Supreme Court - Daily Orders
The Chairman Vaidyanath Sahakari ... vs Shantabai on 13 February, 2025
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.29239 of 2019)
THE CHAIRMAN, VAIDYANATH SAHAKARI
SAKHAR KARKHANA LTD. & ANOTHER … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
SHANTABAI & ANOTHER … RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. Being aggrieved by the Judgment dated 29.04.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad, in First Appeal No.98 of 2012, the appellants have preferred this Special Leave Petition.
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case concern one Late Shri Uddhav Sadashiv Zanje [hereinafter “deceased- workman”] Signature Not Verified who was working as a Quadruple mate in Digitally signed by JAGDISH KUMAR Date: 2025.03.03 18:55:44 IST Reason: Vaidyanath Cooperative Sugar Factory Ltd., Pangri CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 1 of 19 [hereinafter “factory”]. The respondents herein are dependents of the deceased workman and the appellants are Chairman and Managing Director of the factory.
4. According to the respondents/claimants, on 01.12.2008 while the deceased workman was working in the sugar factory in the shift between 12.00 PM and 08.00 PM, due to pressure of work and psychological tensions, he suffered a heart-attack and was admitted to Sanjivani Hospital in Parali. However, he could not survive and died due to the heart-attack. At the time of death, the deceased workman was 50 years old and was drawing a monthly salary of Rs.8,950/-.
5. The respondents filed a claim for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (now the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1954) (hereinafter “the Act”) bearing WCA Appln. No.01 of 2010, claiming the death to be an accidental death. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Beed, vide judgment dated 18.10.2011, dismissed the claim. Aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal being First Appeal No.98 of 2012 before the High Court of CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 2 of 19 Judicature of Bombay, Aurangabad Bench. By impugned judgment and order dated 29.04.2019, the High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the deceased workman sustained personal injury by accident arising out of and in course of his employment. It held the respondents herein to be entitled to compensation of Rs.6,85,078 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from 01.01.2009 till the realization of this compensation amount. Further, it held that the respondents were also entitled to penalty of Rs.3,42,539 from the appellants.
6. We have heard Ms. Anindita Mitra, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, learned counsel for the respondents.
7. At the outset, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was a change in the management of the appellant-Factory and that she has brought to the notice of the appellant the pendency of this appeal. However, there has been no alternative arrangement made by the appellant-Factory insofar as the prosecution of this appeal is concerned.
CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 3 of 19
8. We take note of this submission and since the appellant-Factory is presently a going concern, we have heard learned counsel for the appellants as representing the appellant-Factory and she has effectively made her submissions in the case.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that while the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner was right in dismissing the Workmen’s Compensation Application No.1 of 2010, the High Court was not right in allowing the same and thereby awarding compensation of Rs.6,85,078/- to the respondents herein who are stated to be the dependents of the deceased-Workman. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the deceased- Workman was working as a Quadruple mate in the Factory; that on 01.12.2008 while he was working in the Factory in the shift between 12:00 PM and 08:00 PM, he suffered a heart-attack and was admitted to Sanjeevini Hospital in Parali. However, he did not survive and died in the later hours of that day in the hospital. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the death was not owing to any injury suffered during the course of and CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 4 of 19 arising out of employment as envisaged in Section 3 of the Act; that the ingredients of Section 3 are wholly inapplicable to the facts of the case; that when the death occurred on account of a heart-attack, it was not proved to be an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and therefore, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner rightly rejected the claim of the respondents herein. However, the High Court has reversed the said decision and has awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.6,85,078/- with interest @ 12% per annum from 01.01.2009 onwards till realisation, which is contrary to Section 3 of the Act and contrary to the law. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court may be set aside and the claim made by the respondents be dismissed. In this regard, learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti vs. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali, (2007) 11 SCC 668.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents- claimants supported the impugned judgment and contended CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 5 of 19 that there is no doubt that the heart-attack of the deceased-workman occurred during the discharge of his duties; that he was 50 years of age and he was working as a Quadruple mate in the factory and the scope and ambit of his duties were stressful, which led to the workman suffering a heart-attack when he was just 50 years of age. The Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner was not right in rejecting the claim. But the High Court has rightly allowed the claim and has correctly assessed the compensation, which judgment would not call for any interference by this Court. Learned counsel further placed reliance on another judgment of this Court in the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation & Another vs. Francis De Costa & Another, {(1996) 6 SCC 1} to contend that the expression used in Section 3 of the Act must be construed liberally as the 1923 Act is an Act for the purpose of achieving social justice and for the benefit of workmen. Hence, the case has to be considered in light of the facts and also the expression used in Section 3 of the Act must be liberally interpreted and applied to the facts of the present case. In this regard, it was submitted that possibly if the deceased CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 6 of 19 workman was not working as a Quadruple mate in the appellant-Factory but in any other organisation and in any other capacity and designation, he may not have died due to a heart-attack prematurely at the age of 50 years. In other words, the submission was that owing to the stressful nature of the job, the deceased workman suffered the heart-attack while discharging his duties on 09.12.2008. Learned counsel therefore, submitted that there is no merit in this appeal.
11. We have considered the respective arguments advanced at the Bar.
12. Section 3 of the Act reads as follows:
“3. Employer's liability for compensation.--
(1) If personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:
Provided that the employer shall not be so liable--
(a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the employee for a period exceeding three days;CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 7 of 19
(b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death or permanent total disablement, caused by an accident which is directly attributable to--
(i) the employee having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or
(ii) the wilful disobedience of the employee to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of employees, or
(iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the employee of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of employees.
(2) If an employee employed in any employment specified in Part A of Schedule III contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment, or if a [employee], whilst in the service of an employer in whose service he has been employed for a continuous period of not less than six months (which period shall not include a period of service under any other employer in the same kind of employment) in any employment specified in Part B of Schedule III, contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment, or if a [employee] whilst in the service of one or more employers in any employment specified in Part C of Schedule III for such continuous period as the Central Government may specify in respect of each such employment, contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment, the contracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section and, CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 8 of 19 unless the contrary is proved, the accident shall be deemed to have arisen out of, and in the course of, the employment:
Provided that if it is proved,--
(a) that a employee whilst in the service of one or more employers in any employment specified in Part C of Schedule III has contracted a disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment during a continuous period which is less than the period specified under this sub-section for that employment, and
(b) that the disease has arisen out of and in the course of the employment; the contracting of such disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section:
Provided further that if it is proved that a employee who having served under any employer in any employment specified in Part B of Schedule III or who having served under one or more employers in any employment specified in Part C of that Schedule, for a continuous period specified under this sub-section for that employment and he has after the cessation of such service contracted any disease specified in the said Part B or the said Part C, as the case may be, as an occupational disease peculiar to the employment and that such disease arose out of the employment, the contracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section.
(2A) If a employee employed in any employment specified in Part C of Schedule III contracts any occupational disease peculiar to that employment, the contracting whereof is deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section, and such employment was under more than one employer, all such employers shall be liable for the payment of the compensation in CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 9 of 19 such proportion as the Commissioner may, in the circumstances, deem just. The Central Government or the State Government after giving, by notification in the Official Gazette, not less than three months’ notice of its intention so to do, may, by a like notification, add any description of employment to the employments specified in Schedule III, and shall specify in the case of employments so added the diseases which shall be deemed for the purposes of this section to be occupational diseases peculiar to those employments respectively, and thereupon the provisions of subsection shall apply in the case of a notification by the Central Government, within the territories to which this Act extends or, in case of a notification by the State Government, within the State as if such diseases had been declared by this Act to be occupational diseases peculiar to those employments.
x x x (4) Save as provided by sub-Sections (2), (2A)] and (3) no compensation shall be payable to a11 employee in respect of any disease unless the disease is directly attributable to a specific injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
(5) Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to confer any right to compensation on a employee in respect of any injury if he has instituted in a Civil Court a suit for damages in respect of the injury against the employer or any other person; and no suit for damages shall be maintainable by a employee in any Court of law in respect of any injury--
(a) if he has instituted a claim to compensation in respect of the injury before a Commissioner; or CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 10 of 19
(b) if an agreement has been come to between the employee and his employer providing for the payment of compensation in respect of the injury in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
13. The words “arising out of and in the course of his employment” have been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In this regard, we extract the relevant portions of the judgment of this Court in ESI Corporation (supra) as under:
“13. The meaning of the words “in the course of his employment” appearing in Section 3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, was examined by this Court in the case of Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja [AIR 1958 SC 881 : (1958) 2 LLJ 249]. There, the appellant, a salt manufacturing company, employed workmen both temporary and permanent. The salt-works was situated near a creek opposite to the town of Porbandar. The salt-works could be reached by at least two ways from the town, one an overland route nearly 6 to 7 miles long and the other via a creek which had to be crossed by a boat. In the evening of 12-6-1952, a boat carrying some of the workmen, capsized due to bad weather and overloading. As a result of this, some of the workmen were drowned. One of the questions that came up for consideration was whether the accident had taken place in the course of the employment of the workers. S. Jafer Imam, J., speaking for the Court, held:
“As a rule, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 11 of 19 the journey to and from the place of employment being excluded.” After laying down the principle broadly, S. Jafer Imam, J., went on to observe that there might be some reasonable extension in both time and place to this principle. A workman might be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises in some special cases. The facts and circumstances of each case would have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times this theory of notional extension. But, examining the facts of the case, in particular, after noticing the fact that the workman used a boat, which was also used as public ferry for which they had to pay the boatman's dues, S. Jafer Imam, J., observed:
“It is well settled that when a workman is on a public road or a public place or on a public transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there. A workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment he leaves his home and is on his way to his work. He certainly is in the course of his employment if he reaches the place of work or a point or an area which comes within the theory of notional extension, outside of which the employer is not liable to pay compensation for any accident happening to him. In the present case, even if it be assumed that the theory of notional extension extends up to point D, the theory cannot be extended beyond it. The moment a workman left point B in a boat CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 12 of 19 or left point A but had not yet reached point B, he could not be said to be in the course of his employment and any accident happening to him on the journey between these two points could not be said to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. Both the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and the High Court were in error in supposing that the deceased workmen in this case were still in the course of their employment when they were crossing the creek between points A and B. The accident which took place when the boat was almost at point A resulting in the death of so many workmen was unfortunate, but for that accident the appellant cannot be made liable.””
14. The expression “accident” according to P Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advance Law Lexicon Dictionary means ”undesigned, sudden or unexpected event; mishap; misfortune; disaster”. The word “accident” is derived from the Latin verb “accidere” signifying “fall upon, befall, happen, chance”. In other words, it is a sudden and unexpected event taking place without expectation upon the instant, rather than something which continues, progresses or develops; something happening by chance not according to usual course of things or events, out of the range of ordinary calculations; that which exits or occurs abnormally, CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 13 of 19 or an uncommon occurrence.
15. The word “accident” generally denotes an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and therefore not expected; chance, casualty, contingency (Webster Dictionary).
16. In other words, an “accident” being an unforeseen event causing a misfortune or loss is different from an omission which is as a result of negligence or misconduct. Therefore, the expression “accident” means an untoward mishap which is not expected or designed. In the context of the Act under consideration, the term “accident” for the purpose of seeking compensation for personal injuries sustained would include any injury which is not designed by the workman himself. Thus, the word “accident” would include all mishaps occurring by chance or caused unintentionally and events happening due to unforeseen circumstances under Section 3(1) of the Act. It must be interpreted as mishap or “untoward event not expected or designed” in the popular and ordinary CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 14 of 19 sense. If the injury or death occurred without designed on the part of the workman then the death or injury would be by accident, although it was brought about by a heart attack or some other cause to be found in the condition of the workmen himself. The expression “accident” not being defined under the Act must be interpreted to be an untoward event which is not expected or designed; therefore, an accident means unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss. The interpretation of the word “accident” must be in the popular and ordinary sense and not in a technical sense. Thus, the expression “accident” arising out of and in the course of his employment in Section 3(1) of the Act must be so interpreted as to establish that (1) at the time of the accident he was in fact engaged in the duties of his employment; (2) that it occurred at the place where he was performing those duties; and (3) that the immediate act which led to the accident is not so remote from the sphere of his duties so as to be regarded as something foreign to them. CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 15 of 19
17. In Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti vs. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali & Another, (2007) 11 SCC 668, while applying Section 3 of the Act, this Court observed that the tests attracting the provision of Section 3 of the Act would require the following principle to be proved:
(1) There must be a causal connection between the injury and the accident and the accident and the work done in the course of employment.
(2) The onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resulting strain which contributed to or aggravated the injury.
(3) If the evidence brought on records establishes a greater probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would be enough for the workman to succeed, but the same would depend upon the fact of each case.
18. In the said case, taking note of the fact that the deceased died as a result of heart attack and he was working as a helper, it was observed that per se the duties would not be such which would cause stress and CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 16 of 19 strain. If an additional duty was required to be performed by the deceased, the same was required to be clearly stated. In the facts of the said case, this Court declined to grant any relief and observed that the case did not fall within the scope and ambit of Section 3 of the Act.
19. We have considered the aforesaid judgments in light of the facts of the present case and perused the material on record. Having regard to the nature of the job that the deceased was performing as a Quadruple mate in the appellant-Factory and the cause of his death, we find that there was a causal connection between the death and the nature of the job that the deceased workman was discharging in the appellant-factory.
20. In the circumstances, we find that the High Court was right in allowing the claim petition filed by the respondents herein and thereby setting aside the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner dated 18.10.2011. We do not find any merit in this appeal.
21. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. Since there was a CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 17 of 19 stay of the judgment of the High Court by this Court, we now direct the appellants herein to satisfy the judgment of the High Court within a period of two months from the date of upholding of this order and the same being made available to the respective parties without driving the respondents to file an Execution Petition.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 13, 2025
CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 18 of 19
ITEM NO.21 COURT NO.7 SECTION IX
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
PETITION(S) FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO(S).29239/2019 [ARISING OUT OF IMPUGNED FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 29-04- 2019 IN FA NO. 98/2012 PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY AT AURANGABAD] THE CHAIRMAN VAIDYANATH SAHAKARI SAKHAR KARKHANA LTD. & ANR. PETITIONER(S) VERSUS SHANTABAI & ANR. RESPONDENT(S) (IA NO. 178069/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT IA NO. 178071/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.) Date : 13-02-2025 This matter was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASANNA B. VARALE For Petitioner(s): Ms. Anindita Mitra, AOR For Respondent(s): Mr. Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, AOR Mr. Nishant Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Ankur S. Savadikar, Adv.
Mr. Viraj M. Parakh, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Leave granted.
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order, which is placed on file.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(B. LAKSHMI MANIKYA VALLI) (DIVYA BABBAR) COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH) CA @ SLP (C) No.29239 of 2019 Page 19 of 19