Patna High Court
State Of Bihar vs Renu Devi Alias Ranu Devi on 2 August, 1989
Equivalent citations: I(1990)ACC413, 1990ACJ21
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha
JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J.
1. This appeal arises out of a judgment and award dated 3.8.1984 passed by Mr. Bhagwan Prasad, 3rd Additional District Judge, Dhanbad in Title Suit No. 4 of 1977 whereby and whereunder the said learned court allowed the application for compensation filed on behalf of the respondent-appellant.
2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass.
3. The respondent-appellant filed an application under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act praying therein for an award of a sum of Rs. 10,17,500/-. It is admitted that one Krishnadeo Singh, husband of the respondent, died in a motor vehicle accident. It is further admitted that the said deceased was a contractor of Public Works Department and other government organisations. On 1.11.1976 while the said contractor was travelling in a jeep belonging to State of Bihar which was being driven by one Md. Sabir, it met with an accident on Dhanbad-Darwa Road as a result whereof the said Krishnadeo Singh died on spot.
4. The learned Tribunal found that the deceased was earning about Rs. 1,700/- p.m. and at the time of his death he was aged about 45 years. Taking these facts into consideration, the learned court below awarded a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- by way of compensation.
5. Mr. R.K. Choudhary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, raised a short question. He submitted that the Executive Engineer who was driving the vehicle was under the order of transfer and therefore, it cannot be said that he was authorised to drive the said vehicle. In this view of the matter, according to the learned counsel, no award of compensation could have been passed as against the State of Bihar.
6. It is now well settled that a person driving the vehicle is presumed to have the authority to do the same unless the contrary is proved. It appears that the Executive Engineer concerned did not hand over charge and the said vehicle was under his control and in his custody. It has not been suggested that he was otherwise not competent to drive the vehicle. In a case of this nature, while an Executive Engineer although under an order of transfer was driving the vehicle in order to perform his official duties, the same cannot be said to be an unauthorised act on his part. Such being the position, the State, in my opinion, cannot escape its liability.
7. Further in a case of this nature, the dependants of a deceased may sue only the owner of the vehicle and not the driver. Development of law has occurred in this direction as a result whereof the court has been leaning in favour of grant of compensation as against the owner of a vehicle and not against the driver thereof.
8. Reference in this connection may be made to Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. 1977 ACJ 343 (SC):
Before we conclude we would like to point out that the recent trend in law is to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall within the term 'in the course of the employment' as ordinarily understood. We have referred to Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt 1966 ACJ 89 (SC), where this court accepted the law laid down by Lord Denning in Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd. (1953) 2All ER 753, that the owner is not only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment but also when the driver is, with the owner's consent, driving the car on the owner's business or for the owner's purposes. This extension has been accepted by this court. The law as laid down by Lord Denning in Young v. Edward Box and Co. Ltd. (1951) 1 TLR 789, already referred to, i.e., the first question is to see whether the servant is liable and if the answer is yes, the second question is to see whether the employer must shoulder the servant's liability, has been uniformly accepted as stated in Salmond Law of Torts, 15th Edn., p. 606, in Crown Proceeding Act, 1947 and approved by the House of Lords in Staveley Iron & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Jones (1956) AC 627 and I.C.I. Ltd. v. Shatwell (1965) AC 656. The scope of the course of employment has been extended in Navarro v. Moregrand Ltd. (1951) 2 TLR 674, where the plaintiff who wanted to acquire the tenancy of a certain flat, applied to the second defendant, a person with ostensible authority to conduct the business of letting the particular flat for the first defendant, the landlord. The second defendant demanded from the plaintiff a payment of £ 225 if he wanted the flat and the plaintiff paid the amount. The plaintiff sought to recover the sum from the landlord under the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949. The Court of Appeal held that the mere fact that the second defendant was making an illegal request did not constitute notice to the plaintiff that he was exceeding his authority and that, though the second defendant was not acting within his actual or ostensible authority in asking for the premium as the landlord had entrusted him with the letting of the flat, and as it was in the very course of conducting that business that he committed the wrong complained of, he was acting in the course of his employment. Lord Denning took the view that though the second defendant was acting illegally in asking for and receiving a premium and had no actual or ostensible authority to do an illegal act, nevertheless he was plainly acting in the course of his employment, because his employers, the landlords, had entrusted him with the full business of letting the property, and it was in the very course of conducting that business that he did the wrong of which complaint is made. This decision has extended the scope of acting in the course of employment to include an illegal act of asking for and receiving a premium though the receiving of a premium was not authorised. We do not feel called upon to consider whether this extended meaning should be accepted by this court. It appears Lord Goddard, Chief Justice, had gone further in Barker v. Levinson 66 TLR (Pt.2) 717 and stated that 'the master is responsible for a criminal act of the servant if the act is done within the general scope of the servant's employment'. Lord Justice Denning would not go to this extent and felt relieved to find that in the authorised Law Reports (1951) 1 KB 342, the passage quoted above was struck out. We respectfully agree with the view of Lord Denning that the passage attributed to Lord Chief Justice Goddard went a bit too far.
9. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, there is no merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant.
10. So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, I am satisfied that the learned court below has correctly held that even if the income of the deceased is taken at Rs. 1,700/- per month on the basis of the Income Tax returns filed by him, he would have been in a position to spare Rs. 10,000/- per annum towards his family. As a matter of fact, taking into consideration the age of the deceased and the quantum of his income, I am of the opinion that the compensation awarded by the learned court below in fact is on a lower side.
11. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee assessed at Rs. 1,000/-.