Karnataka High Court
Special Land Acquisition Officer vs Dattatraya Nagesh Wader on 19 March, 1991
Equivalent citations: ILR1991KAR1899, 1991(2)KARLJ116
JUDGMENT Rama Jois, J.
1. This Appeal presented under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Hidkal Dam Project. Hidkal, is glaring example as to how even when no application seeking reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was made and the award of the Land Acquisition Officer have become final, the claimants manage to get references on applications made after long lapse of time with the connivance of Land Acquisition Officers and how on such time barred reference applications, awards are being passed overlooking long lapse of time after which reference were received, which on the face of it disclose that the reference applications were barred by time.
2. Brief facts of the case, are these: 8 acres 3 guntas of land in Survey No. 66 of Majli village of Hukeri Taluk, was acquired pursuant to a Preliminary Notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on 3-5-1963. After the Final Notification, the Land Acquisition, Officer made an award on 8-3-1968. He awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,000-00 per acre. A reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation, was received in the Court of the Civil Judge, Chikodi, after about 14 years, on 5-4-1982. The said application was registered as L.A.C.No. 313 of 1982, in the Court of the Civil Judge, Chikodi. Before the Civil Judge's Court, an objection was filed to the Reference and one of the objections was that the reference application was time barred and an issue to that effect was also framed by the learned Civil Judge. The learned Judge negatived the objection of the appellant and proceeded to make an award, awarding a compensation at the rate of Rs. 9,000-00 per acre. Aggrieved by the said award, this appeal is presented. The third ground raised in the Appeal Memorandum was that the learned Civil Judge ought to have dismissed the reference filed by the respondent on the ground that it was barred by time.
3. This matter was taken up for hearing on 5-2-1991. On the said date, the learned Government Advocate, elaborating the ground that the application was time barred, requested us to permit to raise the following two specific additional grounds:
(1) The application for reference made by the respondent was not made on 18-4-1968 but was made some time after 1-11-1973 or round about the time when the reference was made on 5-4-1982 and consequently the reference application was barred by time.
(2) Even assuming that the reference application was made in time, the reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer on 5-4-1982 was barred by limitation.
Having regard to the glaring facts available from the records, we made the following order:
3. The learned Advocate submitted that the award of the Land Acquisition Officer against which the reference application was made, was dated 8-3-1968 and though the reference application bears the date 18-4-1968, recent investigation and search has revealed that no such reference application was made till April 1982 and it was actually made in April 1982 after nearly fourteen years and the reference came to be made by the then Land Acquisition Officer who entertained the ante dated application obviously with corrupt motive. He submitted that in a report sent by the present Land Acquisition Officer, he has stated that the reference came to be made on account of the fraud played by the respondents and the then Land Acquisition Officer, on the State.
4. In view of the serious allegations made and in view of the fact that reference came to be made after 14 years, we examined the lower court records and in particular the reference application carefully. To our dismay, we found that on the court fee stamp affixed on the application, the word 'Karnataka1 is printed. It is incontrovertible that with effect from 1-11-1956, on which date this State came into existence under the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the name of the State was "State of Mysore" and accordingly on all the court fee stamps used in this State the word "Mysore" was being printed. It is only after 17 years from 1-11-1956 by Section 6 of the Mysore State (Alteration of Name) Act 1973 (Central Act 31 of 1973), the name of the State was changed to State of Karnataka. The new name came into force with effect from 1-11-1973. Therefore, it is clear that the stamp on which the name 'Karnataka' is printed, could have come Into existence only after 1-11-1973. In view of this intrinsic evidence from the application itself, the learned Government Advocate submitted that it was clear that the application is an ante dated one. Having regard to the fact that the said application was forwarded by the then Special Land Acquisition Officer only on 5-4-1982, he submitted that it is quite likely that the application was presented some time in March or April 1982 ante dating it to 18-4-1968 so as to make it appear that it was presented in time, that is, within the time prescribed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
5. The learned counsel next submitted that even assuming that the application was made in the year 1968, according to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by Mysore Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1961, if within 90 days from the date on which the application was presented the Land Acquisition Officer failed to make a reference, the respondent had a right to make an application before the Civil Judge within a period of three years after the expiry of 90 days from the date on which the application was presented before the Special Land Acquisition Officer in view of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963, before the Civil Judge and within the aforesaid three years if no application was made before the court, neither the party had the right to make an application before the Civil Judge nor the Land Acquisition Officer had the power to make the reference.
6. In our opinion, the additional grounds urged goes to the root of the matter and moreover in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is the duty of the court to find out as to whether any proceedings has been commenced within the period of limitation or not and if found to be barred by limitation, dismiss the proceedings in limine. Therefore, in exercise of the power under Order 41, Rule 2 of the C.P.C. we consider that it is just and expedient that the appellant should be allowed to urge the two additional grounds set out in the second paragraph of this order in this appeal.
7. In view of the proviso to Order 41, Rule 2 of the CPC, we give opportunity to the respondents to have their say with reference to the aforesaid two grounds. Accordingly, the cases are adjourned by two weeks."
Thereafter, on 19-2-1991 an application for receiving additional evidence was filed. Copy of the said application was served on the learned Counsel for the respondent on 20-2-1991. The relevant portion of the application and the report annexed thereto reads:
" I, D.B. Naik son of Sri Bheemappa Naik, aged about: 38 years, Special Land Acquisition Officer, Hidkal Dam Project, Hidkal, now at Bangalore, do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as follows:
1. I am working as Special Land Acquisition Officer, Hidkal Dam Project since 16-7-1990.
2. I know the facts of the case and on the basis of the records maintained in our office I am swearing to the contents of this affidavit.
3. I submit that MFA 1098/84 is filed against the judgment and decree passed in LAC Number 313 of 1982 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge, Chokodi. The other connected appeals i.e., MFA No. 655/84 and 1080 of 1984 are preferred against the judgment and decree passed in LAC No. 302/82 and 301/82 respectively.
4. The award and decree passed in LAC No. 313/82 is based on a reference said to have been received by the court of the Civil Judge on 5-4-1982. The said reference is said to have been sent by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Hidkal Dam Project on the basis of the claim application dated 18-4-1969 said to have been filed in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer on 18-4-1968.
5. The award and decree passed in LAC No. 302 of 1982 is in respect of a reference said to have been sent by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Hidkal Dam Project on the basis of the claim application said to have been claimed by the claimant in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer on 26-10-1962. Similar is the case in respect of LAC No. 301/1982.
6. I submit that the original reference register maintained in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer does not contain an entry on 18-4-1968 for having received the claim application of the respondents in the office of the LAO. A xerox copy of the extract of the register containing the entries from St. Nos. 1-71 to 77 is produced herewith which shows that there is no entry of the claim application of the respondent said to have been received in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer on 18-4-1968, I submit that the reference has been sent to the Court by Sri F.F. Varur, the then Special Land Acquisition Officer who was working as Land Acquisition Officer during the period from 1981 to 1983.
7. I humbly submit that the original reference register pertaining to the year 1962 i.e., from 1-1-1962 to 1-3-1963 are not available in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer,
8. I submit that a number of references were sent by the said Land Acquisition Officer Sri F.F. Varur, to the Court, even though they were not received in the office of Land Acquisition Officer and entries were made in the original reference register, those cases also include the reference applications said to have been sent to the court in the above said LAC cases. After coming to know of such cases, a report bearing No. LAQ.MISC.REF.84 dated 5-5-1984 addressed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Hidkal Dam Project, was sent to the Special Deputy Commissioner, LAW & RHN G & M Projects, Belgaum, intimating that unregistered spurious references were made in about 89 applications which were sent to the Court of the Civil Judge, Chokodi. A xerox copy of the said report is enclosed herewith.
9. I humbly submit that the above documents disclose that the claimants have not made any reference applications in the office of the L.A.O. on 18-4-198 and the other claimants in other cases also have not made reference applications, said to have been received by the civil Court on 5-4-1982.
10. I submit that I may kindly be permitted to produce the said two additional documents as additional evidence in the above case which are necessary to come to a just conclusion and pronounce the judgment in the above case regarding the validity of reference made by the LAO."
XXX XXX XXX "On 19-12-1983 two sets of applications 55, 34 in number respectively under Section 18(1) of the L.A. Act were received in the court of the Principal Civil Judge, Chikodi (List enclosed) since the correspondence was not under the signature of the present incumbant SLAO the Civil Judge Chokodi under the references cited above called for the explanation of the present SLAO on the references.
On perusal of the applications and verification with the office records, it was found that both the sets of applications (89) were found to be unregistered spurious and referred fraudulently keeping the office of the SLAO in dark. All the reference forms in Form No. 19 have been signed by Sri F.F. Varur, who was the SLAO Hidkal from 22-5-1981 to 3-2-1983 which goes to say that Sri F.F. Varur sent references under Section 18(1) to the Court as benami SLAO Hidkal till after one year handing over charge of the office.
The second set of references (34 in number) were fraudulently referred to the Court by Sri B.C. Hiremath, Circle Officer and Sri B.R. Barigat, FDC keeping the office of the SLAO in dark. Sri R.C. Hiremath, C.O. has colluded in this mischief even by going to the extent of signing unauthorisedly a number of copies of the award and award statement. Further on verification of the office registers and collecting possible particulars available in Court it is found that a large number of applications under Section 18(1) of the LA. Act which seemingly appear to have been received during the years 1961, 1962, 1965, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978 have been referred by Sri F.F. Varur, SLAO Hidkal during his tenure from 22-5-81 to 3-2-1983 and benami even after till December 1983. But as per the monthly office returns submitted by the SLAO Hidkal these applications could not have been pending unattended for such a long time and since these have been sent unregistered and keeping the office of the SLAO in dark in a fraudulent way the references and the applications whose official custody for decades remains unexplained [under Section 18(1)] are suprious and concocted.
Similarly fraudulent references have been made under Section 18(3B) by Sri F.F. Varur in which there have been no order for the Court to make such references.
These large number of such fraudulent references under Section 18(1) and under Section 18(3B) made by Sri F.F. Varur have been at various stages viz.
1. Prehearing (list enclosed) (not exhaustive)
2. Under hearing (list enclosed) (not exhaustive)
3. Postjudgment (list enclosed) (not exhaustive)
4. Appeal Stage (list enclosed) (not exhaustive) Consequently the Government has been put in an embarrassing position as it has been made a scape-goat for paying undue interest for decades, in post judgment cases which is an under loss to the tune of crores. As at present the SLAO Hidkal is facing execution petition and warrant of attachments as a consequent of these fraudulent references. Unfortunately as the mischief was not brought earlier to the notice of the Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Department of Law and Parly. Affairs and Assistant Collector and Ex-Officio under Secretary to Government Department of Law and Parly. Affairs no appeal decisions have been taken by Government in a lot many cases. Hence it is requested that:
1. Clear immediate instructions regarding action to be taken in such post judgment cases (specially as to whether decretal amount is to be deposited in the Court or not) and prejudgment cases may be solicited from Government.
2. The matter may be brought to the notice of the Divisional Commissioner, Belgaum, the Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Department of Law and Parly. Affairs and Assistant Collector and ex-officio under Secretary to Government Department of Law and Parly. Affairs, Secretary to Revenue Department, Advocate General and all the concerned. And action to investigate and enquire into the matter may be taken as the matter has criminal tings and since the major records are in the custody of the Civil Courts the SLAO in the normal course of his duties cannot take any action.
It is surprising and unfortunate that most of such spurious references have been decreed earlier than the genuine ones.
The matter may kindly be treated as most urgent."
When the matter came up on 25-2-1991, the learned Counsel for the respondent again requested for one more week's time. However, we granted more time till 18-3-1991 to enable the respondent to have his say with reference to the additional grounds as also the application for receiving additional evidence made by the appellant. No objection or counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent either to the additional grounds allowed to be raised under Order 41, Rule 2 of the CPC by our Order dated 5-2-1991 or to the application filed by the appellant seeking permission to adduce additional evidence. In the circumstances and having regard to the facts already set out, we are convinced that in the interest of justice, we should allow the application made by the appellant under Order 41, Rule 2 of the C.P.C. and accordingly we receive the additional evidence.
4. Before considering the two additional grounds raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant, it is necessary for us to consider whether the appellant is entitled to urge before the Court that a reference application, notwithstanding the fact that the same has been referred by the Land Acquisition Officer, was time barred. As far as this issue is concerned, the matter has been dealt with and answered by the Supreme Court in the case of MOHAMMAD HASNUDDIN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, The relevant portion of the Judgment reads:
"11. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that a reference to the court having been made by the Collector, the court had no jurisdiction to question the validity of that reference and was bound to decide the matter on merits. In support of this contention, certain authorities have been cited to us, in which it has been laid down that ft is for the Collector, and the Collector alone, to determine whether to make a reference under Section 18, Sub-section (1), and if he decides to make a reference, it is not open to the court to go behind the decision of the Collector, and hold the reference to be out of time.
xxx xxx xxx
28. If an application is made which is not within time, the Collector will not have the power to make a reference. In order to determine the limits of his own power, it is clear that the Collector will have to decide whether the application presented by the claimant is or is not within time and satisfies the conditions laid down in Section 18. Even if a reference is wrongly made by the Collector the court will still have to determine the validity of the reference because the very jurisdiction of the court to hear a reference depends on a proper reference being made under Section 18, and if the reference is not proper, there is no jurisdiction in the court to hear the reference. It follows that it is the duty of the court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in Section 18 have been complied with, and it is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid reference. It is only a valid reference which gives jurisdiction to the court and, therefore, the court has to ask itself the question whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the reference.
29. In deciding the question of jurisdiction in a case of reference under Section 18 by the Collector to the court, the court is certainly not acting as a court of appeal; it is only discharging the elementary duty of satisfying itself that a reference which it is called upon to decide is a valid and proper reference according to the provisions of the Act under which it is made. That is a basic and preliminary duty which no tribunal can possibly avoid. The court, has, therefore, jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was made beyond the period prescribed by the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, and if it finds that it was so made, decline to answer reference."
From the above decision, it is clear that it is the elementary duty of the Court to decide as to whether the reference is valid.
5. We now proceed to consider the first ground urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant, namely, that the application seeking reference said to have been made by the claimant, which bears the date 18-4-1968 was not made on the said date, but was made some time after 1-11-1973 or around the time when the reference was made to the Court on 5-4-1982 and therefore it was barred by time and therefore the reference was incompetent.
6. As far as the above question is concerned, there is intrinsic evidence in the application presented by the claimant himself that it was an ante-dated application and it must have been presented only after 1-11-1973 or around 5-4-1982, on which date the reference was made. As pointed out in our Order dated 5-2-1991, this State came into existence under the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act with effect from 1-11-1956 and this state was named "State of Mysore" and the name of the State was altered as "State of Karnataka" only with effect from 1-11-1973 under the provisions of the Mysore State (Alteration of Name) Act 1973 (Central Act 31/73). It is seen from the application presented by the respondent, which is found in the original records that on the 75 paise stamp affixed on the application, the word "Karnataka" is printed. Until the State came to be named as Karnataka, as the name of the State was "Mysore", on all Court fee stamps sold in this State, the word "Mysore" was being printed. The name "Karnataka" came to be printed on the Court fee stamps used only on and after 1-11-1973. This factual position stands established by Act 31 of 1973 and is not and could not be controverted by the learned Counsel for the respondent. The Stamp Vendor has written the date in a manner which is not decipherable, but the fact remains that on the stamp the name of the State is printed as 'Karnataka', which circumstance atone is sufficient to conclude that the application was presented some time after 1-11-1973 and not on 18-4-1968.
7. An application seeking reference under Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act is required to be made within 90 days from the date on which the award notice is served or the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was received. In the present case, in the application itself the applicant has stated that he had received the award notice dated 8-3-1968 and that he had accepted the compensation under protest. The learned Counsel for the State also, after verification of the records, stated that he had actually received the amount of compensation on 10-7-1968 and this fact is also not controverted by the respondent. Therefore, it is obvious that the application was not made within 90 days from the date of receipt of notice of the award or receipt of compensation amount and it was made some time after 1-11-1973. Therefore, the reference made pursuant to such an application, which was not made within 90 days in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, was incompetent and therefore it was liable to be rejected by the learned Civil Judge. Therefore, the first ground urged by the learned Counsel of the appellant has to be answered in the affirmative even on the basis of the application presented by the respondent himself.
8. The additional evidence and the Report made by the Land Acquisition Officer has been taken on record, which disclose horrible state of affairs. According to the Report made by the present Land Acquisition Officer, the then Land Acquisition Officer Mr. Varur had made as many as 89 ante dated references in April 1982 and had played a fraud on the State colluding himself with the concerned claimants. There can be no doubt, but for the collusion and fraud played by the Land Acquisition Officer, all those references including the reference concerning the respondent-claimant, could have been made to the Civil Judge's Court. This is, however, a matter for the State Government to make a thorough enquiry and to unearth the truth about the extent of fraud committed by the Land Acquisition Officer in connivance with the claimants.
9. We are also shocked and surprised about the casual manner in which the question of limitation has been disposed of by the then learned Civil Judge Sri M.T. Gudajannavar. The Government Advocate submitted that the two connected M.F.A. Nos. 655 and 1084 of 1984, in which the position is identical, as also most of the fraudulent references made by the Land Acquisition Officer Mr. Varur, particulars of which have been furnished, were decided by the same Judge. As stated earlier, specific objection was taken on behalf of the appellant that the reference application was time barred and that objection was brushed aside by the learned Judge by stating that relevant records were not produced. For rejecting the reference on the ground that the same was made on a time barred application, no other record was necessary other than the application presented by the respondent himself. In the reference application itself, he had expressly stated that the award was dated 8-3-1968 and that he had received the notice of the award and that he had accepted it under protest. Though the date 18-4-1968 was written on the application, it was received in the office of the Civil Judge on 5-4-1982 and an endorsement has been made by the Court to that effect on the application itself and on the very stamp affixed on the application the date 5-4-1982 has been entered. The very fact that reference was received after 14 years from the date of the award, should have made the learned Judge to examine the question with due care and caution. He failed to do so. He winked at it. The facts and circumstances of this case are such as would undermine the faith of the public in the Courts and they have shaken our confidence in the Officer.
10. As far as the second ground is concerned the matter is covered by our Judgment in the case of SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER v. GURAPPA CHANNABASAPPA PARAMAJ (M.F.A. No. 1095 of 1984, Dated 18-12-1991), . In the said case, a similar question was considered by this Court. The relevant portion of the Judgment reads:
"14. As stated earlier, Section 18 of the Central Act was amended by the Amending Act of the 1961 enancted by this State. The Legislature of this State considered that in addition to the time within which an application seeking reference should be made it was expedient to fix not only a time within which the Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer should discharge his duty of making the reference but a right should also be conferred on the party to approach the Court by making an application seeking a direction to the Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer to make the reference. Once such a provision was made, there is no doubt that an application before the Court has to be made within 3 years after the expiry of 90 days from the date of the application and if any application is made beyond the time so fixed in view of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, it is liable to be rejected in limine. In other words, if no application is made within the time, the right to secure reference ceases. This position of law is incontrovertible in view of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kunhaliumma and the two decisions of this Court in Muniswamappa and Chikkamuramaiah. The learned Counsel for the respondent does not dispute that in view of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the right of the respondent to make an application before the Court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act had come to an end, by 15-8-1971 and that the refernce was made after more than 10 years and eight months. He, however, relying on the decision in Balappa ILR 1989 KAR 1931, contends that even after the right of the party comes to an end, the Land Acquisition Officer could make a reference at any time and it would be valid.
15. After careful consideration of the rival contentions, we respectfully disagree with the view taken by the learned Judge in Balappa. We are of the view that the reasonable construction of the provision is, as it has been construed in Gwalior Rayon and Lakshmi Bai it is well recognised rule of construction that in order to ascertain the true meaning of a provision the intention of the Legislature, as ascertainable from the language of the provision is the safe guide. From the amendment of Section 18. it is clear that in addition to the time limit of 90 days fixed in Section 18 the Legislature intended to create a duty in the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference within 90 days and further if within the said period the Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer failed to make a reference, to confer a right on the party to make an application before the Court seeking a direction to the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference. If that right is not exercised by the party within time, then the right ceases. Once the right of the party, to get a reference is time barred, it would be incongruous to hold that the Deputy Commissioner can still make a reference, at any time even after decades. In our view, it is reasonable to construe the provision to mean that the date on which the right of the party to get a reference comes to an end would also be the dale on which the power of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference comes to an end. We are not persuaded to agree with the construction suggested for the respondent that the power of the Officer continues even after the right of the party comes to an end and continues for ever. It means even after an application made before the Court after three years is rejected, as the Court is powerless to entertain a time barred application, the Deputy Commissioner would have the power to make a reference, nullifying the order of the Court rejecting the application as time barred. Such a construction would lead to a situation in which in one case the Deputy Commissioner could make a reference if he so desires and in another he could refuse to do so, if he so desires, in which event the party would be helpless. In other words, the Deputy Commissioner could act according to his whims and fancies. It is difficult to agree that the Legislature intended to bring about such a result. Further, such a construction which brings about anamolous and incongrupus results and gives ample scope for nepotism, favouritism and corruption, should not be given. We have come across several references made after two decades, particularly after several additional benefits were conferred by Amending Act 68 of 1984 amending the Land Acquisition Act. In our opinion, the correct view to take is, just as the party loses the right to the reference if no application is made within 90 days in terms of Section 18(2), the party, who had made an application within 90 days loses the right to secure a reference if he fails to make an application within three years after the expiry of 90 days from the date of the reference application and consequently the power of the Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer to make reference comes to an end. We are, therefore, of the view that the date of cessation of the right of the party to apply to the Court seeking a direction to the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference also constitutes the date of cessation of power of the Deputy Commissioner. To put it in a nut shell the latter comes to an end on the date on which the former ends, and the award of the Land Acquisition Officer becomes final. Therefore, neither the party can seek a reference nor the Deputy Commissioner can make the reference after the expiry of 3 years and 90 days from the date of the reference application.
16. For the reasons aforesaid, we respectfully agree with the view taken in Gwalior Rayon's case and in Laxmibai's case and further hold that the Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer has no power to make a reference under Section 18 of the Act after the right of the party to seek a direction from the Court comes to an end and overrule the decision in Balappa ILR 1989 KAR 1931.
17. Accordingly, we answer the question set out first as follows:
A reference made by a Land Acquisition Officer under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by Karnataka Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1961 after the right of the claimant to make an application before the Civil Judge praying for a direction to call for reference under Section 18 of the Act had come to an end, is invalid."
As can be seen from the above Judgment, we have held that the power of the Land Acquisition Officer to make reference under Section 18 of the Act, as amended by the Karnataka Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1961, comes to an end on the date on which the right of the claimant concerned to make an application before the Civil Judge praying for a direction to call for reference under Section 18 of the Act comes to an end and consequently any reference made after the said date and time is invalid.
11. In the present case, even assuming that the reference application was presented on 18-4-1968, as the reference was made only on 5-4-1982 after nearly 14 years, it was an invalid reference. Applying the ratio of the Decision in MFA 1095/84, we answer the second ground also in favour of the appellant.
12. Before concluding, we are constrained to observe that drastic action should be taken to prevent such fraudulent references on account of the collusion between the claimant concerned and the Land Acquisition Officer concerned, which has already resulted in loss to the exchequer to the tune of several lakhs, may be in crores. Therefore, we suggest the following steps to be taken:
(i) At the end of every month, every land Acquisition Officer must be required to submit a statement to the Deputy Commissioner of the District as to the number of applications under Section 18 received, the date on which the applications were received and whether the applications have already been referred and if some of them have not been referred, the number and the particulars of the application pending at the end of each month.
(ii) Strict instructions should be issued to every Land Acquisition Officer to maintain a register in which the date on which Section 12 notice is served on each of the claimant, the date of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was received and also to make an entry in the register concerned immediately after the expiry of 90 days as to whether any application for reference is received or not and if the application is not received, to make an entry to the effect that the award has become final.
(iii) In respect of all pending references, action should be taken to find out whether any reference application filed beyond time have been referred and if so to take such steps as are necessary for taking appropriate objection and adducing evidence before the Court.
13. In the result, we make the following order:
(i) The Appeal is allowed with costs;
(ii) The Award made by the learned Civil Judge in L.A.C. No. 313 of 1982, is set aside;
(iii) A copy of this Order as also a copy of the Order made in M.F.A. No. 1095 of 1984 dated 18-2-1991, be furnished to the learned Government Advocate for being sent to the Chief Secretary.
14. The lower Court records are directed to be kept in a sealed cover with the Registrar, who is directed to seek the orders of the Court, whenever requisition for the records is received.
15. We also direct that a copy of the Judgment be kept along with confidential records of Sri M.T. Gudajannavar, the then Civil Judge of Chikodi.