Madhya Pradesh High Court
M.P. State Electricity Board And Anr. vs Smt. Kamla Sharma And Ors. on 16 July, 2003
Equivalent citations: AIR2004MP57, 2003(3)MPHT434, AIR 2004 MADHYA PRADESH 57, (2003) 10 ALLINDCAS 855 (MPG), 2003 (10) ALLINDCAS 855, (2003) 3 CURCC 524, (2004) 1 JAB LJ 175, (2003) 4 MPLJ 233, (2003) 3 MPHT 434, (2004) 4 CIVLJ 16
Author: Uma Nath Singh
Bench: Uma Nath Singh
ORDER Uma Nath Singh, J.
1. This civil revision calls in question an order dated 24-2-2003 in Civil Suit No. 69-A/2002 passed by learned 9th Civil Judge, Class-I, Gwalior, rejecting the preliminary objections raised by the applicant/defendant to the valuation of the suit.
2. It is said that the non-applicants filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the Trial Court and paid a total Court-fee of Rs. 240.00 on valuation of the suit. As the question of Court fee pertains to jurisdiction and thus goes to the roots of the matter, the applicant raised certain preliminary objections. It is urged that learned Judge without going into merits of the issue has rejected the plea. Now the judgment is assailed mainly on the ground that the second relief being a prayer for permanent injunction is consequential, therefore, the non-applicants ought to have paid ad valorem Court fee on valuation amount of Rs. 36,000.00. In support of the contention, learned Counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in the case of Comolata Dutta v. Ishwar Industries (AIR 1966 MP 169). The relevant portion of the said judgment on reproduction reads as :--
"It is held that when the plaintiff in a suit for declaration and injunction chooses to value the relief at a certain figure for purposes of jurisdiction, he is bound to pay Court-fee on the same amount. The present suit in no sense can be construed to be a suit for mere declaration because the relief of injunction flows naturally and essentially from the relief of declaration. It is also obvious that the relief of declaration can only be given if the decree is set aside but not when the decree stands."
3. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the non-applicants (plaintiffs in the suit) submits that they are in possession of the land in question right from 1950 and thus, it is a case of settled possession. Learned Counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in the case of Sabina @ Farida v. Mohd. Abdul Wasit, [1997 (1) JLJ 105]. The ratio of the judgment says that:--
"person in settled possession filing suit for declaration and injunction can put any value for declaration and pay fixed Court-fees thereof and for injunction he can value the relief under Section 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act".
This judgment is said to have been followed in a subsequent decision of this Court reported in the case of Shanti Devi (Smt.) v. Radheshyam Palod, 2000(3) M.P.H.T. 451 = [2000(2) JLJ 75]. It is not said to be a case of settled possession and an objection to the valuation of Court-fee has also been taken in the written statement. However, learned Counsel for the non-applicants seeks to refer to a judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court reported in the case of Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (AIR 1958 SC 245), to resolve the point. The relevant extracts of Para 13 of the judgment on reproduction reads as under:--
"It is conceded that the question of Court-fees must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on the merits."
4. Thus, the aforesaid observation demonstrates an admitted position that for the purpose of paying Court-fee, only allegations made in the plaint are relevant and not the written statement. That apart, the first relief sought for in the suit appears to be covered under Article 17 of Scheduled 2 of the Court-fee Act and thus, only a fixed amount of Court-fee is required to be paid and the second relief for a permanent injunction being independent in nature could be assessed separately for levying the Court-fee. Moreover, in view of the ratio of 1997 judgment (supra) the second relief not being consequential is not required to be taxed for payment of ad valorem Court-fee.
5. The non-applicants are said to have been in a settled possession right from 1950 in terms of 1997 judgment of this Court as above and the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court (supra) also indicates levying of Court-fee on the plaint allegations, therefore, the averments made in the plaint alone should be considered for the purpose of taxing the Court-fee. Thus, I find no infirmity in payment of the Court-fees. Secondly, the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court cited by the plaintiffs having been rendered in a different context as being in respect of sale deed does not appear to be relevant for adjudicating the issue on hand.
6. Accordingly, the civil revision, is hereby dismissed and the impugned order is affirmed.