Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Firdosh Khan vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 26 July, 2000
Equivalent citations: [2001(88)FLR430], (2000)IILLJ1569RAJ, 2000(3)WLC127
Author: Ar. Lakshmanan
Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan
JUDGMENT Ar. Lakshmanan, C.J.
1. This appeal is directed against the order dated April 8, 1999 passed by the learned single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1335/1997 whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
2. The writ petition was filed by the petitioner-appellant for quashing the orders (Annexure-6) dated August 27, 1992 passed by the Disciplinary Authority; Annexure-7 dated March 19, 1993 passed by the Appellate Authority and Annexure-8 dated March 4, 1995 passed by the Reviewing Authority and to declare them illegal. Further prayer by way of mandamus to reinstate the appellant in service with all consequential benefits was also sought. The said writ petition was rejected by the learned single Judge vide his order dated April 8, 1999 on the ground that the petitioner- appellant has filed the writ petitions after lapse of two years and therefore, the writ petition cannot be entertained at such a belated stage. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches.
3. Before the learned single Judge, an: argument was advanced by Shri R. P. Vyas, the learned Additional Advocate General that the writ petition cannot be entertained at such a belated stage. Accepting that argument of the learned Additional Advocate General, the learned single Judge rejected the writ petition. The matter was not dealt with on merits.
4. Being aggrieved with the order dated April 8, 1999 passed by the learned single Judge, the petitioner-appellant has filed this special appeal.
5. Mr. Govind Mathur, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the order dated April 8, 1999 passed by the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches is wholly incorrect and we have perused the entire pleadings and the orders impugned in the writ petition as also the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge . In this case, the petitioner-appellant has assailed the validity and propriety of the order (Annexure-8) dated March 4, 1995 passed by the Reviewing Authority affirming the orders (Annexure-6) and 7 dated August27, 1992 and March 12, 1993 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority respectively. It was contended by the petitioner-appellant in his writ petition that the punishment imposed upon him deserves to be quashed and set aside as the finding of the Disciplinary Authority is perverse and contrary to the evidence available on record. It is also averred by the petitioner-appellant in the writ Petition that he was exhonerated by the Enquiry Officer and therefore, the disciplinary authority should not have punished him without appreciating any evidence to hold him guilty of the alleged misconduct. We have perused the writ petition, reply, by the writ petitioner and the rejoinder. It is seen from the order sheets that the learned single Judge admitted the writ petition on September 22, 1997 and issued notices to the respondents. After service of notices, the respondents filed a reply to the writ Petition on March 4, 1998 and a rejoinder was filed by the petitioner-appellant on March 26, 1999. The writ petition came to be disposed of by the learned single Judge on April 8, 1999. It is seen against the facts, and circumstances of the case. He further submits that the writ petition having been admitted on September 22, 1997 ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches vide order dated April 8, 1999. He has submitted that there is no delay at all and the petitioner-appellant has approached this Court to challenge the impugned orders within a reasonable time. He has further submitted that writ petition was entertained by this Court and notices were issued to the respondents and even in turn, the respondents filed a detailed reply to the writ petition on March 4, 1998. Thereafter, a rejoinder to the reply of the respondents was also filed on behalf of the petitioner-appellant on March 26, 1999. Therefore, in such circumstances, the learned single Judge ought not to have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches and should have considered and disposed of the case on merits in accordance with the law.
6. It has also been contended by Mr. Govind Mathur, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant that in the reply, no objection was raised by the respondents with regard to delay and laches and, therefore, there was no occasion on the part of the petitioner-appellant to say anything about the alleged delay and laches in filing the writ petition from the order sheets that the matter was adjourned for about 9 times at the request of both the parties. Under such circumstances, it has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant, that the disposal of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches is not correct. Even if any delay is made out in the present case, reasons thereof have been explained by the petitioner-appellant that his parents met with an accident and they remained in hospital at Udaipaur for months together and, therefore, the appellant was prevented by reasonable cause in not filing the writ petition assailing the validity of the impugned orders within a reasonable time.
7. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the impugned order dated April 8, 1999 passed by the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches is a correct and speaking order, which does not call for any interference by this Court. He has further submitted that no specific objection regarding delay and laches had been raised by the respondents in their reply to the writ petition. The contention that the writ petition has been filed belatedly was raised for the first time at the time of hearing of the writ petition before the learned single Judge has accepted the said contention and dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches and, therefore, the impugned order dated April 8, 1999 passed by the learned single Judge is not liable to be interfered with.
8. We are unable to countenance the contention raised by the learned Additional Advocate General. It has been held by a catena of decisions of this Court, other High Courts and of the Supreme Court that existence of alternative remedy cannot be a bar to the maintainability of the writ petition if there is violation of fundamental rights or violation of any of the provision of the Act or the Rules or violation of the principles of natural justice.
9. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Thressiamma v. Union of India, 1999 (2) KLT 683 held that after the writ petition is admitted, it has to be disposed of on merits and the dismissal of the writ petition after the lapse of some years on the ground of alternative remedy or on the ground of delay will not ordinarily be justified. In the instant case, the writ petition was entertained by the learned single Judge and the respondents were given an opportunity to file a reply to the same and in the reply, no objection with regard to the delay had been taken. Further in the writ petition, the petitioner has specifically raised violation of his fundamental rights and has alleged that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are based on sound consideration of evidence and, therefore the appellate authority has erred in disagreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner has further alleged that there is no reason to disagree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. It is also alleged in para [ii] of the Grounds of the writ petition that there was no evidence available on record to prove the allegations levelled against the appellant and that the findings given by the disciplinary authority are fully supported by the evidence recorded and available on record. Therefore, it was prayed that the order passed by the State Government should be declared illegal and is liable to be set aside.
10. The Supreme Court has depricated the practice of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches and availability of alternate remedy in a case where violation of fundamental rights and principles of natural justice are alleged in the writ petition. In AIR 1962 SC 1506, the Supreme Court has held that if there is allegation of violation of principles of natural justice or violation of any provision of the Act or the Rules, the dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of delay or laches or alternate remedy is not proper.
11. In this view of the matter, we do not agree with the learned single Judge that the writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of delay and laches. Once the writ petition has been admitted, normally the question regarding its maintainability does not at all arise.
12. We, therefore, accept this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated April 8, 1999 passed by the learned single Judge and remit the case back to the learned single Judge with the request to dispose of the same on merits.
13. There will be no order as to costs.