Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Vasavi Kanyaka Seva Trust, Ramanthapur vs District Collector, R.R. Dist., Hyd. ... on 6 March, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(3)ALD115, 2000(2)ALT645
JUDGMENT
1. These two revisions are field against the orders allowing the applications seeking to implead the respondent No.3 in [A No.1030 of 1999 and also the main suit OS No.348 of 1999 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, North and East, Ranga Reddy District.
2. In support of the applications, it was claimed that the respondent No.3 herein is a Welfare Association in respect of the area which covers the subject matter of the suit and it was further alleged that the claim of the plaintiff-petitioner, a trust, is not valid and even the claim of the defendants on the basis of the allotment is not correct. Since the respondent No.3 has taken up the welfare projects like drinking water scheme etc., it is a proper and also a necessary party to the suit.
3. The said orders were sought to be attacked on the main ground that the suit being one for simplicter injunction, no application for impleading third parties is permissible as any decree therein would not bind them and further it is always open for the proposed parties to establish their claim by filing a separate suit. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in K. Gangi Reddy v. Kukkuteswara Swamy Temple, 1992 (2) APLJ 501, and also the unreported judgments in CRP No.2411 of 1988 and CRP No.1020 of 1993.
4 In reply it was contended that since the question virtually embarks upon the rival claims on independent title, the respondent No.3 who is claiming interest in the subject matter, is a proper and necessary party.
5. It is evident from the plaint filed in the main suit in OS No.348 of 1999 that the plaintiff, a trust, claims the suit property on the basis of allotment from the Gram Panchayat through their resolutions dated 3-9-1986 and also the subsequent sanction. The plaintiff also filed a suit in OS No.283 of 1999 against four individuals and Uppal Municipality for injunction wherein there is an interim order of status quo. However, since the defendants viz., the District Collector and the District Medical and Health Officer were making attempts to start construction, the suit was filed. It was also alleged that in the other suit, the plaintiff could not possibly file any impleading petition as against the defendants in this suit as it will only add to delay. Hence a separate suit is being filed.
6. Thus, even from a bare reading of the plaint it is evident that the plaintiff is seeking its right on the basis of an allotment from the Gram Panchayat.
7. In the counter filed in this Court, it was pointed out that the proposed party i.e., the respondent No.3 herein is a registered association with Registration Certificate No.2312 of 1997 from the office of the Registrar of Societies, Hyderabad and they claim the suit land in pursuance of an allotment from the Uppal Kalan Municipality and also the proceedings of the District Collector dated 10-8-1998 and subsequent handing over of the possession to them. The claim of the plaintiff as to the allotment made through the Gram Panchayat resolution was denied and further it was stated that the alleged resolution and the proceedings of the Gram Panchayat are totally bogus.
8. Virtually, in the nature of allegations as spelt out from the pleadings.
it necessarily involves an enquiry into the title-both of the plaintiff and the defendants. It cannot be said that in a suit for injunction, the Court cannot go into the question of title incidentally if the Us so warrants. In the fitness of things and in view of the pleas raised by both the parties, it may also warrant for the plaintiff to seek the relief on title. Be that as it may, normally, the proceedings start with the relief of injunction which ultimately lead to a conversion into a declaration of title or even an enquiry into the title. In such a case and especially taking into consideration the facts of each cause, it cannot be said that in an injunction suit, any third party cannot step in. The provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 CPC, would not make any restrictions as such in its applicability or exclude the same in respect of any suits of injunction. The broader principles there under would apply in respect of the suits especially where the subject matter is an immovable property. The relief of injunction does pertain to the relief touching or concerning the immovable property. It cannot be put on par with a suit for specific performance which is considered as not running with the land as it is only an equitable relief. The principles as laid down while interpreting Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC, are well settled. In Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, , though dealing with a suit where declaration of status was sought for, on consideration of all the concerned parameters it was laid down that in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject matter of litigation.
9. A Division Bench of this Court in Khaja Abdul v, Mahabub Saheb, , considering a similar provision in a case where the suit filed was one for eviction and possession against a tenant, held:
"This provision empowers the Court to either strike out the name of any party improperly joined or add the name of any person who ought to have been joined or whose presence before it may be necessary in order to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suits. The intendment and object of this provision is to invest the Court with ample power and jurisdiction to strike out the name of any party improperly joined or to add any person who ought to have been joined or whose presence is necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. It may also be noticed that this power may be exercised at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without the application of either party. This power must be exercised in the interest of justice and also to avoid multiplicity of suits in respect of all the questions relating to the subject matter of the suit. This provision must be liberally construed as the intendment being effective and complete adjudication and settlement of all the questions involved in the suit.
The expression 'settle all the questions involved in the suit' used in Order 1, Rule 10(2) CPC is susceptive of a liberal and wide interpretation so as to take in the final adjudication of all the questions pertaining to the subject matter thereof. Such wide interpretation warranted by the language employed by Order 1, Rule 10(2) CPC would certainly enable the Court to avoid conflicting decisions on the same questions and at the same time finally and effectually put an end to litigation respecting them. The framers of this rule must be held to have intended that all the material questions common to the parties to the suit and to the third parties should be tried once and for all and the Court is invested to secure the aforesaid result with an ample judicious discretion to add parties which are necessary or proper in this regard. The narrow interpretation of settlement of all the questions involved in the suit between the parties alone would amount to adding something into this provision which was not specifically introduced by the Sovereign Parliament. If the narrow view sought to be placed upon this provision was intended by the Legislature, nothing would have prevented them from using the words 'between the parties.' The crucial test for the addition or otherwise of a particular party as defendant or plaintiff is whether the presence of such party is necessary or atleast proper without whom there can be no effective and final adjudication of alt issues involved in the suit with regard to the same subject matter. The intendment and object of the provision as could be gathered from the language used therein appears to us to adopt a liberal construction to enable the Court to determine all the questions relating to the subject matter of the suit arising not only between the parties to the suit but once and for all in the presence of all those parties whose presence is necessary or proper for an effective and final adjudication."
In Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra, , it was held:
"The object of the rule is to bring on record all the persons who are parties to the dispute relating to the subject matter so that the dispute may be determined in their presence at the same time without any protraction, inconvenience and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. A person may be added as a party-defendant to the suit though no relief may be claimed against him/her provided his/her presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the suit. Such a person is only a proper party as distinguished from a necessary parly."
In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, , it was held:
"If the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions... The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness."
10. Even in the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Savitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpiir, , considering the said provision in a suit seeking decree for maintenance and creation of charge over ancestral property, it was held that the purchasers of suit property even contrary to the interim injunction orders of the Court are necessary parties and it would avoid multiplicity of suits. "Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of the said provision Order 1, Rule 10CPC".
11. In the decision in K. Gangi Reddy's case (supra) relied upon by the petitioner it was held that in a suit for mere injunction, any decree passed would not bind a third party and if it is of the view that the present suit would affect its interest, they are free to file a suit seeking appropriately and it is not a matter wherein it should be allowed to come on record as a defendant in the suit for injunction. It is to be noticed that in this decision, the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Razia Begum's case (supra) and the Division Bench decision of our High Court in Khaja Abdul's case (supra) were not cited. Even in the other unreported judgment in CRP No.241l of 1988 dated 27-10-1988 the self same principle was reiterated holding that in a simple suit for injunction, the question of impleading any third party does not arise. In this case also, the aforesaid reported decisions were not cited. In another unreported judgment in CRP No. 1020 of 1993, this Court has once again reiterated the same principle holding that the suit being one for simpliciter injunction, no third party can be impleaded as any decree therein would not bind such parties, Though the decision of the Supreme Court in Razia Begum's case (supra) was cited, however, the learned Judge proceeded to consider the case on the basis that the relief of injunction is purely a personal relief and it does not run with the land. In fact, the relief of injunction as contemplated under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act pertains to immovable property and it cannot be put on par with a relief of specific performance which is held to be not running with the land. However, the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Khaja Abdul's case (supra), did not come up for consideration.
12. In view of the aforesaid principles as laid down by the Apex Court and also a Division Bench of this Court, the provisions under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC have to be given a very liberal interpretation. There cannot be a blanket proposition that in every suit for injunction, the parties cannot be impleaded and Order 1, Rule 10 CPC cannot be made applicable. No doubt, each case has to be looked from the facts and circumstances involving therein vis-a-vis the pleas as set up by the parties. If the parties on either side come up with independent titles and claims, it cannot be said that the scope of the enquiry is as narrow as to treat the suit as one for simpliciter injunction but certainly gets widened to embark upon the question of title. In Sannasi Ambalagarau v. Venkatapathy Chetty, 1909 IC Vol-II 421, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held:
"Where title is denied, a suit for injunction is maintainable, though not coupled with a prayer for declaration of title, as the prayer for an injunction necessarily involves a declaration of title."
13. As already held, it has to be seen as to whether the presence of the party, though may not be a necessary, would be a proper one and enables the Court to properly adjudicate the matter in the presence of all the parties and the material as produced on their behalf. Any such denial would not only may lead to inconsistent decrees in respect of the same subject matter and in some cases, collusive decrees cannot be ruled out to hood-wink the real title holders. I have perused the affidavit filed in support of the applications to implead and I am satisfied that there is justifiable claim touching upon the subject matter and the respondent No.3's presence would only enhance the assistance to the Court.
14. In these circumstances, 1 do not find any merits in the above revisions and the same are dismissed. No costs.