Karnataka High Court
Babu Rajendra vs Basalingappa on 21 April, 2020
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT KALABURAGI
BENCH
DATED THIS THE 21st DAY OF APRIL , 2020
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
R.F.A.NO.793 OF 2007
BETWEEN:
BABU RAJENDRA
S/O NAGENDRA ASPALLI
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
R/O STATION SAIDAPUR TALUK
YADGIRI DISTRICT
GULBARGA - 585 201.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. SRIVATSA, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR
SRI. V.K.NAYAK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. BASALINGAPPA
S/O BASSANAGOUDA PATIL
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, OCC: AGRIL
R/O. SIDDAPUR VILLAGE
TALUK: YADGIR
DISTRICT: GULBARGA - 585 201.
2. BASAVARAJAPPA
S/O BHAIRAPPAGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, OCC: AGRIL
R/O KUDLOOR
TALUKA YADGIR
DISTRICT GULBARGA - 585 201.
3. BASAVALINGAPPA
S/O BANDAPPAGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, OCC: AGRIL
R/O KUDLOOR, TALUK: YADGIR
DISTRICT: GULBARGA - 585 201.
2
4. SANGAPPA @ SANGAPPAGOWDA
S/O BASAVARAJAPPA IREDDY
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, OCC: AGRIL
R/O STATION SAIDAPUR
TALUK: YADGIR
DISTRICT: GULBARGA - 585 201.
5. SMT.UMADEVI
W/O IRANAGOWDA MALI PATIL
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEWIFE
R/O STATION SAIDAPUR
TALUK: YADGIR
DISTRICT: GULBARGA - 585 201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. A.VIJAYKUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR
R-1, R-2, R-4 & R-5, R-3 IS SERVED)
THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC AGAINST
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED: 16.01.2007 PASSED IN OS
NO. 17/2002 ON THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) YAGDIR,
DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE AND
INJUCTION.
THIS APPEAL BEING HEARD AND RESERVED, COMING ON
FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:-
JUDGMENT
The unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S.No.17/2002 before the trial court has preferred this appeal against the dismissal of his suit for declaration, permanent injunction and other reliefs in respect of the suit schedule immovable property. The property as described in the plaint is House bearing No.3-115, Station 3 Saidapur, coming under Saidapur Gram Panchayath, Yadgiri Taluk, totally measuring 427 ft. North-South and 515 ft. East to West comprising of a residential building, office room cum go- down, well and factory premises, bounded on East by: PWD Road, West by: Public way, North by: Public way and South by: Suit houses as per the sketch annexed to the plaint.
2. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to by their respective ranks before the trial court.
3. The appellant-plaintiff filed the instant suit interalia contending that the aforesaid suit schedule property was built by his fore father for an oil mill and thereafter, the plaintiff's ancestors used the premises to run the said oil mill and the adjoining building for office and other purposes. It was contended that the said oil mill being run under the name and style 'Jagdishchandra Trading Co.,' was approved by the Excise department on 26.10.1964. So also, the Chief Inspector of Factories approved the existence and a running of factory in the said premises on 15.11.1960. It was contended that the plaintiff was residing in the premises meant 4 for office and other use and the oil mill building being in a dilapidated condition was not functioning.
4. The plaintiff contended that he was in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as its absolute owner and got his name entered in the gram panchayath records by a resolution after the death of his father Naganna s/o Banappa Aspali and was paying property tax regularly.
5. Having specifically pleaded ownership and lawful possession the over the suit schedule property, the plaintiff contended that the defendants without having any right or interest over the property, attempted to interfere with his possession which resulted in the plaintiff filing the suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
6. In the first instance, the suit was filed only against the 1st defendant - Basalingappa. Subsequently, defendants 2 to 5 5 were impleaded as additional defendants. Incidentally, it is relevant to mention that defendants 2 to 5 are purchasers of portions of the suit schedule property from the 1st defendant. It is also relevant to state that defendants 1 to 3 filed their separate written statements and contested the suit whereas the defendants 4 and 5 did not contest the suit.
7. In his written statement, the 1st defendant specifically denied the plaint allegations including the allegations with regard to the plaintiff's alleged title and possession over the suit schedule property. It was contended that the suit of the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed since the plaintiff neither had title or possession over the property particularly when the source of title and possession had not been pleaded or substantiated by the plaintiff. So also, the 1st defendant specifically denied the identity, location and measurements and boundaries and schedule of the suit schedule property as described by the plaintiff. In this context, the 1st defendant specifically contended that the property claimed by the plaintiff was actually a survey number measuring 3 acres which was 6 wrongly and erroneously described by the plaintiff by giving wrong measurements. It was contended that the survey number of the suit schedule property was Sy.No.52 of Saidapur village of which the 1st defendant was the owner in actual and physical possession and enjoyment from the time of his ancestors and that he had succeeded to the same from his mother who had in turn acquired it from her mother.
8. The 1st defendant contended that more than 40 years back, his ancestors had put up an oil and ginning factory in a portion of land bearing Sy.No.52 and at the request of Nagendra, father of the plaintiff, the said ancestors of 1st defendant permitted the said Nagendra to run the factory with their leave and licence. It was in this context that the plaintiff's father obtained permissions in his own name to run the factory which was closed after seven years since the same could not be run profitably. It was contended that the factory having been closed, the building became dilapidated, defunct and fell down, and presently, there exists only open spaces and dilapidated walls. It was therefore specifically contended that 7 the property as described by the plaintiff comprising of residential building, office room etc., does not exist except some dilapidated walls since the business being run by the plaintiff's father on leave and licence had closed down. It was contended that the property claimed by the plaintiff was not assigned any panchayath number but the same was land bearing Sy.No.52. It was stated that the plaintiff neither has title nor possession over the any portion of the suit schedule property and had got his name illegally entered in the panchayath records by concealing true facts and on the basis of got up documents which did not confer any right upon him. Under these circumstances, the 1st defendant sought for dismissal of the suit.
9. The defendants 2 and 3 filed identical written statements specifically denying the title and possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. It was contended that the plaintiff does not have any manner of right, title, interest or possession over the suit schedule property. It was also contended that the description extent and boundaries given by 8 the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property was false and incorrect and that the 1st defendant who was the absolute owner in lawful and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property had sold portions of the same in favour of the defendants 2 and 3. It was contended that the defendants 2 and 3 were bonafide purchasers of their respective portions of the suit schedule property having acquired the same for valuable consideration from its earlier owner, the 1st defendant and consequently, they are in lawful and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property. Thus, denying the title as well as the possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property, the defendants 2 and 3 also sought for dismissal of the suit.
10. The trial court framed the following issues:-
(i) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is the owner of the suit schedule property?
(ii) Whether the plaintiff proves his possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property?
9 (iii) Whether the plaintiff proves the alleged encroachment over the suit schedule property? (iv) Whether the defendant no.1 proves the possession of plaintiff over the suit schedule property is on leave and licence? (v) Whether defendants 2 and 3 prove that there is no existence of suit schedule property? (vi) Whether defendants 2 and 3 prove that they are bonafide purchasers? (vii) Is the suit undervalued? (viii) Is the court fee paid inadequate? (ix) Is there no cause of action for the suit? (x) Is the suit barred by limitation? (xi) Is the suit barred under Karnataka Land Revenue Act? (xii) To what reliefs the parties are entitled to?
11. During trial, the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and two witnesses as PWs 2 and 3 and Exs.P1 to P8 were marked on his behalf. While 1st defendant examined himself as DW-1, 3rd defendant examined himself as DW-2 and 2nd defendant as DW-3. One witness was examined as DW-4 and Exs.D1 to D9 were marked on behalf of the defendants. 10
12. By the impugned judgment and decree, the trial court answered all material issues against the plaintiff thereby coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not established his title or possession over the suit schedule property. The trial court also held that the plaintiff had not adduced legal or acceptable evidence to establish the identity of the suit schedule property as contended by him in the suit.
Accordingly, the trial court proceeded to dismiss the suit.
13. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal.
14. In the first instance, by its judgment and decree dated 24.05.2011, this Court was pleased to dismiss this appeal thereby confirming the impugned judgment and decree. However, while doing so, this Court did not consider or dispose of the two applications filed by the plaintiff in the present appeal, viz., I.A.4/2008 dated 01.12.2008 filed under Order 6 Rule 7 CPC seeking amendment of the plaint and I.A.5/2008 under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for permission to produce additional evidence. This aspect of the matter was 11 brought to the notice of the Apex Court by the plaintiff in SLP - and consequently, the Apex Court reserved liberty in favour of the plaintiff to approach this Court once again by way of review. Pursuant thereto, the plaintiff filed review petition in R.P.2559/2013 and contended that in the light of the undisputed fact that his applications I.A.4/08 and I.A.5/08 (supra), had not been considered and disposed of by this Court, the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 24.05.2011 passed by this Court deserve to be reviewed and recalled. Accepting the said contention/submission, by order dated 23.11.2018, this Court allowed the aforesaid review petition and recalled its earlier order and restored the present appeal to file. Accordingly, the present appeal having been restored to file, the matter was taken up for final hearing.
15. I have heard the learned Senior counsel Sri. Srivatsa appearing for the appellant and Sri.A.Vijayakumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and perused the material on record including the impugned judgment and decree.
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16. Firstly, the learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that at the outset, despite the plaintiff filing the suit for the reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction, the plaintiff was restricting the present appeal only to the dismissal of the suit insofar as it related to non-grant of permanent injunction. In this context, learned senior counsel would submit that the plaintiff was not insisting on continuing to prosecute his claim for title over the suit schedule property and that his claim in the present appeal was restricted to the relief of permanent injunction only and that his submissions would be directed to establish the plaintiff's lawful possession over the suit schedule property which would entitle him to a decree for permanent injunction against the defendants.
17. Secondly, learned senior counsel would contend that the application I.A.No.4/2008 for amendment of the plaint contained relevant and material averments with regard to the plaintiff's lawful possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. In this context, it is contended that since the suit out of which the present appeal arises had 13 undisputedly been filed on 07.03.2002 prior to the amendment to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC w.e.f 01.07.2002, the proviso to the said Order 6 Rule 17 CPC would not apply to I.A.4/08 which would have to be decided as per the un-amended provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. It is therefore contended that a perusal of the averments contained in the proposed amendment will indicate that the same is relevant and necessary for adjudication of issues in controversy involved in the presnt appeal and as such, the said application deserves to be allowed by this Court.
18. Thirdly, it is contended that despite exercise of due diligence, it was not possible for the plaintiff to produce the documents now sought to be produced by way of additional evidence along with I.A.5/2008. In this context, learned senior counsel submits that the said documents produced along with I.A.5/2008 clearly establish that the plaintiff was in lawful possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit and as such, the said documents being relevant and material to enable the plaintiff to establish his claim, it is 14 necessary that an opportunity is given to the plaintiff to produce the same in evidence. It is therefore contended that even I.A.No.5/2008 deserves to be allowed by this Court.
19. Fourthly, learned senior counsel submits that while the plaintiff has specifically contended that he was in lawful possession of the suit schedule property, in response, the 1st defendant had specifically admitted in his written statement that the plaintiff's father was a licencee in possession of the suit schedule property. It was therefore contended that even according to the 1st defendant, the plaintiff was in lawful and settled possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and that the 1st defendant as well as the remaining defendants who had purchased the portions of the property from him during the pendency of the suit were not entitled to dispossess the plaintiff from the property except by due process of law and consequently, on this ground alone, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for permanent injunction.
20. Lastly, it was contended that even otherwise, the trial court has committed several serious errors of law, fact 15 and jurisdiction without considering or appreciating the material on record which clearly established that the plaintiff was in lawful and settled possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and consequently, he was entitled to a decree for permanent injunction as against the defendants who were not in actual or physical possession or enjoyment of the suit schedule property. It was therefore contended that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court insofar it related to rejecting the prayer for permanent injunction, deserves to be set aside and a decree for permanent injunction is to be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants.
21. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents- defendants submits that the plaintiff did not have any manner of right, title, interest or possession over the suit schedule property. It was contended that having put forth the plea of title as well as lawful possession based on title, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove his title as well as possession over the suit schedule property in order to claim the reliefs of either 16 declaration of title or permanent injunction. Learned counsel contends that the plaintiff had not adduced any legal or acceptable evidence to establish his title or lawful possession over the suit schedule property. In fact, having conceded that he is not the owner of the suit schedule property, it was not open for the plaintiff to prevaricate at this highly belated stage and contend that he was entitled to a decree for permanent injunction simpliciter, particularly when even the claim for lawful possession was based on lawful title which had not only been not established by the plaintiff but had unequivocally been abandoned and conceded by him. Under these circumstances, it was contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction sought for by him.
22. Insofar as the contention put forth by the 1st defendant in his written statement regarding the plaintiff and his father being a licencee under the 1st defendant and his ancestors in respect of the factory building was concerned, the said defence put forth in the written statement could not be construed as an admission with regard to the plaintiff's 17 possession of the suit schedule property. In this context, it is contended that the 1st defendant had specifically stated that the plaintiff's father was running the factory on leave and licence basis and the factory having been closed and the building having collapsed, the said licence stood automatically revoked and extinguished in terms of Section 62 of the Easements Act and consequently, it was not open for the plaintiff to place any reliance upon the written statement in order to contend that he was in possession of the suit schedule property. It was also contended that at any rate, the right of the plaintiff or his father as a licencee did not vest any possessory right or interest over the suit schedule property in their favour so as to enable them to claim the relief of permanent injunction as against the 1st defendant.
23. Learned counsel for the defendants also contended that despite there being a serious dispute with regard to the identity, location, boundaries and measurements of the suit schedule property as pleaded by the plaintiff, he has not placed any material to establish the same and the suit was 18 correctly dismissed by the trial court on this ground also. In this context, learned counsel contends that notwithstanding the plea of ownership having been abandoned/given up by the plaintiff, it was still incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the identity of the property and in the absence of any proof of the same, the contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff was liable to be rejected.
24. Insofar as the applications I.A.4/2008 and I.A.5/2008 filed by the plaintiff in the appeal are concerned, learned counsel for the respondents submits that since the proposed amendment only seeks to make necessary averments with regard to documents already produced by the plaintiff, the said amendment was superfluous and neither necessary nor relevant for adjudication of the issues in controversy. Similarly, most of the documents sought to be produced along with I.A.5/2008 were post-litem documents which have come into existence after institution of the suit and consequently, the same are neither relevant nor material for adjudication of the present appeal. So also, the documents at items 1 and 2 19 produced by the plaintiff along with I.A.5/2008 do not in any way establish the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. Under these circumstances, learned counsel submits that the said applications are frivolous, untenable, devoid of merit and deserve to be dismissed.
25. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the trial court has correctly and properly considered and appreciated the entire material on record and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court being just and proper, the same does not warrant interference by this Court in the present appeal. Accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the appeal.
26. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the following points would arise for consideration in the present appeal:-
" (1) Whether the appellant-plaintiff proves that he was in lawful possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit? 20
(ii) Whether the applications I.A.4/2008 and I.A.5/2008 filed by the appellant-plaintiff deserve to be allowed?
(iii) Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court is correct and proper?"
Re - Point No.1:
27. As stated supra, despite seeking the reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction, the plaintiff has restricted his claim to the relief of permanent injunction only and has given up and abandoned the claim for declaration. In support of his contention that he is in lawful possession of the suit schedule property, one of the main grounds urged on behalf of the plaintiff is that the 1st defendant has admitted in his written statement that the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property since the same was taken on leave and licence basis by the plaintiff's father from the ancestors of the 1st defendant. It is therefore contended that the 1st defendant having admitted putting the plaintiff's father in possession of the suit schedule property on leave 21 and licence basis, the 1st defendant was not entitled to dispossess the plaintiff except by due process of law and consequently, the plaintiff being in settled possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, he was entitled to a decree for permanent injunction to protect his possession against illegal and unlawful dispossession.
28. To examine the said contention, it is necessary to advert to the written statement filed by the 1st defendant. In paragraph-8 of his written statement, the 1st defendant has contended that there was a oil and ginning factory on the suit schedule property which was being run by the plaintiff's father with the leave and licence of the 1st defendant's ancestors. It is also stated that the said factory having been closed down and the building having become dilapidated and having collapsed, the factory did not exist as on the date of filing the suit and consequently, the suit was liable to be dismissed.
29. A perusal of the said averment made by the 1st defendant in his written statement will clearly indicate that the same cannot be construed or treated as an admission of 22 either the plaintiff or his father's possession or enjoyment over the suit schedule property. All that the 1st defendant has stated is that the plaintiff's father was running the factory on leave and licence basis. It is well settled that permission to use a property on leave and licence basis, in the absence of anything else cannot be construed or treated as creating any right or possession in the property in favour of the licencee. It is equally well settled that a licencee cannot claim any right, interest or possession over the property in which the right of user is granted to him as a licencee. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the said averment made in the written statement of the 1st defendant cannot be construed, treated or understood as an admission on the part of the 1st defendant that the plaintiff or his father was in possession of the suit schedule property, much less, lawful or settled possession of the property.
30. It is also relevant to state that the plaintiff has not placed any material to establish that the factory building was in existence as on the date of filing of the suit. In this context, 23 it is significant to note that Section 62 of the Easements Act contemplates that upon destruction of the subject matter of a licence, the licence is deemed to have been revoked and the same stands extinguished automatically. In the absence of anything to indicate that the factory building which was admitted to have been given on leave and licence in favour of the plaintiff's father was in existence as on the date of the suit, the licence is deemed to have revoked and stood extinguished by operation of law and consequently, no reliance can be placed by the plaintiff upon the said admission by the 1st defendant in order to contend that he was in lawful possession of the suit schedule property. Viewed from this angle also, the said contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff that his possession of the suit schedule property has been admitted by the 1st defendant deserves to be rejected.
31. The material on record also indicates that there is a serious dispute with regard to the very identity of the suit schedule property as put forth by the plaintiff. The pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff indicates that there are material 24 discrepancies and mutual inconsistencies and contradictions with regard to the location, boundaries, measurement and extent of the suit schedule property as contended by the plaintiff. In the plaint, the plaintiff has specifically identified the suit schedule property as House bearing No.3-115 measuring 427 ft. North-South and 515 ft. East-West. While Ex.P1 is the only document which contains the said property number, the other documents produced by the plaintiff do not contain the same number. However, the measurements of the property as contended by the plaintiff are conspicuously absent from Ex.P1. So also, the said measurements are not contained in any of the other documents produced by the plaintiff.
32. The trial court while appreciating the documentary evidence at Exs.P1 to P8 produced by the plaintiff, has taken into account the mutual discrepancies, inconsistencies and contradictions in the said documents coupled with the absence of any other supporting material produced by the plaintiff in order to come to the correct conclusion that the said evidence produced by the plaintiff was not sufficient to come 25 to the conclusion that the plaintiff had established the identity, location and measurements and boundaries of the suit schedule property as contended by him. It is also relevant to state that as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the defendants notwithstanding the plea of ownership having been abandoned/given up by the plaintiff, it was still incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the identity of the property and in the absence of any proof of the same, the contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff was liable to be rejected. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction on this ground also.
33. A perusal of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court will also indicate that the trial court has considered and appreciated the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff in support of his contention that he was in lawful possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of institution of the suit. In this context, the trial court has considered Ex.P1, the mutation register extract 26 which purports to transfer the khata from the name of the plaintiff's father to the plaintiff in respect of property bearing No.3-115 and has come to the correct conclusion that in the absence of any other material to establish as to how the property stood in the name of the plaintiff's father prior to Ex.P1, no reliance can be placed upon the said document to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in lawful possession of the suit schedule property particularly when other material particulars in respect of the property were not found in the documents. Similarly, the trial court also considered the other documents at Exs.P2 to P4, P6 and P7 to come to the correct conclusion that in the absence of the details of the property in relation to property bearing No.3-115 in the said documents, no reliance can be placed upon these documents also. So also, the trial court noticed that the sale deeds at Exs.P5 and P8 relied upon by the plaintiff also did not tally with the property No.3-115 as alleged by the plaintiff and consequently, even these documents were not sufficient to uphold the claim of the plaintiff that he was in lawful possession of the suit schedule property.
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34. Insofar as the oral evidence of the plaintiff (PW-1) and his witnesses PW-2 and PW-3 are concerned, the trial court correctly and properly appreciated the same and came to the correct conclusion that even the said oral evidence was not sufficient to establish that the plaintiff was in lawful possession of the property bearing No.3-115 with the measurements pleaded by him in the plaint as on the date of the suit.
35. Upon re-appreciation of the entire material on record, I am of the considered opinion that the conclusions, inferences and findings recorded by the trial court based on proper and correct appreciation of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff cannot be termed as illegal or arbitrary so as to warrant interference by this Court. A perusal of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff will clearly indicate that having put forth a specific contention in the plaint that he was in lawful possession of the suit schedule property bearing No.3-115 measuring 427 ft. North-South and 515 ft. East-West with specific boundaries, it was incumbent upon the 28 plaintiff to adduce legal and acceptable evidence in support of the said specific plea and in the absence of the same, coupled with the fact that the pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses were not only inconsistent and contradictory with one another but also mutually destructive qua the said plea, the trial court was fully justified in holding that the plaintiff was not in lawful possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit.
36. Yet another circumstance which is relevant to adjudicate upon the plaintiff's claim of lawful possession is the undisputed fact that the plaintiff bases his claim to possession referable to lawful title. Having put forth such a plea, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to substantiate his claim of lawful title in order to succeed in his claim of lawful possession. It is also relevant to state that merely because the plea of title and the relief of declaration has been given up, it does not absolve the plaintiff of his obligation to establish his lawful possession based on lawful title as contended by him. Viewed from this angle also, in the absence of any material to establish the 29 plaintiff's lawful title over the suit schedule property, the trial court was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not in lawful possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit.
37. In view of the discussion made above, I am of the view that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he was in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Thus, Point No.1 is answered against the appellant- plaintiff.
Re-Point No.2:
38. During the pendency of the present appeal, the plaintiff filed an application I.A.4/2008 seeking amendment of the plaint. The said application has been opposed by the defendants.
39. A perusal of the said application will indicate that the plaintiff intends to introduce and incorporate certain additional pleadings in relation to documents at Exs.P4 to P8 already produced by him in the suit. It is contended that the proposed 30 amendment was relevant and necessary to decide the issues in controversy involved in the suit / appeal and that consequently, the said application deserves to be allowed by this Court.
40. I have given my anxious consideration to the averments made in I.A.4/2008, the statement of objections filed by the defendants as well as the rival submissions made by the respective counsel.
41. A perusal of the proposed amendment will clearly indicate that the same only seeks to explain the contents of the documents Exs.P4 to P8 already produced by the plaintiff. In the impugned judgment and decree, the trial court has not only considered and appreciated the said documents are Exs.P4 to P8 with reference to the claim of the plaintiff, but also has come to the conclusion that the said documents neither establish the plaintiff's lawful possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit nor do the said documents enable him to establish the identity of the suit schedule property as pleaded by him in the suit. While dealing 31 with Point No.1, upon re-appreciation and reevaluation of the entire material on record, I have already come to the conclusion that the said documents at Exs.P4 to P8 were not sufficient to establish the identity of the suit schedule property as pleaded by him nor his lawful possession over the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit. As stated supra, except for explaining the contents of the said documents and putting forth certain contentions which have already been put forth by the plaintiff in the suit and in the present appeal, there are no other material pleadings sought to be put forth by way of the proposed amendment which are relevant or necessary for adjudication of the issues in controversy involved in the present suit / appeal. Further, the claim of ownership and the relief of declaration has been given up/abandoned by the plaintiff in the present appeal. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that in the facts of the instant case, the proposed amendment is superfluous in nature and the same being neither necessary nor relevant for adjudication of the present suit / appeal, the application I.A.4/2008 is devoid of merit and the same is hereby dismissed. 32
42. Insofar as the application I.A.5/2008 filed by the plaintiff in the appeal is concerned, most of the documents sought to be produced along with I.A.5/2008 were post-litem documents which have come into existence after institution of the suit and consequently, the same are neither relevant nor material for adjudication of the present appeal and as such, the question of permitting the plaintiff to produce the same does not arise.
43. Insofar as document No.1 viz., tax demand register extract purporting to show the name of the plaintiff's father in respect of property bearing No.3-115 is concerned, the said documents only indicates that property tax has been paid in respect of the property. It is relevant to state that the measurements and boundaries of the property are not found in the said document. So also, while the plaintiff claims that his father was Nagendra Aspalli, the said document shows the name of Nadanna Basappa Aspalli. In view of these discrepancies, I am of the opinion that the said document does not advance the case of the plaintiff that he is in lawful 33 possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit.
44. Similarly, document No.2 which is said to be a registered licence in respect of the factory is also not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit particularly when the said licence appears to have expired much prior to filing of the suit. On the other hand, the said document establishes the specific contention put forth by the 1st defendant that the factory had been shut down and the building has collapsed long back. Accordingly, even this document is neither relevant nor material for the purpose of adjudication of the suit/appeal.
45. As stated above, the remaining documents being post-litem documents, no reliance can be placed upon the same by the plaintiff to contend that he was in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit.
46. It is not in dispute that the suit was filed in the year 2002 and the evidence of the plaintiff having commenced in 34 2006, the same was completed in the same year itself. It is also not in dispute that the defendant's evidence was also completed shortly thereafter and the impugned judgment and decree came to be passed by the trial court on 16.01.2007. I.A.5/2008 was filed by the plaintiff on 11.12.2008 after lapse of more than 1 year 8 months after the above appeal was preferred on 03.04.2007. In this context, a perusal of the averments made in I.A.5/2008 will indicate that the same contains vague, bald and cryptic averments which clearly do not constitute valid or sufficient cause to enable the plaintiff to seek permission to adduce additional evidence under the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. In fact, the mandatory requirements of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC have not been complied with or fulfilled by the plaintiff in the application. Neither valid nor satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the plaintiff to explain the long and inordinate delay in producing the said documents. It is therefore clear that the said application having been filed belatedly filed by the plaintiff, the same is devoid of merit and is liable to be rejected on this ground alone.
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47. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that I.A.5/2008 also lacks merit and the same is hereby dismissed.
Accordingly, Point No.2 is also answered against the plaintiff - appellant.
Re-Point No.3:
48. While dealing with point Nos.1 and 2, I have already come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he was in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit. I have also held that the applications I.A.4/2008 and I.A.5/2008 filed by the plaintiff are devoid of merit and that the same deserve to be dismissed. In view of my aforesaid findings coupled with the material on record which clearly indicates that the trial court was completely justified in coming to the correct conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity nor can the same be said to be 36 perverse or capricious so as to warrant interference by this Court in the present appeal.
Accordingly, even Point No.3 is answered against the appellant.
49. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.
No costs.
SD/-
JUDGE Srl.