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[Cites 10, Cited by 4]

Supreme Court of India

Munir Sayed Ibna Hussain vs The State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 12 November, 1975

Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 1992, 1976 SCR (2) 687, AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 1992, (1976) 3 SCC 548, (1976) 1 SCWR 28, 1976 CRI APP R (SC) 57, 1976 ALLCRIC 176, 1976 SCC(CRI) 459, (1976) 2 SCR 687, 1976 SC CRI R 40, 1976 UJ (SC) 32

Author: M. Hameedullah Beg

Bench: M. Hameedullah Beg, P.K. Goswami

           PETITIONER:
MUNIR SAYED IBNA HUSSAIN

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/11/1975

BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:
 1976 AIR 1992		  1976 SCR  (2) 687
 1976 SCC  (3) 548


ACT:
     Sec 421  of Criminal  Procedure Code-Practice  of	High
Court in  dismissing criminal  appeals	without	 giving	 any
reasons	 disapproved-Power   of	 High  Court  to  dismiss  a
Criminal appeal in limine.



HEADNOTE:
     The appellant  an owner of a hotel was prosecuted along
with five  others for forcibly dispossessing the complainant
who  was   the	Manager	  of  the   Hotel  and	further	 for
misappropriating certain  properties  including	 some  money
belonging to  the complainant.	According to  the appellant,
the complainant	 was merely  a	licensee.  The	Trial  Court
acquitted accused  Nos. 3  to 6	 and convicted accused No. 1
and 2.	The High  Court admitted the appeal of accused No. 2
and acquitted him. The appeal of the appellant accused No. 1
was, however,  rejected by  the High Court it limine without
giving any reasons for the rejection.
     On an appeal by Special Leave,
^
     HELD: 1.  There is	 a whole  catena of cases which have
come up	 to this  Court from  the Bombay High Court in which
this Court  has consistently  disapproved  of  the  practice
followed by the Bombay High Court of not giving reasons when
exercising  its	 power	of  summary  dismissal	of  criminal
appeals which  lie both	 on questions  of fact	and law.  In
other High  Courts such	 appeals are automatically admitted.
The power  of summary  rejection under	section 421  of	 the
Criminal Procedure  Code should	 be only  exercised when the
Court is  satisfied from  a, perusal of the judgment as well
as  the	 record	 that  there  is  absolutely  no  reasonable
possibility of	its success  for reasons  to be mentioned in
the order  of dismissal.  In the present case, it cannot be-
said that  there are  no arguable points. It is difficult to
believe that  the judgments  of this court have neither come
to the	knowledge of the Bombay High Court nor were cited on
behalf of'  the appellant  In any  case, the law having been
declared by  this Court,  it is	 the duty of the Bombay High
Court  to   act	 in  accordance	 with  Article	141  of	 the
constitution and  to apply  it by  giving proper  reasons to
justify whatever  be its  view. The  judgment of  the Bombay
High Court  was set  aside and it was directed that the case
should, be  treated as	admitted for  regular hearing in she
Bombay High  Court and	should be  disposed of in accordance
with law. [688-C, E, F, G, 689-AB] F



JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 191 of 1971.

(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court dated 25-2-1972 in criminal appeal No. 683 of 1971.) M/s. M. K. Ramamurthi & Co. for the appellant. M. N. Shroff and Vineet Kumar, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J. The allegations, on questions of fact raised in the appeal now before us, were quite unusual. The judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 683 of 1971, in respect of coaccused Syed Ali Naki Hade Hasan, who was acquitted on 25-2-1972, shows the nature of the allegations made by the prosecutor 688 in this case. On those allegations, it became necessary to consider whether the accused, who had been put on trial together with six others, was actually in possession of a Hotel. The appellant claimed to be the owner of a hotel of which Jagannath, complainant, was said to be the manager. The case of the Manager was that he had been forcefully dispossessed by the accused and that certain properties belonging to him and others, including some money, were mis- appropriated by the accused. Therefore, the appellant and five others were charged under Section 395 Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 452 read with Section 34 I.P.C. According to the accused, Shri Jagannath and his brother, the complainant, were only licensees. However, these are questions relating to the merits of a case in which the Trial Court had acquitted accused numbers 3 to 8 and the High Court acquitted accused No. 2. The appeal of the only remaining accused, accused No. 1, who is the appellant before us by special leave was, however, rejected in limine by the High Court without giving any reasons for the rejection.

There is a whole catena of cases which have come up here from the Bombay High Court in which this Court has consistently disapproved of the practice followed by the Bombay High Court of not giving reasons when exercising its power of summary dismissal of criminal s appeals which lie both on questions of fact and law. In other High Courts, such appeals are automatically admitted. In any case, it is not possible for this Court to exercise its powers satisfactorily without giving an appellant, who may have an arguable case, an opportunity of first presenting his case to the High Court and getting a decision from it.

The power of a summary rejection of a criminal 1st appeal, even though it is exercisable under the provisions of Section 421 Criminal Procedure Code, should, in our opinion, be only exercised when the Court is satisfied, from a perusal of the judgment as well as the record, that there is absolutely no reasonable possibility of its success for the reasons mentioned in the order. In a case such as the one now before us, it cannot be said that there are no such arguable points that, after the High Court had an opportunity of fully considering both sides of the case, it must necessarily dismiss the appeal. At least, in such cases, where there are arguable points, the High Court should give its grounds and reasons in support of its decision to reject summarily on some absolutely clinching ground. This Court has laid down the duty upon the High Court to record reasons. (See: Mushtak Hussein v. The State of Bombay (13; Krishna Vithu Surosha v. State of Maharashtra (2); Mustaq Ahmed Mohmed Hussain & Anr. v. The State of Gujarat(3); Kapurchand Kesrimal Jain v. The State of Maharashtra(4) .

It is difficult to believe that judgments of this Court have neither come to the knowledge of the Bombay High Court nor were cited on behalf of the appellant. In any case, the law having been declared by this Court, it is the duty of the Bombay High Court to act in accord (1) [1955] SCR 809. (2) [1974] (3) S.C.C. 404. (3) [1973] (1) S.C.C. 702. (4) [1973] (3) S.C.C. 299.

689

ance with Article 141 of the Constitution and to apply it by giving proper reasons to justify whatever be its view.

Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court rejecting the appeal summarily and order that the case will be treated as admitted for regular hearing of both sides by the Bombay High Court, and disposed of in accordance with the law. ,, P.H.P. Appeal allowed.

690