Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mangilal And Anr. vs Board Of Revenue, Gwalior And Ors. on 7 March, 1983
Equivalent citations: AIR 1983 MADHYA PRADESH 134, (1983) JAB LJ 385 (1983) MPLJ 254, (1983) MPLJ 254
JUDGMENT Sohani, J.
1. On a reference made by a learned single Judge of this Court (Vijayvargiya, J.), the following question has been referred to this Full Bench: --
"Whether the restrictions placed on the powers of the Second Appellate Courts under Section 36 of the M. B. Land Revenue & Tenancy Act, apply only to second, appeals filed before the Board of Revenue and not (o second appeals filed beiore the Commissioner and trie Settlement Commissioner under Section 36 (1) and (2) there of ?"
2. The facts giving rise to the aforesaid question, briefly, are as follows : --
In a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, direcled against the order of the Board of Revenue passed on 16-2-1978, it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Board had erred in holding that the Revenue Commissioner hearing a second appeal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of fact. On behalf of the petitioner, reliance was placed on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Prabhudayal v. State (1964 Rn 262). The learned single Judge, who heard the petition, was of the opinion that the restrictions on the powers of the second appellate Court provided by Section 36 of the M. B. Land Revenue & Tenancy Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), applied to all the second appellate Courts and that the aforesaid decision of a Division Bench of this Court required reconsideration. Hence this Full Bench has been constituted to consider the aforesaid question.
3. Shri Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the provisions of Section 36 of the Act placed restrictions on the powers of the second appel-late Court, only when a second appeal was heard by the Board of Revenue, as was evident by a perusal of the provisions of Section 36 of the Act. It was urged that in any event, the decision of this Court in 1964 Rule n. 262 (supra) should not be disturbed on the basis of the doctrine of 'stare decisis'. When the attention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was invited to the Hindi version of the Act published in the Government Gazette dated 6th June, 1952, it was contended, that the English translation thereof published in the Gazette was the authorised text and it was not permissible to refer to the Hindi version of the Act published in the Gazette. Reliance was placed on the decisions reported in Dayabhai Poonambhai v. Natwarlal Talati, (AIR 1957 Madh Pra 1), Municipal Corporation, Agra v. Gulzari (AIR 1965 All 170), Jaswant Sugar Mills Limited, Meerut v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (III), U. P. Allahabad, (AIR 1962 All 240) (FB), Smt. Ram Rati v. Gram Samaj, Jehwa (AIR 1974 All 106) (FB), Bhikam Chand v. State (AIR 1966 Raj 142). and Alok Kumar Agrawal v. State of Bihar (AIR 1976 ( Pat 392).
4. To appreciate the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary 1o refer to the relevant provisions of law. The Act in question was passed by the Legislature of the erst-while State of Madhya Bharat, which had adopted Hindi as the official language of the State by virtue of the provisions of M. B. Official Language Act, Samvat 2007. Section 3 of the Act runs thus:--
"3. All Bills to be introduced and amendments there to to be moved in the Legislature and all Acts passed by it and all Ordinances issued by the Rajpra-mukh; and all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under the Constitution of India or under any law made by the Legislature of Madhya Bharat shall be in Hindi written in the Devana-gari script:--
Provided that an authoritative text of the same in the English language, shall be published in accordance with the provisions of Article 348(3) of the Constitution of India."
By Act no. 18 of 1952 (Samvat 2009), M. B. Revenue Administration and Ryo-twari Land Revenue & Tenancy (Amendment ID Act, Samvat 2007, was amended and, Section 36 of the Act providing for second appeals was substituted by the Amendment Act. The Hindi version of Section 36 of the Act, as substituted by the aforesaid amending Act published in the Government Gazette dated 6th June, 1952, is as follows:--
(Hindi Portion omitted -- Ed.) The Engilish translation of the aforesaid provision as published in the Government Gazette, is as follows:
"36. A second appeal shall lie to:--Second Appeal.
(1) the Commissioner where an ap-peal has been disposed of by :--
(a) a Collector; or
(b) any Revenue Officer, subordinate to the Collector, who has been invested with the powers of the Collector to hear appeals under sub-section (1) of Section 35;
(2) the Settlement Commissioner where an appeal has been disposed of by a Settlement Officer;
(3) the Board where an appeal has been disposed of by the Commissioner of a Division or the Settlement Commissioner on any of the following grounds and no other; namely:--
(i) that the order is contrary to law or usage having the force of law;
(ii) that the order has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law;
(iii) that there has been a substantial error or defect in the procedure as prescribed by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, which may have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits :
Provided that no second appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed under Section 319 of the Quanoon Mal, Gwalior, Samvat 1983," It was conceded before us and rightly so, that the Hindi version of Section 36 of the Act left no room for any doubt that the restrictions on the powers of the second appellate Court provided by the said provision were applicable to all second appeals irrespective of the question of forum of the second appeal. However, in the English translation of Section 36 of the Act, as published in the Government Gazette, the clause 'on any of the following grounds and no other:-- namely', which should have been placed below sub-clause (3), is incorporated in sub-clause (3). The question for consideration is whether it is permissible for this Court, to refer to the Hindi version of the Act, as published I in the Government Gazette.
5. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the decision of the Allaha-had High Court reported in Haji Lal Muhammad Biri Works v. Sales-tax Officer, Allahabad (AIR 1959 All 208). In that case, the Court was required to construe the provisions of Section 3 of the U. P. Sales Tax (Validation) Act, 1958, which was as follows:--
"3 (1), Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, the notification specified in Part A, Part B and Part C of the Schedule shall be deemed to have been issued in exercise of the powers conferred respectively by Section 3, Section 3A and Section 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, as if the said sec-lions were in force on the date on which the notifications were issued in the form in which they were in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, and all the said notifications shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been valid and shall continue in force until amended, varied or rescinded by any notification issued, under any of the said section."
On the language of the aforesaid Section 3 it was urged before the Court that the expression "in the form, in which they were in force immediately before the commencement of this Act" should be read as qualifying the words "the notifications" and should not be read as qualifying the expression the said section" occurring a little earlier. To resolve this doubt, the Court referred, to Ihe Government Gazette, in which the said Act was published in Hindi, in view o£ the fact that Hindi has been adopted as a language by the U. P. Legislature. The Court then observed as follows :
"The English version of the Act, on the basis of which arguments were advanced before us, in the State has merely the status of an authoritative text in the English language of the original Act. The original Act is in Hindi and wherever there be any doubt, and, in fact, principally for purposes of properly interpreting any provision of such an enactment, Ihe proper course is to look at the original Act as published in Hindi, In these circumstances, we looked up the Hindi version of this Act. On examining it, we find that there can be no doubt at all that the expression in English authoritative version in the form in which they were in force immediately before the commencement of this Act' qualifies the words "the notifications" in Section 3 of the U. P. Sales Tax (Validation) Act, 1958. The language in the Hindi version is as follows:--
(Portion in Hindi omitted. -- Ed.) Tf would, of course, have been better, had the meaning conveyed in the original Hindi version been put in the proper form in the English translation so as not to leave any ambiguity which could easily have been done if the expression on the date on which the notifications were issued had not been placed in this section at the place where this expression has been placed but had been placed earlier between the expression "as if the said, sections were" and the words "in force". If this had been done, it would not have been necessary for us to make a reference to the original Hindi version".
The aforesaid decision in AIR 1959 All 208 (supra) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Praaesh (AIR 1961 SG 1634), where the Supreme Court observed as follows (at p. 1538):--
"It should further be noted that the Validation Act was published both in Hindi and, in English, and both of them were authorised versions. The words in The Hindi version make it clear beyond all doubt that the words, "in the form in which they were in force immediately before the commencement of this Act" qualify the word "sections" and not the word "notifications". That is the view expressed by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Haji Late Mohammad Biri Works v. Sales-tax Officer, (AIR 1959 AH 208) on a comparison of the two versions, and we are in agreement with it."
In view of the aforesaid decision of I the Supreme Court, it must be held that where Hindi has been adopted as a I language by the Legislature of a State, Hindi and English are both authorized versions, and it is permissible to rely on the Hindi version in case of a doubt.
6. In view of the aforesaid, decision of the Supreme Court, it is really not necessary to refer to the various decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In AIR 1957 Madh Fra 1 (supra), the question for consideration whether as provided, by the proviso to Article 345 of the Constitution, the M B. Official Language Act prohibited the continuance of the English language for those official purposes within the State for which it was being used immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. It was held that the M. B. Official Language Act did not purport to be and was not a law prohibiting the continuance of the English language for those official purposes in the State for which it was being used immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. The decision in AIR 1957 Madh Pra 1 (supra) is, therefore, clearly distinguishable on facts.
7. In our opinion, in view of the facts that in the erstwhile State of 'Madhya Bharat, Hindi was prescribed as the language for use in Acts passed by the State Legislature, and that the Legislative intent was accordingly expressed in the Hindi version of Act no. 18 of 1952 amending Section 36 of the Act. The contention urged on behalf 'of the petitioners that it was not permissible to refer to the Hindi version of the Act. cannot be upheld.
8. It seems that the Hindi version of Section 36 of the Act was not brought to the notice of the Court in 1964 Rule n. 2G2 (supra). In that case, the question for consideration was whether the second appeal preferred before the Commissioner was governed by the provisions of Sectoin 44 of the M. P. Land, Revenue Code, 1959 or by Section 36 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The Court held that the appeal was governed by the provisions of Section 36 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The Court then observed as follows :--
"Under that provision, a second appeal lay to the Commissioner from an order made in appeal by an officer subordinate to the Collector without any restriction on the powers of the Commissioner in the disposal of the second appeal. It was only in the case of second appeals filed before the Board of Revenue against an order made in appeal by the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner that it was provided that a second appeal before the Board of Revenue would lie only on the grounds mentioned in Section 36 (3) of the Tenancy Act". It is thus clear that the observation that, only in the case of a second appeal before the Board, it was provided that the appeal would lie only on the grounds mentioned in Section 36 (3) of the Act, proceed on an interpretation of Section 36 of the Act, which started as an unexa-mined assumption. While considering the doctrine of 'stare decisis', the Supreme Court in Wamanrao v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 271), affirmed the observations in James Monroe v. Frank Pape (1961) 5 L Ed, 2nd 492 at pp 523-524, that the relevant demands of 'stare decisis' do not preclude consideration of an interpretation which started as an unexamined assumption. It has been observed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Yeshbai v. Ganpat Irappa Jangum (AIR 1975 Bom 20), that where the case was decided on the position of law, which was assumed by the Court, the decision is not an authority for what was assumed. We have already observed that the decision in 1964 R n 262 (supra) was given in ignorance of the Hindi version of the Statute. We. therefore, doubt as to whether the decision in 1964 Rn 262 (supra) can be relied upon as a precedent. In any event, we are of the opinion that the doctrine of 'stare decisis' cannot be invoked in this case as urged on behalf of, the petitioner. The applicability of that doctrine depends largely on the nature of the question at issue. The doctrine is invoked when reversal of a decision, which has prevailed for a con-Isiderable length of time is likely to create serious embarrassment for those, who relying upon a particular interpretation of a statute, have entered into contracts or other transactions, would find themselves frustrated if a different interpretation is put on that Statute. In the instant case, the question is about the powers of a second appellate Court and it cannot be urged that the interpretation, which we are now placing on Section 36 of the Act, would, cause serious embarrassment to those who have relied on the interpretation put upon section 36 of the Act in 1964 Rn 262 (supra).
9. For all these reasons, our answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is that the restrictions placed on the powers of the second appellate Court under Section 36 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act apply not only to second appeals preferred before the Board of Revenue but also to second appeals preferred before the Commissioner and Settlement Commissioner.
10. Let the case now be fixed before the learned single Judge for disposal. Order accordingly.