Madhya Pradesh High Court
Abdul Rajjak @ Rajjak Pahalwan vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 26 November, 2024
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
1
Cr.R.No.972/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY DWIVEDI
ON THE 26th OF NOVEMBER, 2024
CRIMINAL REVISION NO.972/2024
ABDUL RAJJAK ALIAS RAJJAK PAHALWAN
VS.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANOTHER
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Appearance:
Applicant by Shri Mohd. Ali, Advocate and Shri S.A. Farooqui -
Advocate.
Respondent No.1-State by Shri B.D. Singh, Deputy Advocate General.
Respondent No.2 by Shri Sankalp Kochar - Advocate.
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ORDER
In the instant petition, the pleadings are complete and the learned counsel for the parties are eager to argue the matter because of underlying issue. Ergo, with their consent, the matter is heard finally.
2. By the instant criminal revision filed under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C., the applicant is challenging the merit of the order dated 20.02.2024 passed by learned 10 th Additional Session Judge, Jabalpur in S.T.No.313/2022 whereby the application filed under Section 227 of CrPC has been dismissed and the charges have been framed against the applicant for the offence punishable under Sections 452 r/w 120-B, 365 r/w 120-B, 386 r/w 120-B, 506 (part-II), 467, 468, 471 of IPC.
2 Cr.R.No.972/20243. The encapsulated facts, which would lead to a decisive conclusion, are that on 12.01.2022, respondent No.2 (complainant) submitted a computerized typed written report to SHO Police Station, Hanumantal alleging that in the year 2009-10 one Azhar was murdered at Kurai, District Seoni and he was the witness of the said incident. Thereafter, the applicant called the complainant (respondent No. 2) at his house and threatened him not to give any evidence in the case otherwise he would be killed, but the complainant did not accede to the said threat and gave evidence in the court, which got the applicant annoyed and hence afterwards he was carrying ill-will against the complainant.
3.1 The complainant/respondent No.2 also filed a writ petition before this Court alleging anti-national criminal activities against the applicant and co-accused that he encroached the land of educational institution i.e. Anjuman Islamiya and that land was being misused by the accused persons and their family members. The police initiated enquiry against those illegal activities of the accused and in furtherance thereof CSP Jabalpur issued notice under Section 160 of Cr.P.C. to the complainant (respondent No. 2) so as to give proper facts to the police authority, but before the complainant could do so, the applicant and co- accused sent their men to the house of the complainant. The said men of the petitioners threatened the complainant, made him hostage and putting gun on his head made him call the co-accused Mohd. Sartaj keeping mobile on speaker apprising him about the custody of the complainant. The said persons asked Sartaj as to what is to be done further with the complainant, upon which the applicant and accused Sartaj both instructed their men that complainant has given several written complaints to the police against them and he has to withdraw 3 Cr.R.No.972/2024 those complaints and his assurance for withdrawal of the complaints be taken on a stamp paper and if he does not agree to do so, he should be killed. In line with the said conversation, on a blank stamp paper signature of the complainant was obtained on the gun point and threat of life and afterwards the said persons took the complainant to the police station in the office of CSP Gohalpur where he was compelled to give statement to the police that whatever were complaints made by him against the accused persons would be treated to be withdrawn as he does not want to prosecute them any further. As per the complainant (respondent No. 2), all those things were done by threatening his life and because of fear and pressure created upon him he had not raised his voice at the relevant point of time, but when police started taking action against these criminals then only he dared to lodge the report to the police on 12.01.2022 about the incident that took place on 19.09.2020 with him by the applicant and other accused persons. 3.2 After registration of the FIR against the applicant and other co- accused, they filed a petition i.e. M.Cr.C.No.61076/2022 for quashing the FIR, which was later dismissed by this court vide order dated 02.11.2023. Thereafter, the trial was initiated and the application under Section 227 of CrPC was filed on behalf of the applicant, which was dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 20.02.2024, which is impugned in this revision.
4. The main thrust of challenge to the impugned order is on the anvil that the trial Court failed to see that in view of the material produced by the prosecution, the charges for the alleged offence are not made out against the applicant and therefore instead of discharging the applicant from all the charges, the impugned order has been passed exercising the power provided under Section 228 of CrPC. Taking the 4 Cr.R.No.972/2024 arguments further, learned counsel for the applicant submits that from the contents of the FIR and the material produced by the prosecution made appendage to the charge-sheet, it can be inferred that it is not sufficient to constitute the offence for which the charges have been framed against the applicant. Shri Ali submits that as per the FIR, the applicant admittedly was not present on spot and did not physically appear before the complainant, but only on mobile phone other accused were instructed by him and as such they had committed the crime, however, the police neither collected any call-details record, nor did it seize any mobile phone so as to discern the fact that the applicant had actually directed the other accused persons and on his direction, the crime was committed and as such it is arduous to prove that the applicant was involved in the crime. He also submits that from the statement of the complainant and the contents of written complaint, it can be gathered that he made a false story and after such a long time, he approached the police authority. To reinforce, he places reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 9 SCC 293 and Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330. The Supreme Court in Prashant Bharti (supra) has observed that from the mobile call-details as evaluated by the Investigating Officer, it was found that neither the appellant nor the complainant was present at the place of occurrence and that no phone calls were made by the appellant to the complainant, instead it was the complainant who had made calls to the appellant and that at the time when the complainant alleged that the appellant had misbehaved with her daughter and outraged her modesty and as per the complaint, she was actually in conversation with her friends. The proof of facts based on mobile phone call details must be considered to be 5 Cr.R.No.972/2024 conclusive for all intent and purposes. In the case of Rajiv Thapar (supra), the Supreme Court has considered as to under what circumstances, the defence of the accused can be considered and it has been observed as under :-
"29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution /complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution /complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and 6 Cr.R.No.972/2024 condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice."
Juxtaposing the above enunciation of law with the facts of the case at hand, Shri Ali submits that there was no evidence available for the court to approve the involvement of the applicant in the alleged crime. In the dearth of specific material collected by the prosecution so as to substantiate the telephonic conversation between the co-accused and applicant, the applicant's involvement in the crime cannot be proved and thus it is clear that the applicant has been fallaciously implicated and he deserves to be discharged. He propounds that the rejection of the applciation is based on general perception and considering the limited power of the court at the time of exercising power under Section 228 of CrPC. In such a situation, Shri Ali implores that the High Court is empowered to examine this aspect and can discharge the applicant from the baseless charges framed against him.
5. In contrast, Shri B.D. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State submits that merely a bit insufficiency of evidence to wholly prove the allegations made in the FIR would not roil the available material which indicates the clear-cut involvement of the applicant. He further submits that the seizure made by the prosecution clearly divulges that the stamp-papers were used in the crime and the documents relating to the complainant have been seized from the possession of the applicant. It is not a case where there is no material produced by the prosecution and conversely there appears lenity and the court while framing the charges was quite lenient and 7 Cr.R.No.972/2024 liberal. Shri Singh submits that the court while exercising the power under Section 228 of CrPC has to prima facie find that the material collected and produced by the prosecution in the court is sufficient to form an opinion that the accused was involved and he submits that in the case at hand, the charges framed are impeccable and no second thought would serve the purpose.
6. In turn, Shri Kochar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 submits that the in the absence of call-details record and mobile phone used by the applicant, the probability of involvement of the applicant cannot be brought under the clouds inasmuch as seizure of the documents made by the police reletable to the incident makes it clear that the applicant was involved and the court therefore rightly exercised the power under Section 228 of CrPC while framing the charges. To bolster his contentions, Shri Kochar places reliance on various decisions, i.e., the case of Soma Chakravarty v. State through CBI (2007) 5 SCC 403; State of Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengalluru v. M.R. Hiremath (2019) 7 SCC 515 and K. Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. rendered in SLP (Cri.)No.2029/2018.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties at length and perused the documents available on record.
8. Indeed, as per the final report, the written-complaint made by the complainant to the police makes it amply clear that the allegations were not general, but specific in nature. The seizure made from the present applicant of the forged stamp and notarised affidavit, justifies the involvement of the applicant. The documents relating to the incident and also about the identity of the complainant were found in possession of the applicant, which itself ensnares the applicant to bring home the charge. More precisely, it is seen that the applicant was found 8 Cr.R.No.972/2024 in possession of fake blank notarised stamps and also photocopy of affidavit which were alleged to have been obtained by fraud on 19.02.2020. Adhar card of the complainant was also recovered from the possession of the applicant. As per the Notary register, which was also seized by the Investigating Officer there exists no entry of respondent No.2 obtaining the notarised stamp on 19.02.2020. The memorandum of the applicant itself reveals that he was involved in the crime. Thus, on the basis of these material prima facie it can be presumed by the court that the applicant had his own peculiar role to play in the incident. At this juncture, it is expedient to go-through the legal position already set at rest. The Supreme Court in Soma Chakravarty (supra) has observed as under:-
"10. It may be mentioned that the settled legal position, as mentioned in the above decisions, is that if on the basis of material on record the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial."
Further, in M.R. Hiremath (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of 9 Cr.R.No.972/2024 Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] , adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) "29. ... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.""
In the case of K. Ravi (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"9. At this juncture, it would be apt to refer to the observations made by this Court in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and Another1, explaining the scope of Section 397 Cr.P.C. It was held that -
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made 10 Cr.R.No.972/2024 in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
10. Thus, the scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited. Apart from the fact that sub-section 2 of Section 397 prohibits the Court from exercising the powers of Revision, even the powers under sub-section 1 thereof should be exercised very sparingly and only where the decision under challenge is grossly erroneous, or there is non-compliance of the provisions of law, or the finding recorded by the trial court is based on no evidence, or material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely by framing the charge. The Court exercising Revisional 11 Cr.R.No.972/2024 Jurisdiction under Section 397 should be extremely circumspect in interfering with the order framing the charge, and could not have interfered with the order passed by the Trial Court dismissing the application for modification of the charge under Section 216 Cr.P.C., which order otherwise would fall in the category of an interlocutory order.
11. It is trite to say that Section 216 is an enabling provision which enables the court to alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced, and if any alternation or addition to a charge is made, the court has to follow the procedure as contained therein. Section 216 does not give any right to the accused to file a fresh application seeking his discharge after the charge is framed by the court, more particularly when his application seeking discharge under Section 227 has already been dismissed. Unfortunately, such applications are being filed in the trial courts sometimes in ignorance of law and sometimes deliberately to delay the proceedings. Once such applications though untenable are filed, the trial courts have no alternative but to decide them, and then again such orders would be challenged before the higher courts, and the whole criminal trial would get derailed. Suffice it to say that such practice is highly deplorable, and if followed, should be dealt with sternly by the courts.
Over and above, this Court in Criminal Revision No.1781/2023 (Dannu Dheemar and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh) on 13.09.2023 has considered several decisions of the Supreme Court, which read as under:-
5. Before analyzing the facts of the case on merits, it would be appropriate to examine the scope & ambit of criminal revision/powers of Court u/s 397 & 401 of CrPC. In this connection, I would like to refer decisions of Hon'ble apex court in State Vs. R. Soundirarasu, AIR 2022 SC 4218, State of Maharashtra vs. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh 12 Cr.R.No.972/2024 Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659 & Duli Chand v. Delhi Administration, (1975) 4 SCC 649 (3-Judge Bench).
6. In Duli Chand (supra), Hon'ble apex court has held as under:-
"5.........The High Court in revision was exercising supervisory jurisdiction of a restricted nature and, therefore, it would have been justified in refusing to re- appreciate the evidence for the purposes of determining whether the concurrent finding of fact reached by the learned Magistrate and the learned Additional sessions Judge was correct. But even so, the High Court reviewed the evidence presumably for the purpose of satisfying itself that there was evidence in support of the finding of fact reached by the two subordinate courts and that the finding of fact was not unreasonable or perverse. ....."
7. In R. Soundirarasu (supra),Hon'ble apex court has held as under:-
"75. In Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2001) 9 SCC 631: (AIR 2002 SC 107: 2002 cri LJ 225 (SC)), this Court held as under:-
"3.....The revision power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged."
76. Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised to correct manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with appellate power. A revisional court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This 13 Cr.R.No.972/2024 power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or procedure."
8. In Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand (supra), Hon'ble apex court has held as under:-
"21.In embarking upon the minutest re-examination of the whole evidence at the revisional stage, the learned Judge of the High Court was totally oblivious of the self-restraint that he was required to exercise in a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. On behalf of the accused, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court to which one of us (Justice Sabharwal) is a party, i.e. Criminal Appeal No. 523 of 1997 decided on 9.3.2004 [Ram Briksh v. Ambika Yadav]. That was the case in which the High Court interfered in revision because material evidence was overlooked by the courts below.
22.The Revisional Court is empowered to exercise all the powers conferred on the Appellate Court by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 410 Cr.P.C. Section 401 Cr.P.C. is a provision enabling the High Court to exercise all powers of Appellate Court, if necessary, in aid of power of superintendence or supervision as a part of power of revision conferred on the High Court or the Sessions Court. Section 397 Cr.P.C. confers power on the High Court or Sessions Court, as the case may be, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court."
It is for the above purpose, if necessary, the High Court or Sessions Court can exercise all appellate powers. Section 401 Cr.P.C. conferring powers of Appellate Court on the Revisional Court is with the above limited purpose. The provisions contained in Section 395 to Section 401 Cr.P.C., read together, do not indicate that 14 Cr.R.No.972/2024 the revisional power of the High Court can be exercised as a second appellate power."
On the other hand, at this juncture, it is imperative to quote the provisions of Section 228, which enable the court to exercise such power, which read as under:-
228. Framing of charge,- (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which--
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant- cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.
(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause
(b) of Sub-Section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.
On the face of above provisions, the trial court after considering the material produced by the prosecution should draw an opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. The the court will not go to the extent whether the collected material shall lead to conviction of the accused. Here in this case, as per the seizure made by the prosecution of the relevant documents from the applicant and his memorandum prima facie gives a notion that the accused must have committed the crime and it is not the duty of the trial Court to 15 Cr.R.No.972/2024 evaluate whether such material would be sufficient to lead conviction in the trial for the charges levelled against the accused.
9. Of-late, this court in Criminal Revision No.3144/2022 (Hiralal Ahirwar & others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Another) decided on 12.11.2024 while examining the scope of Section 228 of CrPC, has observed as under:-
9. Learned counsel for the respondent/State has submitted that the order of framing charge cannot be quashed at this stage because the trial court at the time of framing charge has to see whether the material produced before the court prima-facie sufficient to register an offence or not. The Court at the time of framing of charge does not evaluate the sanctity of evidence. He has also placed reliance upon a judgment reported in (2009) 16 SCC 605 -
Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and (2012) 9 SCC 734 - Praveen Pradhan Vs. State of Uttaranchal and Another.
10. I have examined the view of the Supreme Court, according to which, the onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take the extreme step to bring an end to his life. At the same time, the Supreme Court has also observed that the duty of the trial court is to presume something at the time of framing of charge and exercising the power under Section 228 of CrPC. The Supreme Court in case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra (supra) dealing with the provisions of Section 228 of Cr.P.C. has observed as under:
"25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as 16 Cr.R.No.972/2024 gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (See Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya [(1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47] .)
26. In Som Nath Thapa [(1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820] a three-Judge Bench of this Court explained the meaning of the word "presume".
Referring to dictionary meanings of the said word, the Court observed thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32) "32. ... if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have [Ed.: The words "might have" were emphasised in the original.] committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has [Ed.: Emphasis in original.] committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.
(emphasis supplied)"
11. From the observation made by the Supreme Court, it is clear that the trial court is required to evaluate the material and the documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. It is further observed by 17 Cr.R.No.972/2024 the Court that for such limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. The Supreme Court also observed that "the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for 'presuming' that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction".
12. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra (supra), the Supreme Court has also relied upon a case of State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath Thapa reported in (1996) 4 SCC 659 and observed that if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame the charge.
10. Thus, in my opinion, on the basis of seizure of the documents and memorandum of the accused, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order inasmuch as it was not a case in which request made by the accused for his discharge could have been accepted. Albeit, it was argued on behalf of the respondents that when the petition under Section 482 of CrPC for quashing the FIR has already faced dismissal, the scope of Section 228 becomes narrower and only on that ground this revision can be dismissed, but I am not convinced with the said submission because the scope of exercising power under Section 482 of CrPC and the scope of exercising power under Section 228 are altogether different. Obviously, the power provided under Section 482 of CrPC is exercised by the High Court, whereas the power enshrined under Section 228 of CrPC is exercised by the trial Court that too on the basis of material placed before it along with the charge-sheet. Thus, it is clear that the trial Court has rightly framed the charges and this court is of the opinion that there was nothing wrong committed by the trial court 18 Cr.R.No.972/2024 and I am also of the opinion that on the basis of material available and limited scope of the trial court at the time of exercising the power under Section 228 of CrPC, nothing wrong has been done and the material produced before the court was quite sufficient to frame the charges against the applicant. It is also not a case of non-application of mind because the trial court has struck down some of the offences which were proposed in the charge-sheet by the police as the court found that there was insufficiency of material to frame the charges for those offences.
11. In view of the above, I do not find that the impugned order requires any interference by this court. The revision being misconceived, is hereby dismissed.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI) JUDGE sudesh SUDESH KUMAR SHUKLA 2024.12.03 17:30:01 +05'30'