Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
State Of Rajasthan And Anr. vs Gyan Singh And Anr. on 1 May, 2001
Equivalent citations: AIR2001RAJ369, 2001(3)WLC1, 2001(3)WLN308
Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan, Bhagwati Prasad
JUDGMENT Lakshmanan, C.J.
1. All these appeals arise out of the judgment dated 18.11.1998 passed by Hon'ble Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. The State of Rajasthan is the appellant in all the appeals. The learned Single Judge held that it is not open to the transport authority to grant and/or counter-sign the stage carriage permit on an inter-State route over and above the celling fixed by an inter-State agreement. The learned Single Judge has followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Janta Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. S.T.A. (1) wherein the Supreme Court has held that agreement between two States regarding fixation of strength of such permits arrived at in compliance with court's direction; compliance with Section 63(3-A) and (3-B) and other relevant provisions of law for finalisation and implementation of the agreement directed to be made and in the meanwhile the concerned transport authorities were directed to re-consider their refusal to countersign the existing permits. The Supreme Court has also directed in the above matter that until the inter-State agreement is finalised as directed in the judgment and steps are taken for grant of permits in respect of vacancies existing or created under the agreement, the Transport Authorities of Union Territory of Delhi should re-consider the decision in the matter of counter signature of existing permits issued by the Transport Authorities in Uttar Pradesh and if there be any permit already granted by the Transport Authority of Delhi, the Transport Authority in Uttar Pradesh may similarly consider the question of counter signature. Further directions were also given by the Supreme Court in regard to the counter signature referred to above.
(2). Learned counsel for the appellant, Shri R.P. Dave submitted that learned Single Judge committed an error in placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Janta Motors Pvt. Ltd. (supra). According to him, the said judgment of the Supreme Court is not a direct judgment on the question and the provisions, in consideration in whose judgments were of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Janta Motors Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is not applicable to the controversy involved and the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. According to Mr. Dave, judgment in the case of Sahib Ram v. State (2), Dated 28.8.1992, Judgment reported in the case of Sunil Kumar Ajmera v. The Secretary, State Transport Authority (3) and judgment in the case of New Vijay Laxmi v. State (4), should be followed. In the above judgments, it has been held that the R.T.A. under Sub-section (1) of Section 88 of the concerned region can grant a permit on inter state route, provided it is counter signed by the State Transport Authority or by the Regional Transport Authority of the concerned region of another State. If the counter signatures are not obtained then automatically that grant will confine within the region of the State.
(3). Per contra, learned counsel Mr. Maheshwari and Mr. Lodha appearing for the respondents placed reliance on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Ashwani Kumar and Anr. v. R.T.A. (5). In that case it was argued that Sub-section (1) of Section 88 has to be construed independently which did not prescribe the existence of a reciprocal agreement regarding the inter-State route permits. According to the learned counsel Sub-sections (5) & (6) cannot come in the way of R.T.A. of a State to grant the permit in a State which, when granted, become valid in the other State upon its being counter-sighed. The Supreme Court negatived the above argument and held that such prescribing can be by way of the act itself or by rules framed under it. Sub-section (5) provides that a proposal to enter into an agreement between the States to fix the number of permits which is proposed to be granted or countersigned in respect of each route or area, shall be published by each of the State Government concerned in their official Gazette and in any one or more newspapers in regional language circulating in the area or route proposed to be covered by the agreement together with a notice of the date before which representation in connection therewith may be submitted and the date not being less than thirty days from the date of publication on which the Authority by which, and the time and place at which, the proposal and any representation received in connection therewith will be considered. Sub-section (6) provides that every agreement arrived at between the States shall, in so far as it relates to the grant of counter-signature of permits, be published by each of the State Governments concerned in the Official Gazette and in any one or more of the newspapers in the regional language circulating in the area or route covered by the agreement and the State Transport Authority of the State and the Regional Transport Authority concerned shall given effect to it. Considering the above argument, the Supreme Court has held as under:-
"The Act envisages three categories of permit-seekers, namely (i) inter-region, (ii) intra-region and (iii) inter-State. Different criteria and procedure has been provided under the Act for granting permits in respect of each of the categories. The grant of inter-State permits with which we are concerned in these appeals are permissible under Section 88(5) of the Act. The existence of a route is a condition precedent for exercise of the power under Sub-section (1) of Section 88 of the Act. Intra (inter) State route under the scheme of the Act has to be reciprocal and cannot be unilaterally created by one State or an Authority in the State. The concerned State Governments are supposed to deliberate and decide the routes to be opened as inter-State routes by determining the number of trips each relate to have and prescribe other conditions for the smooth functioning of the Act to achieve its objective which is claimed to be a social welfare legislation."
(4). The Supreme Court has also observed that accepting the submissions made on behalf of the appellants, would result in frustration of the objective sought to be achieved by the Act. The interpretation put by the High Court is rationale, legal and proper and in absence of existence of inter-State route, the authorities under the Act were not justified in granting the permits to the appellants. The Supreme Court has also held that existence of permit depends upon the reciprocal agreements between the States covered by the route which did not exist in the case before the Supreme Court and therefore orders of authority granting permit in favour of the appellants were quashed as without jurisdiction.
(5). We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side.
(6). In our opinion, judgments in the case of Sahib Ram (supra), Sunil Kumar Ajmera (supra) and New Vijay Laxmi cited and relied by the learned counsel for the appellant will not be any assistance to him. In our view, the judgment in the case of Ashwani Kumar (supra) will govern the entire situation. In the above case, the Supreme Court has laid down the law so clearly and held that the existence of a route is a condition precedent for exercise of the power under Sub-section (1) of Section 88 of the Act and inter-State route under the scheme of the Act has to be reciprocal and cannot be unilaterally created by one State or an Authority in the State and that the concerned State Governments are supposed to deliberate and decide the routes to be opened as inter-State routes by determining the number of trips each route to have and prescribe other conditions for the smooth functioning of the Act to achieve its objective which is claimed to be a social welfare legislation. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar (supra), the aforementioned appeals filed by the State have no merit and are liable to be dismissed. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is affirmed, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar (supra), the law laid down in three judgments in case of Sahib Ram (supra), Sunil Kumar Ajmera (supra) and New Vijay Laxmi (supra) cannot be held to be good law.
(7). Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.