Bombay High Court
Maharashtra State Financial ... vs Jaycee Drugs And Pharmaceuticals Pvt. ... on 10 July, 1990
Author: S.P. Bharucha
Bench: S.P. Bharucha
JUDGMENT C. Mookerjee, C.J.
1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated February 10, 1987, passed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Suresh dismissing its Miscellaneous Petition No. 29 of 1986 filed under Sections 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act (Act 63 of 1951), the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation has preferred this appeal.
2. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., respondent No. 1, had executed an indenture of mortgage dated June 29, 1979, in favour of the appellant, the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation, and respect of certain immovable property, machinery and plant, etc., described in the schedule to the said indenture and also goodwill and uncalled capital of the mortgagor-company to secure repayment of loan of Rs. 30,00,000 to the Corporation and interest thereon. On June 29, 1979, the second, third and fourth respondents executed another indenture in favour of the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation, the appellant, covenanting, agreeing and declaring, inter alia, that if, at any time, default shall be made by the first respondent herein in making payment of the principal sum or the interest thereon under the aforesaid deed of mortgage, as guarantors, they would pay to the Corporation on demand the said monies. Under the said indenture, the second, third, and fourth respondents agreed that the guarantee, shall be enforceable notwithstanding that the security specified in the mortgage still remains outstanding and unrealised. The said guarantee/surety was in nature of a personal bond and the guarantors did not furnish any property by way of security for performance of their obligation towards the appellant Corporation.
3. On December 24, 1985, the appellants, Maharashtra State Financial Corporation, in the instant Miscellaneous Petition No. 29 of 1986 under sections 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as "the Act" praying that Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., the principal debtor and also the second, third and fourth respondents who were sureties be jointly and severally ordered and decreed to pay to the petitioners the sum of Rs. 15,87,391.20 as per the particulars given and interest at the rate of 14.5% per annum and also cost the petition. The case of the petitioner-Corporation was that, under the mortgage deed executed by the principal debtor, a sum of Rs. 15,87,391.20 was due towards the principal and interest. The further case of the Corporation was that, as provided under the Act, they had taken possession of the assets of respondent No. 1 company some time in September 184. Thereafter, they had advertised for sale on three or four occasions. The best offer they could get was Rs. 5,00,000 for the land. According to the appellant Corporation, respondents nos. 2, 3 and 4 having guaranteed repayment of the said amount due, they were also bound and liable for the said sum payable to the petitioner- Corporation.
4. In their affidavit-in-reply, respondents Nos. 2 to 4 had raised various contentions but only two of them were principally urged before the learned singe judge who heard the miscellaneous petition. The first submission was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under section 31 read with section 32 of the Act. The second submission on behalf of the respondents was that to relief by way of decree for payment of money can be obtained in a proceeding under section 31 against respondents Nos. 2 to 4 who had furnished a personal bond standing as sureties.
5. The attention of the learned single judge was drawn to a judgment given by a learned single judge of this court in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Hindtex Engineers Pvt. Ltd. [1987] Mah LJ 243, inter alia, holding that the High Court alone and not the Bombay City Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition under section 31 against an industrial concern carrying on business in the Presidency town of Bombay. The learned single judge himself, therefore, did not decide the question of jurisdiction but proceeded on the assumption that he had jurisdiction to entertain the miscellaneous petition under section 31 of the Act. The learned single judge, however, upheld the contention of the respondents that the sureties having given only a personal assurance to the petitioners, the corporation's claim against the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 could be enforced only in the ordinary court and not under the special machinery provided under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951.
6. Before the amendments were affected by the state Financial Corporations (Amendment) Act, 1985, the State Financial Corporations could apply under section 31(1) to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carried on the whole or a substantial part of his business for the following reliefs :
(a) for an order for the sale of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance ;
(b) for transfering the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation ;
(c) for an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transfering or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the court.
7. Section 19 of the State Financial Corporations (Amendment Act), 1985, has added in section 31(1), the following clause (aa) :
"(aa) for enforcing the liability of any surety."
8. Section 32 of the Act prescribes the procedure in respect of the applications under section 31 of the Act. The aforesaid Amendment Act of 1985 has also made several amendments in section 32 of the principal Act.
9. In the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. LTd. [1979] 49 Comp Cas 187 (SC), while adjudicating on the question of court fees to be paid upon an application under section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, the Supreme Court had considered at length the nature of the proceedings under sections 31 and 32 of the said Act (as the said provisions stood before enactment of the State Financial Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1985). Delivering the judgment of the court, D. A. Desai J., in paragraph 9 of his judgment, had observed that section 31(1) prescribed a special procedure for enforcement of claims by the Financial Corporations. The said proceedings were not in the nature of money recovery proceedings. Therefore, article 1 of the Schedule I to the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1978, which prescribed ad valorem fees was not attracted. The learned judge also held that, under sub-section (6) of section 32, it might be necessary to specify the figure for the purpose of determining how much of the security should be sold. But the investigation of the claim did not involve all the contentions that could be raised in a suit. According to the Supreme Court, the provisions contained in sub- section (6) of section 32 did not expand the contest in an applications under section 31(1) so as to render the application to be a suit between the mortgagor and the creditor for the sale of mortgaged property. In the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. [1979] 49 Comp Cas 187, Supreme Court described the substantive reliefs obtainable in an application under section 31(1) as "something akin at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree". The same could not be styled as substantive relief for repayment of mortgage money by sale mortgaged property. Nor could it be said to be a proceeding to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss. The form of the application, the limited enquiry contemplated by sub-section (6) of section 32 and nature of relief that can be granted and the manner of execution clearly showed that the application under section 31(1) was neither a plaint as contemplated by article 7 of Schedule I to the Bombay Court Fees Act. The Supreme Court held that an application under Section 31 was covered by the residuary article 1(c) of Schedule II to the Court Fees and it should bear a fixed court fee.
10. In their two later decisions, viz., Everest Industrial Corporation P. Ltd., v. Gujarat State Financial Corporation [1987] 62 Comp Cas 513 (SC), and Maganlal v. Jaiswal Industries, , the Supreme Court had referred with the approval to the observations made in their earlier decision in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. [1979] 49 Comp Cas 187 (SC) about the nature of the proceedings under section 31(1) read with section 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. In the case of Maganlal v. Jaiswal Industries, , in paragraph 18 of their judgment, the Supreme Court had observed (at page 2120) :
"In view of these two decisions, the law seems to be settled that an application under section 31(1) of the Act cannot be put on par to a suit for enforcement of a mortgage nor the order passed thereon under section 32 of the Act be put on par as if it was on order in a suit between a mortgage and the mortgager for sale of mortgaged property. On the other hand, the substantive relief in an application under section 31(1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree."
11. Mr. Andhyarujina, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has submitted that after insertion of clause (aa) in section 31(1) and consequential amendments made in different sub- sections of section 32 of the Act, by presenting an application under section 31(1) of the Act, the Financial Corporation may now apply also for enforcement of its dues against the surety irrespective of the fact whether the surety had furnished some property as security or had personally undertaken to repay the sum borrowed by the principal debtor. According to Mr. Andhyarujina, when the statue as amended by the Amendment Act of 1985 did not contain any word restricting the nature of liability of the surety in the absence of any ambiguity in clause (aa),it was not permissible to import words and to make a distinction between one class of surety and another class. Reliance has been placed upon several reported decisions which affirmed the canon of interpretation that once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end, vide Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, . See also S. A. Venkatraman v, State, , etc.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant Corporation has relied upon the dictionary meaning of expression "enforce" and "enforcement".
13. One of the meanings of the word "enforce" given is to compel observance of. "Enforcement" also means, the forcible exaction of a payment, an action, etc. On behalf of the appellant, it has been submitted that the court under section 31 can compel performance of all obligations of a surety.
14. Learned advocate on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the meaning of the expression "enforcing the liability of the surety" ought to be read in the context of the provisions of sections 25(2), 31 and 32 of the Act.
15. The expression "for enforcing the liability of any surety" is not unambiguous. The meaning of the said expression is in fact not clear and explicit on fact of it as suggested by learned counsel for the appellants. The "enforcement" of the liability as surety may contemplate various situations. It may be a case of a surety who has furnished some property as security to back his agreement to guarantee the obligations of the principal debtor. In another case, the might have also furnished only a personal bond. In a third case, the surety may have agreed to personally indemnify the creditor and in addition may have furnished some property by way of security. The adjudication of the liability of the surety and the manner of enforcement of the creditor's claim as against him would certainly depend upon the nature of the proceeding in which these questions are to be dealt with. Therefore, we ought to examine the context in which the words "enforcing the liability of" have been used.
16. We have already referred to the reported decisions of the Supreme Court which have already repeatedly emphasised the limited scope of the proceedings under section 31 read with section 32 of the Act. We are unable to hold that the amendments made in sections 31 and 32 by the Amendment Act of 1985 have expanded the scope of the proceedings under section 31 read with section 32 of the Act. The said amendments have not resulted in converting the said proceeding in which reliefs are prayed under section 31(1)(aa) into fullfledged money suits for enforcing pecuniary claims of the Corporation as against sureties. It is not disputed that, even after the said amendment, the corporation, under section 31 read with section 32, cannot be obtain any relief personally against the principal debtor and the remedies under these provisions are still against the properties mortgaged be sale or by way of taking over management or by obtaining a temporary injunction. It is, therefore, not possible to contemplate that, by effecting amendments in sections 31 and 32, Parliament intended to enlarge the scope of enquiry as against only the surety Examination of the amended provisions 31 and 32 would clearly establish that the said proceedings still remain limited ones for giving only the four specified reliefs. The Corporation is at liberty to pursue its claims for other reliefs in a fullfledged civil suit.
17. Before us, learned counsel both for the appellant-Corporation and for the respondent sureties have made submissions about the scope of section 29 and as to whether section 29 and section 31 are independent of each other and separate provisions for obtaining different kinds of reliefs by the Financial Corporation. For deciding this case, it is unnecessary for us to decide this point. We may only observe that, in case of default by an industrial concern which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation, the Financial Corporation has been given a right to take over the management or possession of both the industrial concern as well as to exercise its right to transfer by lease or sell and realise the property pledged or mortgaged to the Financial Corporation. Section 29 does not necessarily require filing of an application under section 31 before the District Judge. Sub-section (1) of section 31, by using the expression "without prejudice to section 29 of the Act and section 69 of the Transfer Property Act, 1882", has indicated that the provisions of section 31 for enforcement of the claims by the Financial Corporation are not in derogation of the rights of the Corporation either under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Actor under section 69 of the Transfer Property Act.
18. We proceed to examine the different sub-sections of section 32. In case the Corporation prays for reliefs mentioned clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 31(1), it is obligatory for the District Judge to pass ad interim orders, vide sub- sections (1) and (2) of section 32. In case an application is made for obtaining relief under clause (aa) of section 31, the District Judge cannot pass any ad interim order, but is required to issue under section 32(1A) a notice calling upon the surety to show cause why his liability should not be enforced. Sub-section (3) of section 32 has given discretion to the District Judge to examine the offer of the corporation making the application before passing any order under sub-sections (1), (1A) or (2) of section 32.
19. The Amendment Act of 1985 has deleted the original sub-section (4) and has inserted new subsections (4) and (4A).
20. The amended sub-section (4) of section 32 provides for the service of a show-cause notice upon the debtor-industrial concern and also upon the owner of the security after an interim order of attachment is effected under sub-section (1) of section 32. Before us, some submissions have been made about the meaning of the expression "owner of the security" appearing in the amended sub-section (4) of section 32.
21. The learned single judge, in his judgment has, also referred to the said provisions. It is possible to contemplate that owner of a security would be someone other than the industrial concern which has defaulted in repayment of any loan or advance, etc., taken by it from the Corporation. But, the said expression "owner of the security" does not necessarily mean only the surety for the loan for advances taken by an industrial concern. In case, the principal debtor-industrial concern is not the owner but only a licensee or a lessee of the property which is pledged, mortgaged, etc., in favour of the Financial Corporation, a notice to the owner of the surety is terms of sub-section (4) of section 32 has been provided for. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Munalal Gupta v. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation, , while considering the scope of section 31(1)(a) and other related provisions of the State Financial Corporation Act (before the same were amended by the Amendment Act of 1985) had overruled a Division Bench decision of the same High Court in Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation v. Deekey Industries P. Ltd. [1971] All LJ 756 and had come to the conclusion that the property of a surety who is not a partner or otherwise interested in the industrial concern could not be proceeded against under section 31. A District Judge, under section 31 and 32 (as the said provisions stood then), could not order attachment and sale of the property of the surety. Surety could be proceeded against only under the general law.
22. Mr. Andhyarujina, appearing on behalf of the appellant- Corporation, has submitted that, in view of the above difficulties in the way of the Corporation proceeding under section 31 against sureties, changes were made in sections 31 and 32 by the Amendment Act of 1985. In our view, even assuming that Mr. Andhyarujina is right in his submission, still the question would remain as to what extent, if any, the scope of the proceedings under section 31 read with section 32 had been enlarged by the said Amendment Act. Even if the Corporation is not entitled to obtain relief also against any property which might have been given as security by the surety, the further question would remain as to whether the Corporation is entitled under section 31(1)(aa) to obtain any relief personally against such a surety. We may also point out that in case the Corporation applies for relief under section 31(1)(aa), notice upon the surety is to be given under section 32(1A) and not under section 32(4) of the Act. When the surety does not show cause, the District Judge, under section 32(4A), may order enforcement of the liability of the surety. In case cause is shown, the District Judge is enjoined to investigate, under section 32(6), the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto. It is also significant that the Amendment Act has not brought about any change in the scope such as investigation under sun-section (6) of section 32 of the ACt. Therefore, the pronouncement made in Gujarat State Financial Corporation's case [1979] 49 Comp Cas 187 (SC) would continue to apply in its full force to the ambit of an investigation under sub-section (6) of section 32 of the Act. Sub-section (7) of section 32 lays down that orders which the District judge is competent to make after making investigations under sub-section (6). The only change effected by the Amendment Act in sub-sections (7) of section 32 is to insert clause (da) empowering the District Judge to direct the enforcement of the liability of the surety or to reject the claim made in this behalf.
23. The second proviso to sub-section (7) of section 32 applies when the District Judge, under sub-section (7c), release any property from attachment or rejects, under clause (da) of sub-section (7), the claim for enforcing the liability of the surety or rejects the claim to transfer the management to the Corporation under clause (e) of the said sub-section.
24. Sub-section (8) of section 32 makes applicable, as far as practicable, the provisions relating to attachment or sale of a property in execution of a decree contained in the Civil Procedure Code in carrying out an order for attachment or sale of property under section 31(1)(a) read with section 32(7)(a) or (b). Similarly, an order under section 31(1)(b) read with section 32(7)(e) is to be carried out in the manner provided in the Civil Procedure Code for possession of immovable property or delivery of immovable property in execution of a decree.
25. Even after providing by amendment for grant of relief under section 31(1)(aa) for enforcing the surety's liability, the statute has not made any separate provision for execution or carrying out the order which may be passed under clause (da) of sub-section (7) of section 32 of the Act. It could not be assumed that it was a case of casus omissus on the part of the Legislature. The court always ought to endeavour to give an interpretation which would be consistent with the provisions of the Act and would effectuate the intention of the Legislature for inserting clause (aa) in sub-section (1) of section 31 and in making consequential amendments in different sub-sections of section 32 of the Act, if it is possible to do so, without doing violence to the language in the said two sections. The liability of the surety in section 31(1)(aa) read with section 32(7)(da) can be enforced only by attachment or sale of the property furnished by the surety in the manner prescribed by sub-section (8) of section 32 of the Act. Clause (aa) of section 31(1) is available only for obtaining relief against the property furnished by the surety or security for the loan or advance, etc., to the debtor-industrial concern. Therefore, the reliefs contemplated by both clauses (a) and (aa) are by way of converting security furnished by the principal debtor and his surety into money for repaying the loan or advance made by the Corporation. The Financial Corporation no doubt can seek other reliefs including enforcement of personal liability either of the principal debtor or of his surety in a properly constituted suit in the regular court. Section 31 enables the Corporation to obtain only certain specified reliefs. The statute has not excluded the civil court's jurisdiction to entertain suits in respect of loans and advances between the Financial Corporation on the one hand and the debtor-industrial concern and its surety on the other.
26. Mr. Andhyarujina, learned counsel for the appellant Corporation, submitted that an order passed under section 31(a)(aa) read with section 32(7)(da) of the Act can be enforced under section 32G which was also was inserted by the Amendment Act of 1985. We are unable to accept this submission. Section 32G is an independent provision for recovery of any amount which is due to the Financial Corporation by an authority specified by the Government as an arrear of land revenue. The said section 32G cannot be construed as one for execution of orders passed under section 31(a)(aa) read with section 32(7)(da). Section 32G cannot be also be relied upon in order to expand the reliefs obtainable under section 32(6) of the Act. Sections 31 and 32 contain, respectively, the provisions relating to enforcement of certain specified claims of the corporation and the procedure in respect of the same including execution of the orders passed by the District Judge upon the said claims of the Corporation.
27. For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that the learned single judge has correctly held that the appellant- Corporation claim for passing a decree for recovering money against the second, third, and fourth respondents who stood sureties for principal debtor, the first respondent, but did not furnish any property as security, could not be entertained under section 31(1) read with section 32 of the Act.
28. Shri Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents, has next submitted that this court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The debtor-industrial concern carried on its business within the limits of the Presidency Town of Bombay and, therefore, the functions of the District Judge, under sections 31 and 32 of the Act, are exercisable only by a judge of the city civil court. Shri Andhyarujina, learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation, on the other hand, has contended that the city civil court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition under section 31 of the Act. In the absence of the city civil court's jurisdiction, only this High Court was competent to deal with the instant petition under section 31 of the Act. In support of his submission, Shri Andhyarujina has relied upon the decision of the learned single judge in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Hindtex Engineers Pvt. Ltd. [1987] Mah. LJ 243.
29. Sub-section (1) of section 31, inter alia, lays down that where an industrial concern make any default in repayment of any loan or advance, etc., any officer of the Financial Corporation authorised in this behalf "may apply to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of the business for one or more of the following reliefs . . . "
30. The expression "the District Judge" also appears in sub-sections (1) to (7) of section 32 of the Act. Sub-section (9) of section 32 provides for an appeal to the High Court against orders passed under sub-section (4A), sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) of section 32. Sub-section (11) of section 32 provides :
"The functions of a District Judge under this section be exercisable -
(a) in a Presidency Town, where there is a city civil court having jurisdiction, by a judge of that court and, in the absence of such court, by the High Court ; and
(b) elsewhere, also by an additional District Judge or by any judge of principal court of civil jurisdiction."
31. The State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, does not contain any definition of expression "District Judge". The said expression "District Judge" which has been thus defined in section 3(17) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, ". . . shall mean the judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction". The expression "Presidency Town" under section 3(44) of the General Clauses Act".... mean the local limits for the time being of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High court of Judicature at Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, as the case may be.
32. Sub-section (1) of section 31 plainly provides that the forum for filing petition under the said sub-section shall be according to the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge. The situs or place of the business of the industrial concern shall determine the jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain a petition of the Corporation for obtaining all or any of the reliefs mentioned in the four clauses of the said sub-sections (1). We have also already referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in the Case of Gujarat State Financial Corporations v. Natson Manufacturing Co. P. Ltd. [1979] 49 Comp Cas 187, that a proceeding under sections 31 and 32 was not in the nature of a money suit or a proceeding for recovery of money and the reliefs under section 31 are not capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or loss. Therefore, it follows that the question of pecuniary value of an application made under section 31 is irrelevant. The future question whether the value of such an applications is unknown does not at all arise.
33. The expression "city civil court having jurisdiction" in sub- section (11)(a) of section 32 is also referable to the territorial and not to the limits of pecuniary jurisdiction of the civil court in the three Presidency Towns. There is no reason to hold that section 32(11)(a) engrafts an exception to section 31(1) under which the jurisdiction of the District Judge means his territorial jurisdiction and nothing else. We hold that the word "jurisdiction" both in section 31(1) and section 32(11)(a) bears the same meaning, i.e., territorial. Therefore, where there is city civil court having jurisdiction over a Presidency Town and an industrial concern carries on whole or a substantial part of its business within Presidency Town, a judge of that court shall exercise the jurisdiction of the District Judge. Where there is no city civil court in a Presidency Town, the High Court shall exercise the functions of the District Judge under section 31 read with section 32 of the Act. While both in the Presidency Towns of Madras and Bombay, city civil courts were already in existence on the date of commencement of the State Financial Corporations Act, on the said date, no city civil court had been established in the Presidency Town of Calcutta. On September 1, 1953, the President of India had given his assent to the City Civil Court Act, 1953, passed by the West Bengal Legislature. The city civil court was brought into existence thereafter.
34. It is also pertinent to note that sections 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, confer special jurisdiction upon District Judges including judges of city civil court in the Presidency Towns to entertain the Corporations applications for granting all or any of the reliefs under clauses (a), (aa), (b) and (c) of section 31(1). The court functions under sections 31 and 32 as a court of special jurisdiction. In our view, the decision of the single judge of the Calcutta High Court in West Bengal Financial Corporation v. Gluco Series P. Ltd. , on the question of jurisdiction under section 32(11) cannot be considered to be good law for the reasons already consisted by us. Further, the learned in West Bengal Financial Corporation v. Gluco Series P. Ltd. , took in a view about the nature of the proceedings under sections 31 and 32 contrary to the law subsequently laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. [1979 49 Comp Cas 187. The question of the city civil courts jurisdiction to exercise the functions of the District Judge under sections 31 and 32 ought to be decided without reference to the scope of section 3 of the Bombay City Civil Court's Act and the clauses of the Letters Patent of this court. We overruled the decision of the learned single judge in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Hindtex Engineers Pvt. Ltd. [1897] Mah Lj 243, which had taken a contrary view on the question of the city civil court's jurisdiction. Therefore, we conclude that in the Presidency Town of Bombay, the city court and not this court can exercise the functions of the District Judge under sections 31 and 32 of the Act.
35. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to costs.
36. We reject the oral application made by Mr. Andhyarujina on behalf of the appellants for a certificate under article 133(1) read with article 134A of the constitution of India for leave to appeal to Supreme Court.