Delhi District Court
New Ex. No. 23658/2016 vs Ashok on 26 September, 2018
IN THE COURT OF SH. M. P. SINGH, ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE03,
CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
Ex. No. 142/17
New Ex. No. 23658/2016
In the matter of:
Smt. Pushpinder Kaur
W/o Sh. Arjan Singh Dugga,
R/o House No. 193, Sector6,
Panchkula, Haryana. ......Decree Holder
Versus
1. M/s Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd.
101, Akash Deep Building,
26A, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi. .....Judgment Debtor
2. M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd.,
M14, Middle Circle,
Connaught Circus, New Delhi. ......Objector
Execution filed on - 07.09.2001
Objections filed on - 21.03.2002
Objections decided on - 26.09.2018
JUDGMENT
1. An application of the objector M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd., filed on 21.03.2002, under Order XXI Rule 99 read with section 151, CPC is pending disposal.
2. Facts may be taken note of. On 27.04.2000 Ms. Pushpinder Kaur brought an action for possession and recovery of Rs. 2,09,415/ towards rent/damages against M/s Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd. The tenanted premises Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 1 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 was flat no. 101, Akash Deep Building and the monthly rental was Rs. 9,805/. Defendant M/s Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd. did not vacate despite service of notice dt. 15.12.1999. Rent was stated to be due with effect from 01.11.1999. Defendant filed its written statement and in paragraph no.4 (reply on merits) thereof had stated: "Para4 is wrong and is denied. No notice dated 15.12.1999 has been served on the defendant company because the defendant is not the tenant in the flat in question and therefore, the question of termination of tenancy does not arise. In fact, the flat is in the tenancy of M/s. Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. who is in possession thereof." Thereafter, in paragraph no.7 (reply on merits), defendant went on to state: "Para07 of the written statement is wrong and is denied. No cause of action has accrued in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant much less on the midnight of 31.01.2000 as the said flat is not in the tenancy of the defendant, the question of terminating the tenancy or terminating the same, does not arise. Each & every allegation in this para is false, wrong and is denied."
3. On 15.09.2000 replication was filed. Issues were framed on 05.12.2000. Defendant suffered the proceedings ex parte vide Order dt. 02.02.2001. Two witnesses were examined, namely, PW1 Pushpinder Kaur and PW2 Tej Pal Chauhan and the matter was then posted for final arguments. On 22.02.2001 counsels for both the sides appeared and apprised the Court that the matter was likely to be settled. On 08.03.2001 plaintiff's counsel appeared, but none appeared on defendant's behalf and the matter was adjourned for final arguments on the premise that no settlement had taken place. Thereafter, later the same day (08.03.2001), defendant's counsel appeared and sought time to advance his arguments. Then on the next date i.e. 13.03.2001 counsels for both Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 2 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 the sides appeared and on defendant's behalf an application under Order XXIII, CPC was moved upon which the following order came to be passed that day (13.03.2001): "..Case is fixed for arguments to be submitted by the defendant, but instead of submitting the argument he has filed an application u/o 23 CPC submitting that the matter in dispute has been settled and that the plaintiff has executed a lease deed. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that he has no instructions regarding any compromise and that he is not able to identify the signature on the said documents including the application whereas the plaintiff who has signed the application u/o 23 is also not present. Therefore, in the absence of the plaintiff and in the absence of acknowledging the compromise by her counsel the application cannot be considered and therefore, the ld. Counsel for the defendant is directed to produce the plaintiff, if she has entered into the compromise with the defendant. Case adjourned for 20.03.2001 for final arguments to be submitted by the counsel for the defendant or for compromise."
4. Thereafter, on 20.03.2001 Ld. Counsels for both the sides appeared and it was submitted on defendant's behalf that the matter stood settled and the court then proceeded to pass the following order: "..Before submitting the final argument, ld. counsel for the defendant requested to record his statement to the effect that the matter in dispute has been settled under compromise between plaintiff and the defendant and that in that regard application u/o 23 CPC has already been moved alongwith the documents for leasing out the said premises to some other person. In view of the request made the statement of Sh. A.D. Gupta, ld. counsel for the defendant is recorded in which ld. counsel for defendant stated that the matter in dispute has been settled under compromise between the plaintiff and the defendant and possession of the premises has been handed over to the plaintiff and thereafter the same has been leased to M/s. Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. In Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 3 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 view of the statement made by the ld. counsel for the defendant the ld. counsel for the plaintiff has also made the statement stating that he has no instructions and information from the plaintiff that the matter in dispute has been settled under compromise between the plaintiff and the defendant or whether the suit premises has been handed over to the plaintiff by the defendant under that settlement. Therefore, he cannot state that the compromise has taken place between the parties. In view of this statement made by the ld. counsel for the plaintiff stating that no information or instruction has been given by the plaintiff to him regarding any compromise between her and the defendant and in view of this statement made by the ld. counsel for the plaintiff the factum of compromise cannot be accepted and therefore, the Courts has to proceed on with the case in accordance with the law.
Argument as submitted by ld. counsel for the defendant heard whereas the ld. Counsel for the plaintiff has already submitted his arguments.
Vide my separate judgment announced today the suit of the plaintiff is decreed for the possession of the suit premises i.e. Flat No. 101, Akash Deep Building, 26A, Bara Khamba Road, New Delhi, and for an amount of Rs. 2,09,415/ as rent and damages with cost. The defendant is directed to handover the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff and pay the said amount to the plaintiff. Decree sheet be drawn in terms of the judgment. File be consigned to record room."
5. Plaintiff/Decree Holder (for short the 'DH') then on 07.09.2001 applied for execution of the decree. On 15.03.2002 she took possession of the tenanted premises through the court bailiff. Objector came up with the present objections on 21.03.2002. Court of Ld. Civil Judge vide Order dt. 07.05.2002 had dismissed the instant objections of the objector. Objector preferred an appeal. Ld. Appellate Court vide its judgment dt. 28.04.2003 allowed the appeal. Ld. Appellate Court was of the view that proceedings under Order XXI Rules 99 to 103, CPC were in the nature of a suit, and as such executing Court ought to Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 4 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 have framed issues and allowed parties to lead evidence. Ld. Appellate Court was also of the view that the court of Ld. Civil Judge was wrongly trying the execution application and the same ought to have been tried by the Court of Ld. Additional District Judge inasmuch as total value of the reliefs granted under the decree was more than Rs. 3 lacs. Consequently, the instant execution case was made over to this Court.
6. Averments, as set out in the objections, may now be taken note of. They are as follows: I) Objector was in possession of the demised premises with effect from 01.04.2000. Objector had entered into a lease agreement dt. 14.02.20011 with the DH. Pursuant thereto, DH accepted a draft dt. 16.02.2001 for Rs. 99,157/ towards rent and on her oral instructions it (objector) has been paying Rs. 10,000/ per month with effect from August 2001 to clear the arrears of property tax due to New Delhi Municipal Council (for short 'NDMC') on behalf of DH. It has also been paying maintenance charges to Akashdeep Maintenance Committee since the date it has been in possession of the premises.
II) DH failed to bring to court's notice the factum of transfer of tenancy rights through the aforesaid lease deed, though the said fact was brought to Court's knowledge by the erstwhile tenant M/s Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd. by filing an application under Order XXIII, CPC, which was turned down on the ground that plaintiff was not physically present before it. Defendant's counsel had further submitted, 1 It is unregistered and on a stamp paper of Rs. 2/ and it purports to be for 3 years with monthly rental being Rs. 24,910/.
Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 5 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016before making final argument, to the Court that possession of the premises had been handed over to plaintiff and thereafter the same stood leased out to M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd.
III) It is obvious that after 01.04.2000 the premises was never in possession of erstwhile tenant M/s Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd. and rather it (objector) was a valid tenant therein. The DH with malafide intention to take away the tenancy rights accrued to it by way of lease deed dt. 14.02.2001, fraudulently obtained eviction decree against M/s Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd., which was never a tenant on the date of the decree and subsequently filed an execution against the erstwhile tenant. The court bailiff and the DH had dispossessed it (objector) illegally without following the procedure under Order XXI, CPC. The court bailiff and the DH threw away its goods without 'intimating the court warrant'. The DH with gunda elements took away the valuable goods lying in the premises and threw away the same. The eviction decree against M/s Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd. and the order for its execution is not binding upon it (objector) as it was not a party to the suit and the execution proceedings. Objector's dispossession is invalid and the same has been carried out fraudulently. On these averments, objector seeks the following reliefs:
(a) Restore possession of the premises to it (objector),
(b) Restrain the landlady from encumberancing or altering the status quo of the premises.
7. Now to the reply to the aforesaid objections. The averments therein are as follows:
Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 6 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016I) Vineet Kumar Jain, Managing Director of the objector company, has his office at 102, Akash Deep Building, which is right adjacent to the premises in question. Vineet Kumar Jain is the real son of Sh. Vinod Jain, Managing Director of Elephanta Oils & Vanaspati Industries Ltd.
Both father and son duo colluded with each other to harass the DH and this would be apparent from the fact that in the written statement as also in the application under Order XXIII, CPC, contrary to the averments in the instant objection, defendant had pleaded that M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. was in possession since 1997.
II) During the pendency of the suit, defendant/judgment debtor through its Managing Director Vinod Jain approached the DH with a compromise proposal to the effect that the defendant would not contest the suit and would clear all the rental arrears provided she (plaintiff) agreed to execute a fresh lease deed qua the premises in objector's favour, of which his son Vineet Kumar Jain was the Managing Director. Sh. Vinod Jain further proposed that his son Vineet Kumar Jain would pay monthly rentals of Rs. 24,910/. In furtherance of the said proposal, Vinod Jain sent a preliminary rough draft of the proposed lease deed to the plaintiff at Panchkula, Haryana through his employee Sh. B.N. Kapoor. Sh. B.N. Kapoor represented to the plaintiff that it was only a preliminary rough draft of proposed lease deed and the final lease deed would be executed on a proper stamp paper and would be got registered at Delhi. Plaintiff was asked to sign the said rough preliminary draft of the proposed lease deed in token of her having approved the same. The plaintiff, a housewife and not educated enough to understand the contents of the lease deed, was Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 7 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 not inclined to sign the same in the absence of her husband who was away to Patiala that day. However, at the insistence of Sh. B.N. Kapoor, who was known to her for the last more than 10 years and had enjoyed her confidence being the employee of M/s Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd., plaintiff put her signatures on the alleged lease deed in good faith under the belief that it was only a preliminary rough draft of the proposed lease deed. The said rough draft of proposed lease deed, which is now being projected as lease deed did not contain the signatures of Vineet Kumar Jain, Managing Director of objector company or of Sh. B.N. Kapoor at that time. Plaintiff then approached Vinod Jain and his son Vineet Jain several times for execution of regular/final lease deed on a stamp paper, but to no avail. The compromise proposal therefore did not materialise.
III) The alleged lease deed is only a proposed draft of the lease which plaintiff signed only in token of having approved the draft. Vineet Kumar Jain or the attesting witness never signed the alleged lease deed in her presence at the time she put here signatures thereon. No tenancy can be said to have been created on the basis of the alleged lease deed. As the same is unregistered and improperly stamped, it cannot be looked into. In any event, the alleged lease deed was never acted upon for the objector neither took possession of the premises nor paid any rent.
IV) Sh. B.N. Kapoor had handed over the demand draft of Rs. 99,157/ to the DH sans any covering letter towards payment of past rental arrears. This demand draft was not given pursuant to any lease agreement. Plaintiff never authorised the objector to pay property tax on her behalf to NDMC.
Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 8 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016Neither did she authorise the objector to pay maintenance charges to Akash Deep Maintenance Committee.
V) Since the proposal to execute the lease deed never materialised the application under Order XXIII, CPC of M/s Elephanta Oil and Vanaspati Industries Ltd. had become infructuous and the Court rightly rejected the same. The fact that the objector never came in possession of the premises finds support from the fact that warrants of possession was executed against M/s Elephanta Oil and Vanaspati Industries Ltd. and its Managing Director Mr. Vinod Jain had himself handed over possession of the premises to the DH in the presence of Vineet Kumar Jain, Managing Director of objector company. Warrants of possession was in fact shown to Mr. Vinod Jain and Mr. Vineet Kumar Jain and they themselves with the help of their employees had removed on their own their articles and goods from the premises and handed over its possession to DH.
VI) Vineet Kumar Jain, being the son of Vinod Jain (Managing Director of defendant/JD company M/s Elephanta Oils & Vanaspati Industries Ltd.) was well aware of the pendency of the civil suit in which decree came to be passed. The objector took no steps to inform the Court about the lease deed. Hence the present objections are a complete afterthought and intended merely to harass the DH. Denying other averments, DH seeks dismissal of the objections.
8. Objector filed its rejoinder wherein it reiterated its averments as set out in its application under Order XXI Rule 99 read with section 151, CPC and refuted those of the DH as stated in latter's reply.
Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 9 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/20169. Issues framed on 02.12.2006 are as follows:
1. Whether Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. was inducted as an independent tenant w.e.f. 01.04.2000 by the decree holder in respect of the property in question and there was relationship of landlord and tenant between them? OPA
2. Whether the lease deed was properly executed and acted upon by the parties? OPA
3. Whether the lease deed dated 14.02.2001 is properly stamped and registered? If not, its effect. OPA
4. Whether Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. have been illegally dispossessed from the property? OPA
5. Whether Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. and Elephanta Oil and Vanaspati Industries Ltd. are in collusion with each other? If so its effect. OPR
6. Whether the subsequent transfer defeating the injunction order dated 14.11.2003 is null and void? OPD
7. Relief.
10. Only two witnesses were examined, namely the DH (DHW1) and Sh. Neeraj Sachdeva (AW1), Joint Manager (Administration) of the objector company.
11. Arguments heard. Record perused.
12. Issue wise findings are as follows:
13. Issue no.6 - The issue is whether the subsequent transfer defeating the injunction order dt. 14.11.2003 is null and void; onus to prove being on the applicant/objector. Order dt. 14.11.2003 inter alia reads, ".... To come up for reply and arguments on the application [under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC moved in the proceedings under Order XXI Rule 99, CPC] on 05.12.2003. Till Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 10 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 then status quo in respect of alienation, transfer of the property in question shall be maintained. Sh. Manmohan Singh Adv. counsel for the Respt/DH states that the property in question has already been disposed of. Let DH appear and tell the correct position." On the judicial record there is copy of an Agreement for Sale dt. 10.07.2003 jointly executed by the DH, Sh. A.S. Dhugga (DH's husband) and Mrs. Urvashi (DH's daughter) in favour of one Mohd. FaizurRehman for a consideration of Rs. 43 lakhs qua the property in question. However, there is no sale deed in this respect on record. On record I also find an application under Order I Rule 10, CPC moved by Mohd. FaizurRehman on 30.09.2005 stating that he had purchased the property in question on 10.07.2003. DH in her reply to this application had stated that she had entered into the Agreement for Sale with Mohd. FaizurRehman and had transferred possession of the property in question to the latter, but the latter committed breach of the terms of the agreement and as such the agreement is rendered null and void. Therefore, the bottom line is that on the judicial record there are no documents to conclusively say that DH had indeed transferred the property to someone else. Be that as it may, even if arguendo, one were to assume that the DH had indeed subsequently transferred the property in question to a third party thereby defeating the injunction order dt. 14.11.2003, yet under the extant law, such a transfer cannot be declared to be null and void. Law is that conveyance in violation of interlocutory order is not void. In A.K. Chatterjee vs. Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1327 = (2009) 156 DLT 475 (Del) it was observed, "Thus, it follows that a sale deed of immovable property executed in violation/contempt of interim order of injunction is not non est or void, as contended by the plaintiffs in the present case. It also cannot be said that no Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 11 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 right in immovable property subject matter of suit has passed to the applicants, under such a sale deed. In a given case, where sale deed is executed in violation of injunction order, the Court may direct status quo ante by ordering reconveyance to be executed by the erring parties or asking erring parties to join in execution of conveyance in favour of party ultimately found entitled to the same. The Apex Court in Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, (2007) 13 SCC 565 AIR 2008 SC 901, has held that the Courts can pass an interlocutory order in the nature of mandatory injunction in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 151 CPC on the premise that a party against whom an order of injunction was passed acted in breach thereof and so as to relegate the parties to the same position as if the order of injunction has not been violated. This again implies that the conveyance in violation of interlocutory order is not void, inasmuch as if it was so, there would be no need for reconveyance." Thus, under the extant law subsequent transfer, if any, on the part of the DH of the property in question, allegedly contrary to the order dt. 14.11.2003 cannot be said to be null and void. That apart, it is difficult to comprehend as to how could the Order dt. 14.11.2003 operate to stay, something (transfer of property) that had already allegedly taken place in the past. Thus, for these reasons this issue is decided against the objector and in favour of DH.
14. Issue no.3 - The issue is whether the lease deed dt. 14.02.2001 is properly stamped and registered and, if not, its effect; onus to prove being on the applicant/objector. Lease deed in question is on a stamp paper of Rs. 2. For the lease deed purporting to carry monthly rental of Rs. 24,910/, the same having been executed on a stamp paper of Rs. 2/ is a clear case of deficient Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 12 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 stamping (Article 35 of the 1 st Schedule to Indian Stamp Act, 1899). Nonetheless, this lease deed has already been led into evidence by the applicant/objector sans any objection on the part of the DH. Section 36 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 mandates that once an instrument has been admitted into evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided under section 61, be called into question at any stage of the same suit or proceedings on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. Consequently, this lease deed cannot now be called into question on the ground that the same is deficiently stamped. There is no question of application of section 61 of the said Act here. First limb of this issue visàvis proper stamping of the lease deed in question accordingly stands answered.
15. The other limb of this issue is about registration of this lease deed and its effect. This lease deed purports to be for three years. In terms of section 107, Transfer of Property Act and section 17, Registration Act the lease deed in question required compulsory registration. The document purporting to be lease deed dt. 14.02.2001 having not been so registered, proviso to section 49, Registration Act would come into play and the same can only be used as evidence of collateral transaction. In K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited vs. Development Consultant Limited, (2008) 8 SCC 564 it was held that a document required to be registered, if unregistered, is not admissible in evidence under section 49, Registration Act; though it can used as evidence of 'collateral transaction' as provided in the proviso to section 49 of the said Act but such 'collateral transaction' must be independent or divisible from the transaction which required registration and must not be itself registrable. It was further held that use of an unregistered document to prove an important Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 13 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 clause thereof would not be a use for collateral purpose. Therefore, in terms of the extant law an unregistered lease deed can only be used as evidence of 'collateral transaction'. The other limb of this issue accordingly stands answered.
16. Issue no.1 - The issue is whether the DH had inducted M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. as an independent tenant with effect from 01.04.2000 in the property in question and whether there was landlordtenant relationship between them; onus to prove being on the objector/applicant. Objector states that it had been inducted as a lessee with effect from 01.04.2000. In support of its stand, the objector heavily very relies upon the lease deed dt. 14.02.2001. This lease deed cannot be used for any purpose other than for 'collateral transaction' as provided under the proviso to section 49, Registration. As to what is meant by 'collateral transaction' under section 49, Registration Act, in K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited (supra) it was observed:
29. As we have already noted that under the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered document can also be admitted into evidence for a collateral fact/collateral purpose, let us now look at the meaning of "collateral purpose" and then ascertain whether Clause 9 of the lease agreement can be looked into for such collateral purpose.
30. In Haran Chandra Chakrvarti Vs. Kaliprasanna Sarkar, AIR 1932 Cal 83(2), it was held that the terms of a compulsorily registrable instrument are nothing less than a transaction affecting the property comprised in it. It was also held that to use such an instrument for the purpose of proving such a term would not be using it for a collateral purpose and that the question as to who is the tenant and on what terms he has been created a tenant are not collateral facts but they are important terms of the contract of tenancy, which cannot be proved by admission of an unregistered leasedeed into evidence.
31. The High Court in the impugned judgment relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ratan Lal Vs. Hari Shanker, AIR 1980 Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 14 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 Allahabad 180 to hold that since the appellant wanted to extinguish the right of the respondent with the help of the unregistered tenancy, the same was not a collateral purpose. In Ratan Lal case, while discussing the meaning of the term "Collateral Purpose", the High Court had observed as follows: "The second contention was that the partition deed, even if it was not registered could certainly be looked into for a collateral purpose, but the collateral purpose has a limited scope and meaning. It cannot be used for the purpose of saying that the deed created or declared or assigned or limited or extinguish the right to immovable property ..........term collateral purpose would not permit the party to establish any of these acts from the deed."
32. In Bajaj Auto Ltd. vs. Behari Lal Kohli, AIR 1989 SC 1806, this Court observed that if a document is inadmissible for non registration, all its terms are inadmissible including the one dealing with landlord's permission to his tenant to sublet. It was also held in that decision that if a decree purporting to create a lease is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of the terms of the lease can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause in the lease is not using it as a collateral purpose. Again this court in Rai Chand Jain Vs. Chandra Kanta Khosla, AIR 1991 SC 747] reiterated the above and observed in paragraph 10 as under: "10. .......the lease deed Ex. P1 dated 1951978 executed both by the appellant and the respondent i.e. the landlady and the tenant, Rai Chand Jain, though unregistered can be considered for collateral purposes and as such the findings of the Appellate Authority to the effect that the said deed cannot be used for collateral purposes namely to show that the purpose was to lease out the demised premises for residential purposes of the tenant only is not at all legally correct. It is well settled that unregistered lease executed by both the parties can be looked into for collateral purposes. In the instant case the purpose of the lease is evident from the deed itself which is as follows: "The lessor hereby demises House No. 382, Sector 30A, Chandigarh, to lessee for residential purposes only". This clearly evinces that the property in question was let out to the tenant for his residence only...."
33. In the case of Rana Vidya Bhushan Singh Vs. Ratiram, 1969 Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 15 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 (1) UJ 86 (SC), the following has been laid down:
"A document required by law to be registered, if unregistered, is inadmissible as evidence of a transaction affecting immovable property, but it may be admitted as evidence of collateral facts, or for any collateral purpose, that is for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. As stated by Mulla in his Indian Registration Act, 7th En., at p. 189 :
"The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad, Madras, Patna, Lahore, Assam, Nagpur, Pepsu, Rajasthan, Orissa, Rangoon and Jammu & Kashmir; the former Chief Court of Oudh; the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Peshawar, Ajmer and Himachal Pradesh and the Supreme Court have held that a document which requires registration under section 17 and which is not admissible for want of registration to prove a gift or mortgage or sale or lease is nevertheless admissible to prove the character of the possession of the person who holds under it."
34. From the principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court and the High Courts, as referred to hereinabove, it is evident that :
1. A document required to be registered is not admissible into evidence under section 49 of the Registration Act.
2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the Proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act.
3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration.
4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards.
5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose.
17. To begin with, under the extant law the lease deed dt. 14.02.2001 cannot Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 16 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 be looked into to establish that the objector was the lessee with there being transfer of a right to enjoy the immovable property in its favour under a lease as defined in section 105 of Transfer of Property Act, or the quantum of monthly rental or to hold that the tenancy commenced from 01.04.2000. In the case at hand, the very thing that the objector seeks to establish is the reationship of landlordtenant. If the relationship of landlordtenant is established, the very basic, main and fundamental aspect of the present matter would stand decided. The case of the objector would stand or fall on establishing the relationship and that issue being the very main issue cannot be decided in the guise of 'collateral transaction'. Whether there was a tenancy or whether the objector was a tenant cannot be treated as 'collateral transaction' as that is the very main issue in the objections/application under consideration. What cannot be achieved indirectly cannot be achieved directly. As held in K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited (supra) a 'collateral transaction' must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction which the law required registration. In the case at hand, the relationship of lessor lessee is certainly not independent or divisible from the transaction of the lease. Rather, it is the very main and the fundamental aspect of the purported lease, which the objector seeks to establish. Relationship of landlordtenant can certainly not be independent of, or divisible from the contract of the lease. Further, the date of purported commencement of tenancy (01.04.2000) and the rate of monthly rental are also important clauses of the lease deed and not collateral transactions. The date (01.04.2000) of commencement of the purported tenancy is an important clause of the lease deed for the reason that DH's version is that as on 01.04.2000 it was Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd. that was the tenant and consequently the suit filed (on 27.04.2000) and the decree obtained (on 20.03.2001) against it was on a proper Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 17 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 basis.
18. The fact that DH admits her signatures on the document purporting to be lease deed dt. 14.02.2001 will not ipso facto mean that she admits execution thereof. Admission of signatures on a document is one thing and admission of execution thereof is quite another. In Kapil Corepacks Private Ltd. and Others vs. Harbans Lal (since deceased) through LRs, (2010) 8 SCC 452 it has been held that admission of signature on a document is not an admission of its execution. Therefore, it would be futile to contend that DH's admission of her signatures on the document purporting to be lease deed is essentially in the nature of admission of its execution itself. That apart, admission of signature of DH on this document would not make it a registered document. Admission of signature of DH on this document would not take the also same out of rigour of section 49, Registration Act.
19. This issue can be looked at from another perspective. By way of the lease deed executed on 14.02.2001 by incorporating therein that the objector was a tenant from a back date (01.04.2000), the objector cannot seek to displace a positive finding of a Court crystallised in the form of a decree holding that as on the date of filing of the suit (27.04.2000), it was M/s Elephanta Oil and Vanaspati Industries Ltd. that was the tenant. Ld. Trial Court had in fact turned down such a contention. It also cannot go unnoticed that by way of the lease deed it is sought to be proved that the objector was the tenant since 01.04.2000; whereas before the Ld. Trial Court on 22.02.2001 it was represented that the matter was likely to be settled. Therefore, when as on 22.02.2001 the objector had already become the tenant, there appeared to be no reason to represent to the Court on 22.02.2001 that the matter was likely to be settled.
Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 18 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016From the averments in the written statement it also appears that the defendant / JD had stated that it was not a tenant even as on November/December 1999. To say on the basis of an inadmissible document that as on the date of filing of the suit it was rather the objector that was the tenant, contrary to very judgment of a court, will not be acceptable. Such a finding arrived at by a Civil Court on the conclusion of a trial cannot be displaced on the basis of a document/lease deed which to begin with is inadmissible in evidence and by which the objector is shown to be a tenant from a back date (01.04.2000). A court decree cannot be sought to be displaced on the basis of a document, which cannot be admitted in evidence. This Court is also of the view that the objector was very well aware of the pendency of the civil suit (paragraph no. 30 of this judgment). That apart, as would be evident from later part of this judgment, there is no evidence whatsoever on record to corroborate the factum of existence of relationship of landlordtenant between the DH and the objector. Establishing landlordtenant relationship on the basis of a lease deed which is inadmissible in evidence cannot be countenanced to displace findings of a court in the form a judgment/decree and this would be more so when the objector has no other evidence whatsoever to prove the existence of lease, quantum of monthly rental or the time of commencement of the lease.
20. Even if this Court were to accept that the lease deed could be looked into to ascertain the nature of possession under 'collateral transaction', yet it would hardly suffice to advance objector's case. Assuming that the relationship of landlordtenant is discernible from the lease deed in question under 'collateral transaction', yet how can the terms of such a lease be established, viz., the monthly rental and other terms of the lease. One cannot contemplate the Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 19 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 existence of relationship of landlordtenant relationship, sans there being any monthly rental. In terms of section 105, Transfer of Property Act, the very existence of landlordtenant relationship presupposes a certain monthly rental. Without there being any proof of monthly rental, the contention that there existed relationship of landlordtenant on the basis of an inadmissible document must came crashing down.
21. Further, DH in her evidence by way of affidavit deposed that B.N. Kapoor had come to her at Panchkula (Haryana) with the rough preliminary draft of the lease deed and that she signed the same on the assurance that the final lease deed would be executed on a proper stamp paper and would be got registered at Delhi. On this vital and fundamental aspect, there is hardly any crossexamination of DH (DHW1). In her crossexamination, DH (DHW1) stood her ground that when she appended her signatures, the document did not have signatures of any other person and that she had told B. N. Kapoor that her husband was away but at his insistence she signed the same on the promise that the final lease deed would be executed. The objector has not come forward to counter this by saying as to where and in what manner was the document purporting to be lease deed was executed. Neither was any such suggestion as regards the place of execution and the mode and manner of its execution was put to the DH (DHW1). That apart, the objector's witness Neeraj Sachdeva (AW1) in his evidence by way of affidavit does not state as to where and in what manner was the document purporting to be lease deed was executed. The witness to this lease deed, Sh. B. N. Kapoor, did not step into the witness box. The other signatory to this lease deed (Sh. Vineet Kumar Jain, Managing Director of objector company) also did not step into the witness box to depose Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 20 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 about the circumstances / place etc. of execution of the inadmissible document i.e. the lease deed.
22. Further, this lease deed is suspect from yet another prospective. In the written statement, defendant M/s. Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Ltd. had stated that the notice dated 15.12.1999 was not received because it was not a tenant (on that day); and further that no cause of action accrued against it because on the midnight of 31.01.2000 the defendant was not a tenant; and further that no rent was due from 01.11.1999 as M/s. Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Ltd. not a tenant. It is clear from the written statement that M/s. Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Ltd. denied that it was a tenant as on 15.12.1999 or on 01.11.1999 or on 31.01.2000. It is rather a unique case where M/s. Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Ltd. in its written statement stated that it was not a tenant either on 15.12.1999 or on 01.11.1999 or on 31.01.2000. Then who was the tenant between the period 01.11.1999 to 31.03.2000? There are no answers forthcoming on this aspect.
23. The lease deed in question does not establish the relationship of landlord tenant between the DH and the objector. In any event, on the basis of such an unregistered lease, a person claiming to be tenant cannot continue in possession for more than a year. The objector, as per its own case, has been in possession from 01.04.2000 to 15.03.2002 on the claim that it was a tenant.
24. The objector next pressed into service a demand draft dt. 16.02.2001 of Rs. 99,157/ in its endeavour to prove that there existed landlordtenant relationship between it and the DH with effect from 01.04.2000. There is also a covering letter dt. 16.02.2001 with this demand draft. However, the demand draft/ covering letter do not suffice to advance objector's case for the following Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 21 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 multiple reasons.
I) Firstly, together with the demand draft there is a covering letter dt.
16.02.2001. This covering letter does not at all disclose as to which company does it emanate from; whether it emanates from Ms/ Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd. or from M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd.
II) Further, it remains a mystery as to who signed this covering letter. This covering letter does not disclose either the name, or the designation, or name of the company of the person signing the same. The objector does not clear this enigma anywhere.
III) Similarly, it is also not clear as to which company, whether from Ms/ Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd. or from M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd., did the demand draft actually originate from. Mere selfserving ipse dixit that this demand draft was that of M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. would not suffice in the absence of anything on record whatsoever to suggest so. The best evidence was the books of the company or company's bank statement of account. After all, even if a single penny flows out of the coffers of a company, the same would have to be duly accounted for in the books. If the money for the draft was from the coffers of the objector's company then accounts books or the bank statement of accounts ought to have been shown to the Court to corroborate it. But this was not done.
IV) Assuming that the covering letter dt. 16.02.2001 emanated from the objector company, the same cannot be used as evidence to prove landlord tenant relationship. Section 21, Evidence Act bars the objector from relying upon its own covering letter dt. 16.02.2001 as evidence in support of its claim to a landlordtenant relationship. Section 21, Evidence Act Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 22 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 lays down an important principle of law that generally an admission cannot be used by the person who makes it for his own use. An admission will be used by the person in his favour only if and if the same falls within any of the three exceptions laid down therein. In this regard, it would be beneficial to take a look at the first illustration appended to this section. This illustration is as follows: The question between A and B is, whether a certain deed is or is not forged, A affirms that it is genuine, B affirms that it is forged. A may prove a statement by B that the deed is genuine, and B may prove a statement by A that the deed is forged; but A cannot prove a statement by himself that the deed is genuine; nor can B prove a statement by himself that the deed is forged. Objector asserts that there existed tenantlandlord relationship between it and the DH. Therefore, in order to prove this, the objector cannot rely upon covering letter, which it claims to be its own, in view of section 21, Evidence Act.
V) Therefore, the covering letter dt. 16.02.2001 and the demand draft dt.
16.02.2001 do not suffice to establish that there existed landlordtenant relationship between the DH and the objector or that objector was inducted as tenant with effect from 01.04.2000.
VI) Aside from the above, there are few fundamental problems with this covering letter and the demand draft. The covering letter states that the demand draft of Rs. 99,157/ was for the rent for the 'period upto 31.12.2000'. The objector, as already noted, states that it came into the tenancy on 01.04.2000 at monthly rental of Rs. 24,910/ (there is no evidence to prove either the date of commencement of tenancy in favour of objector company or the rate of monthly rental). This Court fails to Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 23 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 comprehend as to on what basis was the very odd figure of Rs. 99,157/ arrived at as being the rental for the 'period upto 31.12.2000'. Neither does the objector bother to clear this enigma as to what was the basis of the calculation to arrive at the very odd figure of Rs. 99,157/ to be the rental for the 'period upto 31.12.2000'. To further compound the problems for the objector, its witness (AW1 Neeraj Sachdeva) in his cross examination toes the stand of the DH and states, "It is correct that the payment of Rs. 99,157/ was towards the previous arrears of rent."
25. The objector next pressed into service the factum of deposit of maintenance charges by it to Akash Deep Maintenance Committee vide various bills (Ex. OB1/15 to Ex. OB1/24). As per the objector, such deposits sufficed to prove landlordtenant relationship. This Court is of the view such deposit of maintenance charges will not suffice to prove transfer of an interest in an immovable property by way of a lease under section 105, Transfer of Property Act or relationship of landlordtenant. This is for the reason that it is not shown, much less proved, that the DH, had authorised the objector to deposit the monthly maintenance charges. There is no express authorisation on the part of the DH. I also cannot infer any implied authorisation on the part of the DH in this regard. If the objector had been depositing the maintenance charges it had been doing so at its own peril. Next, there is a fundamental flaw in these bills. These maintenance bills are for flat no. 101 and 102. The property in question is flat no. 101. The objector states that it had no concern with the flat no. 102. In its rejoinder, the objector states that its managing director Vineet Kumar Jain had no office at flat no. 102. Further, AW1 Neeraj Sachdeva in his crossexamination gave conflicting answers on this aspect. At one place in his Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 24 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 crossexamination, he stated, "102, Akashdeep Bldg. is also the office of M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd." And at another place in his crossexamination he stated, "It is wrong to suggest that M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. was functioning from 102, Akashdeep Bldg." The question is why did the objector company deposit maintenance charges for flat no.102 also? There are no answers forthcoming to this question. To suo moto deposit maintenance charges for flat no. 102, albeit coupled with that for flat no. 101, and then to hold the same against the DH as relationship of landlordtenant cannot be countenanced.
26. The objector next pressed into service the fact that it had paid property tax, out of the monthly rentals, to NDMC. This again does not prove that there existed relationship of landlordtenant between the DH and the objector. The objector could have deposited such property tax out of the monthly rentals only if the DH had asked it to do so. There is no correspondence from the side of the DH asking the objector to deposit the property tax. There is no express authorisation in this regard. There neither appears to be any implied authorisation. There mere factum of deposit of revenue in the form of property tax on the part of the objector will not by itself suffice to vest transfer of a right in an immovable property in its favour by way of lease under section 105, Transfer of Property Act. Ld. Counsel for the objector pressed into service three letters dt. 13.02.2001, 15.06.2001 and 30.07.2001 received from NMDC to show that such a tenancy existed. These letters were addressed by NDMC to the objector company asking it to deposit property tax out of the rent. Letter dt. 13.02.2001 addressed by NDMC to the objector states 'it has been learnt that the property has been let to you'. But then this, this letter dt. 13.02.2001 cannot be read as an admission against the DH. That apart, what was the basis on Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 25 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 which basis NDMC 'learnt' that the property had been let out to the objector has not been disclosed. Further, NDMC letters dt. 15.06.2001 and 30.07.2001, which appear to be in the nature of reminders, also do not suffice to establish the landlordtenant relationship. These letters refers to 'rent attachment order dt. 13.02.2001' and asked the objector to deposit the 'rent' within 7 days from the date when the 'rent' becomes due. These two letters can certainly be not read as admission against the DH. Further, where was the authorisation on behalf of the DH that only Rs. 10,000/ had to be deposited and not any other amount? Objector was doing so sans any express authorisation. That apart, if monthly rental was Rs. 24,910/ (quantum of monthly rental not proved), the question is why would NDMC attach only a part of the rent towards property tax. The objector further pressed into service two letters dt. 22.06.2001 and 21.07.2001 addressed by it (objector) to the DH. These letters state that if the DH does not take up the matter of nonpayment of the property tax with the NDMC it would be constrained to deposit the monthly rent with NDMC. The question is whether the mere fact that the DH did not respond to these two letters would suffice to hold that there was transfer of an interest in an immovable property and that a landlordtenant relationship existed. It is the view of this Court that this would not be so for the following reasons:
(i) Assuming that failure to answer such letters operates as an admission yet such an admission cannot be conclusive proof of the matters admitted in terms of section 31, Evidence Act.
(ii) Even assuming that failure to answer the two letters operates as an admission yet the Court may, in its discretion, require such admitted facts to be proved otherwise than by such admission on the anvil of the proviso Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 26 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 to section 58, Evidence Act. In the instant lis, this Court would not, on the basis of the sole circumstance of failure of DH to answer the letters, hold that there existed a relationship of landlordtenant between them. It is fit and apposite that proviso to section 58, Evidence Act is invoked here (assuming that failure to answer letters operates as admission). This Court accordingly does so. I may note that the proviso to Order VIII Rule 5 (1), CPC is to the similar effect.
(iii) There are cases in which Courts have held defendant's failure to answer plaintiff's notice to be deemed admission of the assertions made therein. But then those cases would be distinguishable on facts. For example, in Kalu Ram vs. Sita Ram, 1980 Rajdhani Law Reporter (Note) 44, an owner sued a trespasser for possession. The defendant therein instead claimed that he was a tenant and further that the owner had agreed to sell him the property. The court found no evidence in support of both the pleas of the defendanttrespasser. Plaintiff had established his plea of trespass. It was in this backdrop that it was held that trespasser's failure to answer the legal notice showed that he had nothing to deny and it was fit case for raising adverse presumption against him. It is settled that ratio of a case must understood in the background of the factual matrix obtaining therein. {Javed Akhtar & Anr. vs. Jamia Hamdard & Anr. MANU/DE/0179/2007}. Reference in this regard can also be made to Bharat Petroleum Corporation & Anr. vs. N. R. Vairamani & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 778.
(iv) Apex Court in Union of India vs. Watkins Mayor & Co., AIR 1966 SC 275 has held that mere failure to answer plaintiff's notice cannot Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 27 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 be deemed to be an acceptance of the averments contained therein on the part of the defendant. It was observed at para 7 as under:
"It was pointed out that the plaintiff had given notice to the defendant claiming rent at the rate of Rs. 4/ per ton per month and there was no protest on behalf of the defendant and, therefore, it must be taken that there was an implied agreement between the parties that rent would be paid at that rate i.e. at the rate of Rs. 2400 per month. We do not think there is any warrant for this submission. Merely because the plaintiff had claimed storage charges at the rate of Rs. 4 per ton per month and there was silence on the part of the defendant, it cannot be deemed that there was acquiescence on the part of the defendant and that there was an implied undertaking on its part to pay godown rent at that rate."
(v) In Wiedemann vs. Walpole (1891)2 QB 534 Queens Bench in an action for breach of promise of marriage held that the mere fact that the defendant did not answer letters written to him by the plaintiff in which she had stated that he had promised to marry her, without any other circumstance, was no evidence corroborating plaintiff's testimony in support of such promise. The Court in its judgment held, "A man might day by day write such letter, which, if they are not answered would be brought forward as evidence of the truth of the charges made in them. The ordinary and wise practice is not to answer them to take no notice of them unless it is made out to be ordinary practice of mankind to answer. I cannot see that not answering is any evidence that the person who receives such letters admits the truth of the statements contained in them. I have, therefore, no doubt that the mere fact of not answering a letter stating that the person whom it is written has made a promise of marriage is no evidence whatever of any admission that he did make the promise and therefore no evidence in corroboration of the promise. ................ It would be a monstrous thing if the mere fact of not answering a letter which charges a man with some misconduct was held to be evidence of an admission by him that he had been guilty of it."
(vi) Supreme Court of United States of America in A. B. Leach & Co.
Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 28 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016Inc. vs. Peirson, 1927 SCC OnLine US SC 176 = 275 US 120 (1927) held, "A man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that he wishes to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the other party against whom he wishes to prove the facts. He no more can impose a duty to answer a charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore failure to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further circumstance making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as an admission."
(vii) A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Manepalli Udaya Bhaskara Rao vs. Kanuboyina Dharmaraju 2003 SCC OnLine AP 1129 = (2004)1 ALD 269 held that mere failure to answer a notice is no deemed admission. It was observed:
"15. From the above discussion, it makes clear that the admission has to be spelled out only from the positive acts on the part of the party, but cannot be culled out or cannot be based on any presumptions. The exchange of notices would only at the most constitute, a demand and refusal in writing, but the absence thereof would not either way constitute an admission. Even failure to issue a notice cannot be said to be an absence of demand nor the failure to reply to such notice would amount to an admission of the claim made therein. Such omission would not amount to a tacit consent in respect of the demanded liability."
27. To sum up the discussion on this issue, it is held: (a) The available evidence does not establish that there was landlordtenant relationship between DH and the objector. (b) The available evidence also does not establish that DH had inducted M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. as an independent tenant with effect from 01.04.2000 in the property in question. This issue is accordingly answered in favour of the DH and against the objector.
28. Issue no.2 - The issue is whether the lease deed in question was Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 29 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 'properly' executed and acted upon by the parties; onus to prove being on the applicant/objector. There is no 'proper' execution of the document purporting to be lease deed. The lease deed for more than a year cannot be said to have been 'properly' executed sans registration. Further, the lease was deficiently stamped. Therefore, at the time of its alleged execution, it was not 'properly' executed. A document claimed to be executed, but in violation of the law of the land cannot be said to have been 'properly' executed. Discussion on issue no.1 would also show that there is no evidence to establish that the parties had acted upon the lease deed. Rent, in terms of the document purporting to be lease deed, is not proved to have been paid. This issue is accordingly answered in DH's favour and against the objector.
29. Issue no.4 - The issue is whether M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. was illegally dispossessed from the property; onus to prove being on the applicant/objector. Decision on the aforesaid issues would entail that M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. was not illegally dispossessed from the property in question. Available evidence does not suggest that M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. was in possession as tenant as on the date of vacation of the premises. This issue is accordingly answered against the objector and in DH's favour.
30. Issue no.5 - The issue is whether M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. and Elephanta Oil and Vanaspati Industries Ltd. are in collusion with each other, and If so its effect; onus to prove being on the DH/respondent in the objection. The available evidence suggests (paragraph no. 25 of this judgment) that the objector perhaps had its office in the adjoining property (102, Akashdeep Building). The available evidence on record would also suggest that the objector very well knew of the pendency of the civil suit. The JD company, during the Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 30 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016 continuance of the civil suit, had represented to the court that the tenancy already stood transferred to the objector and had also relied upon and filed in the civil suit copy of the document purporting to be lease deed dt. 14.02.2001. Further, the managing directors of the two companies are father and son duo. Next, witness to the document purporting to be lease deed dt. 14.02.2001 in objector's favour is one Sh. B.N. Kapoor. And Sh. B.N. Kapoor was none else, but the Finance Manager of the defendant / JD company and this would evident from his letters (Ex. PW1/1, Ex. PW1/2 and Ex. PW1/3) as placed in the main suit. On preponderance of probabilities, it does appear that the objector knew all along about the pendency of the civil suit. Objector was also aware of the final outcome of the civil suit. This issue is answered by holding that the available evidence strongly suggests that the two companies, namely, M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. and Elephanta Oil and Vanaspati Industries Ltd., had been acting in concert and in league with each other.
31. Relief - To conclude, the relief of restoration of possession of the premises as sought for by the objector cannot be granted. The other relief seeking to restrain the DH from encumberancing or altering the status quo of the premises as sought for by the objector also cannot be granted. The application of applicant/objector M/s Pasupati Acrylon Ltd. under Order XXI Rule 99 read with section 151, CPC stands dismissed.
ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN MURARI Digitally signed by MURARI PRASAD SINGH COURT ON 26.09.2018 PRASAD Date: SINGH 2018.09.26 13:07:26 +0530 (M. P. SINGH) ADJ03 (CENTRAL) TIS HAZARI COURTS DELHI/26.09.2018 Ex. No. 142/17 Page No. 31 of 31 New Ex. No. 23658/2016