati J., speaking for a Bench of Five Judges:
The object sought to be achieved by the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act is quite definite and that is to catch substantial evaders of income-tax out of those who have made huge profits during the war period. They form a class by themselves and have to be specifically treated under the procedure laid down in the Act. Being a class by themselves the procedure to which they are subjected during the course of investigation of their cases by the Commission is not at all discriminatory because such drastic procedure has reasonable nexus with the obejct sought to be achieved by the Act, and therefore such a classification is within the constitutional limitations.
On a consideration of these two decisions, I am not in a position to hold that the classification of delinquent officers into those in whose cases disciplinary proceedings were pending and who had to be continued in service for purposes of completing such proceedings and the others in whose cases there was no proceedings pending on the crucial date is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
33. In , the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Industrial Tribunal that re-instatement with back wages of three out of the ten workmen, and refusal to reinstatement in the case of the seven, was discriminatory. Appeals filed by the employer under Article 136 of the Constitution were dismissed, holding that the approach by the Tribunal was fair, just and reasonable.
34. In (1984 I LLJ 161) refusal to reinstate some out of the many police constables who were dismissed from service for participation in an agitation after withdrawal of criminal cases against them was held to be discriminatory. All the 1100 of the police constabulary who were held guilty of the same misconduct of indiscipline and participation in illegal strike were dismissed from service and were also prosecuted. The criminal cases against all of them had been withdrawn, but only some off them were reinstated. The reason why some were refused reinstatement could not be discerned from the records. In spite of the strenuous efforts made by Court the criteria or guidelines or yardstick which were adopted in refusing to reinstate some of the dismissed agitators, and in choosing the others for more beneficial treatment, were not disclosed to the Court. It was in those circumstances that the Court assumed that all the 1100 policemen were identically situated, and that, "If the indiscipline of a large number of personnel amongst dismissed personnel could be condoned or over-looked and after withdrawing the criminal cases against them, they could be reinstated we see no justification in treating the present appellants differently without pointing out how they were guilty of more serious misconduct or the degree of indiscipline in their case was higher than compared to those who were reinstated." It was also observed that, "the respondents failed to explain to the Court the distinguishing features and therefore we are satisfied in putting all of them in same bracket. On that conclusion, the treatment meted to the present appellants suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and Article 14 forbids any arbitrary action which would tantamount to denial of equality as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution".
35. I do not think that the observation noticed above can be applied to the facts of the present case. The definite stand of the Reserve Bank of India is that in the case of 14 officers, who were continued in service in spite of more serious allegations against some of them, such continuance was essential to continue and complete the disciplinary proceedings against them. The assertion that the records of each of the officers involved in the grant of unauthorised/irrecoverable advances were examined has not been effectively controverted. On the materials placed before me by the transferee-bank, dealing with each of the cases of the individual respondents. I am also satisfied that appropriate action has been taken or is being taken against all officers involved in allegations of irregularities in the banking transactions. Proceedings against as many as 9 have been completed, and the remaining are being proceeded against. On the basis of these materials, I am satisfied that there was ample justification for continuing those persons involved in more serious allegations for purposes of initiating and completing appropriate disciplinary proceedings. I am also satisfied that this satisfactorily explains the different treatment meted out to the two sets of officers.
36. Reference is also made to the decision reported in Satish Kumar v. Principal, S.N. Medical College and Hospital . A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court applied the principles of the decision in Ramanna v. International Airport Authority 1979 II LLJ 217 to the acceptance of apology of some of the students who were expelled from the Medical College by the Head of the Department, and refusal to accept similar apology tendered by some of them. The basic postulate of the decision is that acceptance of the apology approximates grant of largesse by the State. I do not think that the principles laid down in Ramanna v. International Airport Authority (supra) will apply to a case where there is complete and clear distinction which justifies a different treatment to some of the delinquents. It is also important to note that the decision of the Allahabad High Court proceeds on the basis that there was no such distinction between the delinquents, some of whose apologies were accepted while rejecting similar apologies of others.
37. I have found that the inclusion in the schedule cannot be equated to the imposition of a personal penalty. It simulates termination of service on the winding up of companies by orders of Court. The drastic consequences of such termination of service entitle the employees concerned to claim participation in the proceedings leading to final approval of the scheme. I have also found that since the employees concerned had not sought to participate in the proceedings, inclusion of their names in the schedule cannot be considered as invalid. Even then, fairness may require reconsideration of their cases by the transferee-bank. The following observations contained in the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen, Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. (supra) also seems to be to the same effect at page 270 of (1985 I LLJ 267) Let it not be forgotten what is laid down by a catena of decisions that where an order casts stigma or affects livelihood before making the order, principles of natural justice namely, a reasonable opportunity to present one's case and controvert the adverse evidence must have full play.
Counsel for the transferee-bank submits that it was open for the petitioners to make any representation to any of the respondents before the scheme was finally approved, and all of them would have got the same opportunity of objective consideration by the transferee-bank as in the case of the officers who were continued in service and against whom disciplinary proceedings are initiated or are likely to be pursued. In that case, final determination in both the cases will be by the transferee-bank. He submits further, that it is open for the petitioners to submit such representations even now in the light of the provisions contained in the proviso to Clause 11 of the approved scheme.
38. Proviso to Clause 11 of the scheme enables employment of one or more of the scheduled employees by the transferee-bank subsequent to the amalgamation. Consideration there under is confined only to the eligibility, suitability and desirability for re-employment of the petitioners. In the light of my finding that the petitioners could have participated in the proceedings leading to the approval of the scheme of amalgamation, had they requested for such participation in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in National Textile Worker's, case (supra) I am of the opinion that the case of the petitioners for re-instatement in service has to be considered by the transferee-bank on representations submitted or to be submitted by them. It is true, that the transferee-bank has reiterated that each of the cases were individually examined, and their inclusion in the schedule was founded on an appraisal of the facts of each case. It is not as if the persons whose livelihood is affected by such determination, may have nothing to contribute towards a fair determination of their cases. It is not sufficient that the decision is fair and unbiased; it is appropriate that in arriving at the decision, the persons, whose livelihood is affected, are also allowed to participate in proceedings leading to the decision. Such an opportunity may even be post-decisional as was held by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi's case (AIR) 1971 SC.597. I am assured by counsel for the transferee-bank that the bank is willing to examine representations of each of the petitioners for re-entertainment in service if such representations are filed without delay. He also points out that such an offer was made in the proviso to Clause 11 of the scheme itself.
39. There seems to be some substantial difference between the offer contained in the scheme and a post-decisional opportunity to canvass the correctness of the inclusion of the petitioners in the schedule annexed to the scheme. It is of course true that the transferee-bank has the discretion to re-employ the scheduled employees on such terms and conditions as they deem fit and therefore it may be possible for the transferee-bank to give the benefit of past service if it is found that the representation has to be considered favourably. On the facts of this case I am of the opinion that the transferee-bank shall consider the representations of the petitioners in the larger perspective than the mere eligibility/desirability etc., for re-employment. Such consideration should, in appropriate cases, enable the concerned employee to be given the benefits of continuity in service as well. It is also desirable and appropriate that the disciplinary proceedings against the other former employees of the transferor-bank are completed expeditiously so that final decision in these cases and also on the representation of the petitioners are rendered simultaneously or at least within the same period of time so that there will no longer be any justification for the complaint that persons involved in more serious irregularities are continued in service and are allowed to enjoy the benefits which were denied to the petitioners.
40. My conclusions, therefore, are:
(a) Article 31A(1)(c) of the Constitution of India does not preclude the challenge of the petitioners against their inclusion in the schedule annexed to the scheme approved under Section 45(7) of the Banking Regulation Act.
(b) The "conclusive evidence' clause contained in Section 45(7A) of the Banking Regulation Act does not preclude judicial review of the schedule annexed to the scheme by this Court in its certiorari/ supervisory jurisdiction.
(c) Termination of services consequent on the inclusion in the schedule annexed to the scheme is similar to termination of services consequent on winding up of a company by Court under Sections 433 and 439 of the Indian Companies Act, and its consequences are not identical to the consequences arising from the abolition of the post.
(d) Employees of the transferor-bank are entitled to participate, and be heard in proceedings prior to the approval of the scheme by the Government of India under Section 45(7) of the Banking Regulation Act, but such opportunity need be given only if the employees likely to be affected by the scheme had sought such an opportunity.
(e) The Reserve Bank of India and Government of India had considered relevant factors in deciding to include names of employees of the transferor-bank including the petitioners in the schedule annexed to the scheme.
(f) There are discernible standards justifying continuance of some of the employees included in Ext. P 2 in the service of the transferee-bank and such continuance was to enable completion of disciplinary proceedings/investigations against the delinquents.
(g) Petitioners are entitled to a post-decisional opportunity to seek review of their inclusion in the schedule and also to seek continuance in service.
41. In view of my finding that the petitioners are not entitled to avoid their inclusion in the schedule, only due to absence of previous notice, since they had not sought any such opportunity and in view of my further finding that principles of natural justice will be sufficiently satisfied if a post-decisional opportunity is given to them to urge their case for benefits of continuance in service, notwithstanding their inclusion in the schedule, I think it is only necessary for me to direct that representations, it' any submitted by any of the petitioners, seeking continuance in service, will be considered on merits and disposed of by the transferee-bank within a period not exceeding three months from today. The disciplinary proceedings against the other transferred employees including the 14 persons whose names are specifically mentioned by the transferee bank will also be completed within the above period of three months.
The Original Petitions are disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.