Delhi High Court
A.K. Bansal vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi And Ors. on 10 August, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1994(30)DRJ508
JUDGMENT K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.
(1) In all these writ petitions, petitioners question the selections made to the post of Assistant Engineers (Civil) in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi ; 60 persons were selected and subsequently appointed; of these 44 persons were already working as Junior Engineers (departmental candidates) in the very Corporation, and the remaining 16 were outside candidates.
(2) The selection process is challenged on the ground that - (i) most of the selectees were ineligible even to apply for the post; (ii) in the selection process 50% of the marks were allocated for viva voce test, while the remaining were distributed for qualification (33-1/3%) and professional experience (16-2/3%); (iii) evaluation of the candidates is attacked as arbitrary to help a few favored candidates and (iv) the notification inviting the application was not advertised, but was sent only to the Employment Exchange and circulated in the general wing of the Corporation; this resulted in the denial of opportunity to other eligible candidates to apply. The four petitioners in writ petition 1666 of 1990 (Arun Kumar Bansal and 3 others), are working as Junior Engineers in Delhi Development Authority. Petitioners in all the other writ petitions are working as Junior Engineers under the 1st respondent Corporation.
(3) It is undisputed that as per the Recruitment Rules, 50% of the posts of Assistant Engineers has to be filled up by promotion (of Junior Engineers, Civil),with 3 years regular service in the grade in the case of those possessing a degree in Civil Engineering or equivalent qualification and 5 years regular service in the grade in the case of those possessing a Diploma in Civil Engineering. Another 50% is to be filled up by direct recruitment. The educational and other qualifications required for direct recruitment are : (i) Degree in Civil Engineering of a recognised University or equivalent; (ii) 2 years professional experience. The post is a selection post.
(4) Since, for a long period, vacancies attributable to direct recruitment were not filled up, a few Junior Engineers filed Writ Petitions and as a result of which the impugned selections were made.
(5) According to the petitioners the "two years professional experience" referred as a qualification, has to be an experience after being a graduate in Civil Engineering or its equivalent. In the instant case, several selectees lacked this 2 years experience, and admittedly, their experiences gained prior to being graduates also were considered. It is also contended that during the past years, the allocable marks at the selection were . (i) for Degree 10 (40%); (ii) for experience 10 (40%) and (iii) Interview 5 (20%). This is altered for the first time in the impugned selection process by allocating (i) 10 to the degree (33-1/3%); (ii) for experience 5 (16-2/3%) and (iii) interview 15 (50%). Petitioners attack this as wholly arbitrary and opposed to the settled principle that marks for the interview should not exceed 12 to 25% of the total marks as otherwise, a high percentage of marks for interview would vest arbitrary powers of selection with the Selection Committee. Some of the petitioners have alleged that a few of the selectees are related to high officers of the 1st respondent and for this purpose also, a higher percentage is allocated for interview.
(6) Respondents deny the allegations of malafide and pointed out that these are factually incorrect apart from being vague. Several candidates who are related to a few highly placed officials of the 1st respondent were not selected and these details are found in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st respondent. A very few selectees are related to a few lower officers of the respondent. The Selection Committee consisted of - (i) Deputy Commissioner Engineering (now referred as Additional Commissioner); (ii) Engineer-in-Chief; (iii) Engineer-in-Chief of water works and (iv) A Superintending Engineer belonging to Scheduled Caste.
(7) Respondents also contend that the post of Assistant Engineer admittedly is higher to that of Junior Engineer, and the persons holding the said post should be capable of shouldering higher responsibilities, and therefore the candidate's personality traits are required to be measured and that the post is required to be filled up by persons of mature understanding; therefore, it was decided to allocate 50% of the total marks for the interview. The two years experience, as the very language shows is 'professional experience' and it is not confined to the experiences of a graduate in Engineering.
(8) At the time of the hearing the learned counsel for the 1st respondent placed before me the relevant records. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioners were fully equipped with the details such as the marks awarded to each of the candidates by the Selection Committee and they had prepared several charts reflecting the various aspects of the selections.
(9) The following questions require to be considered :- 1) Whether the notification inviting applications from eligible candidates should have been advertised -or whether sending the notification to the Employment Exchange was legally sufficient? (2) Whether the selection process was vitiated by the allocation of 50% of marks for the interview? (3) Whether the experience required of a candidate is an experience after obtaining the degree or an equivalent qualification? (4) Whether the evaluation by the Selection Committee and the consequential selections made by it is arbitrary for any reason? (5) Whether the selections were vitiated by bias, favoritism or nepotism? (6) What relief? RE: Question NO.1 - ADVERTISEMENT:
(10) Mr. Gupta contended that notification inviting applications seeking recruitment to the posts in question, was not published in any newspaper and requisite opportunity was not made available to all the eligible aspirants to apply for the post; the learned counsel pointed out that the petitioners in C.W.P. 1666 of 1990 were eligible and have been working in Delhi Development Authority, but they could not apply to the posts for want of knowledge of the notification. The notification seems to have been displayed on the notice board of the 1st respondent and circulated only amongst its employees working in the General Wing; further, vacancies were notified to the Employment Exchange, requesting the latter to sponsor the candidates. Some of the candidates who applied within the stipulated time were actually sponsored by the Employment Exchange subsequent to the last date for filing the application (and after those candidates had already submitted their applications). The learned counsel argued that no public authority could make appointment to the posts under it without due publication of the intending direct recruitment, as otherwise, filling up of posts without proper advertisement would be a denial of opportunity to the eligible candidates to seek employment. Since all the impugned appointments are made in violation of the constitutional requirement, they cannot be sustained nor can they be regularised. The learned counsel relied on the observations made by the Supreme Court in R.N. Nanjuniappa Vs. T. Thiriviah: . The court while referring to the facts of the said case, where appointment was not a case of direct recruitment, but of promotion, observed at page 1772 - "AGAIN,if it were a case of direct recruitment one would expect proper materials for the direct recruitment. There should be advertisements for the post. Candidates have to be selected. Their respective merits would have to be considered.- To say that the appellant (respondent) was the only eligible candidate is to deny the rights of others to apply for such eligibility tests."
In the same page, at para 26, the Court held : "IF the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be regularised. Rectification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules".
(11) In Masood Karim & Others Vs. Govt. State Recruitment Board & others; 1977 Slj 41 Jammu & Kashmir High Court held that advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates to fill up posts by direct recruitment, is a mandatory requirement.
(12) Mr. P.P. Rao appearing for the appointees, on the other hand, questioned the proposition advanced by Mr. Gupta. The learned counsel contended that in a vast country like India, advertisement in no Newspaper would reach all the intending applicants. Apart from the vastness of the country, each region has its own language and even amongst the English Newspapers, each region has its own preferences. In these circumstances, court shall have to take a practical view and uphold any reasonable mode adopted by the public authority inviting the applications.
(13) There is considerable force in Mr. Rao's submissions. The Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 was enacted with a view .to require the employers, on a compulsory basis, to notify to Employment Exchanges all vacancies subject to certain exceptions) Section 4(1) of the Act requires the employer in every establishment in public sector, before filling up any vacancy in any employment in that establishment, to notify that vacancy to the prescribed Employment Exchange. The term 'establishment in public sector' is defined as per Section 2(f), which includes a local authority. However, as per Section 4(4), there is no obligation to recruit any person through the Employment Exchange, merely because the vacancy has been notified. Provision has been made for registration with the Employment Exchanges, by the candidates seeking employment or promotions. Even a person who is already employed may register himself, in case, he seeks a better employment. It is true that, the Act does not make it compulsory for any employment seeker to register himself, to confer eligibility. Similarly, there is no bar against selecting a person who is not sponsored by (not a person registered with) an Employment Exchange. But it can be reasonably expected that a person seeking a public employment would register himself with an Employment Exchange. Similarly, a person resident in an area would be reasonably vigilant to keep a watch over a possible recruitment steps that may be taken by a public sector. The impracticability of advertising the vacancies in Newspapers and the sufficiency of notifying the vacancies to the Employment Exchange has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. N.Hargopal; Air, 1987 Sc 7227 "THE object of recruitment to any service or post is to secure the most suitable person who answers the demands of the requirements of the job. In the case of public employment, it is necessary to eliminate arbitrariness and favoritism and introduce uniformity of standards and orderliness in the matter of employment. .There has to be an element of procedural fairness in recruitment. If a public employer chooses to receive applications for employment where and when he pleases, and chooses to make appointments as he likes a grave element of arbitrariness is certainly introduced. This must necessarily be avoided if Articles 14 and 16 have to be given any meaning. We, therefore, consider that insistence of recruitment through employment exchanges advances rather than restricts the rights guaranteed by Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution. The submission that the employment exchanges do not reach everywhere applies equally to whatever method of advertising vacancies is adopted. Advertisement in the daily Press, for example, is also equally ineffective as it does not reach everyone desiring employment. In the absence of a better method of recruitment, we think that any restriction that employment in Government Department should be through the medium of employment exchanges does not offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution"
In M. Mestan Rao Vs. The Superintendent, Excise Department, Kurnool; 1984 Labour Industrial Cases, 1218, Jeevan Reddy, ]. (as he then was) expressed a similar view. A Five Judge Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, in Daljit Singh Minhas and others Vs. The State of Punjab and others; Air 1978 Punjab and Haryana, 117 took the same view.
(14) There is a Home Ministry's circular enabling a person who is already employed, to register himself at the Employment Exchange seeking a higher post. It is found in National Employment Service Manual (Vol. Ii, Appendix 1 (15). It is referred as Memo No-14.1.1969- Est. dated 29.7.70. It is also referred in Swamy's Complete Manual on Establishment & Administration at page 170. Therefore, it cannot be said that a person in service already is denied of an opportunity to know the vacancies in the posts in question by registering with the Employment Exchange, and thus denied an opportunity to apply. The petitioners point out that, instructions had been received by the 1st respondent to select the candidate sponsored by the Employment Exchange as well as the departmental candidates. But as a fact, the instructions' relied upon by the 1st respondent nowhere refers to the departmental candidates. No departmental candidate was registered with the Employment Exchange and none of them sponsored by it. But 44 out of the 60 selectees were departmental candidates. This establishes that entire selection process was maneuvered to favor the departmental candidates, to get over the prescription in the Rules to confine the appointments to the posts of Assistant Engineers in the in the proportion of 50% by direct and 50% by promotion. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent, however, pointed out that there was no bar against the departmental candidates competing for selection under the direct recruitment quota. In fact, the relevant Recruitment Rules provide for relaxation of age limit in case of governmental and departmental employee in the case of direct recruitment. The notice inviting applications for direct recruitment was displayed in the notice board of the 1st respondent. It is inevitable that when direct recruitment takes place, for the eligible departmental employees also to apply seeking higher post by way of direct recruitment. In the interest of efficiency of service and harmonious relationship between the Corporation (1st respondent) and the employees, 1st respondent cannot prevent the employees from applying for the higher post under the 1st respondent. It is implicit in the very nature of things that departmental candidates need not be registered with the Employment Exchange. This apart Section 4(4) of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 permits the selection of candidates not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. The inherent exception that a departmental employee need not be sponsored by the Employment Fx- change in no way renders the selection process arbitrary.
(15) I agree with the submission of the 1st respondent. Even when selection to the direct recruitment quota is to be made by seeking the names of candidates from the Employment Exchange, it will be open to any Statutory Body to make an exception in favor of its own employees. Such an exception will not render the selection process arbitrary. If this is a valid principle, stretching this to some extent by recognising an inherent or implied exception to the rule, that only those sponsored by Employment Exchange should be considered for selection, in favor of the departmental candidates, also will be valid. It is unnecessary for me to repeat the other submissions noted by me above, advanced on behalf of the 1st respondent in this regard once again; I accept them.
(16) Mr. Gupta, the learned counsel in C.W.P. 1666/1990 emphatically argued that the appointment of the departmental candidates out of 60 shows that it is a case of circumventing the prescription of the Rule that 50% of the posts are to be filled up by direct recruitment and if candidates are not available, these posts should be filled up by deputation or transfer.
(17) Only because a very large number of in house candidates (departmental candidates) are selected it cannot be said that the selection process was a mere 'eyewash' and the real .object was to defeat the provisions of the Recruitment Rules. This situation, no doubt, creates suspicion as to the credibility of the selection process. But suspicion can not be a substitute for proof. We are always susceptible to develop suspicion in such matters; the tendency is to stigmatise the public functionaries and the methodology behind the discharge of public functions. But, a court of law cannot be and should not be swayed by such a wave of suspicion. Better evidence is needed to set at naught the selection process resulting in the appointments of a very large number of candidates, on the ground of arbitrariness or malafides; at any rate, the alleged subtle device adopted to defeat the statutory provisions should be more patent and glaring. I may also add that no pleading is clear and specific, alleging any such device having been adopted to defeat the Rules. RE: Question N0.2 :
(18) Selections of the appointees were made on the basis of the marks allotted to them. Out of the total of 30 marks maximum 10 marks were for the Degree, 5 for the experience and 15 for the interview. Thus, the interview had 50% of the total marks. This is attacked as arbitrary and that this enabled the selection committee to favor the selectees. Petitioners point out that prior to the year 1989, out of the total marks of 25, 10 were kept for degree, 10 for experience and 5 for interview; thus the interview represented only 20% of the total marks; the deviation from the earlier practice and enhancing the role of the interview was without any reason or basis.
(19) According to the 1st respondent , post of an Assistant Engineer is a responsible post where the appointee has to shoulder greater burden and he should be equipped with drive, initiative and supervising capacity. These attributes could be tested more conveniently, at the interview; no written test would give a correct picture of the candidate. It is only where written tests arc held, Along with the interview (viva-voce). Courts have held that the interview should carry a low percentage of marks; however, where no written tests are held and selections are to be made for responsible posts on the basis of qualifications and experience, interview may carry higher marks. It is also pointed out that the need to limit the scope of interview depends upon the nature of the posts or purpose for which selection is made (as in the case of selection of students for technical or higher studies). Respondents also point out that the members of the Selection Committee are high ranking officials of the Corporation and not a single instance of personal favoritism, nepotism or bias is attributed to any one of them. Only vague allegation of malafide is made and no member of the Selection Committee is imp leaded as a respondent. No appointee is related or connected to any high officer of the Corporation.
(20) Having regard to the several decisions of the Supreme Court wherein the question of awarding marks at interview were considered, I am inclined to accept the submissions of the respondents. After referring to the decisions cited by the petitioners, I will be referring to those cited by the respondents.
(21) In Ajay Hasia Vs. Khalid Mujib; , validity of admissions made to an Engineering College was under consideration. The court held that the marks allocated for the oral interview were, very much on the higher side as compared with the marks allocated for the written test. The marks allocated for the interview were 50 as against 100 allocated for the written test, thereby 33-1/3% of the total marks came to be fixed for interview. At page 501, the court held : "NOW there can be no doubt that, having regard to the drawbacks and deficiencies in the oral interview test and the conditions prevailing in the country, particularly when there is deterioration in moral values and corruption and nepotism are very much on the increase, allocation of a high percentage of marks for the oral interview as compared to the marks allocated for the written test, cannot be accepted by the court as free from the vice of arbitrariness."
Thereafter, the court referred to two earlier decisions and the marks allocated for interviews at other competitive examinations, such as Ias and then held - "WEmust, therefore, regard the allocation of as high a percentage as 33-1/3 of the total marks for the oral interview as infecting the admission procedure with the vice of arbitrariness and selection of candidates made on the basis of such admission procedure cannot be sustained."
(22) However, having regard to the lapse of time, the court did not exercise its discretion to set aside the selections made. The following observations of the Supreme Court are also relevant in the context of the present petitioner's case. In the same page (502) the court observed : "THE chart does create a strong suspicion in our mind that the marks awarded at the viva voce examination might have been manipulated with a view to favoring the candidates who ultimately came to be selected, but suspicion cannot take the place of proof and we cannot hold the plea of malafides to be established. We need much more cogent material before we can hold that the Committee deliberately manipulated the marks at the viva voce examination with a view to favoring certain candidates as against the petitioners. We cannot, however, fail to mention that this is a matter which required to be looked into very carefully and not only the State Government, but also the Central Government which is equally responsible for the proper running of the college, must take care to see that proper persons are appointed on the interviewing committee and there is no executive interference with their decision making process. We may also caution the authorities that though, in the present case, for reasons which we have already given, we are not interfering with the selection for the academic year 1979-80, the selections made for the subsequent academic years would run the risk of invalidation if such a high percentage of marks is allocated for the oral interview. We are of the view that, under the existing circumstances, allocation of more than 15% of the total marks for the oral interview would be arbitrary and unreasonable and would be liable to struck down as constitutionally invalid."
(23) In the above decision, the Supreme Court was comparing the percentage of marks allocated for interview as against the written test held, and ultimately held that allocation of more than 15% of the total marks for oral interview would be arbitrary. It was not a case of selecting the candidates for appointment to responsible positions where written test is not held.
(24) In Mohinder Sain Garg Vs. State of Punjab and others; , the court held the allocation of 25% of marks for interview as excessive.
(25) In Ashok Kumar Yadav Vs. State of Haryana; , selections made to the Haryana Civil Service (Executive) were under challenge. The High Court had quashed the selections. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. Selections were made on the basis of the marks obtained at the oral interview, who secured the qualifying marks in the written test. While considering the need to have viva-voce for selection, the Court observed, at page 474 :- "THERE can therefore be no doubt that the viva voce test performs a very useful function in assessing personnel characteristics and traits and in fact, tests the man himself and is therefore, regarded as an important tool Along with the written examination. Now if both written examination and viva voce test are accepted as essential features of proper selection in a give case, the question may arise as to the weight to be attached respectively to them. In the case of admission to a college for instance', as observed by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Liladhar's case , 'where the candidates' personality is yet to develop and it is too early to identify the personal qualities for which greater importance may have to be attached in later life, greater weight has perforce to be given to performance in the written examination" and the importance to be attached to the viva voce test in such a case would therefore, necessarily be minimal. It was for this reason that in Ajay Hasia's case this Court took the view that the allocation of as high a percentage of marks as 33.3% to the viva voce test was beyond all reasonable proportion and rendered the selection of the candidates arbitrary'. But, as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, in the case of services to which recruitment has necessarily to be made from persons of mature personality, interview test may be the only way subject to basic and essential academic and professional requirements being satisfied'. There may also be services 'to which recruitment is made from younger candidates whose personalities are on the threshold of development and who show signs of great promise' and in case of such services where sound selection must combine academic ability with personality promise, some weight has to be given to the viva voce test. There cannot be any hard and fast rule regarding the precise weight to be given to the viva voce test as against written examination. It must vary from service to service according to the requirement of the service, the minimum qualification prescribed, the age group from which the selection is to be made, the body to which the task of holding the viva voce test is proposed to be entrusted and a host of other factors. It is essentially a matter for determination by experts."
(26) After referring to Kothari Committee's report and the allocation of marks for selection to be made for Indian Administrative service, the court held that the allocation of 33.3% in case of ex-service officers and for others 22.2% of the total marks for viva voce test, infected the selection process with the vice of arbitrariness. But, the court declined to set aside the selections made after the lapse of almost two years (vide para 28). The Court recommended allocation of 12.2% of the total marks for viva voce test.
(27) This decision also cannot help the petitioners in the instant case. The court was considering the role of viva voce test in the context of a written test also being held as part of the selection process. Further, the court had pointed that when recruitment is made from younger candidates whose personalities are on the threshold of development and who show signs of great promise and in case of such services where sound selection must combine academic abilities with personality some weight has to be given to the viva voce test. Where 'recruitment has to be made from persons of matured personality, interview test may be the only way subject to basic and essential academic and professional requirements being satisfied." Lila Dhar Vs. State of Rajasthan; was referred in this context. The Supreme Court reiterated the views expressed in Lila Dhar's case (supra).
(28) Before parting with Ashok Kumar Yadav's case , it is necessary to note that, the Supreme Court did not accept the allegations of malafides and favoritism made against the members of the Service Commission, because they were not imp leaded as parties to the writ petition; there was also no factual basis in the pleadings or the evidence. The finding given by the High Court that Selections were vitiated by bias and favoritism was reversed by the Supreme Court. This aspect of this decision has a bearing on the contentions urged in the present case before me that the selections are to be set aside on similar grounds. I find no factual foundation for such a contention in the pleadings; and members of the Selection Committee are also not imp leaded as parties to any of the writ petitions. Vague allegations are only to be mentioned to be rejected.
(29) Ashok alias Somanna Gow'da and another Vs. State of Karnataka & Others; is another decision relied upon by the petitioners. Total marks for qualifying examination were kept at 100 and 50 for interview, for selection to the post of Assistant Engineers. Since 33-1/3% of the total marks is allocated for interview, the selections were held to have been vitiated. But appointments made already were not set aside by the Supreme Court having regard to the lapse of time. But the court directed to appoint the petitioners also to the post.
(30) No doubt this decision has some resemblance to the present case, but this decision itself has been distinguished by the Supreme Court subsequently and confined the decision, to the particular facts. However, the facts cannot be held identical. In the cases before me, apart from the marks given to the Degree, experience also has a say in the totality of marks. Further, the need to measure the personality of the candidate for the particular post did not exist in the said Ashok alias Somanna Gowda's case. D.V. Bakshi Vs. Union of India; is another decision referred by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
(31) Having regard to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Anzar Ahmad Vs. State of Bihar and others: , I do not think I should refer to other decisions. The court referred to the earlier decisions extensively. The court held at page 177, para 8 : "We may now examine the question regarding the validity of the fixation of 100 marks, i.e. 50%, for the interview. The High Court has held the same to be arbitrary and has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court. In this context it may be mentioned that the decisions of this Court with regard to the fixation of marks for interview in a selection broadly fall into two categories : i) Selection for admission to educational institutions, and ii) Selection for employment in service." At page 175, the Court confined the decision in Ashok @ Somanna Gowda's case to the particular facts of the said case. Earlier, at page 174 the court observed, after referring to a few earlier decisions : "THESE observations would indicate that the matter of weight to be attached to interview and the allocation of marks for interview vis-a-vis marks for written examination can arise when written examination as well as viva voce test are both accepted as essential features of proper selection and there also no hard and fast rule regarding the precise weight to be given to a viva voce test as against written examination, can be laid down and the said weight must vary from service to service according to the requirement of the service. The question of weight to be attached to viva voce would not arise where the selection is to be made on the basis of interview only."
(32) Thus, it is clear that greater allocation of marks for the interview is permissible, when selection is to be made on the basis of interview only. Similarly, there is a distinction between a selection of a student for admission to an educational institution, and selection for appointments, to posts under the State. Even in the case of selections for appointments, distinction is made between young recruits and matured personalities. In a case where personality of the candidate has to be measured for selection, having regard to the nature of the responsibilities and duties of the particular post, greater weightage to the viva voce test may be given, as held in Lila Dhar's case .
(33) Mr. Arun Jaitley also referred to two more decisions of the Supreme Court(i) C.P. Kalra Vs. Air India, C.A. 123/1992 decided on 8.4.1993 and (ii) Indian Airlines Vs. Capt. Shukla, .
(36) Several instances were brought to my notice where a candidate would have been selected, only if he had been given 1/2 or one more mark at the interview. These were pointed out to explain that scope for arbitrariness is inherent in allocating such a high percentage as 50% for the oral interview.
(37) That is so. But, court cannot assume that persons vested with the power to select the candidates would act arbitrarily or would be swayed by irrelevant considerations. In the absence of any evidence that members of Selection Committee were biased or were of low caliber, court shall have to proceed that marks at the interview were awarded with objectivity and not subjectivity. A marginal element of subjectivity is inevitable in any method of selection where viva voce test also is part of the selection process.
(38) Similarly it cannot be always said that a candidate found academically brilliant would be a practical man capable of discharging the functions of an Assistant Engineer, where the office holder requires the qualities of drive, initiative and pleasantness in dealing with members of the public and his colleagues. RE: Question N0.3 : (2 years' experience) :
(39) According to the petitioners, eligibility requirement of a candidate is 2 years experience as a graduate; and the experience gained by a candidate prior to his getting a degree in engineering, however, long it may be, cannot be considered. The relevant column in the rule, prescribing the eligibility says the candidate should possess (i) a degree in engineering; (ii) 2 years professional experience. There is no dispute that reference to the experience, is an experience gained in the relevant job; diploma holders working as Junior Engineers also gain the relevant experience. But the petitioners contend that such an experience is outside the scope of consideration. Petitioners rely on a few decisions of the Supreme Court and that of this Court. Further, an affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation in another writ petition and a letter from the Union Public Service Commission are also relied upon.
(40) In the counter affidavit filed in C.W.P. No. 606/1985 (Annexure 7 in C.W.P. 1666/1990), it was stated on behalf of the Municipal Corporation : "IT is however, submitted that the professional experience of two years should be after having obtained the degree in Civil Engineering. Admittedly, the petitioner has acquired degree in Civil Engineering in July, 1984 and thereby he is not eligible for the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) because he does not possess the professional experience after qualifying for degree in Civil Engineering has a nexus relation because after training higher qualification the professional experience gained thereafter is more valuable than the professional experience gained under lesser educational qualification and as such he is not eligible for the said posts even today." In the said case, a letter No.7.3/24(8) 66-RR dated 05.07.1969 from the Union Public Service Commission, addressed to the Municipal Corporation was relied upon. In this letter it was pointed out that the two years professional experience was to be after graduation (or equivalent qualification). This is explained by the 1st respondent in its reply affidavit filed in response to the show cause notice issued in C.W.P. 2285/1990. It is stated : So far as the question as to whether the experience of two years should be posterior to the academic qualifications or not is concerned, the same was being agitated by a large number of employees and the matter was referred to Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) and the Upsc vide their letter No. F.II/35/84/AU.IV dated 13th September, 1985, copy of which is Annexure-RI, informed the Municipal Corporation of Delhi that "the entire service rendered by an officer in the feeder grade shall be taken into account for purpose of counting qualifying service prescribed in the recruitment regulations for promotion. In other words, entire service rendered by an officer possessing .a Diploma but who had subsequently acquired a Degree will be counted for promotion." The affidavit in writ Petition No-696/85 entitled 'Baljit Singh Vs. Mcd etc.' was filed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi on 11.5.1985, prior to the receipt of clarification from Upsc, as mentioned herein above. At that time, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was insisting that the experience prescribed in the Recruitment Regulations should be posterior to the acquiring of the degree and on representation of the employees, the matter was referred to the Upsc and on their advice, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi changed the criteria. Since the circumstances and the policy changed after receipt of the letter from Upsc, the persons who had qualified in terms of the clarifications of Upsc were also called for interview and were considered."
(41) The letter of the Union Public Service Commission dated 13.9.1985 referred in the affidavit is actually found in the file of C.W.P. 3778/1991 (at page 88), Along with the reply, affidavit of the 1st respondent filed therein. It reads: "I am directed to refer to your letter No-16969/CES (A)/UDC(T)/85 dated 4.9.85 on the above subject and to say that as already clarified in this office letter of even number dated 19.8.85, the entire service rendered by an officer in the feeder grade shall be taken into account for purpose of counting qualifying service prescribed in the recruitment regulations for promotion. In other words, entire service rendered by an officer possessing a Diploma but who had subsequently acquired a degree will be counted for promotion. In the particular case cited by you, the officer was a Diploma holder at the time of regular appointment in 1971, acquired a Degree in 1974. As per the recruitment regulations, promotion to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) in Mcd has to be made from Assistant Engineers graduate with 5 years service in the grade and the Diploma holder with 10 years service in the grade. Since the officer has acquired a Degree in the year 1974 he will be eligible for promotion in the year 1976, when he has rendered 5 years' regular service in the grade and also is in possession of a degree."
(42) Petitioners contend that the stand taken by the 1st respondent in the earlier C.W.P. 696/1985 and the letter of the Upsc relied upon at.that time, were with reference to the post of Assistant Engineer, while the letter of the Upsc dated 13.9.1985 is with reference to the post of Executive Engineer, and that there is a substantial difference between the language used as to the eligibility regarding these two posts. This contention of the petitioners cannot be brushed aside, as irrelevant. But the real answer to the question to be based on the clear language used in the relevant Recruitment Rules.The Rules nowhere say that for direct recruitment to the post of Assistant Engineer experience of 2 years is with engineering degree.
(43) In N. Suresh Nathan & another Vs. Union of India &Others ; . the relevant eligibility requirement was as follows :- "1. Section Officers possessing a recognised Degree in Civil Engineering or equivalent with three years' service in the grade failing which Section Officers holding Diploma in Civil Engineering with six years' service in the grade - 50%. 2. Section Officers possessing a recognised Diploma in Civil Engineering with six years' service in the grade - 50%." The designation of Section Officers was the same as 'Junior Engineers'. The dispute was whether a Diploma holder Junior Engineer who obtained a degree while in service became eligible for appointment as Assistant Engineer by promotion on completion of 3 years service including therein the period of service prior to obtaining the degree or the 3 years' service as a degree holder was to be reckoned from the date he obtained the degree. The Supreme Court held : "THERE is sufficient material including the admission of respondents Diploma holders that the practice followed in the Department for a long time was that in the case of Diploma Holder Junior Engineers who obtained the degree during service, the period of three years service in the grade for eligibility for promotion as Degree holders commenced from the date of obtaining the Degree and the earlier period of service as Diploma holders was not counted for this purpose. This earlier practice was clearly admitted by the respondents Diploma holders in para 5 of their application made to the Tribunal at page 115 of the paper book. This also appears to be the view of the Union Public Service Commission contained in their letter dated December 6, 1968 extracted at pages 99-100 of the paper book in the counter affidavit of respondents I to 3. The real question, therefore, is whether the construction made of this provision in the .rules on which the past practice extending over a long period is based is untenable to require upsetting it. If the past practice is based on one of the possible constructions which can be made of the rules then upsetting the same now would not be appropriate. It is in this perspective that the question raised has to be determined."
Thereafter the court noticed the two categories referred in the eligibility rule - (i) those possessing degrees; and (ii) those possessing Diploma. From each category 50% of the posts was to be filled up. There was also a rule wherein a degree was equated with Diploma with 3 years' professional experience. Therefore the court held that - "THE entire scheme, therefore, does indicate that the period of three years' service in the grade required for Degree holders according to Rule Ii as the qualification for promotion in that category must mean three years' service in the grade as a Degree holder and, therefore, that period of three years can commence only from the date of obtaining the Degree and not earlier. The service in the grade as a Diploma holder prior to obtaining the degree cannot be counted as service in the grade with a Degree for the purpose of three years service as a Degree holder."
(44) The petitioners contend that this decision is an authority in support of their preposition advanced in the instant case. To the same effect is a decision of this court in Slum Wing, Dda, Graduate Engineers Association Vs. Dda and others; . The respondents rely on the very language of the Regulations and the implicit indication in the Regulation to the effect that wherever experience was 'with' the degree, same was clearly stated. In the relevant rule involved in Suresh Nathan's case the rule said "Degree.....with 3 years" service, unlike the relevant rule involved in the present cases.
(46) To me, respondents seem to be right. The rule in question is quite clear. It requires the candidates to have two qualifications, each independent of the other. Nowhere the requisite experience is stated as the one acquired after the degree. The experience referred in the eligibility rule has no connection to the degree referred in the first part. The experience is not the experience with the degree. The object behind the rule is to enable those having the job experience of 2 years to apply for the employment, provided the candidate also has a degree.
(47) Most of the appointees had the experience of 10 to 15 years, though they were Diploma Holders earlier. The decision of the Supreme Court in M.B. Joshi & Others Vs. Satish Kumar Pandey and others; supports the contention of the respondents. In this the rule is found printed in Hindi, but its purport was translated to me as saying "12 years for Diploma Holders and 8 years for Sub-engineers who obtained degree while in service." One of the contentions urged was - "it was argued that the period of 8 years can only be counted from the date when diploma holder Sub-Engineer acquired the degree of Engineering and not prior to said date" (vide para 6 of the report). Suresh Nathan's case was relied upon for this proposition. However, the Supreme Court did not accept the contention; while doing so, Suresh Nathan's case was distinguished. After referring to the practice that governed the facts of Suresh Nathan's case, the court proceeded tq observe at page 271 - "THE rule in that case prescribed for appointment by promotion of Section Officers/Junior Engineers provided that 50 per cent quota shall be from Section Officers/Junior Engineers provided that 50 per cent quota shall be from Section Officers possessing a recognised degree in Civil Engineering or equivalent with three years service in the grade failing which Section Officers holding Diploma in Civil Engineering with six years' service in the grade. The aforesaid rule itself provided in explicit terms that Section Officers possessing a recognised Degree in Civil Engineering was made equivalent with three years' service in the grade. Thus, in the scheme of such rules the period of three years' service was rightly counted from the date of obtaining such degree. In the cases in hand before us, the scheme of the rules is entirely different."
t and then at page 272 : "THE Rules in our case do not contemplate any equivalent of any period of service with the qualification of acquiring degree of graduation in engineering as was provided in express terms of N. Suresh Nathan's case (AIR 2993 Sc 564) making three years service in the grade equivalent to degree in engineering. In our opinion, in the Rules applicable in the cases before us clearly provide that the diploma holders having obtained a degree of engineering while continuing in service as Sub- Engineers shall be eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer in 8 years of service and quota of 10 per cent posts has been earmarked for such category of persons."
(48) The court also referred to the practice adopted in those cases as a relevant factor to interpret the eligibility rule.
(49) The petitioners rely on the alleged practice by referring to the affidavit filed by the respondent in an earlier writ petition. But said affidavit was based on a letter written by the Union Public Service Commission, which was subsequently ignored, by another letter written in September, 1985. Actually, there is no particular 'practice' proved in the instant case. Concept of 'practice' involves, following a particular procedure or mode of selection on more than one occasion. An isolated instance, if any, cannot be equated to 'practice'. 'Practice' should reflect an established method.
(50) It is also necessary to note here, that out of the 60 selected candidates, 40 candidates were already working as Junior engineers for considerable period in the 1st respondent Corporation itself and (lie experience gained by them in the employment of the 1st respondent cannot just be ignored by restricting the scope of the eligibility rules.
(51) The respondents also relied on another decision in S.A. Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. Karnataka Public Service Commission and another; 198(3) Slr 565, wherein a learned Judge of Karnataka High Court held that experience of 5 years referred in the eligibility rule need not be after obtaining the degree in Engineering.
(52) In Ashok Kumar Sharma and another Vs. Chander Shekhar and another; 1992(3) Scale 528, the court held that it was sufficient if the requisite eligibility of the degree had been acquired by the date of interview conducted to make the selection. Re : Eligibility Date ETC. :
(53) The date on which the qualifications should -have been acquired has to be considered as an alternative question. The decision of the Supreme Court in Union Public Service Commission, U.P. Allahabad and another Vs. Alpana; (1994) I Scc 723, clearly indicates that in the absence of a specific statement, either in the Rules or in the advertisement inviting the applications, as to the date when eligibility ought to be acquired by a candidate, the candidate should have the eligibility by the last date fixed for the submitting the application; any other approach would lead to several anamolies. The Supreme Court held, at page 728 - "MANY candidates superior to the respondent in merit may not have applied as the result of the examination was not declared before the last date for receipt of applications. If once such an approach is recognised there would be several applications received from such candidates not eligible to apply and that would not only increase avoidable work of the selecting authorities but would also increase the pressure on such authorities to withhold interviews till the results are declared, thereby causing avoidable administrative difficulties. This would also leave vacancies unfilled for long spells of time. We, therefore, find it difficult to uphold the view of the High Court impugned in this appeal."
(54) In the instant case, the circular dated 30.6.1989, issued to the departmental employees clearly stated - 'The departmental candidates fulfillling the under mentioned qualification may also apply :- "Qualification Essential ; (i) Degree in Civil Engineering of a recognised University or equivalent. (ii) 2 years professional experience." The applications had to be received in the office by 17th July, 1989.
(55) Therefore, by 17th July 1989, the candidate should have the requisite qualifications viz.: (i) the degree and (ii) 2 years professional experience. The circular nowhere provided for the degree or experience to be acquired subsequently.
(56) The candidates who have not graduated in engineering (or holding equivalent qualification) as on 17.7.1989 or who had not completed 2 years of professional experience on the said date were not eligible not only to be selected, but also to apply. The fulfilllment of the said qualification alone would confer eligibility to apply. It was not brought to my notice that any of the selectee obtained the degree or completed two years professional experience, after 17.7.1989. The petitioner's entire argument was that the professional experience of 2 years has to be after the degree, which, I do not accept.
(57) Assuming that a few of the selectees gained the requisite experience or obtained the degree only by the time the interview was held in March, 1990 and not by the last date fixed for applying, should this court set aside the entire selection process and nullify the appointments?
(58) Mr. Ravinder Bhat, one of the counsel for the petitioners relied on a few decisions to contend that the requisite qualification should have been there in the candidate before the last date for applying for the post. M.M.C.Fernandes, Section Superintendent, Mormugao Port Trust Vs. The Mormugao Port Trust and others; 1985(2) Slj 439 is a decision of Bombay High Court. There, the question was slightly different. The power to relax the age restriction of a candidate was exercised by the Government not at the time of inviting the applications, but at the time of making the appointments.
(59) In Dr. Prit Singh Vs. S.K. Mangal ; 1993 Suppl. (1) Scc 714, the appointee was not qualified even on the date of the appointment. In S. Ganpathy and others Vs. Air India and another; the candidate was not qualified on the date of the application and therefore his appointment was set aside.
(60) Similar was the situation in U.P. Public Service Commission, U.P. Allahabad & another Vs. Alpana; . The advertisement inviting the applications clearly stated that the applicant should possess the degree on the last date fixed for receipt of applications and that an attested copy of the degree examination certificate and mark sheet thereof also had to be produced with the application.
(61) In Dr. Umakant Saran Vs. State of Bihar and others; , actually, "on the date the government decided to till the posts, the petitioner 'had not even completed the minimum period of teaching experience........", though by the time the appointments were made, he had the experience. The Court held that, experience was irrelevant because the relevant date is the date when decision to fill the post was taken (62) However, in Ashok Kumar Sharma Vs. Chander Shekhar: 1992(3) Scale 528 = 1993 Supp. (2) Scc 611, the eligibility acquired by the time of interview was accepted by the Court as sufficient. This was distinguished in U.P. Public Service Commission case on the ground that the court extended the principle of (another) Rule 37 by analogy which permitted such a situation and that one of the Judges agreed with the majority only on equitable considerations.
(63) Having regard to the trend of the decisions of the Supreme Court not to upset the appointments made already when appointees were work ing for two years or more, I consider it equitable and in the larger interest of public not to venture into upsetting these appointments even assuming that the requisite eligibility was acquired subsequent to the date fixed for submitting the applications, (though on facts I have not found such ineligibility).
(64) In Ashok Kumar Yadav Vs. State of Haryana; , even though the marks allocated (or viva voce test were held to be high rendering the selection process arbitrary, the court held that court's discretion would not be exercised to set aside the selections made after the lapse of almost two years (vide para 28). However, eligible candidates not selected, were given one more opportunity to appear in the ensuing competitive examination, irrespective of their age.
(65) In Mohinder Sain Garg Vs. State of Punjab etc.; . appointments made already were not quashed, but the petitioners were granted the relief.
(66) In Rekha Chaturvedi Vs. University of Rajasthan; 1993 Supp. (3) Scc 168. inspite of the illegality found in the appointments they were not quashed as there was a lapse of 8 years. Here the appointees became eligible only by the time the appointments were made and not on the last date fixed for filing the application. The court, actually held at page 175 (para 10): "THE contention that the required qualifications of the candidates should be examined VVIth reference to the date of selection and not with reference to the last dale turn making applications has only to be stated to be rejected. The date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for the posts would be unable to state whether they are qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet to acquire the qualifications. Unless the advertisement mentions a fixed date with reference to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection or otherwise, it would not be possible for the candidates who do not possess the requisite qualifications in praesenti even to make applications for the posts. The uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary consequence, viz., even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts thus swelling the number of applications. But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject others, arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/ notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should judged, the only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications should be judged, the only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that when the Selection Committee in the present case, as argued by Shri Mahon Swarup, took into consideration the requisite qualifications as on the date of selection rather than on the last date of preferring applications, it acted with patent illegality, and on this ground itself the selections in question are liable to be quashed."
(67) In Ram Sarup Vs. State of Haryana and others: , it was held that appointments made were not wholly void, but were irregular and therefore, not to be set aside. It was a case of gaining certain experience, which the promotees gained after the promotions. Question N0.4; RE: EVALUATION.
(68) For marks obtained at the degree or its equivalent examination, the Selection Committee had to award the following marks, as per the norms decided earlier. The maximum allocable mark was 10 and the slabs were : 8 9 10 Those who procured 51% to 60% - 6 -do- 61% to 70% - 7 -do- 71% to 80% -do- 81% to 90% -do- 91% to 100% (69) For the professional experience, since 2 years was the minimum to have eligibility, no mark was to be awarded; over and above this, for each completed year of experience 1/2 a mark was to be awarded, subject to a maximum of 5. Thus the maximum of 5 was to be awarded to those who had a total of 12 years or more of professional experience.
(70) It was pointed out that in case of Surender Negi, petitioner No.1 in C.W.P. 4488/1993, there was an error in awarding only one mark for his experience instead of 3, thus he was denied 2 marks due to him. If this had been given, his total marks would be 17-1/2 resulting in his selection. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent admitted this error. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the said petitioner No.1 in C.W.P. 4488/1993 should have been appointed. A direction to appoint him with effect from the date other selectees were appointed, is therefore, issued. He shall be given his due seniority also.
(71) Several instances where proper marks were not awarded for 'degree' or experience, were pointed out. But in none of those cases, awarding of the 'proper marks' would have made any difference in the selections. In one case (SI.No. 192 in the chart given), the total marks would have been 16 which would not result in his selection; further, he is not a petitioner atall. In another case at SI. No.22 (Anil Tyagi), selected candidate was given a total of 20-1/2 marks. He was given only l/2a mark for experience of 2 years 7 months; actually marks should have been 'nil'. Even then, his total will be 20 and he had to be selected; the resultant position is the same. There is an instance of selected candidate getting 16-1/2 where an extra 1/2 was given wrongly for experience; this would reduce the total to 16; thus even if he would not have been selected, having regard to the lapse of time, I would not consider it proper to set aside his appointment; however, if any candidate missed the appointment by such a patent mistake (by denial of proper marks for experience), such a candidate can be directed to be appointed, as in the case of Surender Negi. Actually, all those who procured 16 marks and above were selected in the general category. 44 Candidates, most of whom procured 15-1/2 and a very few 15, were kept in the 'reserved list'. But, amongst the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, those who secured 12 to 14 marks were selected.
(72) The learned counsel for the petitioner questioned the propriety of awarding the marks in lump for viva voce test without bifurcating the marks for the several traits of personality. I do not think it is possible for this court to go into the said question and lay down how the personality test should be sub-divided into various aspects of one's personality (Vide Liladhar's case, ). It is for the Selection Committee or those who constitute the Committee to prescribe the manner of evaluation at the viva voce test. If no particular mode is prescribed, it necessarily has to be left to the good sense of the members of the Selection Committee.
(73) Mr. Gupta relied strongly on the observations of the Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Dtc Mazdoor Congress and others; 1991 Supp (1) Scc 600 l paras 230 & 231) : "There is need to minimise the scope of the arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however, high-placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the previous rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that individuals are not and not become wise because they occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the posts, however, high they may be. There is only a complacent presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a society pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law. The employment under the public undertakings is a public employment and a public property. It is not only the undertakings but also the. society which has a stake in their proper and efficient working. Both discipline and devotion are necessary for efficiency. To ensure both, the service conditions of those who work for them must be encouraging, certain and secured, and not vague and whimsical.' With capricious service conditions, both discipline and devotion are endangered, and efficiency is impaired..' (74) In E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu; -, the court held after referring to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution: "THEY require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 arid 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same 'vice: in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16."
(75) Need to regulate the exercise of the power is always there. Bat I do not think it is possible to regulate minutest details of exercising any kind of power. It may be a good idea to reduce the percentage of allocable marks at the interview; but . even here under certain situations, viva voce test has been found to be necessary. In fact, it can be said that .some Universities are liberal in awarding marks and therefore, giving equal weightage to the marks obtained at the University examination would result in inequality; to reduce this kind of anamoly, candidates may be tested at the interview, through viva voce. Sometimes, treating different candidates equally on the basis of a particular range may also Serve this purpose.
(76) I am inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that 50% of the total marks, allocated for viva voce, has enabled the Selection Committee to tilt the fate of a few candidates. But on that ground alone, the entire, selection process cannot be set aside. The 1st respondent may have to reformulate its policy in future and reduce the weightage to be given to the viva voce test to select suitable candidates.
(77) It was contended that allocating same marks to candidates falling within a particular range for qualifications, was arbitrary. For example, a candidate who had 61% in the degree is allotted 7 marks like a person who had obtained 69%; it was contended that further sub-divisions should have been made to award suitable marks for the qualifications. This argument, in my view, is stretching the rule of equality to absurd limits. Law cannot function effectively as a practical rule, if such a microscopic distinction also should be adhered to. Question N0.5: RE: BIAS:
(78) I have already referred to the respective pleadings. It is not possible to accept the vague allegations of the petitioners in this regard. Selection Committee members are not imp leaded to any of the writ petitions. The 1st respondent has pointed out that a very few number of the selectees are related to some minor officials of the 1st respondent only, which by itself cannot indicate that that selections were biased. Question 6: RELIEF:
(79) The writ petitions have to be dismissed as a result of the above discussion, except in the case of petitioner No.1 in C.W.P. 4488/1993 (Surender Negi); The 1st respondent is directed to issue appointment letter to the said petitioner to be effective from the date of appointing other selectees and grant him the appropriate seniority and other consequential benefits.
(80) I find that a considerable number of inservice (departmental) candidates are disappointed by the impugned selections; 'heart burning' caused by this disappointment may affect their functioning. It is for the 1st respondent to consider the advisability of altering the quota prescribed for promotions and direct recruitment; instead of 50:50, probably, the proportion may be altered to 2:1 (promotionl quota may be increased to 2/3 of the cadre strength of Assistant Engineers); provided the nature of the post of Assistant Engineer, could be properly met by this alteration.
(81) Accordingly, C.W.P. 4488 of 1993 of Saminder Nagi is allowed; all other writ petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.