Delhi District Court
Romy Singh vs The State on 27 November, 2024
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-006777-2024
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.: 175/2024
ROMY SINGH,
S/o. Shri. Ram Bahadur,
R/o. 156B, Uttaranchal Enclave,
100 Foota Road, Near Shani Mandir,
Sant Nagar, Burari, Delhi. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE (GOVT. NCT OF DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of Institution : 03.05.2024
Date when judgment was reserved : 20.11.2024
Date when judgment is pronounced : 27.11.2024
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed in terms of the provisions under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') against the judgment dated 15.12.2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned judgment'), passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-01/Ld. MM-01, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi ( hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. MM'), in case bearing;
"State v. Romy Singh, Case No. 296128/2016", arising out of FIR No. 102/2013, PS. Maurice Nagar, under Sections 186/353/332/323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'), convicting the appellant of the offences punishable under Sections 186, 332 and 353 IPC, and the consequent order of sentence dated 01.04.2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned order'), passed by the Ld. Trial Court, though, bestowing appellant benefit of the provisions under Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 1 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:54:39 +0530 Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 ( hereinafter referred to as the 'Probation of Offenders Act'), however, correspondingly, directing the appellant to deposit a fine of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand only), without according benefit under Section 12 of the said enactment/Probation of Offenders Act to the appellant herein (hereinafter impugned judgment and impugned order are collectively referred to as the 'impugned judgment and order').
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is that on 02.09.2013, on receipt of PCR Call vide DD No. 8A, the concerned police official(s) reached at the spot, i.e., in front of Maurice Nagar Police Station, where the complainant, Anil Kumar, Ct. Ramroop No. 2748/N and Ct. Umesh No. 1765/N were found present, who had apprehended/caught hold of one person, namely, Romy Kumar Singh S/o. Ram Bahadur, the appellant herein. At that point in time, the appellant was handed over to the concerned police official/IO/SI and Ct. Manoj, who had reached the spot along with the SI, who took Sh. Anil Kumar, Ct. Ramroop, Ct. Umesh and the appellant for their medical examination at Hindu Rao Hospital. Upon reaching the Hospital, medical examination of Ct. Ramroop (vide MLC No. 6953/13), Ct. Umesh (vide MLC No. 6942/13) and Anil Kumar (vide MLC No. 6944/13) was conducted, wherein the Doctor had inter alia recoded, "A/H/O Physical assault". Further, as per the prosecution, the complainant/Anil Kumar tendered his statement in the Hospital inter alia proclaiming that he was working as an autorickshaw driver of vehicle bearing registration no. DL-1RM-0252. As per the complainant, on the said day, i.e., on 02.09.2013 at around 01:30 a.m., as he was waiting for a customer in front of Maurice Nagar Police Station, one person, who was Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 2 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:54:44 +0530 later identified as Romy Kumar S/o. Ram Bahadur, approached the complainant and asked him/the complainant to take him/Romy Kumar to Burari against a consideration/fare of Rs. 30/- (Rupees Thirty only) (एक शक्स जिसका नाम मुझे रोमी कु मार S/o राम बहादूर पता चला है, मेरे पास आया तथा मुझे Rs. 30 रुपये किराये पर बुराड़ी चलने को कहने लगा). Upon this, the complainant asked the person to board his autorickshaw on 'meter-determined' fare, hearing which, the said person, who was intoxicated started beating the complainant ( इस पर मैने उसे मीटर से चलने के लिए कहा। इस पर उपरोक्त शक्स जो नशा शराब में था ने मेरे साथ मारपीट करनी शुरु कर दी). Consequently, the complainant got down from his auto and entered the police station to seek help. Following this, upon the complainant's request/plea two constables, namely, Ct. Ramroop and Ct. Umesh, reached the spot with the complainant (outside the police station). At that time, the appellant is asserted to have approached the said persons, while uttering foul language/hurling abuses and beat up Ct. Ramroop by grabbing hold of his collar, in which process Ct. Ramroop's uniform tore (इस पर मेरे साथ 2 सिपाही जिनका नाम मुझे सिपाही रामरुप तथा सिपाही उमेश पता चला है आये, तथा हम थाने से बाहर आये जहां पर उपरोक्त शक्स रोमी गालियां देता हु आ हमारी तरफ आया तथा सिपाही रामरुप का गिरे बान पक मारपीट की जिससे सिपाही रामरुप की वर्दी भी फट गयी). As the complainant and said constables struggled to refrain Romy Kumar, the appellant also caused injuries to Ct. Umesh as well as preserved to hurl abuses. Finally, after much tussle, the appellant could be contained and handed over to the SI, upon him reaching there. Markedly, upon the complainant's complaint, the instant FIR was registered, and investigation ensued. Relevantly, during the course of investigation, the appellant was arrested and upon conclusion of the investigation, chargesheet was filed before the Ld. MM, accompanied with a complaint in terms of the provisions under Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 3 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2024.11.27 12:54:48 +0530 Section 195 Cr.P.C.
2.1. Significantly, vide order dated 09.03.2016, Ld. MM took cognizance of the offences under Sections 186/353/332/323 IPC. Subsequently, upon arguments on charge being addressed on behalf of State as well as the appellant, Ld. Trial Court, vide its order dated 31.08.2018, framed charges under Sections 186/353/332/323 IPC against the appellant, to which, the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Appositely, during the course of trial, prosecution examined four witnesses (PWs), i.e., PW-1/Ct.
Ramrup, PW-2/Ct. Umesh, PW-3/Anil Kumar and PW-4/IO/SI Ram Chander. Pertinent to note here that during the course of proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, the appellant admitted the; (1) MLC No. 6942/2013 as Ex. A-1; (2) MLC No. 6944/2013 as Ex. A-2; (3) MLC No. 6953/2013 as Ex. A-3; (4) FSL 2013/C-7276 dated 26.09.2013 as Ex. A-4; (5) Complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C. as Ex. A-5; (6) FIR No. 102/2013 as Ex. A-6; and (7) Statement of Ct. Manoj No. 2496/N, in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C. Consequently, the witnesses specified as Sr. Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the list of prosecution witnesses, as specified under the chargesheet, were dropped from the array of prosecution witnesses vide order dated 06.02.2023 of the Ld. Trial Court. Subsequently, on conclusion of prosecution evidence, recording of statement of the appellant/accused under Section 313/281 Cr.P.C. on 16.10.2023, as well as on conclusion of arguments on behalf of the parties, as aforementioned, the Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment and order, while holding the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 186/332/353 IPC, sentenced them in the manner, as noted hereinabove.
3. Learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 4 of 36 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:54:53 +0530 contended that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled principles of law, deserving their setting aside at the outset. In this regard, Ld. Counsel outrightly submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that in the instant case, there are numerous yawning voids, infirmities, and contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, making the entire prosecution story unworthy of credence, not appealing to the senses of a prudent man. It was further submitted by Ld. Counsel for the appellant that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case and even failed to consider the submissions of the appellant as well as erred in convicting the appellant, in contravention of the judgments relied upon by the Ld. Counsel, applicable to the present case. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court even failed to appreciate the cardinal principle of law that benefit of doubt must accrue in favour of the appellant herein. In this regard, Ld. Counsel vehemently argued that in the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the allegations against the appellant as there is clear lack of evidence against him, despite which, as per the Ld. Counsel, benefit of doubt was not accorded to the appellant by the Ld. Trial Court. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the testimonies of the police officials have not been corroborated by independent witnesses, besides the complainant has not supported the case of the prosecution. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that not only has the complainant not asserted about any injury being caused at the time of the alleged commission of incident, rather, did not even identify the appellant as the perpetrator of alleged offence. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, there are material contradictions in the Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 5 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:54:57 +0530 testimonies of the police officials/PW-1 and PW-2 as to the distance of the alleged place of incident from the police station and nature on injuries sustained by them is concerned. Even otherwise, despite the incident having allegedly taken place at public place/road, the police officials made no endeavor to join any independent witnesses in the present proceedings. It was further fervently argued that there are material lacunae/omissions in the investigation conducted by the concerned police officials, entitling the appellant benefit of doubt in the instant case.
4. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that not only did the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the truth of circumstances and passed its judgment/decision in haste, rather, did not properly appreciate/examine the facts of the present case, wrongly holding the appellant guilty of the aforementioned offences. Ld. Counsel further vehemently contended that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court against the principles of natural justice, contrary to the settled principles of law/judicial dictates as well as oblivious to the fact that the entire evidence produced by the prosecution does not inspire confidence or even sufficient to hold the appellant guilty, beyond reasonable doubt. It was further submitted that the entire evidence produced by the prosecution does not inspire confidence to convict the appellant and that in the absence of any reliable material/evidence, it was not safe for the Ld. Trial Court to have passed an order of conviction against the appellant, on guess work and fanciful conjectures. Even otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the order of sentence was also passed by the Ld. Trial Court, whimsically, failing to appreciate that the appellant was a young man of 39 (Thirty Nine) years and responsible to take care of his old/ailing parents. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 6 of 36 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:55:01 +0530 submitted that the appellant is a Law graduate in the year, 2020 and due to the order of fine/conviction having been passed by the Ld. Trial Court, while bestowing/granting sentence, the appellant had been unable to register himself with the Bar Council of Delhi, further disentitling him job prospects. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the appellant is a peace living and law-abiding citizen and the incident in question was neither premediated nor deliberate, rather, occasioned due to a quarrel over a trivial issue, where even the appellant had sustained injuries. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the appellant had never been involved in any other case, much less convicted of any offence, whatsoever, which factors have not been considered by the Ld. Trial Court while passing the impugned order. Ld. Counsel further vehemently argued that the punishment/penalty must not be retributive in nature, rather, humanizing, considering that condemning the appellants with severe sentence would subject the appellant's family members to grave depravity. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, substantial time has lapsed since the incident in question and in case relaxation/leniency is not afforded to the appellant, serious repercussions would ensue to their physical and mental well-being. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant inter alia prayed that the present appeal be allowed, and the impugned judgment and order be set aside. In the alternate, Ld. Counsel, entreated that the appellant may be permitted/granted the benefit/relaxation in terms of the provisions under the Probation of Offenders Act, including the provisions under Section 12 thereof.
5. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the impugned judgment and order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 7 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2024.11.27 12:55:06 +0530 case as well as in consonance with the settled judicial precedents. Ld. Addl. PP for the State further submitted that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses have not only been consistent, rather, of sterling quality, lucidly pointing out towards the only inference of guilt of the appellant. As per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, testimonies of police officials cannot be discarded solely for the reason of their employment/designation, as the law is settled that police officials are competent witnesses and there is no general principle that conviction cannot be premised on the testimonies of police officials. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the police officials in the instant case are victims, being obvious/natural and competent to depose against the appellant herein. It was further submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State that the appellant has failed to lead any evidence or raise any probable defence in his favour by adducing any witnesses, or otherwise. Lastly, it was submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State that no ground of any indulgence or relaxation in either the impugned judgment or even impugned order, passed against the appellant is made out, which would convince this Court to grant any relaxation in favour of the appellant, as entreated. Accordingly, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed at the outset, as grossly malicious and devoid of merits.
6. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant as well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State have been heard and the record(s), including the Trial Court Record, thoroughly perused.
7. At the outset, this Court deems it prudent to enunciate the scope of jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal. In this regard, this Court deems it apposite to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Padam Singh v. State of U.P., Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 8 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:55:09 +0530 (2000) 1 SCC 621, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while delving into the issue of 'scope an ambit' of appellate court's jurisdiction inter alia noted as under;
"2. ... It is the duty of an appellate court to look into the evidence adduced in the case and arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even if it can be relied upon, then whether the prosecution can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by the appellate court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts. It must be remembered that the appellate court, like the trial court, has to be satisfied affirmatively that the prosecution case is substantially true and the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt as the presumption of innocence with which the accused starts, continues right through until he is held guilty by the final court of appeal and that presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court. The judicial approach in dealing with the case where an accused is charged of murder under Section 302 has to be cautious, circumspect and careful and the High Court, therefore, has to consider the matter carefully and examine all relevant and material circumstances, before upholding the conviction."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Narendra Bhat v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 17 SCC 785 , remarked in respect of the foregoing as under;
"3. This Court has in a series of judgments held that a court exercising appellate power must not only consider questions of law but also questions of fact and in doing so it must subject the evidence to a critical scrutiny. The judgment of the High Court must show that the Court really applied its mind to the facts of the case as particularly when the offence alleged is of a serious nature and may attract a heavy punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Markedly, from a conjoint reading of the aforenoted judicial dictates it can be perspicuously deduced that the jurisdiction of this Court in appeal extends to reappreciation of the Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 9 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:55:13 +0530 entire material placed on record of the trial court and to arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not. In fact, as aforenoted, court(s), while exercising appellate power is not required to consider the question of law, rather, also question of facts to affirmatively reach a conclusion of guilt or innocence of an accused. In fact, it is trite law 1 that non- reappreciation of the evidence on record in an appeal may affect the case of either the prosecution or even the accused. Needless to reemphasize that the appellate court is to be wary of fact that presumption of innocence of an accused, even extents until an accused is held guilty by the final court of appeal and that such a presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court.
10. Ergo, being cognizant of the aforesaid, however, before proceeding with the determination of the rival contentions of the parties, it would be pertinent here to reproduce the provisions under law/IPC, relevant for the purposes of present adjudication, as under;
"21. Public Servant-The words "public servant"
denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following; namely:-
*** *** *** Eighth-Every officer of the Government whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience;
*** *** *** Twelfth-Every person- (a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government;...
*** *** ***
186. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions-Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three 1 State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735.
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27
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months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
*** *** ***
319. Hurt-Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.
*** *** ***
321. Voluntarily causing hurt-Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt".
*** *** ***
323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt- Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
*** *** ***
332. Voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant from his duty-Whoever voluntarily causes hurt to any person being a public servant in the discharge of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person or any other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by that person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
*** *** ***
353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant form discharge of his duty-Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Notably, from a conscientious perusal of the aforesaid provisions, in particular, that under Section 186, 332 and 353 IPC, it is quite manifest that the said provisions are aimed to protect the public servants from unwarranted obstruction in the Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 11 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2024.11.27 12:55:21 +0530 performance/discharge of their duty(ies) in their official capacity. Here, this Court deems it pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in Udayanath Barik & Ors. v. The State, MANU/OR/0162/1989, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while inter alia explicating the ingredients under Section 186 IPC, noted as under;
"11. To constitute an offence under Section 186, IPC the following ingredients must be present.
(i) There must be an obstruction;
(ii) the obstruction must be by the accused;
(iii) the obstruction must be voluntary;
(iv) the obstruction must be of a public servant; and
(v) the obstruction must be in discharge of his, i.e., the public servant's public functions."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In so far as culpability under the provisions of Section 332 IPC are concerned, this Court deems it apposite to make a reference to the decision in Rajan v. State of Kerala, MANU/KE/2894/2010, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala, while enunciating the scope and ambit of the said provisions, observed as under;
"11. An offence under Section 332 of Indian Penal Code is attracted if the accused voluntarily caused hurt to any person being a public servant in the discharge of his duty. It is not necessary to establish further that hurt was voluntarily caused to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as a public servant. On the other hand, if hurt was voluntarily caused to a public servant, while not discharging his duty as a public servant, it is necessary to prove that hurt was caused with intent to prevent or deter that person or any other public servant from discharging his duty. On the other hand, if hurt was voluntarily caused to a public servant, while he was discharging his official duty as such public servant, it is not necessary to establish further that it was so caused with the intention to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant. On the other hand, even if hurt was caused voluntarily to a public servant, if he was not discharging his duty as a public servant at that time, it is necessary to prove Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 12 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:55:25 +0530 additionally that hurt was caused to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as a public servant.
12. Ingredients of an offence under Section 332 of Indian Penal Code are (1) hurt must have been caused to a public servant and (2) it must have been caused -
(a) while such public servant was acting in the discharge of his duty as such, or (b) in order to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty as a public servant or (c) in consequence of his having done or attempted to do anything in the lawful discharge of his duty as such a public servant. Evidence necessary to establish an offence under Section 332 of Indian Penal Code are (a) the accused voluntarily caused bodily pain, disease or infirmity to the victim (as provided under Section 321 of Indian Penal Code), (b) the victim of the hurt is a public servant and (c) at the time of causing of hurt, the public servant concerned was discharging his duties qua public servant."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Correspondingly, for the prosecution to successfully bring home culpability under Section 353 IPC, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that there has been an assault or use of criminal force against public servant1, "while he was discharging his duty or there should be an intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty." Notably, as aforenoted, there does seem to be overlap in the ingredients of the provisions, noted hereinabove, however, the law is trite that the offences envisaged under Section 186, 332, and 353 IPC are distinct and variant. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Durgacharan Naik & Ors. v. State of Orissa, MANU/SC/0078/1966, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while appreciating the peculiarity of the provisions under Section 186 and 353 IPC, remarked as under;
"5. ...It is true that most of the allegations in this case upon which the charge under s. 353, Indian Penal Code is based are the same as those constituting the charge under s. 186, Indian Penal Code but it cannot 1 Shaik Ameena Rehamani v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., MANU/AP/0790/2023.
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be ignored that Sections 186 and 353, Indian Penal Code relate to two distinct offences and while the offence under the latter section is a cognizable offence, the one under the former section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186, Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions but under s. 353, Indian Penal Code the ingredient of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is necessary. The quality of the two offences is also different. Section 186 occurs in Ch. X of the Indian Penal Code dealing with contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, while s. 353 occurs in Ch. XVI regarding the offences affecting the human body..."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Further, in order to attract accountability under Section 323 IPC, it is required of the prosecution to prove1, "(a) the victim suffered from bodily pain, disease or infirmity; (b) that the accused caused the aforesaid bodily pain etc.; (c) that the accused did so intentionally or with knowledge that in the process hurt would be caused." Apposite at this stage to further note that Section 39 of IPC defines the term, "voluntarily" as, "a person is said to cause an effect "voluntarily" when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it".
15. Therefore, being wary of the aforenoted legal principles/judicial dictates and the rival contentions of the Ld. Addl. PP for the State as well as that of Ld. Counsel for the appellant, this Court would not proceed with the determination on merits of the instant case. In particular, this Court would proceed with the determination, 'whether on the basis of the material placed on record, culpability for the offences/charges levelled 1 Hanif Usmanbhai Kalva & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, MANU/GJ/1012/2015.
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against the appellant is made out/established 'beyond reasonable doubt' in the instant case?'. However, in order to do so, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly refer to the deposition of PW-1/Ct. Ramrup before the Ld. Trial Court, who asserted that on 02.09.2013, he was posted at PS Maurice Nagar as constable and that on the said day, he was working as a DD Writer from 12:00 midnight to 08:00 a.m. Further, as per PW-1, at around 01:30 a.m. one auto-driver came to the room of the DO and informed that one boy was quarreling with him and that his auto was parked outside the PS. Consequently, as per PW-1, the DO instructed him/PW-1 as well as PW-2/Ct. Umesh to look into the matter. Thereupon, PW-1, PW-2 and the said auto driver (who was identified as Anil) went outside the PS and approached towards the auto bearing no. DL-1RM-0252. As per PW-1, as they went near the auto, one boy, whose name was subsequently revealed as Romy, as well as correctly identified by PW-1 as the appellant/accused before the Ld. Trial Court, started hurling abuses on seeing them and caught PW-1's collar as well as started quarreling with PW-1, in which process, PW-1's shirt was torn. PW-1 further proclaimed that they tried to overpower the said person/Romy, however, he/Romy was in a drunken state/condition and, he/Romy also started quarreling with Ct. Umesh. Nevertheless, as per PW-1, they were eventually able to overpower that person/Romy and apprehend him. In the meantime, as per PW-1, SI Ram Chander along with Ct. Manoj reached at the spot and Romy was handed over to SI Ram Chander. Thereupon, as per PW-1, the IO took them to Hindu Rao Hospital where their MLC(s) were prepared and the IO recorded the statement of Anil, as well as prepared the rukka. PW-1 further deposed that the rukka was handed over by the IO to Ct. Manoj, with direction to get the FIR registered. Consequently, Ct. Manoj Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 15 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:55:37 +0530 went to the police station and returned to the spot after some time, thereafter, handed over the copy of FIR and original rukka to IO SI Ram Chander for further investigation. Further, as per PW-1, IO seized the blood sample of accused from the Hospital, bearing the seal of 'HRH' vide seizure memo Ex. PW1/A, bearing PW-1's signature at point A, as well as arrested the accused vide memo Ex. PW1/B and conducted his personal search vide memo Ex. PW1/C, both, bearing PW-1's signature at point A. Subsequently, as per PW-1, they all returned to the PS and the IO prepared site plan (Ex. PW1/D, bearing PW-1's signatures at point A) at the instance of complainant. PW-1 also deposed that he handed over his torn shirt of dress/uniform to the IO, who prepared a pullanda of the same and sealed the same with the seal of 'RSN'. IO is also proclaimed to have seized the same vide seizure memo Ex. PW1/E, bearing PW-1's signature at point A. Thereafter, as per PW-1, the seal after use handed over to Ct. Umesh and the case property was deposited in malkahana. IO is also asserted to have recorded PW-1's statement. PW-1 further identified one shirt of dress bearing the batch of Ct. Ramrup, the left pocket of which and its three buttons were torn, as the one belonging to him and torn by the appellant, as well as seized by the IO, as Ex. P-1. PW-1 further identified one bottle of blood bearing the seal of 'HRH' and particulars of the present case and no.13/C-7276, as the same which was handed over to the IO by the Doctor and seized by the IO, as Ex. P-2.
16. Conspicuously, PW-1 in his cross examination by/at the behest of the appellant, asserted as under;
"XXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for accused. The incident took place at about 01:30 am on 02.09.2013. I do not remember whether any other public person was present at the spot along with accused or not. The incident took place outside/in front of PS Maurice Nagar which took around 10-15 Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 16 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:55:41 +0530 steps. I do not remember as to what colour of the cloths was worn by the accused on the date of incident. I do not know the weather of 01:30 am on the day of incident whether it was raining or not. On the main gate of the police station there is always a police personal i.e. Santri present outside of the police station. I do not remember on that day who was the police personal/Santri present outside the police station. On the day of incident one Santri was present outside the police station but I do not remember his name. It is wrong to suggest that on the day of incident it was raining heavily and the sky was overloaded with deep black clouds and due to which it is very difficult to identify the accused, therefore, the accused has been falsely implicated in the present case. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely at the instance of IO."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Strikingly, PW-2/Ct. Umesh deposed on the same lines as that of PW-1/Ct. Ramrup inter alia affirming that when PW-1, Anil Kumar and he/PW-2 went outside the police station on the date of the incident, the boy who was standing near the auto (identified by PW-2 as the appellant herein, before the Ld. Trial Court) stated hurling abusing language and caught hold the Ct. Ramroop/PW-1 from his collar due to which his uniform was torn. Further, as per PW-2, when he tried to save the Ct. Ramroop/PW-1, the appellant also manhandled him/PW-2. Further, as per PW-2, they tried to overpower the appellant/accused, however, the appellant was in drunken state/condition and also started quarreling with them as well as gave beatings to him/PW-2, due to which PW-2 is asserted to have sustained injuries. Needless to reiterate the remaining, deposition of PW-2 being in consonance with that of PW-1. Further, PW-2, in his cross examination, declared as under;
"XXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for accused. I do not know whether the night of incident was cloudy or not. There was one Santri present at the entrance gate of police station. I do not remember his name at present. I was medically examined. I Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 17 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:55:45 +0530 sustained the slight cut injury on my left hand finger. I do not know which finger sustained the injury. The distance between the place of incident and the entrance gate of police station 20-30 meters. It is wrong to suggest that uniform was torn by the officer himself. It is wrong to suggest that no such incident took place on any point of time. It is further wrong to suggest that accused was not present at the spot as alleged by the police. It is wrong to suggest that it is quite difficult to identify any person or thing as there was deep cloudy night when the incident took place. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Reference here is further made to the testimony/examination in chief of PW-3/Sh. Anil Kumar before the Ld. Trial Court who deposed as under;
"On 02.09.2013 at about 01:30 am I was standing infront of PS Maurice Nagar and waiting for the passengers. After couple of minutes one person came and ask me to go Sat Nagar, Burari at fare of Rs. 30/- and I said I will go by meter only. On this, the said person started manhandling with me and he was also in drunken condition. I came out of the auto and went inside the police station for help. Two police officials came alongwith me outside for my help. The said person whose name later on revealed as Romy Singh also started using abusive language against the police officials and caught hold the collar of one police official whose name was later on revealed as Ct. Ram Roop.
At this stage, witness is asked to look around the court whether the person who has fought with him and police officials is present or not to which he failed to identify the accused present in the court today stating that there was crowd and students' elections were going on."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Quite evidently, it is observed from above that, the complainant/PW-3 affirmed about the incident having taken place on 02.09.2013 at around 01:30 a.m., near PS Maurice Nagar and of the person/accused manhandling the complainant, being in drunken state and subsequently using abusive language against the police officials as well as holding collar of Ct. Ram Roop. Further, Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 18 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:55:49 +0530 PW-3 also asserted that he came to know of the name of the accused as Romy Singh, however, failed to identify the appellant as the said accused before the Ld. Trial Court, asserting that due to crowd and students' election, it would not be possible for him to identify the accused. Markedly, PW-3 in his cross examination by Ld. Addl. PP for the State denied the suggestion that the accused had torn the shirt of Ct. Ramrup and was confronted with the said extract in his statement Ex. PW3/A, where it was so recorded. Further, PW-3 also denied his signatures on the site plan as well as denied the suggestion that he was deliberately not identifying the appellant owing to a compromise between them.
20. Here, it is also apposite to refer to the deposition of PW-4/SI Ram Chander affirmed the facts stated by PW-1 and PW-2 in their respective depositions inter alia pertinent to him/PW-4's reaching the spot and apprehending the appellant; taking the victims as well as the appellant for their respective medical examination in the Hospital; recording of statements of witnesses, including the complainant, and having the FIR of the case registered through Ct. Manoj; seizure of the torn uniform of PW-1 and blood sample of the appellant, sealing the same and having the same deposited in malkhana, etc. In his cross examination, PW-4 affirmed that he had not witnessed the incident and that he could not say, whether at the time of incident, it was cloudy sky and dark. PW-4 further denied the suggestion that the appellant was falsely implicated in the present case and also denied the suggestion that all the paperwork of the present case was carried out, while sitting in the police station. Apposite at this stage, for the purposes of present discourse to refer to the relevant extracts of appellant's statement, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 313/281 Cr.P.C., as under;
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GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27
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"...Qn. Why PWs have deposed against you?
Ans. They all are interested witness.
Qn. Why this case has been registered against you?
Ans. It is a false case.
Qn. Do you want to say anything more?
Ans. I have been falsely implicated in this case..."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Conspicuously, in light of the foregoing, this Court would proceed with the evaluation of the contentions by/on behalf of the appellant in so far as it pertains to the reliability of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, in the instant case. In this regard, it is reiterated that one of the primary contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant is that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the appellant's conviction could not have been premised on the testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4, being police officials, in the absence of any corroborative public witnesses, especially when PW-3/the complainant did not support the case of the prosecution. However, the said contention, does not find any favour with this Court in light of the persistent avowals of the superior courts, declaring the police officials as competent witness in criminal trials/cases. Relevant in this regard, to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722, wherein the Hon'ble Court, in an akin context observed as under;
"30. It cannot be stated as a rule that a police officer can or cannot be a sole eyewitness in a criminal case. It will always depend upon the facts of a given case. If the testimony of such a witness is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidence, then the statement of such witness cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police officer and may have some interest in success of the case. It is only when his interest in the success of the case is motivated by overzealousness to an extent of his involving innocent people; in that event, no credibility can be attached to the statement of such witness.
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32. Wherever, the evidence of the police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. The courts have also expressed the view that no infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. Such reliable and trustworthy statement can form the basis of conviction."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Correspondingly, the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Roop Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 SCC OnLine P&H 443, to the akin effect, iterated the law as under;
"13. As regards the second limb of the argument that the conviction has been sustained merely on the testimony of two police officers without any independent corroboration, is also without any merit. It is certainly not the law that in each and every case irrespective of the case and attending circumstances, the evidence of the police officer needs coroboration before it is accepted or to be acted upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly, applies so much in favour of a police officer as of other persons and it is not the judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds therefor. Even if the testimony of a police officer requires some corroboration to be acted upon, the corroboration does not necessarily mean that the witness should be corroborated by other witness only. The testimony of a police officer can be corroborated by way of some intrinsic circumstantial evidence available on the record. In fact, in a given case, there may not be any other direct evidence of the witness to corroborate the evidence of the police officer but at the same time there is nothing to reach at the conclusion that the police officer was malicious and interested in falsely framing up the accused and there was certain in-built and unimpeachable circumstantial evidence on the record to support the evidence of the police officer, then in such a case implicit reliance can be placed upon the testimony of such a police officer."
(Emphasis supplied) Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 21 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:56:05 +0530
23. Here, it is further apposite to note the law on hostility of witness. In this regard, this Court is cognizant of the repeated declarations1 of the superior courts inter alia to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof, which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in C. Muniappan and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, enunciated the law as under;
"82. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra, (1996) 10 SCC 360] this Court held that (at SCC p.
363, para 7) evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543], Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516], Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P.,(2006) 2 SCC 450], Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360] and Subbu Singh v. State, (2009) 6 SCC 462.
83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence.
*** *** ***
85. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution's witness. As the mental abilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the 1 Selvamani v. The State rep. by the Inspector of Police, MANU/SC/0403/2024.
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details of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. Vide Sohrab v. State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751, State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505, Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217, State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2007) 12 SCC 381, Prithu v. State of H.P., (2009) 11 SCC 588, State of U.P. v. Santosh Kumar, (2009) 9 SCC 626 and State v. Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Therefore, in view of the principles noted hereinabove, this Court unambiguously observes that from the consistent testimonies of PW-1/Ct. Ramrup and PW-2/Ct. Umesh, the presence of the appellant in front of PS Maurice Nagar 02.09.2013 at around 01:30 a.m., his apprehension from the spot as well as the commission of incident by him, i.e., obstructing the said police officials in discharge of their official duty, as well as assaulting of using criminal force to deter said public servants from discharge of their duty by the appellant, besides, of the appellant's voluntarily causes hurt to the said police officials in the discharge of their official duty stands duly proved in the instant case. Further, as aforenoted, testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 cannot, in the considered opinion of this Court, be discarded solely for the reason of their employment/designation as police officials in view of the aforenoted judicial dictates, especially so when PW-1 and PW-2 are also the victims in the instant case and no reasons are forthcoming from the testimonies or cross examination of any of the police officials or other prosecution witness(es) to falsely implicate the appellant in the present case. Needless to further mention that the respective MLCs of PW-1 (MLC No. 6953/13, Ex. A-3) and PW-2 (MLC No. 6942/13, Ex. A-1), which were duly admitted by the appellant in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C., demonstrate the presence of 'simple injuries' on the body/person of said victims. Further, both the said Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 23 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:56:12 +0530 victims have explicated in their respective depositions of the factum of appellant's abusing them, beating them, as well as of the appellant's grabbing hold of the collar of PW-1 and tearing his uniform in the said process. As aforenoted, both, PW-1 and PW-2, being, government officials, inter alia enjoined to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience, clearly, fall within the meaning of 'public servant' under Section 21 of IPC, while discharging their said obligation when the offence in question was committed. Further, it is clear from the testimonies of the said witnesses, that both, PW-1 and PW-2 were acting on the complaint of PW-3 and under the direction of DO, in-charge of the police station at the relevant point in time, while endeavoring to contain the activities of the appellant at that point in time/relevant point in time, markedly, acting in 'discharge of their official duties', when the incident in question occurred/injuries and criminal force/assault ensued. Pertinent to further note here that the factum of the appellant being under the influence of alcohol at the time of occurrence, also stands duly corroborated from the FSL 2013/C-7276 dated 26.09.2013 (Ex. A-4, admitted by the appellant in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C.), which notes the sample/Exhbit-1 of the appellant to find containing, "Ethyl alcohol 182mg/100 ml of blood". Needless to further mention that, undoubtedly, PW-3/complainant did not identify the appellant as the assailant on the date of occurrence due to, "crowd and students elections were going on", however, the complainant, nevertheless corroborated the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 to the effect that on 02.09.2013 at around 01:30 a.m., near PS Maurice Nagar; one person manhandled him/PW-3 in drunken state; consequently, the complainant approached the police officials at PS Maurice Nagar;
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two police officials came along with PW-3 outside with him/PW-3 for his help and the said person, whose name was later on revealed as Romy Singh, "also started using abusive language against the police officials and caught hold the collar of one police official, whose name was later on revealed as Ct. Ram Roop." Ergo, this Court is concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the unimpeachable testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, lucidly point out towards the only finding of guilt of the appellant in the instant case. Further, as aforenoted, mere 'so called' hostility of PW-3 would not, in the considered opinion of this Court sufficient to put a dent in the prosecution's case, considering the law is trite that police officials are competent witnesses and there is no general rule to seek corroboration of testimony of police officials by independent witnesses in all cases. Needless to mention, the police officials in the instant case, i.e., PW-1 and PW-2 are also victims and PW-3, by and large corroborated the incident in his deposition, despite him failing to identify the appellant as the assailant. Here, this Court deems apposite to note that though under the cross examination of PW-1 and PW-2, the appellant/Ld. Counsel for the appellant endeavored to raise a defence that the appellant could not have been correctly identified as the assailant in the instant case by the said witness owing to 'dark and cloudy night' on the said date of occurrence, however, the said defence finds no mention in the appellant's statement under Section 313/281 Cr.P.C. Needless to mention, the appellant has deliberately opted not to lead any evidence in support of his said contention or take the said suggestion/defence further in any manner so as to sound reasonable/plausible to a prudent man under the circumstances put forth. Apposite to further note that the appellant under his statement recorded in terms of the provisions under Section Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 25 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:56:20 +0530 313/281 Cr.P.C. asserted that he has been falsely implicated in the present case and that the prosecution witnesses are 'interest witnesses'. However, even here, except for such mere assertion, no evidence/material is forthcoming on record in support of the appellant's said assertion. Needless to mention that no material/suggestion/evidence has been brought forth on record of the Ld. Trial Court by the appellant to corroborate the said avowal that the police officials endeavored to wrongfully implicate in the present case, as otherwise contended by him.
25. In so far as the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant pertaining to the alleged contradictions and variance in the statements/testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 is concerned, this Court is again in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the 'so called' variance and contradictions pertaining to PW-2's not remembering the finger in which he sustained injury; or the variance in PW-1's and PW-2's cross examination as to the place of occurrence being 10-15 steps or 20-30 steps, respectively, outside PS Maurice Nagar; or the absence of mention of injury by PW-1 in the FIR, are all not material, even in considered opinion of this Court. In fact, this Court ardently reiterates that non mentioning of entire particulars in the FIR is not detrimental to the case of prosecution, clearly, FIR being not an encyclopedia of events1. In regard the foregoing, in particular, in respect of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant's assertion regarding contradictions in testimonies of PW- 1 and PW-2, this Court deems it apt make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505 , wherein the Hon'ble Court inter alia observed as under;
1State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed Shaikh Babajan, (2009) 14 SCC 267.
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GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27
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"10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals. Cross-examination is an unequal duel between a rustic and refined lawyer. Having examined the evidence of this witness, a friend and well-wisher of the family carefully giving due weight to the comments made by the learned counsel for the respondent and the reasons assigned to by the High Court for rejecting his evidence simultaneously keeping in view the appreciation of the evidence of this witness by the trial court, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court was in error in rejecting the testimony of witness Nair whose evidence appears to us trustworthy and credible."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Similarly, in this regard, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rammi v. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649, noted as under;
"24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 27 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:56:29 +0530 who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Evidently, from the conspectus of the above, it may be clearly deduced that minor discrepancies, which do not go into the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, cannot be permitted to be annexed with any undue weight. In fact, it is trite law1, the discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution and those which emanate due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance and must necessarily be discarded. The rationale behind the same is quite obvious, as elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324, inter alia recording as under;
"30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence.1
Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241.
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Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited..."
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Ergo, to recapitulate, in order to disregard the testimony of a witness, it is imperative that the same is determined to be replete with material improvements, contradictions and variation. In contrast, law provides for due concession to marginal variations and normal discrepancies in the statement/testimony of a witness, which are bound to occur due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence, etc. Consequently, when the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 in the instant case are analyzed, mindful of aforenoted revered principles, this Court finds itself difficult to be convinced with the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that the testimonies of the said witnesses are unreliable and worthy of rejection.
29. Wherefore, in light of the foregoing discussion, when the evidence placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court is conscientiously evaluated, this Court unmistakably reaches a conclusion that from the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, victims/police officials, corroborated in material particular from the MLCs of PW-1 (MLC No. 6953/13, Ex. A-3) and PW-2 (MLC No. 6942/13, Ex. A-1) as well as FSL 2013/C-7276 dated 26.09.2013 (Ex. A-4, all said documents admitted by the appellant in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C.), torn cloth produced in court by the MHC(M) and duly identified by the said Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 29 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:56:37 +0530 witnesses, as well as also finding credence from the testimony of PW-3/complainant in the aspect hereinunder noted, this Court is of the considered opinion as well as in concurrence with the finding of Ld. Trial Court that the offences under Section 186, 332 and 353 IPC stand proved 'beyond reasonable doubt' against the appellant herein. However, the offence under Section 323 IPC is not proved unwaveringly against the appellant, in the absence of any assertion by PW-3 as to causation of any injury on the person of the complainant by the appellant herein. As a corollary and in light of the foregoing discussion, no error/lacunae/irregularity can be attributed to the impugned judgment dated 15.12.2023 of the Ld. Trial Court, which deserves to be upheld and is, accordingly, upheld.
30. In so far as the aspect of release of appellant on probation/according benefit of Section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act to the appellant is concerned, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the relevant provisions under the Probation of Offenders Act, as under;
"3. Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition-When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 379 or Section 380 or Section 381 or Section 404 or Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal Code or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under Section 4 release him after due admonition.
Explanation-For the purposes of this section, previous conviction against a person shall include any Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 30 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:56:41 +0530 previous order made against him under this section or Section 4.
4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct-(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1) is made, the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
(3) When an order under sub-section (1), the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order or impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender.
Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 31 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:56:45 +0530 (5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Notably, the Probation of Offenders Act was brought into force, in view of the increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of the offenders as useful and self-reliant members of society without subjecting them to deleterious effects of jail life, however, law is trite 1 that no one can claim the benefit of Sections 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act as a matter of right and the court has to, "pass appropriate orders in the facts and circumstances of each case having regard to the nature of the offence, its general effect on the society and the character of the offender, etc." Correspondingly, superior courts have persistently avowed2 that for the benefit under Probation of Offenders Act to enure in favour of an accused, court must be cognizance of the nature of offence, conditions stipulated under Section 4 of the said enactment, as well as, judicial precedents governing the field.
32. Whence, in light of the foregoing principles, this Court would now proceed with the determination of rival contentions of Ld. Counsel for the appellant to the effect that the appellant is a young man of 39 years of age, responsible to take care of his old/ailing parents, besides the appellant is a Law graduate in the year, 2020 and due to the order of fine/conviction having been passed by the Ld. Trial Court, the appellant had been unable to register himself with the Bar Council of Delhi, further disentitling him job prospects. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the appellant is a peace 1 Commandant, 20th Battalion, ITB Police v. Sanjay Binjola, (2001) 5 SCC 317.
2Mohd. Hashim v. State of U.P., (2017) 2 SCC 198.
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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living and law-abiding citizen and the incident in question was neither premediated nor deliberate, rather, occasioned due to a quarrel over a trivial issue, where even the appellant had sustained injuries, besides the appellant had never been involved in any other case, much less convicted of any offence, entitling the benefit of probation, including Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act in the instant case. However, as aforenoted, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that there are multiple aggravating factors against the appellant, disentitling the appellant to relaxation of probation in the instant case.
33. Ergo, in light of the foregoing submissions of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant and that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State, further, being wary of the facts and circumstances of the present case, aggravating as well as mitigating factors brought forth, antecedents of the appellant and the possibility of reformation in view of the report of the probation officer dated 28.03.2024 inter alia noting that the appellant has, "positive attitude and optimistic approach. He is highly motivated to lead his life with the discipline norms of society...there is full scope of improvement in his behavior as well as in way of social life..." , this Court is of the considered opinion that in the matter at hand, the appellant deserves the benefit of probation/provisions under Probation of Offenders Act, which has rightly so1 been accorded by the Ld. Trial Court.
1Law is settled that when the Ld. Trial Court releases an accused on probation of good conduct even though he had been found guilty of the graver offence, the appellate court should not deprive him of that benefit without some cogent grounds, while finding him guilty of lesser/minor offence. Reference is further made to the decision in Ramnaresh Pandey vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/SC/0159/19734, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court noted, "Neither the learned Additional Sessions Judge nor the High Court gave any reason why the appellant should be deprived of the benefit of an order under Section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act under which provision the appellant had been released by the trial court. In the absence of any cogent reason the appellant, in our opinion, should not have been deprived of that benefit. We accordingly accept the Appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct that the appellant should be released on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act as directed by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied).
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34. Needless to mention that there is nothing on record to demonstrate that the appellant preserved to harass or trouble the victims/complainant, subsequent to the day of incident; appellant has expressed an inclination to lead normal life as well as, undertaken not to repeat similar offences in future, the appeal and faced the ordeal of litigation as early as year, 2016, i.e., when the chargesheet was filed; there is nothing negative in the probation reports against the appellant, rather, as aforenoted, the probation officer has recommended that the case of the appellant for benefit of probation, there is no previous conviction, as well as the offences proved against the appellant are not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Needless to further mention that as per the aforesaid report of the probation officer, the appellant has a fixed abode in the local limits of NCT of Delhi, the appellant further has favorable and positive report qua his behavior as well as there are no complaints of anti-social behavior against him. Further, as per the appellant's nominal roll dated 19.11.2024, nothing adverse has been brought to the notice of this Court. Conclusively, this Court is of the considered opinion that having regard to the foregoing circumstances, the benefit of probation was rightly accorded to the appellant herein by the Ld. Trial Court. However, it is pertinent to observe that as per the mandate of law, in particular, that under Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, Ld. Trial Court, while granting the benefit of Section 4 of the said enactment, could have awarded compensation in favour of the victims, payable by the appellant and not fine, as directed under the impugned order.
35. Conclusively, in light of the foregoing discussion, the conviction of the appellant under Section 186, 332 and 353 IPC is upheld. Accordingly, the judgment dated 15.12.2023, passed by Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 34 of 36 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2024.11.27 12:57:02 +0530 the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate-01/Ld. MM-01, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing; "State v. Romy Singh, Case No. 296128/2016", arising out of FIR No. 102/2013, PS. Maurice Nagar, under Sections 186/353/332/323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is hereby upheld. However, in so far as the order of sentence dated 01.04.2023/impugned order is concerned, same is modified to the extent that that the appellant, namely, Romy Singh would be now accorded/entitled to benefit under Sections 3/4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, upon the appellant furnishing a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) with one surety of the like amount each, subject to the satisfaction of the Ld. Trial Court, with an undertaking to appear and receive punishment when called upon and in the meantime, to keep the peace and be of good behavior maintain peace during the period of 01 (one) year, as well as further subject to the following conditions;
i) The appellant shall not involve himself in any offence and registration of any further case shall make him liable for cancellation of probation;
ii) The appellant shall receive the sentence as may be given by the court, if the benefit of probation is withdrawn;
iii) The appellant shall maintain peace and harmony and refrain from criminal activity; and
iv) The appellant is further directed to deposit Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand only) with the Ld. Trial Court, to be released as compensation to the victims, in terms of the provisions under Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
36. Needless to mention that since the appellant, namely, Romy Singh, has been dealt with under Section(s) 3/4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, he shall not suffer any disqualification attached with conviction, in terms of Section 12 of the said enactment1/Probation of the Offenders Act. At request, the bonds, 1 Radhey Shyma And Another v. State of U.P. & Anr., Crl. Rev. No. 436 of 2014, dated 20.09.2023 (Hon'ble Allahabad HC).
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surety and compensation, as aforesaid be filed/deposited by the accused, within seven days from the date of this judgment, as per law and rules.
37. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this judgment/order.
38. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance. Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2024.11.27 12:57:52 +0530 Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal) on 27.11.2024. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi Crl. Appeal No. 175/2024 Romy Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) Page No. 36 of 36