Madras High Court
V.Purushothaman vs M.Velu Gounder on 6 February, 2012
Author: V.Periya Karuppiah
Bench: V.Periya Karuppiah
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 06.02.2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH S.A.No.170 of 2004 V.Purushothaman ... Appellant / Plaintiff vs. 1.M.Velu Gounder 2.Irissammal 3.Govindarasu 4.Sekar Alias Mannangatti ... Respondents / defendants Appeal filed under Section 100 of C.P.C. against the judgment and decree dated 27.08.2003 in A.S.No.5 of 203 on the file of Principal District Court at Pondicherry and reversing the Judgment and Decree dated 13.11.2002 in O.S.No.720 of 1999 on the file of III Additional District Munsif Court at Pondicherry. For Appellant : Mr.V.Sekar for Mr.D.Shivakumaran For Respondents : Mr.R.Natarajan J U D G M E N T
This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.5 of 2003 dated 27.08.2003 in reversing the judgment of the Trial Court made in O.S.No.720 of 1999 dated 13.11.2002 in decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff.
2. The plaintiff is the appellant and the defendants are the respondents in this appeal.
3. The brief facts of the case of the plaintiff before the lower Court would be as follows:-
i) The case of the plaintiff is that he and the defendants 3 and 4 are the sons of the defendants 1 and 2. The relationships of parties are detailed in the Genealogy in Schedule 'A' of the plaint. Several immovable properties, including the entire 'B' schedule property, originally belonged to the joint Hindu Family comprising the said Velu Gounder (D1) and his sons (plaintiffs and the defendants 3 and 4) and thus, the properties remained in their open, continuous and undivided ownership and possession thereof. Owing to necessity, the parties have amicably partitioned the properties by and under a registered partition deed, dated 24.10.1996 and thus, the plaintiff and the defendants 3 and 4 came into open and exclusive of their respective shares in the properties in their own rights as absolute owners thereof.
ii) It is in such course of said partition of several properties of the Family amongst the said sharers, the said entirety comprising the properties described in schedule 'B' to suit was divided into six portions and two such portions each were allotted to the sons/plaintiffs 3 and 4 herein. Since the said Entirety of the Family had a common irrigation through the common bore-well Motor shed situated at the south-east of the property and since all the said six divisions of the said entirety could be accessed from only Iyyanar Koil Thope situated on the western periphery of the said entirety, the entirety was divided in such manner to facilitate common way and water course for all said shares. It is thus the exclusive title and possession of properties described in schedule 'B' hereto were allotted and delivery to the plaintiff herein and the defendants 3 and 4 were allotted and delivered the other four blocks of the said entirety. Thus, the said six blocks of properties , i.e., the said entirety were divided along with the necessary way and water course to said properties through the passage and vaikal in property described as schedule 'C' hereto.
iii) In course of such exclusive enjoyment of their respective shares of the family's properties, the parties have been having their access of ingress and egress to their respective adjacent lands in the area through the property and passage as described in schedule ' C' in the plaint. The said passage comprise the only ingress and egress to the two blocks of property of the plaintiff and to those of the other shares in the said entirety of the family in the area and includes the vaikal (canal) as the only source of common irrigation to their separate and adjacent properties of the said entirety. The said 'C' Schedule property is thus, the only access to the plaintiff's property from the Government poromboke road and is the only source of irrigation from the canal to the motor shed within the family's said entirety. Such course of way for water to the said separate properties of the said sharers in the said entirety are thus openly enjoyed, used and developed in common and are thus orally accepted and acquienced by their such common use and enjoyment for long. Though all the said sharers had thus acknowledgedly acquiesced in the use and enjoyment of the said common way and water course through the said 'C' Schedule property thus, estopping them from disturbing their mutal course through the rights, the defendants had now turned inimical to the plaintiff for their own personal reasons, since August 1999. In source of such intent, the defendants are at late attempting to prevent and block the plaintiff's said common property in the 'C' Schedule to suit. Inasmuch as the plaintiff is legally entitled for the continuing common use and enjoyment of the said common property in 'C' scedule as his only access of ingress and egress to his properties in schedule 'B' to suit and since the defendants are also in such use of said 'C' scedule property for access in such use of said 'C' schedule property for access to their lands, the defendants are legally and factually obligated to desist from any distrubance or interference to the plaintiff's said rights over the C-schedule property.
iv) Since the defendants disturbed the plaintiff's right unlawfully, the plaintiff attempted to reason out the same directly with defendants. The defendants did not at all permit the plaintiff to speak thereon to them. Though the plaintiff had thus been attempting for an amicable settlement through elders and friends, the defendants have not been heeding at all but had been violently attempting to prevent the plaintiff from use of the said property in the C schedule in suit. Hence, the plaintiff is forced to file this suit for declaration that the property described in 'C' to plaint is the common way and water course as passage and irrigation to the properties of parties to suit including as the only ingress and egress to plaintiff properties in Schedule 'B' to suit; for the consequent permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, men or any one claiming through them from disturbing or interfering with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the common way and water-course on 'C' schedule property in any manner including by executing or causing any kind of document regarding the said 'C' schedule property and for mandatory injunction.
4. The contentions raised in the written statement filed by the defendant would be thus:-
i) The defendants filed the written statement and contended that the suit for mandatory injunction declaring that the plaint schedule property as path way will not lie since there is no any pathway or canals as alleged in the plaint. It is true that there is a partition deed among the plaintiff and the defendants on 24.10.1996 and their relationship as averred in the plaint. Further the averments that the property extent to 4 kulis and the motor pump set and the Electric service is a common property among the plaintiffs and the defendants herein. There is no any dispute in enjoying the water for irrigation of their respective share lands in common as mentioned in the document between the plaintiff and the defendants till date. There is a specific clause mentioned in the partition deed that the irrigation canal under use and enjoyment of the parties will not be disturbed by others.
ii) As such the defendants 1 to 4 never disturbed the plaintiff's right to irrigate the lands belongs to the plaintiff as per the partition deed. There is no passage within the lands mentioned in the partition deed as alleged in the plaint to width of 10 feet or 6 feet. There is only common irrigation canals throughout the lands and there is no passage as alleged in the plaint. The bunds of the irrigation canals are only used as footpath to go into the lands among the parties. Apart from that, there is no separate passage to the width of six feet or ten feet in any place, that is, as per 'C' schedule of the plaint. There is no property as mentioned in the 'C' schedule in the suit lands. Hence, the claim of the plaintiff is not correct and the same is liable to be rejected.
iii) The defendant further submitted that in the property of him in R.S.No.5 he sold to an extent of 20 kuzhies to one Ezhil raja who is the adjacent owner of the land. The said land sold to him on the agreement that he will give equally to the plaintiff from his land to go to the land of the plaintiff directly. Ezhilraja did not give that after his purchase from the plaintiff. Apart from that, there is no dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant at any point of time.
iv) It is further submitted that the defendants never caused any disturbance to the plaintiff's enjoyment of right to use common canals and passage already existed in the lands. Further, even for irrigation there is no dispute till this date. There is no any cause of action for the suit at any point of time as alleged in the plaint. The length of the canals as alleged in the schedule is also not correct and the same is liable to be rectified. For the above reasons, the defendant prayed to dismiss the suit with costs.
5. The trial Court framed necessary issues on the basis of the pleadings and came to the conclusion of decreeing the suit as prayed for.
6. Aggrieved upon the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the defendants preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate Court, after hearing both sides had come to the conclusion of allowing the appeal and thereby dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff.
7. The plaintiff, having aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, had preferred the appeal before this Court.
8. On admission, this Court, had formulated the following substantial questions of law for consideration in this appeal.
"Whether the reversing judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court is sustainable in law, as the lower Appellate Court has not appreciated the entire evidence applicable to the facts of the case and the relevant question of law to decide the issue raised before him ?"
9. Heard Mr.V.Sekar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.D.Shivakumaran, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Mr.R.Natarajan learned counsel for the respondents/defendants.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit in his argument that the lower Appellate Court had not considered the evidence produced by the parties, especially, the evidence of the Commissioner CW1 but had passed the reversal judgment. He would submit that the suit was laid by the plaintiff for declaration that the C-schedule property is a common way and water course as passage and irrigation to the properties of the parties to the suit and for ingress and egress to the properties mentioned in schedule-B and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the common way and water course on the property in schedule-C of plaint and from executing any kind of documents regarding C- schedule property and also for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove any kind of obstruction, preventing the plaintiffs from using C-schedule property for his access and irrigation of B-schedule properties. He would further submit that the evidence of DW1 would go to show that he had no objection for using item No.1 of the C-schedule as common path way and water course to irrigate item Nos.1 and 3 of B-schedule. He would further submit that item Nos.2 and 4 of B schedule properties are located on the western part allotted to the plaintiff and for the said property, water could be passed only through the third defendant's property which is located in between item No.2 of B-schedule and the motor pumpset, motor shed and canal. He would further submit that the trial Court had categorically come to the conclusion of granting of easmentary right to the plaintiff by virtue of partition deed dated 24.10.1996, which was not considered by First Appellate Court, while interfering with the judgment of the Trial Court. He would further submit that the First Appellate Court had dismissed the entire suit even without considering the admission of the defendants in respect of item No.1 of C-schedule properties for being used as common path way as well as a canal to reach the lands belonging to the plaintiff in B-schedule of item Nos.1 and 3. He would further submit that the non-consideration of evidence as well as the recitals in partition deed Ex.A1 entered into between the parties, itself would show that the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is not in accordance with law. He would also submit that the purchase of the third defendant is bound by implied grant of easementary right existed in between the parties to the partition deed and it should have been accepted by the lower Appellate Court. He would also submit that the report of the Commissioner is very clear about the existence of path way described as item No. 2 of the C-schedule. However, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was set aside by the First Appellate Court on a wrong notion that there was no extent of path way as mentioned in Ex.A1. He would further submit that the view taken by the First Appellate Court that the defendant did not prove the existence of path way for more than 20 years to accrue easmentary right by way of prescription has not germane at all. He would submit that the lands belonging to the plaintiff described in item Nos.2 and 4 of B-schedule required to be provided with the canal in the property belonging to 3rd defendant located in between the canal and passage shown in the Commissioner sketch, as per the common way described in item No.1 of C- schedule. He would further submit in his argument that there is no other option to get water from the common motor pumpset or through common canal and pathway described in item No. 2 of C-schedule. Therefore, item No.1 of C-schedule should have been the only way to go over the property of the plaintiff connecting item No.2 of C-schedule and item Nos.2 and 4 of B-schedule. He would also cite a judgment of this Court reported in 1999 (2) LW 392 (Samsudeen v. Krishnan and others) in support of his argument. He would therefore, request the Court that the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court was without any reasons and without following the legal principles and therefore, it may be set aside and the appeal may be allowed and thus, the suit as decreed by the trial Court may be restored.
11. The learned counsel for the respondents/defendants would submit in his argument that the First Appellate Court was correct in coming to the conclusion of setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court since there was no existence of C-schedule canal as described in the plaint. He would also submit that there was no existence of 10 feet common pathway and canal and the plaintiff miserably failed to prove the same. He would also submit that there was no demarcation of a common canal in the partition deed entered into between parties and the lower appellate court had correctly discussed that no common canal formed for the purpose of irrigating the properties belonging to the plaintiff. He would further submit that the Commissioner's report was not objected to by the plaintiff and therefore, the case of the plaintiff that there was a common path way in the canal to the width of 10 feet was not accepted by the First Appellate Court. He would further submit that the plaintiff also did not prove the existence of common canal for over a statutory period and therefore, the First Appellate Court had come to a correct conclusion of granting easmentary right even on the ground of prescriptive title. He would further submit that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief on the date of suit and therefore, he would not be entitled to any relief. He would also submit that there was no common canal with the width of 10 feet as detailed in item Nos. 1 and 2 of C-schedule to irrigate 4 items of B-schedule properties on the date of the suit as found in the Commissioner's report and therefore, the plaintiff cannot be granted any relief sought for by him. He would rely upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2003) 1 SCC 726 (Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P. and others) for the said principle. He would further submit that the lower Appellate Court had completely gone into the evidence of parties and the admitted documents namely, the partition deed and had come to the conclusion of reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and therefore, the finding of fact by the First Appellate Court was in accordance with law and therefore, it cannot be disturbed. Hence, he would request the Court to dismiss the second appeal by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court.
12. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced on either side.
13. The suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant was for the following reliefs:-
"i) declaring that the property described in schedule 'C' to plaint is the common way and water-course as passage and irrigation to the properties of parties to suit including as the only ingress and egress to plaintiff's properties in schedule 'B' to suit,
ii) consequently granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants or whomsoever claiming through them from disturbing or interfering with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the common way and water course on property in schedule 'C' of plaint in any manner including by executing or causing any kinds of purported documents regarding said 'C' schedule property,
iii) granting mandatory injunction (in event of preventing the plaintiff's entry into 'C' Schedule property by defendants in any manner during pendency of suit) directing the defendants to remove any kind of obstruction preventing the plaintiff's only access and irrigation to his 'B' schedule properties through the 'C' schedule property,
iv) directing the defendants to pay the costs of the suit to the plaintiff."
14. The Trial Court had decreed the suit on the basis of the Commissioner's report and sketch produced in item Nos.C1 and C2 and on the admitted recitals of the partition deed produced as Ex.A1. The claim of the plaintiff was that the plaintiff is entitled to take water from the motor pump set and common well located on the east-west corner of the total extent of the properties, prior to the division. Accordingly, various items of properties were allotted to in between plaintiff, defendants 3 and 4. No allotment of property was done in favour of the father and mother of the parties namely first defendant and second defendant. The claim made by the plaintiff was that he is entitled to take water from the well to irrigate his land. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff was that the 3rd defendant as DW1 had himself admitted that they used the way shown as item No.2 of C-schedule and they used to take water from the common pumpset through common canal. Therefore, anybody could understand that the common canal was formed for the purpose of irrigating the lands allotted to all the share holders namely plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4. The Commissioner's report shows that there was a canal and passage which is shown as C2 in the sketch,Ex.C3 with the measurement of 22 feet X 5 feet. No doubt, the admission of DW1 would refer to the said canal and passage which would have been used as common canal. The existence of such canal is shown only to an extent of 5 feet. However, the First Appellate Court had not considered the existence of the said canal in the place of item No.2 of C-schedule. It had deliberately found that there was no existence of canal as put-forth by the plaintiff in order to establish plaintiff's claim of prescriptive title to such easementary right. The First Appellate Court has grossly erred in perceiving so, where there is a clear admission on the part of DW1 to that effect. Such a finding reached by the First Appellate Court is contrary to the evidence available before the Trial Court.
15. Furthermore, the First Appellate Court had discussed the recitals of the partition deed and had come to the conclusion that it was agreed between parties of the said partition deed Ex.A1 to form a water course to take water from the common well to the respective land of the sharers. Admittedly, the 3rd defendant is one of the sharers and his property is located in between the properties allotted to the plaintiff in item Nos. 1 and 3 on the eastern part and item Nos.2 and 4 on the western part, in which, the Commissioner noted that tapioca plants were standing. The said Commissioner's sketch would also go to show that there is yet another property belonged to the third person namely Purushothaman in between item Nos. 1 and 3 of B-schedule and item Nos. 2 and 4 of B-schedule of another part.
16. As per Ex.A1 partition deed, it has been categorically stated regarding the right in the common well, and the motor pump-set and the maintenance over the said pump-set and well, regarding taking of water from common well, in the vernacular language as follows:-
bghJ nkw;go fpuhkj;jpy; hPrh;nt be. 12 9/ f.be.435 2 y; ml';fpa brhj;jpy; nfhtpe;juhR epyj;jpw;F bjd;g[wj;jpy; 4 FHp mst[s;s g[";ir epyk;. rf;F ge;jp jc&&;zhKh;j;jp epyj;jpw;F (fp)/ jz;lghdp kw;Wk; nfhghy;rhkp epyj;jp[w;F(t) nfhtpe;juhR ghR epyj;jpw;F (nk) (bj) ,jw;Fl;gl;ljpy; 10 vr;.gp.ePh; nkhl;lh; nghh; kpd; rh;tP!; cs;gl i. g[Unrhj;jkd; -1 nfhtpe;juhR 2 nrfh; (v) kz;zh';fl;o - 3 Mfpa d;W egh;fSk; rkkhf cgnahfg;gLj;jpf; bfhs;s ntz;oaJ. kpd;rhu gpy;iyia c& Kd;W egh;fSk; rkkhf fl;of;bfhs;s rk;kjpf;fpnwhk;/ ePh; nkhl;lh; VjhtJ gGJ Vw;gl;lhy; c&& Kd;W ghf!;jh;fSk; rkkhf bryt[ bra;Jf; bfhs;s ehk; rk;kjpf;fpnwhk;/ .....
c& epyj;ija[k; mjpy; cs;s ePh; nkhl;liua[k; c& Kd;W egh;fSk; tpw;fpuak; bra;a chpik fpilahJ. c& epyj;jpypUe;J tha;f;fhy; gpoj;Jk;. ePh;ghrdk; bra;Jf; bfhs;s eh';fs; rk;kjpf;fpnwhk;/ tha;fhiy kwpg;gjw;F ve;j ghf!;jh;fSf;Fk; chpik fpilahJ.
17. Whether the agreement to take water from the common canal for irrigation of the lands in item Nos. 2 and 4 of B-schedule should have been through the land belonging to 3rd defendant in which tapiaco plants were raised adjacent to common canal described as C2 in the Commissioner's sketch. When there is an agreement in between sharers to form a canal through the properties which they owned earlier in common, to irrigate the land after partition, such canal should have been constructed through properties after they shared in between them. Admittedly, the properties in item Nos.1 and 3 of B-schedule and item Nos. 2 and 4 of B-schedule were allotted to the plaintiff and the land surrounded by item No.2 of the C-schedule and item Nos.1 to 4 of B- schedule were allotted to 3rd defendant, who had raised tapiaco plants in the said property on the date of visit of the Commissioner. The right given to every sharer in the partition deed Ex.A1 i.e., the plaintiff, defendants 3 and 4, is a right accrued to the said sharers including the plaintiff on the date of filing of the suit. The said right and liability of the sharers namely plaintiff, defendants 3 and 4 in Ex.A1 shall go with the property as a liability attached with the right. Other sharers namely 4th defendant was allotted to some other property which is located on the southern side and on the farther more east in the total extent of the property and the shortest way for irrigating item Nos.2 and 4 of B schedule from the common well through motor pump set would be the suit property as shown in item No.1 of C schedule.
18. The judgment of this Court reported in 1999 (2) LW 392 (Samsudeen v. Krishnan and others) is with regard to the easement of necessity regarding path way and principle would apply to tis case. The relevant portion would be as follows:-
"13. As already observed, the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant presuppose the existence of an alternative pathway for refusing relief of the easement of necessity. In the present case, it has not been established that the alleged alternative pathway could be used as of right by respondents 1 and 2, D.W.2 being the exclusive owner of the alleged alternative pathway.
14. The courts below have reached the finding regarding the non-existence of an alternative pathway as of right and found the existence of the suit pathway as the only pathway available to respondents 1 and 2 for access. This finding has been reached on an appreciation of the material evidence on record. No execution can be taken to the said finding."
19. As per the judgment of this Court, the principle that the suggestion of alternative path way or alternative canal which is non-existence, cannot be a remedy when the right of using the common canal within the properties is available. As regards this case, the Commissioner's report clearly depicts the existence of item No.2 of C-schedule common canal but its width is reduced to only 5 feet, which has been categorically admitted by DW1 also. Similarly, the right to take water from the common well through a common canal to irrigate the properties in between parties was established in Ex.A1. That shows that the water from the common well shall be taken only through common canal and there is a right to irrigate the properties belonging to all parties namely plaintiff, defendants 3 and 4 through the lands allotted to them in the partition deed. Therefore, such allotted lands are entitled to such a right to get water for irrigation from common well through other land allotted to other sharers. The said right cannot be prevented by other sharers. Such right was well available on the date of filing of the suit.
20. The judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2003) 1 SCC 726 (Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P. and others) has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants. The relevant passage runs as follows:-
"7. ... The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i.e., the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. Third-party interests may have been created or allowing relief to the claimant may result in unjust enrichment on account of events happening in-between. Else the relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum and for no fault of the petitioner. A plaintiff or petitioner having been found entitled to a right to relief, the court would as an ordinary rule try to place the successful party in the same position in which he would have been if the wrong complained against would not have been done to him."
21. There is no dispute that the rights of parties shall be determined on the date of filing of the suit. Relying upon the said decision, it was argued that there was no existence of common canal described as item No.1 of C-schedule to take water or to have a path way from B-schedule item Nos.1 and 3 to the item Nos.2 and 4 of B-schedule on the date of suit. It is an admitted case that the land allotted to the parties namely, plaintiff/ defendants 3 and 4 in Ex.A1 partition deed have to be utilised for the purpose of irrigating the lands allotted to the sharers. It is an admitted fact that there is an existence of common canal measuring 27 feet X 5 feet which was also used as passage running from the common well and motor pump set to the land belonging to the plaintiff described in item Nos.1 and 3 of B-schedule. That common canal could have been used by the 3rd defendant for the properties lying on its east-west. When such a common canal as described in item No.2 of C-schedule in a reduced width of 5 feet is in existence, the necessity to take water from the common well to item Nos.2 and 4 of B-schedule which were also the lands allotted to the plaintiff in the partition deed Ex.A1, could be possible only through the land allotted to the 3rd defendant either through item No. 1 of C-schedule or directly crossing from the centre of the item No.2 of C-schedule, through the land belonging to 3rd defendant in which tapiaco plants have grown. The easmentary right was granted in common well in the partition deed Ex.A1 and the convenient way to bring water from the common well to item Nos.2 and 4 of B-schedule in terms of the partition deed Ex.A1 would be through item No.1 of C-schedule. The path way and canal for taking water as suggested by the Commissioner from the common well and motor pum-pset rounding the land belonging to the 4th defendant on the southern end of the total extent of properties is some other person's land, which can not be subjected for consideration in view of the judgment of this Court reported in 1999 (2) LW 392 (Samsudeen v. Krishnan and others). This is purely an easement of grant coupled with the necessity and it cannot be exercised through 3rd parties property but could be exercised only through the parties to the partition deed Ex.A1. The lower Appellate Court had not gone into the oral and documentary evidence but had reversed the finding of the trial Court. Therefore, the question of law as formulated by this Court at the time of admission of this appeal is decided in favour of the appellant and thus, the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court are set aside and the appeal is allowed and thus, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is restored. Consequently, the suit is decreed with costs.
22. In fine, I am of the considered view, that the second appeal is liable to be allowed. Accordingly, the second appeal is allowed with costs and the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is restored. No costs in this appeal.
.02.2012 Index:Yes/No Internet:Yes/No ssn To
1. Principal District Court, Pondicherry.
2. III Additional District Munsif Court, Pondicherry.
V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH, J., ssn Pre-delivery judgment made in S.A.No.170 of 2004 .02.2012