Delhi District Court
Mrs P vs State on 12 May, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-020199-2024
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 587/2024
MRS. 'P1',
W/o. Shri. 'T',
R/o. XYZ. ... REVISIONIST/
PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI)
2. RAHUL @ RAJAN,
S/o. Shri. Kishan Kumar,
R/o. 16/679, I-Block, Bapa Nagar,
Padam Singh Road, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi.
3. MEERA BAI,
W/o. Shri. Vyas Dev,
R/o. 16/527, E-Block, Bapa Nagar,
Padam Singh Road, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi.
4. RENU,
D/o. Shri. Vyas Dev,
R/o. 16/527, E-Block, Bapa Nagar,
Padam Singh Road, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of e-filing : 06.12.2024
Date of institution : 24.12.2024
Date when judgment was reserved : 10.03.2026
Date when judgment is pronounced : 12.05.2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed under Sections 438/440 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 1 Identity of the complainant/prosecutrix and that of her relatives and other particular have been deliberately withheld in view of the decisions in; Birbal Kumar Nishad v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2021 SCC Online SC 3464; X v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC Online SC 279; and Saleem v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 3 HCC (Del) 365:
2023 SCC Online Del 2190.
CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 1 of 42
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2026.05.12
16:37:49
+0530
(hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS')/pari materia with Sections 397/399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code'), seeking setting aside of the order dated 06.09.2024 (hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned order'), passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (Mahila Court)-04/Ld. JMFC (Mahila Court)-04, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. JMFC/Ld. Trial Court'), in case bearing, 'State v. Rahul @ Rajan & Ors., Cr.
Case No. 07/2023', arising out of FIR No. 458/2022, PS. Prasad Nagar, under Sections 354/354A/323/506/509/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'). Pertinently, by virtue of the impugned order the Ld. Trial Court discharged respondent nos. 2-4 (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused persons/respondent nos. 2-4') of the charges/offences alleged against them, i.e., respondent no. 2 was discharged of the offences under Sections 354/354A/323/506/509/34 IPC, whilst respondent nos. 3 and 4 were discharged of the offences under Sections 506/34 IPC.
2. Succinctly, the genesis of the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court was a complaint dated 28.08.2022, received at the concerned police station from the prosecutrix/ revisionist, Mrs. 'P' (hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant/prosecutrix/revisionist'), addressed to the concerned SHO, PS. Prasad Nagar inter alia averring that on 24.08.2022 at around 02:00 p.m., she was proceeding from her house via Military Road. Correspondingly, as per the complainant, her sister-in-law (nanad), Renu/respondent no. 4, told her that in case she would pass near her fiancée's/proposed in-law's house, then her fiancée, namely, Rajan @ Rahul/respondent no. 2, would beat CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 2 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:37:55 +0530 her/the complainant (मेरी नन्द जिसका नाम रेनू है, उसने मुझे कहा था अगर तू मेरे होने वाले ससुराल की तरफ से जब भी जायेगी तो तुझे मेरा होने वाला पति जिसका नाम राजन उर्फ राहुल है, बहुत मारेगा।). As per the complainant, she was not aware that the house of respondent no. 2 was on the same path/road. However, as per the complainant, on seeing her, respondent no. 2, started to abuse her as well as scuffle ensued between the complainant/revisionist and respondent no. 2 (मुझे पता नहीं था उस लड़के का घर उस तरफ ही है। वो मुझे देखकर गालियां देने लगा वहां मेरी उससे रोड पर जिद बहस भी हु ई।). Congruently, it was avowed by the complainant that in the meanwhile, her father-in-law (sasur), namely, Vyas Dev also reached at the spot and that respondent no. 2 pressed her/revisionist's breasts in front of her father-in-law, however, as per the revisionist, Vyas Dev did not object to the same (वहां मेरे ससुर भी आ गए थे उनका Vyas Dev **** मेरे ससुर के सामने ही मुझे उसने मारा मेरी छाती भी दवाई लेकिन मेरे ससुर ने मेरा साथ ना देकर लड़के वालों का साथ दिया). The complainant's complaint further chronicles that at that point in time, respondent no. 2's father was also present at the spot, however, no one heard revisionist's entreaties. As per the revisionist, he called at 100 number at that point in time, however, her/revisionist's mother-in-law/respondent no. 3 and sister-in-
law/respondent no. 4, started to pressurize her to withdraw her complaint. Further, as per the revisionist, respondent nos. 3 and 4 threatened her that in case, she did not withdraw her complaint, she and her husband would be removed from their home (मैंने 100 नंबर Complaint की मेरे दबाब भी बनाया कि वापस ले तू लेकिन मेरी नंद रेनू नहीं डरी उल्टा मेरी सांस जिसका नाम मीरा है। उन्होंने कहा अगर तू यह शिकायत पुलिस कार्यवाही करायेगी तो तुझे घर से निकाल देंगे। और तुझे तेरे पति को बेदखल कर देंगे।). 2.1. Markedly, in the foregoing facts and circumstances and on the basis of the revisionist's complaint, the instant FIR came to be registered, and investigation ensued. Relevantly, CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 3 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.05.12 16:38:00 +0530 during the course of ensuing investigation, site plan of the incident spot, i.e., in front of 16/683-I, Military Road, Bapa Nagar, Karol Bagh, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'spot') was prepared as well as endeavor was made to record the statement(s) of public persons in the vicinity, in relation to the incident in question, however, to no avail. Concomitantly, statement of the revisionist, in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was got recorded before the concerned Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate-02 (Mahila Court)/Ld. MM-02 on 30.08.2022, wherein the revisionist inter alia proclaimed as under;
"...24.08.2022 की बात है। मैं रास्ते से काम के लिए जा रही थी। घर से थोड़ी दूर विजय चौक के रास्ते पे , मुझे मेरी ननद का boyfriend राजन राहुल दिखा जो मुझे घूर रहा था। उसने मुझे गाली देना शुरू कर दिया और कहा "मेरे घर के रास्ते क्यों आई।" तो मैं ने फिर उसकी मम्मी को बुलाया। उसकी मम्मी आ गई। तब उस लड़के ने मेरे ससुर को फोन कर दिया, तो वो भी आ गए, फिर सबके सामने राजन राहुल ने मेरा गला पकड़कर मुझे घसीट कर bike के side में ले जाकर गला दबाया | जान से मारने कि धमकी दी। उसका साथ मेरे ससुर ने भी दिया और उस लड़के को रोका नहीं ससुर ने वैसे कु छ नहीं किया बस लड़के को रोका नहीं क्योकि उन्हे अपनी लड़की का रिश्ता की फिक् र थी। उसने मुझे माँ बहन की गाली दी थी। जब मैं ने उसकी बहनो के लिए बोला तो गुस्से में उसने मेरे साथ मारपीट की। सास ने मुझे धमकी दी है कि अगर मैं ने complaint कि तो वो मुझे घर से बेदखल कर देगे । फिर हादसे बाद मैं ने 100 No पर फोन कर दिया था । MLC नहीं कराया मैंने। लड़ाई की CCTV Footage भी है। घटना 24/08/2022 के 2 बजे दोपहर की है ।..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.2. Subsequently, on 03.09.2022, respondent no. 2 is asserted to have joined the investigation at the concerned police station and respondent nos. 3 and 4 were joined in the investigation on 18.10.2022, who were all bound down, in terms of the provisions under Section 41A Cr.P.C. Correspondingly, the concerned IO made an application for obtaining the CDRs, CAF and mobile location chart of the revisionist's mobile phones, CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 4 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:38:04 +0530 besides CCTV footage of the incident spot was obtained for the date of incident, i.e., for 24.08.2022 from 13:07-13:19 hrs. Subsequently, on recording of statements of various witnesses and upon conclusion of investigation in the instant case, chargesheet came to be filed before the Ld. Trial Court by the concerned IO. 2.3. Noticeably, upon such chargesheet being filed, Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 02.01.2023, took cognizance of the offences, as specified under the chargesheet and issued summons/notice to respondent no. 2. Subsequently, on compliance of provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C., supplementary chargesheet being filed before the Ld. Trial Court and on the arguments on the aspect of charge having been addressed by/on behalf of the revisionist, State/Ld. Addl. PP for the State as well as by/on behalf of respondent nos. 2-4, Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 06.09.2024, discharged respondent nos. 2-4 of the allegations/charges levelled against them, inter alia under the following observations;
"...2. The case of the prosecution, as can be culled out from the complaint and charge sheet is that on 24.08.2022 at about 2.00 pm when the complainant was going on the road towards the house of the accused Rahul Ranjan then the accused Rahul @ Ranjan abused her, threatened her and also touched her inappropriately in the manner mentioned in her complaint and statement recorded u/s 164 CrPC. Further, the accused no. 2 Meera Bai (mother in law of complainant) and accused no. 3 Renu (sister in law of complainant) threatened the complainant. On the basis of the above, it is alleged by the prosecution that the offences under Sec. 354/354-A/323/506/509/34 IPC is attracted against the accused no. 1 Rahul @ Ranjan and offences under Sec. 506/34 IPC are attracted against the accused no. 2 and 3:
*** *** ***
6. Perusal of the record shows that there are contradictions in the original complaint of the complainant and her statement u/s. 164 CrPC, as in the original complaint, she has stated that on CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 5 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.05.12 16:38:07 +0530 24.08.2022 at around 2.00 pm when she was going from her house to military road then her nanad namely Renu stated her that if she goes through the street of her to be husband namely Rajan @Raju then he will beat her and he started abusing her. Thereafter, her father in law came at the spot whereas in her statement recorded u/s 164 CrPC she has not stated anything about her sister in law namely Renu and has simply stated that when she was going to Vijay Chowk then boyfriend of her nanad namely Renu met her and started abusing her. Further, there is one CCTV footage relied upon by the prosecution in support of its case. In the footage, it is seen that at around 03.08 pm, the complainant was standing alone in front of the house of the accused Rahul Ranjan. However, in her complaint, complainant stated that she was passing from there which is in contradiction with what is evidently can be seen in the CCTV footage. Thereafter, the complainant started having argument with the accused Rahul @ Ranjan and the accused no.2 (mother in law) and father in law of the complainant reached at the spot to pacify the matter. However, it can be seen clearly in the footage that the complainant was also saying some heated words to the accused persons which are not audible. Further, at around 3.16 pm, complainant was having very heated arguments and saying many thing to accused Rahul @ Ranjan and on the instigation of the complainant, the accused Rahul @ Ranjan caught hold the complainant once from her neck but it is evident from the CCTV footage that he did not touch the complainant inappropriately as alleged by her in her complaint and her statement recorded u/s 164 CrPC. Accused no.2 Meera Bai can only be seen to pacify the matter between the complainant and the accused Rahul Ranjan. The accused Renu can not be seen in the said video and she was not at the place of occurrence, Perusal of the record further shows that apart from the complaint, there is no public witness of the alleged incident. Therefore, there are no sufficient material on record to frame charge against her also.
7. It is trite law that at the stage of framing of the charges, the Court has to look at the material supplied by the prosecution to form a prima facie opinion, as to whether the offences as alleged, could possibly have been committed. At the same time, the Court cannot act as a mere post office and has to apply its judicial mind to reach the conclusion. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Dipak Bhai Jagdishchandra CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 6 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:38:11 +0530 Pately. State of Gujarat, 2019 SCC Online SC 588, has held as follows:
*** *** ***
8. The above principles have also been recently affirmed in the case, State (NCT) of Delhi Vs. Shiv Charan Bansal & Ors, (2020) 2 SCC 290.
9. Looked at holistically, the entire case of the prosecution and the allegations levelled against the accused person, gives rise to a 'mere suspiciontas opposed to 'grave suspicion and thus, does not fulfill the threshold required for framing of charge. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the latest decision of Deepak Dua vs State (Crl.Rev. 968/18 dt. 31.08.2021) has held as follows:
*** *** ***
10. Therefore, in light of the above discussion, the accused persons have been able to show that no ground is made out framing of charge against accused persons and the case of the prosecution gives rise to a mere suspicion, which is not sufficient for framing of charge. Therefore, the accused no.1 Rahul G. Ranjan stand discharged for the offences under Sec. 354/354A/323/506/509/34 IPC and accused no. 2 and 3 stand discharged for the offences under Sec. 506/34 IPC. Bail bonds and surety bonds of the accused person stand discharged, Originals, if any lying on record be returned to the surety against acknowledgment.
File be consigned to record room after due compliance..."
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled cannons of law, deserving the same to be set aside, as suffering with gross illegality. It was further submitted that there has been a serious miscarriage of justice, in as much as the order of discharge of the respondent nos. 2-4 was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, based on totally untenable grounds as well as in violation of the settled judicial precedents and legal provisions. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order was passed by CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 7 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.05.12 16:38:15 +0530 the Ld. Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent reasons have been delineated under the said order. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld. Trial Court did not appreciate that at the time of discharging respondent nos. 2-4, detailed appreciation of evidence was not required, and that Ld. Trial Court had to merely see whether from the material placed on record, prima facie ingredients of the offences/charges alleged against the said respondents were satisfied or not. However, in the instant case, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court carried out an exhaustive review of the material brought forth to erroneously discharge respondent nos. 2-4, principally relying on the CCTV footage placed on record. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further vehemently argued that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not appreciating that as per the statement of the complainant before the police officials and that recorded before the concerned Ld. MM, in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., prima facie ingredients of offence/charge under Section 354/354A/323/506/509/34 IPC are made out against respondent nos. 2-4 in the instant case. As per the Ld. Counsel, while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court committed serious error in passing the impugned order by wrongly appreciating the CCTV footage, written complaint and statement of the revisionist, in so far as the Ld. Trial Court failed to take into consideration that respondent nos. 2-4 could not prove their defence against the revisionist's case despite there being sufficient material on record against the respondent nos. 2-4 in the chargesheet. 3.1. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further submitted that while appreciating the CCTV footage placed on record, Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the criminal acts committed by CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 8 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:38:19 +0530 respondent nos. 2-3 were clearly covered under the said footage. Even otherwise, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel that while reaching a finding of discharge of respondent nos. 2-4, Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that it is not necessary that every incident was covered under the CCTV footage brought on record. In fact, as per the Ld. Counsel, there was incident of hot-talking and abusing by respondent no. 2 against the revisionist, which was not covered under the CCTV footage. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the incident in question had commenced way prior to the spot, covered under the CCTV footage where respondent nos. 2-4 were present. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the entire incident was not covered under CCTV footage in question and the revisionist had specifically explicated about the incident under her statement, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Ergo, under such circumstances, Ld. Trial Court's heavy reliance on the CCTV footage, to discharge the accused persons/respondent nos. 2-4 is not only contrary to the facts brought forth, rather, also in contravention of the settled judicial dictates. Congruently, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist submitted that the impugned order is overall incomplete and based only on the opinion, favoring the accused persons/respondent nos. 2-4. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionist made no contradiction in her written complaint dated 28.08.2022; her statement, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 C.P.C. as well as the CCTV footage brought on record. On the contrary, as per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionist consistently described each and every particular of the incident in her complaint and said statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. 3.2. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further submitted that CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 9 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:38:23 +0530 from the material placed on record, it is prima facie evident that respondent no. 2, assaulted and used criminal force upon the revisionist/petitioner with an intention to outrage her modesty, sexually harassed her/the revisionist; used criminal force upon the revisionist as well as intimidated her of dire consequences, prima facie attracting the ingredients of offences/charges levelled against respondent no. 2. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, there are also sufficient allegations/material against the accused persons/respondent nos. 3-4, of criminally intimidating the revisionist, while acting in concert as well as common intention with each other. Ergo, it was argued that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court oblivious of the said facts, making the same, liable to be set aside on this sole ground. It was further fervently reiterated that while discharging the accused persons/respondent nos. 2-4, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the relevant provisions under law, settled judicial dictate as well as the principles governing the stage of charge that only the material brought forth on record by means of chargesheet is to be considered at such a stage, and proceeded to pass the impugned order in utter haste. Accordingly, it was entreated that the impugned order be set aside, and the Ld. Trial Court be directed to proceed with the framing of charges against the accused persons/respondent nos. 2-4.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State/respondent no. 1 submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or incorrectness can be attributed to the impugned order, which was CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 10 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:38:26 +0530 passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant of the principles of law, as well as wary of the facts and circumstances brought forth. 4.1. Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-4 submitted that the Ld. Trial Court, passed the order, impugned herein, after due appreciation of facts and circumstances brought forth as well as in light of settled judicial dictates. In this regard, it was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court exercised its discretion judicially, justly and fairly as well as passed the order, impugned herein by considering the facts of the present case and in consonance with the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience. Even otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the petitioner has initiated the present proceedings in an extremely motived manner, solely to falsely implicate her in-laws and their relatives in a false case, out of matrimonial discord. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-4 further submitted that respondent no. 3 and her husband are senior citizens, who have persistently been harassed by the revisionist and the revisionist has opted to initiate the present proceedings not only against her in-
laws, rather, also against respondent no. 3's fiancée with an ulterior motive/design.
4.2. Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-4 further submitted that the allegations levelled against the accused persons/respondent nos. 2-4 are extremely unfounded and have been made out of malicious exercise. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the version put forth by the revisionist, stands belied from the CCTV footage brought on record, where no such incident has been captured. On the contrary, it was argued that in the said CCTV footage, the revisionist is seen as the actual perpetrator of offence. Even otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 11 of 42 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.05.12 16:38:32 +0530 Counsel, that the allegations under Section 506/509/34 IPC are unsupported by any material or substance and general allegations have been levelled against the accused persons, with a sole design to implicate them in the present case. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, even the allegations for the offences under Sections 323/354/354A IPC are unsupported by any material/evidence, besides, the same are contradicted from the CCTV footage, filed by the IO along with the chargesheet. Ergo, as per the Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-4, the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, being wary of the said facts, necessitating no interference by this Court. Accordingly, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed, outrightly.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, Ld. Addl. PP for the State/respondent no. 1 and Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-4, heard as well as the records, including the Ld. Trial Court records as well as other material placed on record, thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions under law, in particular that under law/Section 438 BNSS2, as under;
"438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or 2 Pari materia provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C., which provides, "397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..."
(Emphasis supplied) CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 12 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.05.12 16:38:49 +0530 his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
*** *** *** (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub- section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding...."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be agitated either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon'ble Court while explicating the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (pari materia with Section 438 BNSS), observed as under;
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 13 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:39:22 +0530 no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Similarly, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC Online Del 1192, in a similar context noted as under;
"67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The Revisional Court has to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the impugned order on the face of record."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 14 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:39:28 +0530 of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a settled law3 that trite law that in a case where the order of subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality, "merely because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner." Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC Online Del 312, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further apposite to observe here that it is no longer res integra that the order, discharging an accused is not interlocutory in nature, ergo, not affected by/barred by the provisions under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. (pari materia with Section 438(2) BNSS). Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Girdharilal Sapru, (1981) 2 SCC 758, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the context of foregoing, unambiguously remarked, as under;
3Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC Online MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC Online MP
958.
CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 15 of 42
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2026.05.12
16:39:33
+0530
"5. It, however, appears that the respondents contended that the revision petition was barred by limitation. Even this contention is founded on a very technical ground that even though the revision petition was filed very much in time the requisite power of attorney of the learned Advocate on behalf of the petitioner was not legally complete and when it was re-submitted the limitation had expired. Without going into the nicety of this too technical contention, we may notice that Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo motu and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a clear illegality the High Court could not have rejected the petition as time barred thereby perpetuating the illegality and miscarriage of justice. The question whether a discharge order is interlocutory or otherwise need not detain us because it is settled by a decision of this Court that the discharge order terminates the proceeding and, therefore it is revisable under Section 397(1), CrPC and Section 397(1) in terms confers power of suo motu revision on the High Court, and if the High Court exercises suo motu revision power the same cannot be denied on the ground that there is some limitation prescribed for the exercise of the power because none such is prescribed. If in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised what a glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably established by this case itself. We, however, do not propose to say a single word on the merits of the cause because there should not be even a whimper of prejudice to the accused who in view of this judgment would have to face the trial before the learned Magistrate."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Correspondingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haryana Land Reclamation and Development Corporation Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1990) 3 SCC 588, reiterated in the context of foregoing, as under;
"2. The question for consideration in this appeal is whether the order of discharge passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonepat is or is not an "interlocutory order" within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). The appellant which is a State Government undertaking registered under the Companies Act, 1956 is working under the CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 16 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:39:36 +0530 administrative control of Haryana Government in Agricultural Department. The Secretary of the appellant-Company filed a criminal complaint before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonepat against respondent 2 under Sections 409, 467, 468 and 466-A of the Penal Code, 1860 on the allegations that the second accused committed criminal breach of trust, misappropriated the stocks entrusted to him and defalcated the account books and stocks registers, etc. It seems that the complaint was referred to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. On the final report submitted by the Inspector of Police, Sonepat city, the learned Magistrate passed the following order on April 11, 1988.
*** *** ***
4. There are several decisions of this Court explaining the term "interlocutory order" occurring in Section 397(2) of the Code. In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana [(1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] the said term is defined thus: (SCC p. 142, para 6) *** *** *** Untwalia, J. speaking for the bench in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551 :
1978 SCC (Cri) 10] , after referring to Amar Nath case [(1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] and to some more decisions and after explaining what the term "interlocutory order" means finally observed as follows: (SCC p. 561, para 17) *** *** *** When the question that has arisen in the present case is examined in the light of the above observations made in Amar Nath case [(1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] and Madhu Limaye case [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] , it is clear that the order of the High Court is not sustainable and as such is liable to be set aside as the order of discharge passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate does not fall within the definition of the term "interlocutory order"
and the inherent power of the High Court is not limited."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to now consider the principles governing framing of charges. In this regard, it is relevant to outrightly note the settled law4 that at the stage of framing of charges, neither can the truth, veracity and 4 State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 17 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:39:40 +0530 effect of the prosecution case be meticulously5 judged, nor can any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. On the contrary, at such a stage, only the sufficiency of ground for proceeding against the accused, on a general consideration of materials placed before the Court by the investigating police officer is relevant. Further, though, sifting of evidence is permissible6, however, scanning of evidence in detail is not. Quite understandably, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Reena v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC Online Del 630, iterated the said principles in unequivocal terms as under;
"12. Thus it is settled position of law that at the time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed to look into the evidence of the case in detail and is only to consider whether there is a strong suspicion against the accused on the basis of the material that comes before it. The court has the power to sift the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out, whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused. However, the Court is not supposed to delve deeply into the merits of the matter and start a roving expedition into the evidence that is brought forth it, as if conducting a trial. Further there is no one fixed definition that may be ascribed to the term prima facie' nor can the term strong suspicion have a singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of its own independent facts and circumstances."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Concomitantly, it is settled law7 that the inconsistency in the material produced by the prosecution or the defect in investigation8, cannot be looked into for discharge of an accused, in the absence of full-fledged trial. In fact, the probative 5 Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
6State of Maharashta v. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393.
7Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476.
8State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police v. N. Suresh Ranjan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709. CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 18 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:39:44 +0530 value9 of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material placed on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768, wherein the Hon'ble Court remarked as under;
"59. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P. [Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21] , it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions and inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Relevant to further note that it is trite law10, at the stage of framing of charge, only the police report is required to be considered and the defence of the accused11 cannot be looked into. Needless to mention that the superior courts12 have persistently deprecated the practice of holding a mini trial at the time of framing of charge. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharat Parikh v. CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein the Hon'ble Court enunciated the judicial principle(s), as under;
9Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
10State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & Anr. v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 373; and State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
11State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294.
12Indu Jain v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 341. CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 19 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:39:48 +0530 "19. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi case [(2005) 1 SCC 568: 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] at the stage of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible and a mini trial cannot be conducted at such stage. At the stage of framing of charge the submissions on behalf of the accused have to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. The accused will get an opportunity to prove the documents subsequently produced by the prosecution on the order of the Court, but the same cannot be relied upon to reopen the proceedings once charge has been framed or for invocation of the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Apposite to further emphasize13 that at the stage of charge, court(s) is/are not even required to record detailed reasons for framing charge, rather14, a very strong suspicion founded upon materials placed before it, which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges. In fact15, it is only when no case is made out even after presuming entire prosecution evidence, can an accused be discharged. Needless to accentuate16, "at the stage of framing of charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial." Notably, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715, while inter alia illuminating the principles as well as the scope of enquiry for the purpose of charge/discharging an accused, observed as under;
13Bhawna Bai v. Dhanshyam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 217 14 Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 and Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368.
15Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633 16 Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 424 CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 20 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:39:53 +0530 "14. ...In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused".
The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. However, this Court is equally conscious that superior courts have determinedly asserted while determining on the aspect of charge/discharge, court cannot act, merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution. On the contrary, it has been continually stressed that the court(s) has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. Congruently, it is expected of the courts to be equally wary of the fact that if two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the courts are empowered to discharge an accused. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368, wherein the Hon'ble Court, remarked, as under;
"21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 21 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:39:57 +0530 prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."
(Emphasis supplied) CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 22 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.05.12 16:40:04 +0530
17. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder noted, however, before proceeding with the determination of the rival contentions of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and Ld. Counsel for the respondents/Ld. Addl. PP for the State, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC, as under;
"319. Hurt-Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.
*** *** ***
321. Voluntarily causing hurt-Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt".
*** *** ***
323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt- Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
*** *** ***
354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty-Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
*** *** *** 354A. Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment-(1) A man committing any of the following acts-
(i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
(iv) making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment. (2) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 23 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:40:08 +0530 (3) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
*** *** ***
503. Criminal intimidation-Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
*** *** ***
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation-
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;...
*** *** ***
509. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman-Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Notably, it is observed from a perusal of Section 323 IPC that the essence of the said offence lies in the accused's causing hurt to the victim, voluntarily, i.e., intentionally or with knowledge that in the process, hurt would be caused. Significantly, the term, hurt, in turn, is defined under Section 319 IPC as causation of any bodily pain, disease or infirmity to a victim. Quite evidently, disease or infirmity may have external manifestation, however, bodily pain may not be easily perceivable from any medical report. Ergo, it is quite understandable that the superior courts have persistently avowed that in order for conviction under Section 323 IPC to stand, it is not essential for production of an CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 24 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:40:11 +0530 injury/medical report. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar, (2021) 9 SCC 191, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in unambiguous terms noted as under;
"11. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellant-accused that all the appellants were alleged to have been armed with lathis and so far as PW 8 is concerned, no injury report is forthcoming and/or brought on record and therefore they cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 323 IPC is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that PW 8 in his examination-in-chief/deposition has specifically stated that after he sustained injuries, treatment was provided at Government Hospital, Paatan. He has further stated in the cross-examination on behalf of all the accused persons except accused Dinanath Singh that he sustained 2-3 blows of truncheons. He has also stated that he does not exactly remember that how many blows he suffered. According to him, he first went to Police Station, Paatan along with the SHO of Police Station, Paatan, where his statement was recorded and thereafter the SHO sent him to Paatan Hospital for treatment. Thus, he was attacked by the accused persons by lathis/sticks and he sustained injuries and was treated at Government Hospital, Paatan has been established and proved. It may be that there might not be any serious injuries and/or visible injuries, the hospital might not have issued the injury report. However, production of an injury report for the offence under Section 323 IPC is not a sine qua non for establishing the case for the offence under Section 323 IPC. Section 323 IPC is a punishable section for voluntarily causing hurt. "Hurt" is defined under Section 319 IPC. As per Section 319 IPC, whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause "hurt". Therefore, even causing bodily pain can be said to be causing "hurt". Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no error has been committed by the courts below for convicting the accused under Section 323 IPC..."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. In so far the provisions under Section 354 IPC are concerned, it is settled law that in order to attract culpability under the said provision, it is required for the prosecution to prove; (i) CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 25 of 42 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.05.12 16:40:15 +0530 commission of criminal assault or use of criminal force on a person, who is a woman; (ii) use of criminal force on such victim by the aggressor/accused; and (iii) use of criminal force upon such a woman with a mens rea (intention or knowledge) to 'outrage her modesty'. In this regard, this Court deems it apposite to refer to the decision in Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 1 SCC 215, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court17, while explicating the basic ingredients of Section 354 IPC, noted as under;
"9. In order to constitute the offence under Section 354 mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged is sufficient without any deliberate intention of having such outrage alone for its object. There is no abstract conception of modesty that can apply to all cases. (See State of Punjab v. Major Singh [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1] .) A careful approach has to be adopted by the court while dealing with a case alleging outrage of modesty. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC are as under:
(i) that the person assaulted must be a woman;
(ii) that the accused must have used criminal force on her; and
(iii) that the criminal force must have been used on the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
10. Intention is not the sole criterion of the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC, and it can be committed by a person assaulting or using criminal force to any woman, if he knows that by such act the modesty of the woman is likely to be affected. Knowledge and intention are essentially things of the mind and cannot be demonstrated like physical objects. The existence of intention or knowledge has to be culled out from various circumstances in which and upon whom the alleged offence is alleged to have been committed..."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Analogously, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 371, 17 Premiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 10 SCC 81. CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 26 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:40:19 +0530 cogitating on the ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC and the meaning of the term, 'modesty', remarked as under;
"11. Coming to the question as to whether Section 354 of the Act has any application, it is to be noted that the provision makes penal the assault or use of criminal force to a woman to outrage her modesty. The essential ingredients of offence under Section 354 IPC are:
(a) That the assault must be on a woman.
(b) That the accused must have used criminal force on her.
(c) That the criminal force must have been used on the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a woman, removing her saree, coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object. As indicated above, the word 'modesty' is not defined in IPC. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third Edn.) defines the word 'modesty' in relation to woman as follows:
"Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lowe; Shame-fast, Scrupulously chast."
*** *** ***
14. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as "freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct". In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.), the meaning of the word 'modesty' is given as "womanly propriety of behavior; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reverse or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions"..."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Congruently, from a scrupulous analysis of the CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 27 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.05.12 16:40:23 +0530 provisions under Section 354A IPC, it is observed that for the said provisions envisage criminality against any man who engages in unwelcome physical contact and advances explicit sexual behavior, demands sexual favors, shows pornography against a woman's will, or makes sexually colored remarks. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to make note of the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in V. Madhusoodhanan v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC Online Ker 6867, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while explicating the basic ingredients and contours of the provisions under Section 354A IPC, noted as under;
"8. ...On reading the penal provision, the same deals with sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment. It has been specifically provided that if a man commits an act of physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures, the same is an offence under Section 354A(1)(i) of IPC. When a man commits an act and makes a demand or request for sexual favour, the same is an offence under Section 354A(1)(ii) of IPC. Similarly, when a man commits an act showing pornography against the will of a woman, the same also is an offence under Section 354A(1)(iii) of IPC. Coming to Section 354A(1)(iv) of IPC, any man making sexually coloured remarks to a woman is guilty of the offence of sexual harassment..."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Correspondingly, for bringing home charge(s) under Section 506 IPC, prosecution is required to prove that an (i) accused threatened some person; (ii) such threat must extend to causing any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; and (iii) the accused did so with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 28 of 42
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2026.05.12
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Pertinently, the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera, 1995 SCC Online Ori 317, while explicating the meaning of the word, 'alarm' used under Section 503/506 IPC, noted as under;
"...9. Therefore, intention must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether he is alarmed or not is really of no consequence. But material has to be brought on record to show that intention was to cause alarm to that person. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in application of Section 506 IPC. The gist of the offence is the effect which the threat is intended to have upon mind of person threatened. *** The threat must be intended to cause alarm from which it follows that, ordinarily, it would be sufficient for that purpose. The degree of such alarm may very in different cases, but the essential matter is that it is of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates and take away from his acts that element of free voluntary action which alone constitutes consent. The case where the threat produces an alarm is comparatively a simple one, for all that has then to be proved is that threat was given and that the alarm was due to the threat: but where the threat has not that effect, it involves a question whether it was sufficient to overcome a man of ordinary nerves. The Court may hold it to be an empty boast, too insignificant to call for penal visitation of Section 506. "Intimidate"
according to Webstar's Dictionary means" (1) to make timid, make afraid, overawe; (2) force or deter with threats or violence, cow". Threat referred to in the Section must be a threat communicated or uttered with intention of its being communicated to the person threatened for the purpose of influencing his mind. Question whether threat amounts to a criminal intimidation or not does not depend on norms of individual threatened if it is such a threat as may overcome ordinary free will of a man of common firmness. "Threat" is derived from Anglo-sexam word "threotou to life", (harass). It is the dicleration of an intention to inflict punishment, loss or pain on another. "Injury" is defined in Section 44. It involves doing of an illegal act. If it is made with intention mentioned in the section, it is an offence. Whether threat was given with intention to cause alarm to the person threatened has to be established by evidence to be brought on record..."
(Emphasis supplied)
CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 29 of 42
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2026.05.12
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23. Significantly, in the aforenoted dictate, the Hon'ble Court explicitly observed that the mens rea/intention envisaged under Section 503/506 IPC must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether or not such a victim is alarmed, is not of any consequence. Here, it is further apposite to make reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with the ingredients of offence under Section(s) 503/506 IPC, inter alia, observed as under;
"11. ...A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Pertinent to further note that the essential ingredients of Section 509 IPC are; (i) intention on the part of an accused to insult the modesty of a woman; and that the (ii) insult must be caused by; (a) uttering any words, or making any sound or gesture, or exhibiting any object intending that such word or sound shall be heard or that the gesture or object shall be seen by such woman, or (b) by intruding upon the privacy of such a woman. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Varun Bhatia v. State, 2023 SCC Online Del 5288, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, while inter alia explicating the contours of the provisions under Section 509 IPC, noted as under;
"18. Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code delineates two pivotal components for establishing an offence: firstly, the presence of an intention to insult CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 30 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:40:38 +0530 the modesty of a woman, and secondly, the manner in which this insult is perpetrated. The cornerstone of this provision is the requirement of intent, where the accused must possess a deliberate intention to affront or insult the modesty of a woman. This intent sets apart ordinary speech or actions from those that amount to an offence under Section 509. The insult itself can take place through two distinct modes. It can occur verbally or visually by uttering specific words, making sounds, or displaying gestures or objects, with the deliberate intent that these words, sounds, gestures, or objects are heard or seen by the woman involved. Alternatively, insult can manifest as an intrusion upon the woman's privacy, meaning thereby encroaching upon her personal space or violating her sense of privacy intentionally, in a manner that affronts her modesty. In essence, Section 509 emphasizes that intent is the linchpin of this offence, necessitating a deliberate affront to a woman's modesty for the Section to be invoked."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Here, it is further apposite to note that the superior courts have persistently avowed that in order for the provisions under Section 509 IPC to be invoked, merely insulting a woman is not sufficient, rather, insult to the modesty of a woman is an essential ingredient of the said provision. In this regard, the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Abhijeet J.K. v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC Online Ker 703, in unambiguous terms, noted as under;
"8. Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code provides that, whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine.
9. Utterance of any word or making of any sound or gesture by a person, intending to insult the modesty of a woman, attracts the offence punishable under Section 509 I.P.C., if such act was made intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture shall be seen by such woman.
CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 31 of 42
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.05.12
16:40:42 +0530
10. There is distinction between an act of merely insulting a woman and an act of insulting the modesty of a woman. In order to attract Section 509 I.P.C., merely insulting a woman is not sufficient. Insult to the modesty of a woman is an essential ingredient of an offence punishable under Section 509 I.P.C. The crux of the offence is the intention to insult the modesty of a woman.
11. Section 509 I.P.C. criminalises a 'word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman' and in order to establish this offence it is necessary to show that the modesty of a particular woman or a readily identifiable group of women has been insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical act (See Khushboo v. Kanniammal, MANU/SC/0310/2010: AIR 2010 SC 3196)."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Consequently, being mindful of the above, this Court would now proceed with the determination of the issue/question, 'whether the Ld. Trial Court committed any illegality, impropriety and/or irregularly in discharging the accused persons/respondent nos. 2-4 of the charges/allegations levelled against them in the chargesheet?'. In this regard, this Court outrightly observes that from a conscientious perusal of the impugned order, it is noted that one of the reasons of discharging the accused persons/respondent nos. 2-4, transpires to be the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that there are contradictions in the initial complaint of the revisionist and her subsequent statement, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C. In particular, as aforenoted, it is explicitly noted by the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order that while under her initial statement, the revisionist asserted that on 24.08.2022 at around 02:00 p.m. when she was going from her house to military road then her sister- in-law (nanad), Renu/respondent no. 4 stated to her that if she goes through the street of her to be husband, Rajan @Raju then, he/Rajan would beat her/the revisionist. However, as per the Ld. CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 32 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:40:46 +0530 Trial Court, in her subsequent statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the revisionist did not state anything about sister-in-
law/respondent no. 4 and simply stated that when she was going to Vijay Chowk then respondent no. 4's boyfriend met the revisionist and started abusing her. However, in the considered opinion of this Court, such 'discrepancies/omissions' could not have been appreciated by the Ld. Trial Court at the stage of charge, to reach a finding of respondent nos. 2-4's discharge. In fact, this Court is conscious of the repeated avowal of the superior courts that the discrepancies between the initial statement/FIR and any subsequent statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. may, though, form a defence of an accused, however, the same cannot be a ground for discharge, without initiation of trial. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hazrat Deen v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC Online SC 1781, wherein the Hon'ble Court, explicated the law in this regard, in the following terms;
"5. The petitioner has not been charged only under the POCSO Act. Even assuming that the petitioner could not have been charged under the POCSO Act, the petitioner has been charged under various provisions of the IPC which were admittedly in force on the date of the alleged offence. The learned counsel for the petitioner emphatically argued that the FIR does not disclose offence under Section 376 of the IPC. The FIR is the initial document. In her statement given by the prosecutrix under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) after the prosecutrix attained majority, she categorically made statements which tantamount to offence under Section 376 of the IPC.
6. Discrepancies between the FIR and any subsequent statement under Section 164 of the CrPC may be a defence. However, the discrepancies cannot be a ground for discharge without initiation of trial."
(Emphasis supplied) CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 33 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:40:50 +0530
27. Correspondingly, it is noted from a thorough perusal of the impugned order that the Ld. Trial Court further profoundly placed reliance on the CCTV footage brought on record along with the chargesheet, while discharging the accused person. In fact, as aforenoted, the Ld. Trial Court went ahead to inter alia reach a finding that the revisionist was seen in the said footage, "also saying some heated words to the accused persons" and that as per the Ld. Counsel, at around 03:16 p.m., in the said footage, the revisionist was, "having very heated arguments and saying many thing to accused Rahul @ Ranjan and on the instigation of the complainant, the accused Rahul @ Ranjan caught hold the complainant once from her neck but it is evident from the CCTV footage that he did not touch the complainant inappropriately". However, in the considered opinion of this Court, such finding of the revisionist's instigating the accused persons; or of the revisionist' saying heating words to the accused persons; or that of the revisionist's saying many things to respondent no. 1; or that of respondent no. 1's, acting upon instigation of the revisionist; could not have been reached by the Ld. Trial Court, especially when the Ld. Trial Court itself and even this Court, noted from an analysis of the CCTV footage placed on record that the said CCTV footage/video was mute/inaudible. Even otherwise, such heavy reliance solely on the CCTV footage, without appreciating the statements of the complainant under her initial complaint and statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., in the considered opinion of this Court unfounded and fallacious, especially when the genuineness and the admissibility of the said CCTV footage/video, was undecided. In fact, law is trite18 that only 18 Kavita v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5382.
CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 34 of 42
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2026.05.12
16:41:03
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unimpeachable documentary material in the form of CCTV footage, which as per the CFSL report/forensic analysis is determined to be untampered and genuine, may be considered at the stage of charge/discharge. However, when the genuineness and the admissibility of CCTV footage was yet to be determined, such CCTV footage, cannot form the sole basis of accused's discharge. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Jiyaji Daniel v. State of Kerala, Crl. MC No. 8494/2024, dated 16.06.2025, wherein the Hon'ble Court, whilst, being confronted with an akin conundrum, remarked, as under;
"2. The petitioner moved an application for discharge before the trial court contending that even if the materials produced by the prosecution are accepted in their entirety, the alleged offences are not attracted against him. To bolster his argument, the petitioner relied on the CCTV footage containing the visuals of the happenings in the rooftop area during the relevant point of time. By the impugned order, the trial court dismissed the discharge application by holding that a laborious sifting of evidence is not warranted at the stage of framing charge. In the impugned order, it is also observed that the accused cannot be discharged based on CCTV footage of the incident, as admissibility of the video recording can be decided only at the stage of evidence.
*** *** ***
5. While dismissing the discharge petition, the learned Sessions Judge has observed that some of the witnesses had stated that the petitioner along with other accused had encouraged the 1st accused to unleash violence against the victim. In such circumstances, the complicity or otherwise of the petitioner cannot be decided based on a video recording of the incident, the genuineness and the admissibility of which are yet to be decided. It is the settled law that, for the purpose of exercising the inherent power under Section 528 of BNSS, the High Court should not conduct mini trial or microscopic scrutiny of documents."
(Emphasis supplied) CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 35 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:41:08 +0530
28. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as well as that by/on behalf of the respondents/Ld. Addl. PP for the State/respondent no 1 and Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-4, this Court observes that from the facts and circumstances of the case, material and the documents placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court, including inter alia the contents of the chargesheet/supplementary chargesheet, statements of witnesses, including that of the complainant/revisionist, CCTV footage, other documents placed on record, reasonable ground, strong/grave suspicion and prima facie case for proceeding with the framing of charges under Section 323/352/506 IPC exists against respondent no. 2/Rahul @ Rajan and that to proceed with the framing of charges under Section 506 IPC exists against respondent no. 3/Meera Bai. In this regard, it is noted by this Court unambiguously records that the revisionist, both, under her initial complaint as well as her subsequent statement, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., consistently asserted that on 24.08.2022, when she/the revisionist was present at respondent no. 2's house at Military Road, respondent no. 2 assaulted and beat her/the revisionist. Congruently, the revisionist further proclaimed under her statement, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., that respondent no. 2, caught hold of the revisionist by her neck and pushed her on the side of the road as well as threatened to kill her. Needless to mention that the factum of respondent no. 2's catching hold of the revisionist, once from her neck, was also duly noted by the Ld. Trial Court, under the impugned order, as also noted by this Court under the CCTV footage placed on record. Ergo, under such CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 36 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:41:13 +0530 circumstances, it is reiterated that in the considered opinion of this Court, reasonable ground, strong/grave suspicion and prima facie case for proceeding with the framing of charges under Section 323/352/506 IPC exists against respondent no. 2/Rahul @ Rajan. Needless to further reiterate that as aforenoted, for the provisions under Section 323 IPC to be attracted in a case, it is not always necessary to produce an injury/medical report, as even causation of bodily pain, may fall within the purview of 'hurt' under Section 319 IPC.
29. Congruently, it is noted that the revisionist, consistently asserted under her complaint and subsequent statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. that respondent no. 3/Meera Bai, threatened her that in case, she did not withdraw her complaint against respondent no. 2, she/the revisionist would be removed from her house/ostracized from her house along with her/revisionist's husband. Ergo, under such circumstances, this Court reiterated that strong suspicion, sufficient grounds, prima facie case to proceed with the framing of charges under Section 506 IPC exists against respondent no. 3/Meera Bai. Needless to further note that respondent no. 3 is also seen at the spot in the CCTV footage, however, in the absence of any audio in the said CCTV footage, this Court does not concede with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order that respondent no. 3/Meera Bai, "can only be seen to pacify the matter between the complainant and the accused Rahul Ranjan". On the contrary, in the considered opinion of this Court, in view of the consistent allegation of the revisionist in her complaint and subsequent statement, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the exact role and CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 37 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:41:19 +0530 proclamation at the spot, can only be determined once evidence is led during trial.
30. However, in the considered opinion of this Court no reasonable ground and/or strong/grave suspicion of prima facie case exits for proceeding with the framing of charges under Section 354/354A/509 IPC against respondent no. 2/Rahul @ Rajan. In this regard, this Court reiterates that for prosecution under Section 509 IPC, it is imperative that there are definite allegations of insult to the modesty of woman or of intrusion into her privacy and that merely insulting a woman is different from insulting the modesty of woman. Clearly, in light of the same, when the material placed on record is conscientious perused, it is noted that the revisionist merely asserted that respondent no. 2 abused her and that nowhere, under the material placed on record, any element/allegation of any insult from respondent no. 2, as directed/intended to insult the modesty of the complainant/revisionist in the instant case, is forthcoming so as to prima facie attract the provisions under Section 509 IPC against respondent no. 2, entitling respondent no. 2 to be discharge from the said offence. Concurrently, the allegations levelled by the revisionist against the respondent no. 2's pressing her breast, under her initial complaint, in the considered opinion of this Court, do not make out a strong suspicion or prima facie case to proceed against respondent no. 2 for the charges under Section 354/354A IPC. Needless in this regard to note that it is the revisionist's own case that the incident transpired during a scuffle, when respondent no. 2 pushed her on a side. Ergo, being wary of the settled law that mere touching or pushing a woman, accidentally in a wrongful manner, cannot be said to be with an intention to outrage her CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 38 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.05.12 16:41:24 +0530 modesty. Needless in this regard to observe that the superior courts have persistently avowed that the test of outrage of modesty is to be determined by thinking19, "whether a reasonable man will think that the act of the offender was intended to or was known to be likely to outrage the modesty of the woman". In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent here to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Sumit Kr. Gupta v. State of West Bengal, CRR No. 3236/2013, dated 22.04.2014, wherein the Hon'ble Court, remarked in an akin context, as under;
"...From the above facts this Court is of the further opinion that the touching of the informant by the petitioner took place during a heated quarrel between them. The subject of the quarrel was the locking of the outer gate on the tenanted premises. In such view of the matter during the heat of the quarrel when the petitioner touched or pushed the informant accidentally in a wrongful manner, the same cannot be said to be with an intention to outrage her modesty..."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Congruently, in the considered opinion of this Court, no reasonable ground and/or strong/grave suspicion of prima facie case exits for proceeding with the framing of charges under Section 506 IPC against respondent no. 4/Renu. Needless in this regard to observe that the allegations against respondent no. 4 are general in nature in as much as they do not even disclose the particulars, where respondent no. 4 is asserted to have threatened the revisionist. Needless to mention that it is not even the case of the revisionist in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. or that under her complaint that respondent no. 4 was present at the spot of occurrence. Ergo, under such circumstances, even in the considered opinion of this Court, 'mere suspicion' as opposed to 19 M.A. Vaheed v. K.K. Lathika, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 5174.
CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 39 of 42
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12
16:41:28 +0530
'grave suspicion', exists so as not to convince even this Court that charges for the offences/allegations levelled against respondent no. 4 ought to be framed in the instant case. In fact, in this regard, this Court deems it pertinent at this stage to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in K v. State, 2025 SCC Online Del 4716, wherein the Hon'ble Court, in an akin situation, noted as under;
"18. At the stage of framing of charge, the settled legal position is that the Court must examine whether there exists grave suspicion against the accused warranting a full-fledged trial. In the present case, having regard to the totality of circumstances, the significant and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the improbable conduct of the victim, the findings of the ICC exonerating the accused, absence of independent or medical evidence, and a possibility of a motive for false implication stemming from an employment dispute, this Court is of the considered view that no grave suspicion arises against the accused."
(Emphasis supplied)
32. Conclusively, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court unwaveringly records and reiterates that the Ld. Trial Court committed impropriety/erred in discharging respondent no. 2/Rahul @ Rajan of the offences under Sections 323/352/506 IPC and discharging respondent no. 3/Meera Bai of the offence/charge under Section 506 IPC. However, as aforenoted, Ld. Trial Court, committed no illegality and/or impropriety in discharging respondent no. 2/Rahul @ Rajan of the offences under Sections 354/354A/509 IPC and discharging respondent no. 4/Renu of the offence under Section 506 IPC.
33. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing discussion, further being cognizant of the facts and circumstances brought forth, material and documents placed on record as well as being wary of the aforenoted judicial dictates, this Court unambiguously CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 40 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:41:33 +0530 records that the impugned order dated 06.09.2024 passed by Ld. JMFC (Mahila Court)-04, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing, 'State v. Rahul @ Rajan & Ors., Cr. Case No. 07/2023', arising out of FIR No. 458/2022, PS. Prasad Nagar, discharging respondent nos. 2-4 of the charges/allegations levelled against them, deserves to be set aside and is hereby set aside, in as much as respondent no. 2/Rahul @ Rajan is discharged of the offences under Sections 323/352/506 IPC and respondent no. 3/Meera Bai is discharged of the offence/charge under Section 506 IPC. However, the impugned order is upheld in so far as it discharges respondent no. 2/Rahul @ Rajan of the offences under Sections 354/354A/509 IPC and discharges respondent no. 4/Renu of the offence under Section 506 IPC.
34. Conclusively, the present revision petition is disposed of in above terms.
35. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court, concerned, with directions to proceed as per law, in light of the foregoing discussion. Needless at this stage to note that nothing stated hereinabove shall be construed as opinion on final outcome of the case and the same shall be decided in accordance with law upon conclusion of evidence.
36. Further, a copy of this order, be given dasti to the revisionist and the respondents/Ld. Counsel for the respondents. Needless to mention that the compliance of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 1 has been carried out.
CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 41 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12 16:41:38 +0530
37. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.05.12
16:41:42
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 12.05.2026. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CR. No. 587/2024 Smt. 'P' v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. Page No. 42 of 42