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[Cites 9, Cited by 0]

Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur

M/S Raj State Mines vs Employees Pvo Fund Anr ... on 29 March, 2023

Author: Sameer Jain

Bench: Sameer Jain

[2023/RJJP/001668]

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                     BENCH AT JAIPUR

                     S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4810/2010

M/s. Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd., Khanij Bhanwan,
Tilak Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur through its Manager (F&A) Sh.
R.K. Singh.
                                                                                   ----Petitioner
                                              Versus
1. Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, Scope Minar,
Core-II, 4th Floor, Laxmi Nagar District Centre, Laxmi Nagar, New
Delhi- 110092, through its Registrar.
2. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Jaipur, Nidhi Bhawan,
Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur.
                                                                               ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)                  :     Mr. Pranjul Chopra with
                                         Mr. Sameer Sharma &
                                         Mr. Kartik Goyal
For Respondent(s)                  :     Mr. Deepak Goyal



                   HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN

                                              Order

REPORTABLE

Reserved on                24.01.2023
Pronounced on               29.03.2023

1.    The present petition is filed against the impugned order

dated     19.02.2010            passed         by      Presiding         Officer,       Employees

Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in ATA 509(12)

2006, titled as Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. vs.

Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner Jaipur and against the

order dated 04.08.2006 passed by Assistant Provident Fund

Commissioner           Jaipur       under        Section        14B       of    the     Employees

Provident Fund and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952.




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2.    Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the

order(s) dated 19.02.2010 and 04.08.2006 have been passed in

contravention of the settled position of law and while passing the

said orders, the respondents have neither considered the relevant

facts of the case nor have they abided by the mandate of the ad

rem statutory provisions pertaining to the imposition of penalty by

way of damages and the corresponding charges on interest.

Hence, the impugned orders are non-est and void ab-initio.

3.    In this background, while praying for the quashing of the

orders referred herein-above, learned counsel for the petitioner

has apprised the Court of the brief and relevant factual matrix of

the present petition. It is submitted that the petitioner is an

enterprise of the Government of Rajasthan, which is engaged in

the mining of             rock phosphate, lignite, gypsum, silica and

limestone. The petitioner is covered by the mandate of The

Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,

1952 (hereinafter, 'Act of 1952') and the Employee's Pension

Scheme of 1971. However, the provisions of the Act of 1952 were

applicable to the petitioner only to the extent that the petitioner is

an exempted establishment under Section 17(1)(a) of the Act of

1952. The petitioner-company, with a resolve to benefit its

employees, proposed to introduce a pension scheme titled,

'RSMDC Ltd. Employee's Pension Regulations, 1994'; in lieu of the

Employee's Pension Scheme of 1971. The Board of Directors of the

petitioner-company resolved to implement the said Regulations of

1994 w.e.f. 1.04.1994. Meanwhile, during the period when the

said Regulations of 1994 were being finalized, the Central




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Government,           namely          the      EPF      Department               introduced         the

'Employee's Pension Scheme, 1995'.

4.    At this juncture, it was submitted by the learned counsel for

the petitioner that considering the fact that the implementation of

the petitioner-company's Regulations of 1994 was to be carried

out w.e.f. 01.04.1994, the petitioner-company entered into a

dialogue      with       the      Assistant         Provident          Fund        Commissioner

regarding       the     compliance            and      modalities          for    the      grant     of

exemption from the Pension Scheme of 1995, as introduced by the

Central Government. Subsequently, taking into account the factum

of resistance and unrest from the employees of the petitioner-

company qua the Scheme of 1995 and after further considering

the fact of the probable implementation of the Regulations of

1994, subject to the examination by the Committee formed by the

Board of Directors; the petitioner-company decided to avail the

benefit of Paragraph 39 of the Scheme of 1995, which provides

establishments exemptions from the operation of the Pension

Scheme of 1995. Therefore, relying upon the benefit envisioned in

Paragraph 39, the petitioner-company did not make contributions

to the pension fund.

5.    Thereafter, since there was                          a delay occurring                  in the

finalization of the Pension Regulations of 1994, which were to take

effect from 01.04.1994; vide communication dated 23.12.1996, it

was suggested by the P.F. Authorities that the amount of pension

contribution be remitted to the pension fund by the petitioner-

company and the same would be refunded, subject to the grant of

exemption under Paragraph 39 of the Pension Scheme of 1995. In

light of the said suggestion, the petitioner-company deposited the


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due amount on 23.12.1996. Moreover, upon a finalization of the

Regulations        of     1994,        the     petitioner-company                 submitted         an

application under Paragraph 39 of the Scheme of 1995, for grant

of exemption from the Pension Scheme of 1995, in lieu of the

Regulations of 1994, as formulated by the petitioner-company.

However, vide letter dated 11.04.1997, the said exemption

application was rejected on the ground that the Regulations of

1994 were deemed to be less favourable to the employees when

juxtaposed with the Pension Scheme of 1995. Thereafter, on

19.02.2003, the erstwhile RSMDC was amalgamated into the

petitioner-company. Subsequently, on 28.10.2004, summons were

issued under Section 14B of the Act of 1952, in the name of

Managing Director (RSMDC) wherein it was inter-alia alleged that

the RSMDC had failed to remit the amount of P.F. Contribution

charges, within the stipulated due date. In light of the said

summons, necessary details/explanation was called from the

petitioner-company. On 17.01.2005, a representative of the

petitioner-company attended the inquiry conducted against the

company        and       vide      letter      dated        15.01.2005,            apprised         the

respondents regarding the fact of amalgamation of the companies

w.e.f. 20.02.2003 and submitted that the erstwhile RSMDC had

been regularly complying with the provisions of the Act and

accordingly, submitting its dues.

6.    In this background, on 06.06.2006, respondent no.2 issued a

letter dated 18.05.2006 along with a statement showing the

amount due on part of the petitioner-company under Section 14B

of the Act for the period from March 1995 to August 2002, which

was quantified to the tune of Rs. 6,09,117/- as damages under


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Section 14B and interest @ Rs. 21,768/- under Section 7Q of the

Act. In response, the petitioner-company submitted its reply vide

letter dated 13.07.2006, advancing its bonafides and genuineness

in light of the fact that the damages for the period between

December 1995 to February 1997 would not be applicable to the

petitioner-company on account of the fact that the delay, as made

out by the respondents, came into existence on account of the

fact that the Pension Regulations of 1994 were not approved by

the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and the application

filed under Paragraph 39 was rejected. Therefore, the inadvertent

delay was caused under unavoidable circumstances. Hence, it was

contended that the intentions of the petitioner-company were

bonafide, as is reflected from the fact that when there was a delay

on their part in finalizing the Pension Regulations of 1994, the

petitioner-company on their own accord, started depositing the

statutory contributions in the year 1996. Therefore, the authorities

below have passed legally unsustainable order(s), without taking

into consideration the bonafide intentions of the petitioner-

company and overlooking the relevant facts and circumstances of

the case. Hence, the orders dated 19.02.2010 and 04.08.2006 are

liable to be quashed and set aside.

7.    Per     contra,        learned         counsel        for     the      respondents            has

submitted that the impugned order(s) have been passed in

accordance         with      law,      after       due      application          of     mind        and

consideration of the relevant facts and law applicable. He has

relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil

Appeal No(s). 2136/2012 titled as Horticulture Experiment

Station Gonikoppal, Coorg v/s The Regional Provident Fund


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Organization wherein it was held that any default or delay in the

payment of EPF contribution by the employer under the Act is a

sine qua non for imposition of levy of damages under Section 14B

of the Act of 1952. Furthermore, learned counsel has also

submitted        that      the       Hon'ble        Apex        Court        in     Horticulture

Experiment (Supra) has taken into consideration the three

Judge Bench judgment in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs.

Dharmendra Textile Processors and Ors. reported in (2008)

13 SCC 369 and has held that mens rea is not an essential

element for imposing penalty/damages in civil obligations and

liabilities. Lastly, in support of his contentions, learned counsel

relied upon Rule 32B of the Employee Provident Funds Scheme

1952, which is reproduced hereinunder:-

          32B. Terms and conditions for reduction or
          waiver of damages:-

          The Central Board may reduce or waive the damages
          levied under section 14B of the Act in relation to an
          establishment specified in the second proviso to
          section 14B, subject to the following terms and
          conditions, namely: --
          (a) in case of a change of management including
          transfer of the undertaking to workers' co-operative
          and in case of merger or amalgamation of the sick
          industrial company with any other industrial
          company, complete waiver of damages may be
          allowed;
          (b) in cases where the Board for Industrial and
          Financial Reconstruction, for reasons to be recorded
          in its schemes, in this behalf recommends, waiver of
          damages up to 100 per cent may be allowed;
          (c) in other cases, depending on merits, reduction of
          damages up to 50 per cent may be allowed."

8.    In this regard, learned counsel submitted that in terms of

Rule 32B, the petitioner-company falls under the statutory ambit


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of Sub-rule (c). Therefore, as per the mandate of the said Rule, it

is only the Central Board which, depending upon the merits of a

case, can reduce or waive the damages imposed under Section

14B, to an upper limit of 50% only. Hence, after duly taking into

consideration the factual matrix of the case and the application of

the relevant law, the Appellate Tribunal as well as the Assistant

Provident Fund Commissioner have passed well-reasoned orders,

strictly in accordance with law. Hence, the present writ petition is

liable to be dismissed.



9.      This Court has heard the arguments advanced by the learned

counsel for the both the sides, scanned the record of the case and

perused the judgment(s) cited at Bar.


10.     In the case at hand, the following facts warrant germane

consideration, for the fair and efficacious adjudication of the

matter:

10/1. That the petitioner-company is a State instrumentality,

being a Government-Company having 100 per cent equity of the

State.

10/2.     That the petitioner-company introduced a pension scheme

for the benefit of its employees, titled as 'RSMDC Ltd. Employee's

Pension Regulations, 1994'. However, while the said regulations

were being finalized, the Central Government introduced the

Employee's Pension Scheme, 1995. Accordingly, the petitioner-

company applied for exemption under Paragraph 39 of the

Scheme of 1995, which came to be operational from 16.11.1995.



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10/3.     That since delay was occurring in the finalization of the

Pension Regulations of 1994, which were to take effect from

01.04.1994, it was suggested by the P.F. Authorities that the

amount of pension contribution be remitted to the pension fund by

the petitioner-company and the same shall be refunded on the

grant of exemption from the Scheme of 1995. Accordingly, the

amount due was deposited on 23.12.1996, under the belief that

the amount will be refunded if the exemption is granted.

10/4. However, the said application for exemption filed under

Paragraph 39 of the Scheme of 1995 was rejected on 11.04.1997.

11.     On a perusal of the aforementioned facts, it is observed that

the petitioner-company had been regularly complying with the

provisions of the Act of 1952 and the Schemes applicable thereto

and had further been depositing their statutory contributions in a

timely manner towards the Pension Scheme. Moreover, they also

co-operated with the Department upon the initiation of inquiry

against the petitioner-company under Section 14B of the Act of

1952. The bonafides of the petitioner-company are further

established by the fact that when there was a delay in the

finalization of the Pension Regulations of 1994, the petitioner-

company on their own accord, started depositing their statutory

contributions, under the genuine belief that the amount shall be

refunded to the company if the exemption, as prayed for under

Paragraph 39, is granted. Therefore, in the above background,

having established the bonafides of the petitioner-company, the

central point of consideration which arises in the instant matter is-




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               "Whether in the light of the provisions of Section
         14B of the Act of 1952, the levy and imposition of
         damages is mandatory or not and whether the same
         encapsulates the requirement of mens rea on part of
         the petitioner-company to evade their statutory
         obligations towards the provident fund or pension
         scheme as a pre-requisite to such imposition
         of/damages?"
12.   Before adverting to the adjudication of the issue framed

herein-above, it would be appropriate for this Court to reproduce

the relevant provisions necessary for its due consideration, herein-

under:

              "14B. Power to recover damages.--Where an
              employer makes default in the payment of any
              contribution to the Fund [the (Pension) Fund or the
              Insurance Fund] or in the transfer of accumulations
              required to be transferred by him under sub-
              section (2) of section 15 [or sub-section (5) of
              section 17] or in the payment of any charges
              payable under any other provision of this Act or of
              [any Scheme or Insurance Scheme] or under any
              of the conditions specified under section 17, [the
              Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other
              officer as may be authorised by the Central
              Government, by notification in the Official Gazette,
              in this behalf] "may recover" [from the
              employer by way of penalty such damages,
              not exceeding the amount of arrears, as may
              be specified in the Scheme:]
              [Provided that before levying and recovering such
              damages, the employer shall be given a reasonable
              opportunity of being heard]:
              [Provided further that the Central Board may
              reduce or waive the damages levied under this
              section in relation to an establishment which is a
              sick industrial company and in respect of which a
              scheme for rehabilitation has been sanctioned by
              the    Board     for   Industrial  and    Financial
              Reconstruction established under section 4 of the
              Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act,
              1985, subject to such terms and conditions as may
              be specified in the Scheme.]



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          32B. Terms and conditions for reduction or
          waiver of damages:-

          The Central Board "may reduce or waive" the
          damages levied under section 14B of the Act in
          relation to an establishment specified in the second
          proviso to section 14B, subject to the following terms
          and conditions, namely: --
          (a) in case of a change of management including
          transfer of the undertaking to workers' co-operative
          and in case of merger or amalgamation of the sick
          industrial company with any other industrial
          company, complete waiver of damages may be
          allowed;
          (b) in cases where the Board for Industrial and
          Financial Reconstruction, for reasons to be recorded
          in its schemes, in this behalf recommends, waiver of
          damages up to 100 per cent may be allowed;
          (c) in other cases, depending on merits,
          reduction of damages up to 50 per cent may be
          allowed."

13.   In a bid to settle the central issue framed herein-above, it is

imperative to peruse the judgment cited by the learned counsel

for the respondent in the case of Horticulture Experiment

(Supra), wherein reliance has also been placed upon the Apex

Court decision in Dharmendra Textiles (Supra). While placing

reliance upon the said judgment, it has been considerably argued

by the respondents that mens rea or actus reus are not essential

elements for the imposition of penalty or damages for breach of

civil obligations and liabilities. Learned counsel, in particular,

placed reliance upon the following extract from the said judgment,

which is reproduced below:


          "15. It may be noticed that Dilip N. Shroff (supra)
          on which reliance was placed has been overruled by
          this Court in Union of India and Others v.
          Dharmendra Textile Processors and others
          (supra). For the aforesaid reasons, the view

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          expressed by this Court in Employees State
          Insurance Corporation (supra) may not be binding
          precedent on the subject and of no assistance to the
          appellant(s).
          17. Taking note of three-Judge Bench judgment of
          this Court in Union of India and Ors. v.
          Dharmendra Textile Processors and Ors.
          (supra), which is indeed binding on us, we are of
          the considered view that any default or delay in the
          payment of EPF contribution by the employer under
          the Act is a sine qua non for imposition of levy of
          damages Under Section 14B of the Act 1952 and
          mens rea or actus reus is not an essential element
          for imposing penalty/damages for breach of civil
          obligations/liabilities."

14.   On the other hand, in order to set forth and establish the

requirement of mens rea on part of an establishment to evade

their statutory obligation, thereby warranting the imposition of

penalty under Section 14B of the Act of 1952, learned counsel for

the petitioner has extensively relied upon the celebrated judgment

of the Apex Court in M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. The State

of Orissa reported in 1970 SCR (1) 753. In particular, emphasis

has been laid on the said extract from the said judgment, which is

reproduced herein-under:


             7. Under the Act penalty may be imposed for
             failure to register as a dealer : Section 9(1) read
             with Section 25(1)(a) of the Act. But the liability
             to pay penalty does not arise merely upon proof of
             default in registering as a dealer.
             An order imposing penalty for failure to carry out
             a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-
             criminal proceeding, and penalty will not ordinarily
             be imposed unless the party obliged either acted
             deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of
             conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in
             conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will
             not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to
             do so. Whether penalty should be imposed for


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             failure to perform a statutory obligation is a
             matter of discretion of the authority to be
             exercised judicially and on a consideration of all
             the relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum
             penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to
             impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to
             impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial
             breach of the provisions of the Act or where the
             breach flows from a bona fide belief that the
             offender is not liable to act in the manner
             prescribed by the statute. Those in charge of the
             affairs of the Company in failing to register the
             Company as a dealer acted in the honest and
             genuine belief that the Company was not a dealer.
             Granting that they erred, no case for imposing
             penalty was made out.

15.   Additionally, learned counsel for the petitioner has also

placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Organo

Chemical Industries & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors.:(1997)

4 SCC 573; Bharat Heavy Vehicles vs. P.F. Commissioner:

AIR    1994         SC       1175        and       Employees              State        Insurance

Corporation vs. HMT Ltd. reported in AIR 2008 SC 1322.

While placing reliance upon the said judgments, learned counsel

for the petitioner has submitted that in situations where there is

absence on part of an establishment to deliberately evade their

statutory obligations and especially in situations, where the delay

so caused was on account of bonafide reasons, the imposition of

damages upon the establishment is completely unjustified. In light

of the same, it was also argued that considering the factum of

non-establishment of an intentional attempt to evade the payment

of the petitioner-company's statutory dues coupled with the fact of

delay caused on account of a bonafide belief arising from the

exemption application so filed under Paragraph 39, the imposition



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of penalty by the concerned authorities was wholly unjustified and

misconceived in the eyes of the settled position of the law.


16.     Having comprehensively considered the judgments cited by

the learned counsel for both the sides on the issue framed herein-

above, it is observed that judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court

rendered in M/s Hindustan Steel (Supra) is squarely applicable

to the facts and circumstances of the instant matter. Whereas, the

applicability of the judgment(s) cited by the learned counsel for

the respondent is not met out in the facts and circumstances of

the present case. The holdings in the case of Horticulture

Experiment (Supra) and Dharmendra Textiles (Supra) are

distinguishable from the facts of the instant case, on the following

grounds:

16/1.          The ground for delay caused in the payment of the

statutory obligations in Horticulture Experiment (Supra) were

distinct from the facts and circumstances of the instant matter

insofar as the establishment i.e. Horticulture Experiment Station,

was not a State instrumentality unlike the petitioner-company.

Moreover, contrary to the facts of the present matter qua the

deposition of dues by the petitioner-company in the Pension Fund

and the factum of the application for exemption filed by them, the

Horticulture        Experiment            Company            had       neither        fulfilled      its

obligation to deposit monies in the Pension Fund and nor had they

applied     for     an     exemption           of     any      sort,      which       could         have

inadvertently caused them to fumble in timely paying their dues




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as required under the Act of 1952 and the corresponding Rules

framed therewith.

16/2.          In the case of Dharmendra Textile (Supra) as relied

upon by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Horticulture Experiment

(Supra), while considering the provision of Section 11AC of the

Central Excise Act, 1944, it was held that the levy of penalty

under the said provision was mandatory, as the legislature had

used the words "assessee shall be liable" ('shall' being the

keyword), which leaves no room for discretion on part of the

authorities.        Furthermore,             the       provision          of     Section            11AC

encapsulates the inter play of fraud, collusion or any willful mis-

statement or suppression of facts or contravention of any other

provisions of the Act, with an intent to evade the payment of duty.

Therefore, in such circumstances, the question of mens rea or

intent will not act as a hindrance as the adjudicating authority has

not been provided any discretion to levy duty less than what is

legally and statutorily leviable. However, in the                                        facts       and

circumstances of the present case and upon the analysis of

Section 14B of the Act of 1952, it is observed that the legislature

has used the words "may recover" ('may' being the keyword),

which leaves ample of room for the authorities to exercise their

discretion in imposing the penalty by way of damages. Therefore,

in such circumstances, the requirement of mens rea may be

incorporated while adjudicating upon the issue of the imposition of

damages, subject to the bonafides of the defaulting party. At the

same time, Section 14B of the Act of 1952, unlike Section 11AC of

Central Excise Act, 1944 does not provide for the presence of


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fraud, collusion or any willful mis-statement, thereby warranting

the mandatory imposition of penalty. Hence, Section 14B provides

for discretion to be exercised by the Authorities in assessing a

case for the imposition of a penalty. Furthermore, even as per

Rule 32B of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, the

Central Board has been empowered to reduce the damages up to

the upper limit of 50%, depending upon the merits of the case;

thereby, implying the availability of the discretion to be exercised

by    the        concerned             authorities            in      the         imposition         of

penalty/damages.

16/3. In this regard, reliance is also placed upon the Apex Court

judgment in Union of India Vs. Rajasthan Spinning &

Weaving Mills reported in (2009) 13 SCC 448 wherein it was

categorically held that the decision in Dharmendra Textile

(supra) must be understood to mean that, though the application

of Section 11AC would depend upon the existence or otherwise of

the conditions expressly stated in the Section, once the Section is

applicable in a case, the Authority concerned would have no

discretion in quantifying the amount and penalty must be imposed

equal to the duty determined under Sub-section (2) of Section

11A. More importantly, it was also clarified that the decision in

Dharmendra Textile (supra) is applicable only insofar as

Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is concerned and not

other statutory provisions, as provided under the law. It is also

pertinent to note that the finding in the judgment of Rajasthan

Spinning & Weaving Mills                            (supra)          was       not     taken        into

consideration         while       passing        the      judgment           in    the      case     of


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Horticulture Experiment (supra), as relied upon by the learned

counsel for the respondents.

17. Accordingly, in the case at hand, reliance can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Hindustan Steel (Supra), wherein the three Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that an order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of the law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. It was further held that penalty will also not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. In this regard, it was analyzed that whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose the penalty shall be justified in refusing to impose said penalty, if it is satisfied that there was a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the said breach flew from the bonafide belief that the offender was not liable to act in the manner as prescribed by the statute. Furthermore, the aforementioned judgment of Hindustan Steel (supra), passed by a Larger Bench, was not considered while passing the judgment in Horticulture Experiment (supra). Therefore, the latter is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the instant matter, for the reasons stated herein-above.

(D.B. SAW/547/2023 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:44:50 PM) [2023/RJJP/001668] (17 of 18) [CW-4810/2010]

18. At the risk of repetition, it is observed that in the facts of the present case, the petitioner-company did not act in a mala fide manner in deliberately trying to disregard their obligations to timely submit their dues towards the Pension Fund, as is reflected from the fact that when there was a delay in the finalization of the Pension Regulations of 1994, the petitioner-company on their own accord, started depositing the statutory contributions. Moreover, the petitioner-company was under the genuine belief that the said amount will be refunded if the exemption, as sought under Paragraph 39, is granted to them. Therefore, it can be conclusively stated that those in charge of the affairs of the Company qua the payment of dues acted in honest and genuine belief that the petitioner-company shall be granted an exemption, as sought for. It is trite that the breach on part of the petitioner-company did not flow from deliberate defiance of the law. Hence, despite granting that they erred, no case for imposing penalty is made out against the petitioner-company.

19. It is noteworthy that all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof, so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. The words of a provision must be construed with some imagination of the purpose and object of the legislation altogether. Accordingly, the provision of Section 14B explicitly employs the term "may" recover, which when read with the corresponding Rule 32B, further cements the discretion provided to the authorities vide the Act of (D.B. SAW/547/2023 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:44:50 PM) [2023/RJJP/001668] (18 of 18) [CW-4810/2010] 1952 and their corresponding Rules, to exercise their discretion in imposing penalty and/or reduce it thereof.

20. Therefore, in light of the observations made herein-above and considering the fact that the delay so caused by the petitioner-company was on account of a bonafide and genuine error, for which a sufficient explanation was thereby provided, this Court deems it just and proper to quash and set aside the order(s) dated 19.02.2010 and 04.08.2006, passed by the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal and Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, respectively. Furthermore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the proceedings initiated under Section 14B of the Act of 1952 are held to be untenable.

21. As a result, the writ petition is allowed. All pending applications shall stand disposed of.

(SAMEER JAIN),J JKP/90 (D.B. SAW/547/2023 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 11/11/2023 at 04:44:50 PM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)