Telangana High Court
Puppala Suchitra And 3 Others vs K. Preamchander Reddy And 2 Others on 23 January, 2025
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 COMMON ORDER:
Since the parties and lis involved in both the revision petitions are same, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
2. CRP.No.2527 of 2022 is filed challenging the order dated 20.07.2022 passed in IA.No.546 of 2021 in OS.No.162 of 2019 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, at LB.Nagar ; and CRP.No.429 of 2023 is filed challenging the order dated 10.01.2022 passed in IA.No.4 of 2021 in CMA.SR.No.8 of 2021 on the file of the Principal District Judge, at LB.Nagar, Ranga Reddy District. CRP.No.2527 OF 2022
3. The brief facts of the case are that the respondents herein filed IA.No.546 of 2021 in OS.No.162 of 2019 under Order I Rule 10 of CPC praying to implead them as plaintiff Nos.2 to 3 in the suit, stating that they purchased the suit schedule property from Plaintiff No.1 through a registered 2 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 sale deed dated 09.09.2019. However, Defendants 1 to 4 claimed ownership of the property, alleging that they had purchased it from Ayesha Tabassum, who had acquired it from Syed Sami Ahmed. It was contended that Syed Sami Ahmed was an imposter who had created forged documents, including the sale deed and that defendant Nos.1 to 4 were aware of the pending suit and had purchased the property with knowledge of the dispute. On the other hand, the defendant Nos.1 to 4 claimed that they were the absolute owners and possessors of the plot, having purchased it from Ayesha Tabassum, and that they had constructed a compound wall and erected a gate on the property, and had obtained an electricity connection as well.
4. After hearing both sides, the trial Court considered the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the CPC and the principles laid down in various judgments, such as, Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay 1, Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal 2, Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon 3, Kunna Ramulu v. 1 (1992) 2 SCC 524 2 2004) 2 SCC 601 3 (2005) 11 SCC 403 3 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 Kunna Annapurnamma 4, Pannala Renuka v. Kavali (Rajumouni) Venkataiah 5 and held that the respondents herein were necessary parties to the suit and that their impleadment would avoid multiplicity of proceedings and allowed the petition, directing them to pay costs of Rs.2,000/- to the petitioners herein and to carry out amendments and file a neat copy of the plaint within 14 days.
CRP.No.429 OF 2023
5. The brief facts of this case are that the respondents herein who are third parties to IA.No.257 of 2019 in OS.No.162 of 2019 filed IA.No.4 of 2021 in CMA.SR.No.8 of 2021 under Section 151 of CPC seeking leave to file CMA against the order dated 30.01.2020 passed in the said IA., stating that they are the purchasers of the suit schedule property from the Plaintiff, and contended that they are the bona fide purchasers of the suit schedule property and have a strong case. On the other hand, the said plea was strongly opposed contending that the respondents herein are third 4 2002 (2) ALT 491 5 2006 (6) ALD 761 4 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 parties to the suit and have no locus standi to file the appeal, and that they have no cause of action. The trial Court considered the provisions of CPC and the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.N. Krishna Murthy v. Ravikumar 6 and Raj Kumar v. Sardar Lal 7 and held that a stranger can appeal against a decree, only if he is aggrieved person whose rights are affected, and observed that the respondents herein are lis pendente transferees, having purchased the suit schedule property during the pendency of the suit, and that they are bound by the decree passed in the suit and have the right to challenge it, and accordingly, allowed the petition, granting the respondents herein leave to appeal against the impugned order. Aggrieved thereby, these revision petitions are filed.
6. Heard Sri D.Jagan Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for petitioners, and Sri Koppula Gopal, learned counsel for respondents.
6 2020 5 ALD 153 SC 7 2004 2 ALD 95 SC 5 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023
7. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the trial Court erred in allowing I.A.No.546 of 2021 in O.S.No.162 of 2019 which was filed by respondents herein who contend that they have purchased the suit schedule property from the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. He contended that the respondents being purchasers pendente lite cannot be permitted to be brought on record in a suit for injunction and relied on the principle that a purchaser pendente lite is not entitled to be impleaded in a suit for injunction, as the suit is primarily between the plaintiff and the defendant. He asserted that the trial court failed to appreciate that in a suit for injunction, the plaintiff is required to prove possession over the suit schedule property as on the date of filing the suit, and that subsequent purchasers, such as Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, would not be in a better position to prove the possession of plaintiffs. He lamented that the plaintiffs possession is a crucial factor in determining the reliefs in a suit for injunction, and that the application to implead respondents was filed only to delay the proceedings in the suit. 6
SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023
8. Learned counsel for petitioners incessantly contended that respondents purchased the suit schedule property after the order of injunction was vacated, and subsequently filed C.M.A.SR.No.08 of 2021 with a leave to challenge the order, and lamented that the same would show the clear attempt to re-agitate the issue that had already been decided by the trial Court. Therefore, while praying this Court to allow the revision petitions, setting aside the order dated 20.07.2022 passed in IA.No.546 of 2021 in OS.No.162 of 2019 as well as order dated 10.01.2022 passed in IA.No.4 of 2021 in CMA.SR.No.8 of 2021, in support of the said contentions, he relied on the judgments rendered in the case of S.Kumudham Vs. R.Rajendiran and Another 8, whereunder, it was observed that "A Court of law is not under an obligation to make a lis pendens suit, seeking appropriate relief in the manner known to law and in accordance with law". He also relied on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Others 9. Furthermore, in the case of Mohd. Sharfuddin Vs. 8 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 3850 9 2017 16 SCC 680 7 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 Mohd. Jamal and Others 10 and the relevant paragraph Nos.19 to 21 read as under:
"19. A learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court in Shankaralingappa v. Nanje Gowda, AIR 1981 Karnataka 78, held that a judgment in a suit for injunction is not a judgment in rem and binds only the parties to the suit. Broadly, 'privies' are of three kinds viz., (i) 'privies' in blood; (ii) 'privies' in estate and (iii) 'privies' in law. The plaintiff is not a 'privy' in blood and a 'privy' in law. But, the question is whether he is a 'privy' in estate. The learned Judge observed at paras 25 and 26 as follows:
"The suit filed by Kalaiah as also the suit filed by the plaintiff are not for declaration of title or their ownership. Both the suits are simple suits for permanent injunctions. A decree for permanent injunction does not prohibit the defendant from instituting a suit for declaration of his title and for recovery of possession from the very decree holder that has obtained a decree for permanent injunction. On the very first principle stated by Sir William de Grey in 10 2003 SCC OnLine AP 184 8 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 Duchess of Kingston's case, as also on the legal principles that distinguish ownership and possession, it is difficult to hold that a transferee is a 'privy' in estate and the decree made against his transferor operates as res judicata against him. A decree for permanent injunction obtained by one person against another person, cannot obviously bind all other persons and ignore the factual changes that take place with regard to possession. If that is not the position, then it ignores all legal and factual changes that take place and stamps that decree as if it is a covenant running with that land. With all the anxiety of law to safeguard possession, acceptance of such a proposition, would even defeat the very safeguards provided by law and would create innumerable problems in safeguarding possession. In this view also, the Court should be loath to accept the extreme proposition that the plaintiff, the transferee is a 'privy' in estate and the decree obtained by Kalaiah against Lingamma operates as res judicata against him. From this it follows, that the decree in O.S. No. 597 of 1942-1943 (Exhibit D-12) cannot operate as res judicata against the plaintiff.9
SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 An injunction does not run with the land. An injunction only acts in personam or against a person. Both these principles are firmly established legal principles (vide Somnath Honnappa Bennalkar v. Bhimrao Subrao Patil, ILR (1974) Kant 1506)."
20. In Ganesh v. Narayan, AIR 1931 Bom. 484, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that "a decree for permanent injunction obtained against a father in Hindu Joint family can be executed against the son."
21. The learned Senior Counsel also refers to the passage in Text Book by Sir John George Woodroffe on law relating to Injunctions in India and extracted para 17.03 which reads thus:
"INJUNCTION IN RESPECT OF ACTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL:--Insofar as an injunction is in its nature a remedy against an individual, it will be issued only in respect of acts done by him against whom it is sought to be enforced. Thus, an injunction cannot be obtained against executors on account of acts done by their testator. They may be sued for an injunction in respect of a wrong done by themselves, but they 10 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 cannot be so sued in a representative character. And for the same reason, namely, that an injunction is an order directed to a person, it does not run with the land. By reason of this same operation in personam the Court may exercise jurisdiction quite independently of the act to be done, provided the defendant be within the reach and amenable to the process of the Court."
9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for petitioners and asserted that there are no illegalities or irregularities in the orders under challenge, as the respondents herein are purchasers of the property from plaintiffs and if any order is granted against the plaintiffs, the same shall bound on them as well. Therefore, while praying this Court to dismiss the Revision Petitions, as the same lacks merits, he relied on the judgments rendered in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw and Another Vs. Farida Khatoon and Another 11 whereunder, it was observed that "Under Order XXII Rule 10, no detailed inquiry at the stage of granting leave is contemplated. The court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its 11 2005 11 SCC 403 11 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit by or against the person on whom the interest has devolved by assignment or devolution. The question about the existence and validity of the assignment or devolution can be considered at the final hearing of the proceedings. The court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit". Further, in the case of V.Narayana Reddy Vs. Ani Narayanam and Another 12 in paragraph No.16 it was observed as under:
"16. In Kesari Goutham Reddy v. Velpula John Victor Macaulay, 2007 (5) ALD 656 the question that arose for consideration before this Court was whether a purchaser pendente lite the proceedings can come on record to safeguard his interests in the pending litigation, and whether it would not be just and proper to dismiss such an application. This Court followed the judgments of the apex Court in Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal, (2004) 2 SCC 601 and Amit Kumar Shaw v.
Farida Khatoon, (AIR 2005 SC 2209) and held that a person sought to be impleaded is a proper and necessary party to the proceedings because 12 2009 4 ALD 13 12 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 his interests are going to be affected it he was not added as party to the proceedings."
10. Having regard to the rival submissions made and on going through the material placed on record, it is noted that admittedly, the respondents are subsequent purchasers of the suit schedule property. The trial Court while considering the judgments passed in the cases of V.N. Krishna Murthy (supra 6) and Raj Kumar (supra 7) allowed the orders under challenge, specifically observing that leave to appeal should be granted to the respondents herein, them being the lis pendent transferees, having been bound by the decree passed and that they have got equally right to question the validity of the order, and are entitled to seek leave to prefer the appeal against the order.
11. In the context of civil proceedings, the issue of impleading a purchaser pendente lite often arises, to which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principle that under Order XXII Rule 10 of CPC, the Court need only be prima facie satisfied to grant leave for continuing the suit, without conducting a detailed inquiry into the assignment or 13 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 devolution of interest. The said principle was reaffirmed in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw (supra 11) whereunder, it was held that the validity and existence of such assignment or devolution can be examined at the final hearing, and that the said approach ensures that the proceedings are not unduly delayed or complicated by unnecessary inquiries at the interlocutory stage. Furthermore, in the case of V.Narayana Reddy (supra 12) the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied on the judgment rendered in Kesari Goutham Reddy v. Velpula John Victor Macaulay 13, in Raj Kumar (supra 7) and Amit Kumar Shaw (supra 11) to hold that a purchaser pendente lite can be impleaded as a necessary party to safeguard their interests. In essence, it was recognized that a purchaser pendente lite has a legitimate stake in the outcome of the proceedings and should be permitted to participate in the suit to protect their rights and the said approach promotes justice and ensures that all parties with a legitimate interest in the dispute, are heard.
12. Reverting to the facts of the case on hand, it is imperative to note that the respondents are subsequent 13 2007 5 ALD 656 14 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527/2022 & 429/2023 purchasers of the suit schedule property from plaintiffs and having regard to the legal position as discussed above, it is needless to mention that any order passed against the plaintiffs, shall have binding on the respondents herein as well. In other words, it is a matter of their right to seek proper adjudication. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that there are absolutely no illegalities or irregularities committed by the trial Court in impleading the respondents herein as party to the suit and in granting leave to them to prefer appeal against the injunction order, warranting interference of this Court. There are no merits in these revision petitions and the same are liable to be dismissed.
13. Accordingly, these Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall also stand closed.
_______________ K. SUJANA, J Date: 23.01.2025 PT