Delhi High Court
Harbans Singh And Others vs Smt. Gurcharan Kaur on 21 November, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1990CRILJ1591, I(1990)DMC416
ORDER
1. This petition has been brought under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashment of the complaint pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate under S. 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'). It has been pleaded by the petitioners that the said offence punishable under S. 4 of the Act cannot be taken cognizance of as the same is barred by limitation.
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that Smt. Gurcharan Kaur, respondent has filed a complaint against the present petitioners and two other persons, namely, Jang Bahadur Singh and Sukhjit Bahadur Singh, making allegations that her marriage was performed with Gursharan Singh on July 12, 1981, at Delhi and at the time of the settlement of the marriage, the petitioners had demanded dowry items comprising of T.V., fridge and scooter or Rs. 20,000/- in lieu thereof besides other items of dowry which are given at the time of marriage normally. It was mentioned that the complainant's father had expressed his inability to meet the demands regarding T.V., fridge and scooter or Rs. 20,000/- in lieu of the same but he agreed to meet the said demands by the by after the marriage and the petitioners are stated to have agreed to the performance of marriage under such conditions with great reluctance. It was further alleged that after 3-4 months of the marriage, the petitioners again raised the demand for supply of the said dowry items or Rs. 20,000/- in lieu thereof as consideration for the marriage and the complainant managed to obtain Rs. 1,000/- on two occasions but the same did not satisfy the greed of the petitioners. It was alleged that the demand of said dowry items was again repeated from time to time and ultimately on July 2, 1983, the complainant was turned out from the matrimonial house on failure of her parents to meet the said demand of dowry. After obtaining necessary sanction from the authorities concerned, the complaint was filed.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that any demand of dowry made after the performance of the marriage cannot be termed as offence under S. 4 of the Act as is stood before amendment of the Act. He has further argued that demand of dowry made before the marriage as consideration for the marriage constituted the offence which had become time barred by the time the complaint was filed.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent has, on the other hand, argued that the dowry items demanded by the petitioners were as consideration for performance of the marriage and those dowry items could not be given at the time of the marriage and were agreed to be given by and by but the repetition of the demand of the said items of dowry constituted an offence and the limitation would start running only from the date the last demand for the said items of dowry was made and calculating the limitation from that date, the complaint was filed well within time.
5. S. 7 of the Act (before amendment) prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of an offence except on a complaint made within one year from the date of the offence. So, the crucial question which arises for decision in the present case is as to what could be considered the date of the offence ? It is obvious that if the date of the offence in the present case is to be deemed to be the date when the first demand of dowry items was made, as consideration for performance of the marriage, before the marriage was performed then the complaint filed in 1983 was hopelessly barred by time. But if it is to be held that the date of offence is also when the demand for the said dowry items was repeated even after the performance of the marriage and till the complainant was turned out from the matrimonial house, then on the face of it the complaint filed being well within one year from that date is not barred by limitation.
6. S. 2 of the Unamended Act defined 'dowry' as any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly ...... at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage. In the present case, the allegation made in the complaint and the statements made as preliminary evidence in support of the complaint preliminary evidence in support of the complaint clearly show that the items of dowry demanded at the time of settlement of the marriage were obviously as consideration for the marriage and come well within the definition of 'dowry' given in S. 2 of the Act. It is true that if dowry items are not demanded as consideration for the marriage they would not constitute 'dowry' as understood by S. 2 of the Act as it stood before amendment. So, any demand of any property or valuables after the performance of the marriage which demand of dowry items would not constitute dowry as understood by S. 2 of the Act. In Mandan Lal v. Amar Nath (1984) 2 Crimes 584 : (1985 Cri LJ NOC 118), it has been laid down by a single Judge of this Court that the property given must not merely be "connected" with the marriage marriage but must be connected as a quid pro quo, as it were, in the sense that it is the property given either to secure an agreement to marry or given at the time of marriage in exchange for or as the reasons for the marriage and it may also include property given subsequent to the marriage but expressly deferred as the reason for the marriage but would not include property that may pass hands subsequent to the marriage, even months or years after it, merely to save the marriage from being broken or to otherwise keep the family of the in laws of the wife better disposed towards her, or to smoothen the course of matrimonial life, or to save the wife from harassment, humuliation, or taunts, on the ground that the she did to bring enough at the time of marriage. So, unless and until, there is a demand of 'dowry' items made as consideration for the marriage, the said items could not be deemed to be 'dowry' as understood by S. 2 of the Act. Even if certain items of dowry which have been demanded as consideration for the marriage are not given at the time of the marriage, still those items of dowry would continue to be covered by the definition of 'dowry' given in S. 2 of the Act even though the said dowry items are given after the performance of the marriage but if no dowry items have been agreed or demanded as consideration for the marriage then even if some demand of dowry is made after the performance of the marriage, the latter would not come within the meaning of 'dowry' as given in S. 2 of the Act. Similar view was expressed by another single Judge of this Court in Inder Sain v. State (1981) 20 DLT 309 : (1981 Cri LJ 1116), which judgment was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of L. V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar .
7. In the case of L. V. Jadhav (supra), the highest Court had widened the scope of the demand of dowry as given in S. 4 of the Act by laying down that it is not necessary that the demand of dowry should have been agreed to by the other party at the time of settlement of the marriage in order to constitute the offence under S. 4 of the Act. Mere demand of dowry items as consideration for the marriage at the time of settlement of the marriage was held to come within the mischief of S. 4 of the Act. A single Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Nirdosh Kumar v. Smt. Padma Rani alias Meena (1984) 2 Rec Cri R 239, also laid down by a single Bench of this Court in two above cases.
8. The question which has arisen for decision in this case before me has not been considered by any of the judgments cited at the bar. In Lajpat Rai Sehgal v. State (1983) 23 DLT 324 : (1983 Cri LJ 888), a single Judge examined the question whether the delay made in filing a complaint beyond the period of limitation prescribed could be condoned or not by taking resort to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Court came to lay down that a delay for sufficient reasons could be condoned by taking resort to provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in view of S. 4(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case, this question has not arisen whether there exists any sufficient ground for condensation of delay. The question which has arisen for decision is as to what should be treated as a date of offence for calculating the period of limitation. However, in the case of Lajpat Rai (supra) the facts were, to some extent, similar that a demand of dowry items as consideration for the marriage was made prior to the marriage and the demand was repeated even after the marriage. However, the complaint filed in the case was beyond limitation even from the date when the fresh demand of dowry was made. S. 4 of the Act reads as follows :
"If any person, after the commencement of this, demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both :
Provided that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this section except with the previous sanctions of the State Government or of such officer as the State Government may, by general or special order, specify in this behalf."
9. A perusal of the aforesaid section shows that the demand of dowry itself is an offence. Of course, that demand must be dowry items as understood by S. 2 of the Act. In the present case, it is true that a demand was made regarding the dowry items as consideration for the marriage, so the offence, of course, stood committed even before the marriage was performed. However, when the demand was repeated again and again after the performance of the marriage in respect of the same very items of dowry which are covered by definition of 'dowry' given in S. 2 of the Act, the petitioners would be, in my view, deemed to have committed again an offence under S. 4 of the Act when the demand was repeated. I am not laying down that the offence contemplated under section 4 of the Act is a continuing offence but what I am emphasising is that every demand of dowry whenever repeated constitutes another offence and thus, the dates of commission of the offence under Section 4 would be when the demand was made initially and also when the said demand was repeated afresh. The wording of S. 4 of the Act does not make the demand as an offence which has been made only prior to the marriage. It is evident that the dowry items demanded as consideration for the marriage, which come within the definition of 'dowry' in S. 2 of the Act, if are given prior to the marriage or at the time of the marriage, the person taking such dowry items would be guilty of offence punishable under S. 3 of the Act which reads as follows :
"If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both."
10. It is also very clear that if some dowry items which were demanded as consideration for the marriage are not given at the time of the marriage but are given after the performance of the marriage even then such person taking such dowry would be deemed to have committed offence punishable under S. 3 of the Act. Similarly even though the dowry items demanded prior to the marriage as consideration for the marriage are not given at all even then the offence stands committed when the demand was made would come within the fore corners of S. 4 of the Act and similarly, if a demand is repeated after the marriage the person repeating such a demand would be deemed to have committed an offence again under S. 4 of the Act and the date of offence would be also when the demand is repeated in respect of the dowry items demanded at the time of the marriage as consideration for the marriage.
11. In view of the above discussion, I conclude that the complaint filed by the respondent was not barred by limitation. This view is being expressed by me on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint and the preliminary evidence led in support of the complaint. Nothing would debar the trial Court to give any finding on merits if on merits the trial Court comes to the conclusion that no demand of dowry was made after the performance of the marriage. The trial Court could then return the finding that the complaint is barred by time as the demand made at the time of settlement of the marriage was beyond the period of one year preceding the filing of the complaint I hence dismiss this petition.
12. Petition dismissed.