Karnataka High Court
K.R. Raghuveer vs General Manager, Vijaya Bank on 17 July, 1986
Equivalent citations: ILR1986KAR3141, 1986(2)KARLJ268, (1987)ILLJ89KANT
JUDGMENT Rama Jois, J.
1. This writ Appeal is presented against the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition of the appellant in which he questioned the legality of the acceptance of his resignation.
2. The facts of this case, in brief, are as follows :
The appellant was an officer on the establishment of the Vijaya Bank. On 24th February, 1983 he addressed a letter to the Management. In the said letter, after giving vent to his feelings about the injustice said to have been done to him in the matter of his conditions of service, he concluded the letter as follows :
"Now, under Rule 20(2) of the Service Regulations 1982, I hereby give the management notice of resignation of 3 months i.e. I will cease to be under Vijaya Bank's service from 25th May, 1983.
Please note because of the letters from the per-Dept., I was disturbed and I had to cancel may tour programme under L.F.C. Though I extended the leave for a week as I decided to resign, on second thought, as a matter of principle with a intention not to take advantage of the facilities. I have not availed this benefit.
It is not out of the way to mention here that Mr. G. V. Anchan has slandered me and it is also reliably learnt that Mr. G. Chandran and Mr. Parthasarathy have thrown aspersions at me.
Under the circumstances, please accept the resignation without causing further problem to me.
I thank you in anticipation of your favourable action."
Subsequently, on 2nd April, 1983 the Management refuted the allegations made against the Management by the appellant in his aforesaid letter. The last portion of that letter reads :
"Your untenable contentions are rejected and you are hereby informed that your resignation has been accepted and you will be relieved from duty in due course."
3. As stated earlier, according to the letter of appellant dated 24th February, 1983 his resignation was to be effective from 25th May, 1983. On 19th May, 1983 the appellant addressed a letter to the Management. It reads :
"Dear Sir, Acceptance of conditional resignation PER letter 7663 dated 6th May, 1983.
In continuation of my letter dated 11th May, 1983 (copy enclosed for perusal), I wish to bring to your notice the following for valuable consideration :
1. The enquiry has to be conducted.
2. The Management can relieve me only if they find out from the enquiry that :
a) the Senior Manager G. V. Anchan has not called me as 'BAD COMPANY' and
b) his action on 5th March, 1983 is in order.
Please note that the resignation notice dated 24th February, 1983 has become null and void as the precondition has been violated by the Management Representative of the branch.
Under the circumstances if the Management relieves me from duty before + without fulfilling conditions (1) and (2) it will be a prima facie case of abuse of power and be deemed that the management is also a party to the said acts of the Senior Manager. Moreover, your silence will amount to admittance of harassment/ illtreatment/ discrimination as explained in my earlier letters.
In view of the foregoing in the interest of justice and equity, I request you to appropriately direct the Personnel Department immediately.
Thanking you,"
4. The Management, however, on 23rd May, 1983 relieved the appellant by issuing a memo. The memo reads :
"With reference to your above resignation letter dated 24th February, 1983 and in terms of H.O. Letter No. PER : KRS : 5269/83 dated : 2nd April, 1983, you are hereby relieved from the service of the Bank with effect from to-day, after office hours."
Thereafter, the appellant had presented the Writ Petition. As the Writ Petition was dismissed the appellant has presented this appeal.
5. Sri S. P. Shankar, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that as the resignation was to be effective with effect from 25th May, 1983 and the same was withdrawn on 19th May, 1983 the Management could not have relieved the appellant on the basis of the resignation.
6. From the contents of the letter of the appellant dated 19th May, 1983, it is clear that his resignation was conditional and could not be acted upon as the conditions had not been accepted by the Management. In other words, the stand of the appellant was that the resignation was withdrawn as the pre-conditions set out in the letter of resignation has not been accepted by the Management.
7. The stand of the Management, however, has been that the appellant had no right to withdraw the resignation after the same was accepted and as the acceptance of resignation, by letter dated 2nd April, 1983, had been communicated to the appellant there was no question of the appellant withdrawing the resignation thereafter.
8. The precise question, namely, as to whether an employee who had tendered resignation which is intended to be effective from a future date has the right to withdraw the resignation before the date on which it becomes effective and if so whether the acceptance of resignation earlier to the date on which it was to be effective was valid came up for consideration in the case of Nagaraju v. State of Karnataka (1985 - II - LLJ - 96) Applying the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Gopal Chandar Misra (1978 - I - LLJ - 492) this Court held that an employee who had tendered resignation to be effective from a future date has the right to withdraw the resignation before the date on which it was intended to take effect and therefore, even if in the meanwhile, the resignation had been accepted by the Management, it would be of no effect for, even such acceptance could be effective only from the date with effect from which the resignation was to become effective and that with the withdrawal of the resignation before that date there would be no resignation to be accepted from that date. Relevant portion of the Judgment in Nagaraju's case reads :
"In support of his contention, Learned Counsel relies on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajkumar vs. Union of India . The ratio of the decision is that an employee who had tendered resignation could withdraw his resignation before it was accepted and he could not do after it was accepted and he ceased to be in service.
Therefore, there can be no doubt, that if the resignation of the petitioner became effective from the date of its acceptance, i.e., 23rd August, 1969 the petitioner had no right to withdraw. But the facts of this case are different. Though the management purported to accept the resignation on 23rd August, 1969 even according to the acceptance extracted later in the judgment the petitioner was to continue in service till 22nd September, 1969 and his service was to come to an end only on 22nd September, 1969. In other words resignation was to come into effect from 22nd September, 1969. Therefore, the precise question which arises for consideration in this case is whether the petitioner was entitled to withdraw the resignation before it became effective ? This aspect is directly covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Gopalchandra Misra supra. The relevant portion of the Judgment reads thus :-
"it will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a "prospective" resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resignor. This general rule is equally applicable to Government servants and constitutional functionaries. In the case of the Government Servant or functionary who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation give up his service/of office, normally the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office tenure of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office-tenure terminated when it is accepted by the Competent Authority. In the case of a Judge of a High Court, who is a constitutional functionary and under Proviso (a) to Article 217(1) has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office, his resignation becomes effective and tenure terminated on the date from which he, of his own volition, choose to quit office. If in terms of the writing under his hand, addresses to the President, he resigns in presenti the resignation terminates his office-tenure forthwith, and cannot, therefore, be withdrawn or revoked thereafter. But, if he by such writing, chooses to resign from a future date, the act of resigning office is not complete because, it does not terminate his tenure before such date and the Judge can at any time before the arrival of that prospective date on which it was intended to be effective withdraw it because the Constitution does not bar such withdrawal."
"From the above Judgment, it is clear that in a case where the resignation tendered is to become effective with effect from the future date, the employee who has tendered resignation has a right to withdraw the resignation before it becomes effective and he goes out of employment."
In the present case also resignation was prospective in that, though it was tendered on 24th February, 1983 it was to be effective from 25th May, 1983. Therefore, the appellant had the right to withdraw it before 25th May, 1983. Therefore, the acceptance of resignation on 2nd April, 1983 which itself was also to be effective from 25th May, 1983 did not and could not deprive the appellant of his right to withdraw the resignation.
9. Learned Counsel for the Management, however, argued that the Writ Petition was dismissed also on the ground of delay as the same was presented on 7th December, 1983 and therefore, the Court should not interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge.
10. It is true that the resignation was accepted on 2nd April, 1983 by the Management and was given effect to from 25th May, 1983 and the appellant approached this Court only on 7th December, 1983. According to the appellant, he had made representation to the Management for re-consideration of its decision and only when he realised that there was no chance of reconsideration, he approached this Court. Apart from this, it appears to us, the delay is not such as would justify denial of relief in entirety. The delay in the present case is marginal and therefore, in our opinion, it would be sufficient to deny part of the relief on the ground of laches.
11. At this stage, when the matter was heard on the last occasion, the learned Counsel for the appellant had submitted that the appellant would give up his claim for backwages in the event of his securing relief of reinstatement.
12. Learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank submitted that in the resignation letter addressed by the appellant to the Management he had used disparaging language against the Management and this itself was sufficient basis to say that he should not be taken back to service.
13. Learned Counsel for the appellant agreed that the language used in the representation was not conducive to the discipline or etiquette, but submitted that the same was used in anger and the appellant was repenting for using the said language in his representation. He also submitted that the appellant was expressing unconditional regret for the use of the said language. Accordingly, the appellant filed a memo covering both the aspects. It reads :
"The appellant regrets the use of words and expressions in the course of his correspondence with the Respondent and withdraws the same unconditionally.
In the event of the appeal being allowed, the appellant undertakes to forego the monetary benefit of arrears of salary from 23rd May, 1983 till the date of the final order in this appeal. All other benefits available in law be given to the appellant."
14. In view of the expression of unconditional regret for the language used in the representation, it appears to us, the language used in anger should not be made a ground to deny the relief to the appellant. As the appellant has given up his claim for backwages, we are of the view that the relief of reinstatement should not be denied to the appellant and the denial of part of the relief would be sufficient and commensurate with the laches in presenting the Writ Petition.
15. In the result, we make the following order :
(i) The Writ Appeal is allowed.
(ii) In reversal of the order made by the Learned Single Judge, Writ Petition No. 21092/83 is allowed.
(iii) The appellant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits except salary up to the date on which he reports for duty pursuant to the posting given pursuant to this order or after expiry of one month from to-day whichever is earlier.